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THE FEDERAL EVOLUTION OF IMPERIAL GERMANY (1871-1918) 
 
This dissertation examines the evolution of federal government in the German Empire from the 
unification in 1871 to the collapse of the monarchy in 1918. The story of how the imperial federal 
state changed over the four and a half decades of its existence has hitherto been hidden from view by 
disciplinary biases and methodological limitations. While concentrating on how Germany’s peculiar 
form of government oscillated between a Western-style constitutional monarchy and a semi-absolutist 
autocracy, historians have failed to make sense of deeper systemic issues. In order to move these to the 
centre of analysis, the thesis combines different perspectives from history, law, and political theory. 
This approach exposes an extraordinary development. The 1871 constitution left Germany’s 
organisational nature largely undefined. The new national state possessed only very few institutions 
and competences. There was not even a national government. The Reich completely depended on the 
constituent states. This weakness was no coincidence. Bismarck’s plan was to secure the dominance of 
the Prussian monarchy by giving the union enough flexibility to develop either into an integrated 
composite state or a loose cooperative assembly of states. But the decades after unification turned out 
differently. By seizing control over the Prussian administration, the federal bureaucracy gradually 
acquired so many competences that by the outbreak of the First World War Germany had changed into 
a centralised state. Rather than by the collaboration of the monarchical state governments, national 
decision-making was now shaped by the competition and cooperation of the federal parliament – the 
Reichstag – and the newly emerged federal government around the Chancellor.  
This transformation came about, the thesis argues, because both monarchical and democratic actors 
– above all the Prussian government, the federal bureaucracy, and the national parliament – saw 
federal structures primarily as an instrument of power to be manipulated for their own purposes, 
namely for the preservation of princely prerogatives or for the expansion of parliamentary rights. 
There was little respect for federalism as an organisational principle that was beneficial per se (for 
example because it devolved power to a regional level). Rather, most executives, administrators, and 
parliamentarians understood Germany’s federal organisation – albeit for different reasons – as a 
necessary evil and a means to an end. This attitude had a lasting impact on German political culture, 
with federal structures remaining at the mercy of power interests throughout the twentieth century. 
The dissertation is woven from three different strands. By combining them, it can draw connections 
that would not come into view if it concentrated on just one of these themes. First, it is a history of 
German federalism that focuses on the key question of the political history of the Empire: who or what 
actually governed Germany? As it thus exposes the anatomy of power in the imperial state, it is also a 
contribution to one of the biggest controversies in modern European history, namely the debate on 
Germany’s alleged ‘special path’: where did Germany go wrong? Thirdly and lastly, the thesis offers a 
systemic analysis of federal structures whose observations are relevant for federal orders – such as the 
European Union – more generally.  
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This dissertation is composed of five chapters. The book that will grow out of it comprises 
three additional chapters, which could not be included into the thesis for reasons of space. 
Details are provided in the Introduction. 
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article relates to this analysis are provided in Chapter 4. (NB: As it is published material, the 
article is not included into the word count).  
 
All tables, figures, photos, maps, and caricatures can be found either at the beginning or at the 
end of the chapter in which they are discussed, unless otherwise indicated. References 
concerning the tables are provided directly beneath them. The figures displaying the statistical 
analysis of the Bundesrat protocols and the material they are based on are discussed in detail 
in the main text of Chapter 5. The links to the caricatures as well as the credits of the photos 
and maps can be found in the list of pictures, maps, and caricatures.  
 
Frequently used primary sources, source collections, and secondary literature are abbreviated 
in the footnotes. Full references can be found in the list of abbreviations and/or the 
bibliography.  
 
All quotes in the main text are translated into English. The original version can be found in 
the footnotes. All translations are by me, unless otherwise indicated. In translating the 
German constitutions of 1848, 1867/71, 1919, and 1949, I have largely followed the 
translation provided by Hucko, Elmar M. The Democratic Tradition. Four German 
Constitutions. Oxford: Berg, 1989. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Picture 1: Anton von Werner, Die Proklamierung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches, 1885, Friedrichsruh version. 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Anton von Werner, Die Proklamierung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches, 1877, photograph of the original 
version in the Berlin Palace. 
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Anton von Werner’s 1885 Proclamation of the German Empire continues to shape the 
view that we have of Imperial Germany today. It is hard to find an academic study, a piece of 
popular history, or a textbook that does not illustrate the unification of 1870/71 with reference 
to this history painting. The Prussian court painter who witnessed the proclamation with his 
very eyes in the Galerie des Glaces of Versailles on 18 January 1871 offers us a front view of 
the ceremony (see Picture 1). In the centre, Bismarck dominates the scene in a white gala 
uniform, the proclamation charter still in hand. From a podium, William of Prussia receives 
the homage of the surrounding Prussian military officers. Crown prince Frederick and the 
Duke of Baden stand on either side of the new Emperor, the latter raising his arm to give 
William three cheers. It has often been pointed out that there are no popular representatives in 
the painting, their absence reflecting the fact that Germany’s unification was an act of 
aristocratic statesmanship and military power rather than of popular sovereignty.1 More than 
any other problem, the parliamentary deficit that flowed from this foundation has dominated 
the historiographical discussion about the imperial state.  
This, however, is only half the story behind the painting. Few people know that the 1885 
picture is only the second version of the Proclamation, which William I commissioned as a 
gift for Bismarck’s seventieth birthday. The original, which von Werner had painted for the 
Berlin Palace between 1871 and 1877, was lost in the Second World War, but survives as a 
black-and-white photograph (see Picture 2). It differs from its later counterpart profoundly. 
Instead of a front view, von Werner chose a diagonal perspective that underlines the 
isocephalic array of heads cheering the new emperor. These heads belong to the princes and 
military officers of the German states, whom the later redaction largely replaced by Prussian 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  See for example Daniel Schulz, Verfassung und Nation: Formen politischer Institutionalisierung in 
Deutschland und Frankreich (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013), p. 144 and Bernd Jürgen Wendt, “Von der 
Erbfeindschaft zur Partnerschaft. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen von Bismarck bis Adenauer,” in 
Otto von Bismarck und das “lange 19. Jahrhundert”: Lebendige Vergangenheit im Spiegel der 
“Friedrichsruher Beiträge” 1996-2016, ed. Ulrich Lappenküper (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017), p. 558. 
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figures. While Bismarck and the new Kaiser dominate the second version, they are hard to 
pick out in the original.  
We can thus see how the pattern of emphasis has shifted. The original painting depicts the 
union of princes and characterises it as an egalitarian brotherhood in arms whose members 
acclaim their leader as a primus inter pares. In contrast, the 1885 version marginalises the 
federal allies and celebrates the unification as an act of Prussian hegemony that establishes a 
national Kaisertum.2  
Here, then, von Werner put the teleological political programme of the contemporary 
Borussian historians around Johann Gustav Droysen and Heinrich von Treitschke on canvas: 
he conveys a more Prussianised, more nationalised, and more centralised account of the 
unification than in the rather confederate original.3 Through the contrast between them, the 
two versions of the Proclamation draw our attention to the second main feature of the 
imperial German state, a feature easier to overlook than its undemocratic form of government, 
namely Germany’s organisation as a federal union of states.  
This union was unique. Germany’s unification created an organisational entity 
unprecedented in the history of modern statehood: a national state in the form of a permanent 
union of sovereign princes. While both monarchical unions and federal states had been around 
before, they had never been combined. After the failure of the 1848 revolution and the 
Frankfurt Parliament, whose draft constitution had proposed a parliamentary and more unitary 
solution to the problem of German statehood, the legal historian and national-liberal politician 
Georg Waitz concluded with reference to a statement by the Prussian diplomat Christian von 
Bunsen that  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  For a comprehensive history and interpretation of the painting, see Thomas Gaethgens, Anton von Werner: 
Die Proklamierung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches. Ein Historienbild im Wandel preußicher Politik (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer, 1990). 
3  On the Borussian School of history writing, see for example Robert Southard, Droysen and the Prussian 
School of History (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995). 
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Germany has obviously the mission to develop the constitutional monarchy in the form of the 
federal state and thus to generalise and elevate this type [of state] to a new rank. Or, to look at it 
from the other side: Germany is called to give to the form of the free federal state a new […] 
direction in the history of the world.4 
 
Waitz was under no illusion, however, about the immense difficulties that stood in the way of 
the creation and operation of a monarchical federal state. The failure of the 1849 Frankfurt 
constitution had exposed the key problems: How could monarchical power be preserved in 
the presence of a national parliament? And how should the relations of the hegemonic state 
Prussia, the middling states, and the small states to each other and to the national level be 
arranged in order to create a stable union? The shadows of 1848/49 suggested that Germany’s 
long-standing tradition as a multi-state order – first in the Holy Roman Empire and then in the 
German Confederation – would make finding a solution to these problems more difficult 
rather than easier.  
Yet, the 1871 constitution did not clarify any of these issues. In fact, it left the most 
fundamental problem of whether the new nation state was a federation, confederation, or any 
other type of union deliberately unsettled. This was in part a function of Bismarck’s effort to 
accommodate two conflicting principles: the legally guaranteed sovereignty of the princes and 
their states; and the reality of Prussian hegemony. He explained his intentions as early as 
1866: 
 
Concerning the form [of the new German state], one will need to adhere more to a confederation, 
but in practice give it the nature of a federal state with elastic, inconspicuous, but far-reaching 
manifestations.5 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  [‘Deutschland hat offenbar den Beruf, die konstitutionelle Monarchie in der Form des Bundesstaates zu 
entwickeln und dadurch den Typus derselben zu verallgemeinern und zu einer höheren Geltung zu erheben. 
Oder, von der anderen Seite her betrachtet: Deutschland ist berufen, der Form des freien Bundesstaates eine 
neue [...] Entwicklung in der Weltgeschichte vorzuzeichnen’] Georg Waitz, “Das Wesen des Bundesstaates. 
Reden und Betrachtungen von J. v. Radowitz,” Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur, 
1853, 494–530, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 18, p. 91. 
5  [‘Man wird sich in der Form mehr an den Staatenbund halten müssen, diesem aber praktisch die Natur des 
Bundesstaates geben mit elastischen, unscheinbaren, aber weitgreifenden Ausdrücken.’] Quoted in Reinhart 
Koselleck, “Bund,” ed. Otto Brunner and Werner Conze, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon 
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett, 1997), p. 668. This remark was part of 
Bismarck's famous Putbuser Diktat on 30 October 1866. On the views that he formed in Putbus on the 
constitution and government of the future German national state, see Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um 
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Bismarck’s idea was straightforward: if it was inevitable to create a national state and to 
involve a parliament in its government, then Prussian dominance and monarchical power had 
to be secured by giving the union enough flexibility to develop into either an integrated 
composite state (federation) or a loose cooperation of states (confederation). This rationale 
resulted in a striking vagueness of the constitution. Although Imperial Germany comprised 
several levels of government, her constitution established only seventy-eight articles, half of 
which were technical administrative provisions. While two bulky articles alone dealt with the 
correct taxation of brandy, not a single paragraph defined whether Germany was a federal or 
confederate state.6  
To be fair, it is not at all unusual for federal states to be based on rudimentary written 
constitutions that leave the development of more precise arrangements to political practice. 
The 1787 constitution of the United States, for example, comprises no more than seven 
original articles, which are now supplemented by twenty-seven amendments and numerous 
Supreme Court decisions. Federal constitutions tend to confine themselves to regulating only 
the most basic questions about the functions of constitutional organs, the competences of 
different levels of government, and the separation of powers. But even the briefest federal 
constitutions usually define at least some organisational principles that determine in what 
direction the union will evolve in future.7 The German constitution of 1871, however, did not 
do so. It left the evolution of the federal state entirely undetermined, thus subjecting it to the 
vagaries of a political environment that was shaped by the growing conflict between 
monarchical and parliamentary power.  
From this perspective, it is not surprising that over the course of the economic, social, and 
cultural integration in the decades following the unification Germany evolved far beyond her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Deutschlands Gestaltung, ed. Alexander Scharff (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1958), chapter 8 'Bismarcks 
Putbuser Entscheidung', pp. 236-64. 
6  For the regulations concerning brandy, see RV (1871), art. 34, 38. 
7  See for example USC (1787), art. 4, which defines the states relations, makes provisions about the accession 
of new states to the union, and guarantees the republican form of government of the states.  
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open-ended constitutional framework. As more and more competences came under the federal 
remit, the states were gradually marginalised and the national level became the real centre of 
power. Among the federal constitutional organs, power shifted from the council of state 
governments, the Bundesrat, to the newly emerged federal administration under the 
Chancellor, to the Emperor, and to the federal parliament, the Reichstag. These developments 
changed the German nation state completely. In 1874, Heinrich von Treitschke – having his 
eye on the Prussian dominance in the union – still spoke of a ‘national monarchy with 
confederate institutions’.8 Thirty-three years later, the constitutional lawyer Heinrich Triepel 
noted that Germany ‘has already walked down half the road to a [centralised] Reich 
monarchy’.9  
Triepel’s observation gives us a preliminary sense of how dramatic Germany’s federal 
evolution was. Nonetheless, it seems difficult to picture it concretely. This is because often it 
manifested itself not in conspicuous structural innovations, such as the creation of new 
national institutions, but in subtle systemic changes. Moreover, the concepts we are used to 
employing when describing the development of federal states – such as centralisation or 
mediatisation – are rather abstract. So is the term federalism. This does not mean, however, 
that federal evolution is an issue that is hard to grasp. On the contrary: when we look behind 
the abstractions, it soon becomes clear how concrete a problem it is.  
The phenomenon of federal evolution embraces dynamic processes on two distinct, but 
interrelated levels of government. On the one hand, the relations between the states – the 
Länder – and the national level – the Reich – constituted the vertical coordination of the 
imperial federal state. Centralisation meant the quantitative and qualitative shift of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  [‘nationale Monarchie mit bündischen Institutionen’] Heinrich von Treitschke, “Bund und Reich,” 
Preußische Jahrbücher 34 (1874), p. 536. 
9  [‘den Weg zur [zentralisierten] Reichsmonarchie schon mehr als zur Hälfte zurückgelegt’] Heinrich Triepel, 
Unitarismus und Föderalismus im Deutschen Reiche. Eine staatsrechtliche und politische Studie. (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1907), p. 72. 
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competences from the Länder to the Reich. This could go so far as to relegate some or all of 
the states to political impotence, in which case we speak of mediatisation.  
On the other hand, the relations between the confederate (Bundesrat) and unitary 
(Emperor, Chancellor, Reichstag) constitutional organs on the national level formed the 
horizontal coordination of the federal state. Here, centralisation increased the authority of the 
latter at the expense of the former, with the result that constitutional functions shifted. This 
process unfolded in a much more subtle way than the marginalisation of the states. It became 
manifest in changes of political practice, for example in how over time the Chancellors 
altered their approach to dissolving the Reichstag. The constitution conferred this power upon 
the Bundesrat.10 Bismarck therefore took great care to base the dissolution of the parliament 
in 1878 on a common decision of the state governments in the Bundesrat. Fifteen years later, 
however, his successor Leo von Caprivi no longer saw any need for a confederate consensus. 
He merely discussed the matter with the Bundesrat plenipotentiaries of the states in an 
extraordinary session. Things changed further in the new century. By 1906, Bernhard von 
Bülow felt able publicly to announce the dissolution of the Reichstag on his own initiative. 
Only a few days after his decision had been implemented did he put it to the vote of the 
Bundesrat.11  
This behaviour was outright unconstitutional and indicated a shortage of respect for the 
federal organisation of Germany. As such, it was one incident among many that revealed how 
political actors, both monarchical and parliamentary, saw federal arrangements merely as an 
instrument of power. This instrumental character made federal politics highly complex. While 
the Reichstag tried to change the federal order to the effect that it could expand its powers and 
make the executive parliamentarily responsible, the monarchical governments wanted to 
prevent precisely that. In this conflict, federal provisions were sometimes bent in one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  RV (1871), art. 24. 
11  On the changing practice of Reichstag dissolutions, see: Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 212f.; Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, p. 294; and Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 17f. 
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direction, sometimes in another, depending on whose interests dominated at the time. As a 
matter of principle, monarchical actors tried to keep the union as confederate as possible. 
Leaving most powers with the state governments and the Bundesrat implied that the federal 
parliament would stay relatively weak and that no federal executive under the Chancellor and 
Emperor would emerge that the Reichstag could attempt to hold accountable. For exactly the 
same reasons, parliamentarians and democrats had a basic interest in centralising the federal 
system as much as possible.  
These conflicting interests were the reason for many oddities in the German federal union. 
According to the constitution, a national government did not exist. Bismarck even prohibited 
the use of the term Reichsregierung when a comprehensive apparatus of federal ministries 
evolved in the first two decades following unification.12 These ministries, the so-called 
Reichsämter, were formally mere auxiliary offices to the Chancellor, the only official minister 
of the Reich. Although they came to prepare most federal legislation, the constitution knew of 
no mechanism by which they could introduce bills into the legislative process. In order to 
become active in the machinery of federal government, the executives of the Reichsämter had 
to become members of the Prussian bench in the Bundesrat. The Kaiser was not the monarch 
of the Reich.13 He was not even allowed to move around his empire as he liked. To take the 
waters in Baden-Baden, for example, he needed the explicit invitation of the Duke of Baden. 
Rather than the Emperor, the ‘collectivity of united governments’ was considered the 
sovereign of Germany.14 The central constitutional organ was therefore the Bundesrat, which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  See Bismarck’s letter to Paul Eck, director in the Federal Department of the Chancellor, 1 September 1877, 
printed in  Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3, no. 164, p. 214. See also Eduard Rosenthal, Die Reichsregierung. Eine 
staatsrechtliche und politische Studie (Jena: Fischer, 1911), p. 76. 
13  On this issue, see Oliver F. R. Haardt, “The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918),” German History 34, 
no. 4 (2016), pp. 529-54. 
14  [‘Gesamtheit der verbündeten Regierungen’] See for example Adolf Arndt, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches (Berlin: Häring, 1901), p. 114; Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 5th ed., vol. 1, 
4 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911), p. 97; Otto Mejer, Einleitung in das Deutsche Staatsrecht, 2nd ed. (Freiburg 
& Tübingen: Mohr, 1884), p. 280; Georg Meyer, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. Gerhard 
Anschütz, 7th ed. (Leipzig & München: Duncker & Humblot, 1919), pp. 419-23; and Philipp Zorn, Das 
Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 2nd ed., vol. 1: Das Verfassungsrecht, 2 vols., Guttentag’sche Sammlung 
 
Introduction 
 
9!
enjoyed powers across the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Although all state 
governments exercised voting rights in the council, many of them had no special envoy for 
this purpose. This led to unusual alliances that overcame regional divides. The Bavarian 
government, for instance, often cast the Hamburg vote. At times, the Hessian plenipotentiary 
represented up to ten different states in the Bundesrat. Appointment powers often seemed 
random, too. The Bavarian king, for example, was the only monarch of the Reich who had the 
privilege of appointing the judges of a special senate at the federal military court.15  
This list of federal curiosities could be continued almost ad infinitum. However, the point 
here is that these examples suggest not only how complex the imperial federal state was; but 
also that the reason behind this complexity were dynamic conflicts of power that made the 
allegedly abstract process of federal evolution very concrete in constitutional reality.  
Due to these concrete manifestations, historians have long realised that federal evolution 
was a key problem in the development of the state and politics of Imperial Germany.16 
Nonetheless, they have largely ignored it because they have focused on other questions of 
statehood, most importantly on Germany’s ambiguous form of government that they have 
situated somewhere between a Western-style constitutional monarchy and a semi-absolutist 
autocracy. The German historian Hans-Peter Ullmann has rightly pointed out that while it is 
principally known that Germany underwent centralisation, the question of ‘when […] and 
where […] the system and practice of political rule changed has not been sufficiently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
von Lehrbüchern des Deutschen Reichsrechtes 5 (Berlin: Guttentag, 1895), p. 90. See also Holste, 
Bundessaat, p. 254, where he also refers to these lawyers. 
15  Paul Laband, “Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Reichsverfassung seit der Reichsgründung,” Jahrbuch des 
öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 1 (1907), p. 40. See also Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 242, fn. 796. 
16  The importance of federalism as a key problem of the imperial state has probably been stated most clearly by 
Hans Boldt in his short essay “Der Föderalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich als Verfassungsproblem,” in 
Innere Staatsbildung und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Österreich und Deutschland 1867/71-1914, ed. 
Helmut Rumpler (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), 31–41. 
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researched’.17 In other words, we know that the union became more centralised, but not how 
or why, to what extent, in what context, or to what effect.  
There are, in fact, only two studies that make the imperial federal state their subject of 
analysis. Both suffer from the methodological biases of legal and political historiography, 
respectively. Heiko Holste has examined how the federal union developed in the Empire and 
the Weimar Republic.18 But his study is confined to the evolution of the legal norms of the 
federal system, and does not embed these into the political history of Germany. Hans-Otto 
Binder has taken exactly the opposite approach in his analysis of the relations between the 
constituent states and the national level during Bismarck’s chancellorship. 19  While he 
reconstructs the political motivations and modes of negotiations in the Bundesrat, he ignores 
how the normative framework changed over time, for example in regard to the legislative 
functions of the federal constitutional organs. Holste’s and Binder’s works are thus a reminder 
that in order to write a holistic study of federal evolution we must overcome traditional 
disciplinary divides between legal and conventional historiography. It is impossible to take 
the federal state fully into view if we neglect either its normative framework or its political 
context. 
Across disciplines, there has recently been a slight rise of interest in the history of German 
federalism. Maiken Umbach, for example, has edited a book on German federalism since the 
eighteenth century that includes contributions by some of the finest historians, linguists, and 
political scientists of modern Germany.20 The imperial federal state has received more 
attention on the initiative, in particular, of scholars at the institutes of European Studies in 
Siegen and Vienna. In a short essay, Christian Henrich-Franke has demonstrated that simple 
models from political science can help us to understand the changing functions of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  [‘Wann [...] und wie [...] sich [...] System und Praxis politischer Herrschaft änderten, ist noch nicht gründlich 
erforscht.’] Hans-Peter Ullmann, Politik im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Enzyklopädie Deutscher 
Geschichte 52 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), p. 83. 
18  Holste, Bundesstaat. 
19  Binder, Reich. 
20  Maiken Umbach, ed., German Federalism. Past, Present, Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
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legislative organs. 21  So far, the new series ‘Federalism in Historical-Comparative 
Perspective’ comprises a detailed catalogue of the Bundesrat plenipotentiaries of the different 
states and a collection of essays that compare various problems in the federal systems of 
Imperial Germany, the Habsburg monarchy, and the European Union.22 The Austrian political 
scientist Hans Kristoferitsch has also published a comparative study, which looks at Germany, 
the United States, Switzerland, and the European Union, and concentrates on more general 
patterns of integration theory.23 While each of these works adopts a very specific approach, 
they all provide important groundwork for a comprehensive analysis of federal evolution in 
Imperial Germany. 
The same can be said of the many studies that examine individual problems of the federal 
union, although they often date back several decades, some of them even to the years of the 
Weimar Republic. Both jurists and historians have tried to make sense of the constitutional 
role and mode of operation of the Bundesrat.24 A few works have charted the dynamic 
development of the federal administration, both at and below the ministerial level.25 The 
period of federal evolution that has received most attention is the era of unification, with 
historians disagreeing about whether it was primarily an act of Prussian leadership and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  Christian Henrich-Franke, “Wandlungen föderalen Regierens im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Die 
Entscheidungsfindung im Fall der Sozialgesetzgebung,” Historische Zeitschrift 293, no. 2 (2011): 373–99. 
22  Lilla, Föderalismus. Gerold Ambrosius, Christian Henrich-Franke, and Cornelius Neutsch, eds., 
Föderalismus in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive, vol. 2 "Föderale Systeme: Kaiserreich - 
Donaumonarchie - Europäische Union", Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Europäische Regionalforschungen 20 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015). 
23  Hans Kristoferitsch, Vom Staatenbund zum Bundesstaat?: Die Europäische Union im Vergleich mit den 
USA, Deutschland und der Schweiz, Schriftenreihe Europainstitut Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien 27 (Vienna: 
Springer, 2007). 
24  See for example Walther Peter Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat,” in Zur Problematik 
“Preußen und das Reich,” ed. Oswald Hauser, Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-preussischen Geschichte 
4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1984), pp. 83–104; Heinrich Otto Meisner, “Bundesrat, Bundeskanzler und 
Bundeskanzleramt (1867-1871),” in Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 
1981), pp. 76–94; and Udo Scholl, Der Bundesrat in der deutschen Verfassungsentwicklung. 
Reichverfassung von 1871 und Grundgesetz, Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht 407 (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1982). 
25  See Rudolf Morsey's book Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, Neue Münstersche 
Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957) and his essay “Zur Geschichte der 
obersten Reichsverwaltung im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (1890-1900),” Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 24, 
no. 86 (1971): 8–16. See also Armin Dittmann, Die Bundesverwaltung. Verfassungsgeschichtliche 
Grundlagen, grundgesetzliche Vorgaben und Staatspraxis ihrer Organisation, Tübinger 
Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 56 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983). 
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Bismarck’s statesmanship or, as the modern interpretation holds, a complex negotiation 
process in which many solutions were possible.26 The relations of all of the major constituent 
states to the national level have been put on the map since the 1970s, with Saxony being the 
only exception.27 This gives historians the opportunity to turn now to the hitherto neglected 
role that these states played collectively as heterogeneous groups – namely as middling and 
small states – in federal government.  
As the federal hegemon, Prussia is a special case. There is no topic of federal organisation 
that has received more attention than the relations between Prussia and the national state, the 
so-called Prussian-federal dualism. The controversy has pivoted on whether over the years 
Prussia came to completely dominate the Reich (Verpreußung) or whether the Reich 
gradually took control over Prussia until it was mediatised (Verreichung).28 This has led to 
endless battles about the numerous overlaps of Prussian and federal institutions and staff, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26  See the collection of essays in Theodor Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein, eds., Reichsgründung, 1870-71: 
Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970). For the traditional interpretation, see 
for example Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung.  For the modern interpretation, see for 
example Richard Dietrich, “Föderalismus, Unitarismus oder Hegemonialstaat?,” in Zur Problematik 
“Preußen und das Reich,” ed. Oswald Hauser, Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-preussischen Geschichte 
4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1984), 49–82 and Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat.”, pp. 87-92. 
27  On Bavaria, see Binder, Reich; Rauh Föderalismus; and Rauh, Parlamentarisierung. On Wurttemberg, see 
Binder's study and Georg Helmut Kleine, Der württembergische Ministerpräsident Freiherr von Mittnacht, 
Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg 50 (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1961). On Baden, see Hans Klaus Reichert, Baden am Bundesrat 1871 bis 1890 (Heidelberg: 
Berenz, 1966) and the following two source collections: Walther Peter Fuchs, Großherzog Friedrich I. von 
Baden und die Reichspolitik 1871-1917, 4 vols., Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche 
Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg 15, 24, 31, 32 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968) and Hermann Oncken, 
ed., Großherzog Friedrich I. von Baden und die deutsche Politik von 1854-1871: Briefwechsel, 
Denkschriften, Tagebücher, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927). On the Hanseatic cities, see 
Helmut Paul Dahl, Lübeck im Bundesrat 1871-1914. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einzelstaatlicher Politik im 
Deutschen Reich (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1969) and Hans-Georg Schönhoff, Hamburg im Bundesrat. 
Die Mitwirkung Hamburgs an der Bildung des Reichswillens 1867-1890 (Hamburg: Christians, 1967). On 
the exception of Saxony, see Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat.”, pp. 86f. 
28  The most important works are Heinrich Triepel, Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1938); Kersten Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus. Preußens staatsrechtliche Stellung im 
Deutschen Reich, Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Studien zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Regensburg: Roderer, 1986); and the collection of essays in Oswald Hauser, ed., Zur Problematik “Preußen 
und das Reich,” Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-preussischen Geschichte 4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1984). In 
Hauser, see in particular Walther Hubatsch, “Das preußische Staatsministerium von Bismarck bis zum Ende 
der Monarchie. Ein Überblick,” pp. 165–80, which addresses the under-researched role of the Prussian State 
Ministry, and Michael Stürmer, “Eine politische Kultur - oder zwei? Betrachtungen zur Regierungsweise des 
Kaiserreichs,” pp. 35–48, which introduces a new perspective focussing on political culture. Goldschmidt, 
Kampf is a special case. In Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, p. 25 Rudolf Morsey 
has exposed that Goldschmidt produced an emphatically unitary interpretation of Prussian-federal relations, 
because his work was commissioned by the interior ministry of the Weimar Republic in order to generate 
support for the centralising reforms of the 1930s. However, the collection of sources that Goldschmidt 
attached to his interpretation remains the most comprehensive on the subject and, as such, is indispensable. 
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which there is a striking lack of quantitative evidence. In light of this scattered state of 
research, it is one principal task of this study to synthesise the insights from the manifold 
works on individual problems into one coherent narrative of federal evolution.  
This narrative must also take into account those works that do not centre on federal 
questions, but deal with them in the context of other broad historiographical debates on the 
imperial state. The discussion of Germany’s ambiguous form of government – the so-called 
Reichskonstitutionalismus debate – considers the federal union an essential element of the 
constitutional compromise that made cooperation between monarchical particularists and 
democratic nationalists at all possible.29 In contrast, the dispute about whether the Reichstag 
gradually succeeded in making the government of the Chancellor responsible – a process that 
has been dubbed ‘silent parliamentarisation’ – sees federal structures as a barrier that 
conservatives erected in order to prevent the parliament from gaining more power.30 Both of 
these debates form part of a larger controversy that asks what role the state and politics of the 
Empire played in the course of modern German history, which encompassed two world wars, 
National Socialism, and the Holocaust.   
The most prominent manifestation of this controversy is the debate over the German 
Sonderweg. This argument about Germany’s alleged ‘special path’ to modernity, both 
politico-constitutional and socio-economic, has shaped the historiographical discussion about 
modern Europe since the 1970s, involving many of the greatest German and English 
historians.31 While the idea of an Anglo-American norm of modernisation has gradually been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  Most important are the works by Ernst-Rudolf Huber:  “Bismarck und der Verfassungsstaat,” in 
Nationalstaat und Verfassungsstaat. Studien zur Geschichte der modernen Staatsidee (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1965), 188–223; “Die Bismarcksche Reichsverfassung im Zusammenhang der deutschen 
Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 1981), 
171–207; and his Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3  and 4. See also Huber's main antagonist Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, “Der Verfassungstyp der deutschen konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert,” in 
Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue 
Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 1981), 146–70. 
30  See most importantly the two works by Rauh, Föderalismus and Parlamentarisierung. 
31  See the benchmark works by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918, Kleine 
Vandenhoeck-Reihe 1380 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 
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dropped since the days of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, the problem of path-
dependencies that steered Germany toward the Nazis’ seizure of power and the Holocaust still 
plays a key role.32 Historians continue to look for the continuities and discontinuities of 
modern German history.33 In so doing, they have – as far as political and constitutional 
structures are concerned – focussed exclusively on Imperial Germany’s peculiar form of 
government. The federal nature of the Empire has played close to no role. In a way, this is 
understandable because for the first generations of historians after the war the top priority was 
to make sense of the governmental terror regime of the Nazis, rather than to examine more 
subtle systemic questions. However, the debate about path-dependencies remains incomplete 
as long as we neglect one of the two main features of German statehood in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  
For this reason, this study must relate the federal evolution of Imperial Germany to the 
broader context of modern German history. This does not mean flogging a dead horse by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2nd ed., vol. 3, 5 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1996), and Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte, Kleine 
Vandenhoeck-Reihe 1407 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975). In reply to the Sonderweg thesis, 
see above all David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, Bourgeois Society and 
Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). See furthermore 
Wolfgang J. Mommsen's two books Der Autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur des 
Deutschen Kaiserreiches, Fischer Taschenbücher 10525 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1990) and Das Ringen um den nationalen Staat. Die Gründung und der innere Ausbau des Deutschen 
Reiches unter Otto von Bismarck 1850 bis 1890, vol. 7.2, Propyläen Geschichte Deutschlands (Berlin: 
Propyläen, 1995); Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1983 and 1991); 
Michael Stürmer, Das ruhelose Reich: Deutschland 1866-1918, Die Deutschen und ihre Nation 3 (Berlin: 
Severin & Siedler, 1983); and Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, 2 vols. (Munich: 
Beck, 2000). For a concise overview of the historiographical debate, see Ullmann, Politik im Deutschen 
Kaiserreich 1871-1918, pp. 53-62. 
32  On path-dependencies in the historiographical debate, see Richard Evans, “From Hitler to Bismarck: Third 
Reich and Kaiserreich in Recent Historiography,” in Rethinking German History. Nineteenth-Century 
Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich (London: Allen&Unwin, 1987), 55–91; Thomas Nipperdey, 
“1933 und die Kontinuität in der deutschen Geschichte,” in Nachdenken über die deutsche Geschichte. 
Essays (Munich: Beck, 1986), 225–48; and Helmut Walser Smith, “When the Sonderweg debate left us,” 
German Studies Review 31, no. 2 (2008): 225–40. On the recent emergence of an alternative trend that wants 
to treat the nineteenth and twentieth century as separate eras, see Paul Nolte, “Abschied vom 19. Jahrhundert 
oder Auf der Suche nach einer anderen Moderne,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft 22 "Wege der 
Gesellschaft (2006): 103–32, and the sharp remarks by  Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-
Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (London: Penguin, 2006), p. XII. 
33  See for example Helmut Walser Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race 
across the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and the collection of 
essays in Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp, eds., Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), in particular their introductory essay “Das Bild des Deutschen 
Kaiserreichs im Wandel,” pp. 9–30 and Helmut Walser Smith's essay “Jenseits der Sonderweg-Debatte,” pp. 
31–50, which is a revised version of his 2008 article "When the Sonderweg debate left us". 
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asking whether there was a federal Sonderweg that led Germany down a different road than 
other federal systems, such as the United States or Switzerland. Rather, it means asking – free 
from teleological perspectives – what influence special systemic features of the federal union 
had on the government of Germany and what legacy, both structural and political, the federal 
evolution of the Empire bequeathed to the Weimar Republic and beyond. There is, of course, 
no point in reading history backwards. This is true for federal evolution as much as for any 
other topic. Rather, the task is to relate the imperial era to the wider context of how 
Germany’s federal structures evolved in the twentieth century.34  
In light of the state of the historiography, this dissertation will attempt a comprehensive 
narrative of federal evolution that is embedded in the political history of the Empire and that 
takes the long-term history of modern Germany into account. It may appear surprising that 
this has never been done before, because this is a topic whose relevance no historian would 
deny. One reason for this neglect has certainly been the overwhelming body of relevant 
sources. They comprise the records of every parliament, executive organ, and administrative 
agency on the national level, in each of the twenty-five states, and on the various subordinated 
levels of government, most importantly the municipalities. The federal union has thus 
supplied historians with more documentation than anyone could ever hope to read in one 
lifetime.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34  Only very few historical works have touched on this issue at all, namely Hans Boldt, “Der Föderalismus in 
den Reichsverfassungen von 1849 und 1871,” in Die Amerikanische Verfassung und Deutsch-
Amerikanisches Verfassungsdenken, ed. Hermann Wellenreuther and Claudia Schnurmann, Krefelder 
Historische Symposien:Deutschland und Amerika. Zweites Symposion, veranstaltet in Krefeld 28.-31. Mai 
1987 (New York & Oxford: Berg, 1990), 297–333; Wolfram Siemann, Vom Staatenbund zum Nationalstaat. 
Deutschland 1806-1871, Neue Deutsche Geschichte 7 (Munich: Beck, 1995); and Thomas Nipperdey, “Der 
Föderalismus in der deutschen Geschichte,” in Nachdenken über die deutsche Geschichte. Essays (Munich: 
Beck, 1986), 71–131. Some legal historians have considered this problem more comprehensively, but have 
largely focussed on normative issues. See Peter Bug, “Der Föderalismus im Kaiserreich. Politische 
Strukturen und Prozesse,” in Föderalismus in Deutschland. Traditionen und gegenwärtige Probleme. 
Symposion an der Universität Kassel 10. bis 12. April 1991, ed. Jochen Huhn and Peter-Christian Witt, 
Schriften zur Innenpolitik und zur kommunalen Wissenschaft und Praxis 8 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 
55–74; Bodo Dennewitz, Der Föderalismus. Sein Wesen und seine Geschichte (Hamburg: Drei Türme, 
1947); and Bernd Grzeszick, Vom Reich zur Bundesstaatsidee. Zur Herausbildung des Föderalismus als 
Element des modernen deutschen Staatsrechts, Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht 705 (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1996). A brief overview has been provided by the journalist Albert Funk, Kleine Geschichte des 
Föderalismus: vom Fürstenbund zur Bundesrepublik (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 
 
Introduction 
 
16!
It is therefore imperative to define a more narrow focus. This study will look at the Reich 
rather than the Länder. It is a history of federal evolution on the national level, which 
considers the states only in so far as they participated in the government of the union and as 
what was going on inside of them was relevant for the whole of Germany. Hence, it draws 
primarily on sources from national bodies and commentators. Despite the historiographical 
neglect of federal evolution, these sources have long been rendered accessible, most of them 
either in print or online. Among others, they include: the protocols of the Reichstag;35 the 
federal law gazette, the Reichsgesetzblatt; 36  complementary official handbooks, most 
importantly the Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich;37 the most relevant exchange between the 
highest federal agencies; 38  the protocols of the Prussian State Ministry; 39  and the 
correspondence and biographical notes of the most important office holders, such as 
Bismarck, the major state secretaries, and the key Bundesrat plenipotentiaries of the states.40 
At the heart of this study, however, is the attempt to recover the voices of those sources 
that historians have so far either neglected or treated with outright contempt. The protocols of 
the Bundesrat, which were not published but distributed to the state governments only, have 
routinely been denounced as useless.41 Many historians ‘could hardly imagine a more tight-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35  Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1867-1870 and Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1871-1918. Available 
online at a platform provided by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 
http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/index.html. For the protocols of the constitutive Reichstag of 1867, see 
Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien. 
36  RGBl., 1871-1918. Available online at Wikisource,  
https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Reichsgesetzblatt_(Deutschland). 
37   Handbuch. Also important are Felix Stoerk, ed., Handbuch der Deutschen Verfassungen. Die 
Verfassungsgesetze des Deutschen Reiches und seiner Bundesstaaten nach dem gegenwärtigen 
Gesetzesstande (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1884); Justus Illing, Handbuch für Preußische 
Verwaltungsbeamte, des Staates, der Kommunalverbände, der Korporationen und für Geschäftsleute, 7th 
ed., 2 vols. (Berlin: Haack, 1898); and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, ed. Statistisches Handbuch für das 
Deutsche Reich, 2 vols. (Berlin: Heymann, 1907). 
38  Most important is the collection by Goldschmidt, Kampf. 
39  Protokolle (PSM). 
40  See for example Gesammelte Werke; Martin Friedrich Rudolph von Delbrück, Lebenserinnerungen von 
Rudolph von Delbrück, 1817-1867: mit einem Nachtrag aus dem Jahre 1870 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 
1905); and Hugo Lerchenfeld-Köfering, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten: 1843-1925, 2nd ed. (Berlin: 
Mittler, 1935). 
41  Protokolle (DR), 1871-1918. 
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lipped source’, because the protocols do not record any debates.42 They merely provide lists 
of attendance, agenda points, and voting results. Moreover, their technical language makes 
them an incredibly dry read. Yet, none of this prevents them from being informative. On the 
contrary: if we are to reconstruct the course of federal evolution, the more than fifty volumes 
of the protocols, each of them several thousand pages strong, are indispensable, as they offer 
the opportunity to chart the relations between the states and the national level over the whole 
imperial era. This study will uncover this information by way of a sophisticated statistical 
analysis, which will shed new light on the debate about the Prussian-federal dualism by 
providing – for the very first time – solid quantitative evidence for the gradual mediatisation 
of Prussia. 
The second viewpoint that this study tries to recover is that of the contemporary 
constitutional lawyers. Unlike their colleagues from legal history, conventional historians 
have usually rejected the commentaries of the doctrinal debate as useless, because the 
positivist approach of the lawyers focussed on legal norms, largely ignored political practice, 
and used an excessively abstract and complex language.43 This disciplinary bias of historians 
overlooks the fact that in the absence of a constitutional court the lawyers were the most 
competent contemporary commentators on the imperial federal state. Their debate is thus an 
extremely rich source on federal evolution. From their observations, we can infer conclusions 
about structural problems that might not be reflected in the records of the constitutional 
actors. In other words, the commentaries of the lawyers are likely to provide the missing links 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42  [‘eine sprödere Quelle läßt sich kaum vorstellen’] Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 24. 
43  See for example the criticism in Binder, Reich, pp. 1-5. As a point of contrast, see the legal-historical studies 
by Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. 2, 4 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1992) 
and by Manfred Friedrich, Geschichte der deutschen Staatsrechtswissenschaft, Schriften zur 
Verfassungsgeschichte 50 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), which show how informative the doctrinal 
debate can be. 
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that we need to make sense of federal evolution. Each part of this study will therefore keep a 
close eye on the observations that the constitutional experts made.44  
Through the lens of these different kinds of sources, this study will focus in particular on 
the two main problems that drove the evolution of the federal state forward: First, how did the 
balance between monarchical and parliamentary power that the federal constitution 
established evolve over time? Did the federal system protect the power of the princes 
permanently? Or did the Reichstag succeed in expanding its powers? And, second, how did 
the relationship between the Prussian and the federal government develop? Did Prussia 
maintain a hegemonic status? Or did the Reich come to dominate Prussia? And if so, how did 
these processes look, when did they occur, and how were they intertwined? By making these 
issues its guiding questions, this study will illustrate how dynamic the federal union was and 
how dramatically it changed over time.  
In so doing, this study will argue that Bismarck failed in his attempt to secure Prussian 
dominance and to preserve monarchical power by means of a flexible federal union. The 
decades after unification were a shining example of the law of unintended consequences: by 
instrumentalising the Prussian government, the federal administration acquired so many 
competences and functions over the years that by the outbreak of World War I Germany had 
practically been transformed into a centralised state. Prussia was no longer independent, the 
states played close to no role in national decision-making any more, and a fully-fledged 
federal government under the Chancellor had emerged that the Reichstag managed 
increasingly to hold responsible.  
This complete transformation of the German nation state came about because both 
monarchical and parliamentary actors, above all the Prussian government, the federal 
administration, and the Reichstag, saw federal structures primarily as an instrument of power !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44  For reasons of space, this dissertation does not include a separate analysis of how the doctrinal debate on the 
federal state developed among the lawyers. Such an examination of the principal intellectual environment of 
federal evolution will, however, form the opening chapter of the book that will grow out of the dissertation.  
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that they tried to manipulate for their own purposes, namely for either the preservation of 
princely prerogatives or the expansion of parliamentary rights. Federal evolution was 
therefore driven primarily by power interests, pragmatically pursued, rather than by law and 
constitutionality. The political process knew no limits in changing, manipulating, or 
abolishing even the most fundamental federal structures. Political actors and commentators 
had no respect for federalism as an organisational principle that was beneficial per se, for 
example because of the advantages of subsidiarity. Rather, they understood – each of them, to 
be sure, for very different reasons – the federal organisation of Germany as a necessary evil 
that was little more than a means to an end. This attitude turned out to have a lasting impact 
on the political culture of Germany, with federal structures remaining at the mercy of power 
interests in the Weimar Republic and beyond. 
This argument will be developed over the course of five chapters, each addressing a 
specific problem of federal organisation with a distinct methodology. The first two chapters – 
‘Unification’ and ‘Constitution’ – will deal with the basic conditions under which the federal 
state evolved. They will examine the unification process and the design of the constitution 
through the lens respectively of political caricatures and the debate in the constitutional 
convention, the constitutive Reichstag of 1867.  
Then will follow two chapters on ‘Government’ and ‘Participation’, which will scrutinise 
how the balance of functions and competences between, on the one hand, the federal 
constitutional organs and, on the other hand, the national level and the states evolved from the 
adoption of the constitution to the wartime collapse of the monarchy. These chapters will 
survey the legislative process and the remit of the federal administration and will analyse 
statistically how the states were involved in federal politics across time. Together, they will 
provide a comprehensive picture of how federal government evolved over the years.  
The last chapter ‘Conflict’ will explore the factors that destabilised the union structurally. 
By looking at different kinds of constitutional disputes through numerous case studies, it will 
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identify formal and informal mechanisms of conflict resolution and will examine what impact 
these had on the course of federal evolution.45  
Finally, the conclusion will show how both systemically and culturally the experience of 
the imperial era shaped the evolution of German federal structures through the times of the 
Weimar Republic, the Nazi dictatorship, and the Federal Republic. Moreover, it will infer 
some systemic observations from the imperial German case that are relevant for federal orders 
in general, with a particular eye on the ongoing debate about a reform of the European Union. 
So this study is in fact woven from three distinct strands. Combining them permits me to 
draw connections that would not come into view if I concentrated on just one line of 
approach. First and foremost, it is a history of the evolution of federal government in Imperial 
Germany, a history with its own highly revealing dynamic. This main strand of the 
dissertation is an investigation into subtle systemic changes that pivots on the key question of 
the political history of Imperial Germany, a question often posed, but never satisfactorily 
answered: who or what actually governed Germany? The Kaiser or the Chancellor? The 
Prussian government or the federal bureaucracy? The Bundesrat or the Reichstag?  
As it thus paints a picture of the anatomy of power in the imperial state, this study is also a 
contribution to one of the biggest debates in modern European history: where, how, and why 
did Germany go wrong? To this debate on Germany’s ‘special path’, this study adds a 
perspective that has never been considered before.  
Thirdly and lastly, this study offers a systemic analysis of federal structures. The 
observations it makes about the structural phenomena that occurred in the German federal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45  The book that will grow out of this dissertation comprises three additional chapters, which could not be 
included in the thesis for reasons of space. The book will open with a chapter called ‘Environment’, which 
will examine the debate on the federal state among constitutional lawyers (see above fn. 44). The two 
chapters on ‘Government’ and ‘Participation’ will be supplemented by a chapter on ‘Monarchy’, which will 
analyse the development of the constitutional position of the Emperor. This chapter will be based on an 
article that I have written for German History and that is attached to this dissertation in the appendix. The 
thesis will refer to it where relevant (see Notes on the Text). The book will close with a chapter on 
‘Periphery’, which will examine the legal and public discourses about the overseas colonies and Alsace-
Lorraine. It will show how the odd structural relationship of these territories to the Reich destabilised the 
federal union throughout the imperial era.  
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union – for example in regard to the interrelation between federal organisation and 
parliamentary rights, between power politics and the spread of decision-making on different 
levels, or between the individual freedom and structural constraints of political actors – are 
relevant for federal orders more generally.  
In this context, the idiosyncrasy of the imperial German federal state, which lay at the 
crossroads of monarchical tradition and democratic modernity, makes it a particularly 
informative case, not least by virtues of the contrasts that can be drawn with other cases. As 
the eminent German-American public lawyer Karl Loewenstein, who had escaped the 
centralised terror regime of the Nazis and had found refuge in the federal union of the United 
States, put it after World War II: ‘Whoever wants to study federalism in its ultimate 
refinement has to look at Germany, which has practised it for centuries.’46 From this 
perspective, the federal evolution of Imperial Germany is one of these potent historical 
subjects that can help us not only to understand better key moments of our past, but also – in 
this light – to comprehend the present and prepare the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  [‘Wer den Föderalismus in seinem letzten Raffinement studieren will, muss sich an Deutschland halten, das 
ihn seit Jahrhunderten praktiziert.’] Quoted in Ines Härtel, ed., Handbuch Föderalismus. Grundlagen des 
Föderalismus und der deutsche Bundesstaat, vol. 1 (Berlin: Springer, 2012), p. 8. 
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CHAPTER I 
UNIFICATION 
 
Versailles, 21 January 1871 
My darling, 
 
I haven’t written to you in too long, forgive me, but this imperial birth was difficult, and kings 
have in such times the oddest desires, like women before they give to the world what they can’t 
keep anyway. As the accoucheur, I felt more than once the dire need to be a bomb and to explode 
in order to shatter the whole building into pieces.1 
 
When she received this note from her husband in late January 1871, Johanna von 
Bismarck probably paused in bewilderment. Why was Otto so annoyed? He should have been 
celebrating. The proclamation of the Emperor in Versailles was the climax of his greatest 
political triumph: the unification of Germany. His lines suggested that there was more to his 
anger than just his usual depression. Reflecting on what he had endured since he had taken 
office as Prussian Prime Minister in 1862, Johanna presumably concluded that in the hour of 
final achievement Otto simply needed to release all his frustration about how difficult it had 
been to unite the German states.2 
What did this process of unification look like? And what impact did it have on Germany’s 
federal order? Historians have told the story of German unification many times. In fact, they 
had started telling it while the process of unification was still underway. In the public debate 
about Germany’s future and the wars with Denmark, Austria, and France, historians were 
particularly numerous among the commentators. Most important were the contributions by 
Heinrich von Treitschke.3 For him and his colleagues of the ‘Borussian School’ of history 
writing, unification under Prussian leadership was no less than the fulfilment of German !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  [‘Mein Liebling, ich habe Dir schrecklich lange nicht geschrieben, verzeihe, aber diese Kaisergeburt war eine 
schwere, und Könige haben in solchen Zeiten ihre wunderlichsten Gelüste, wie Frauen, bevor sie der Welt 
geben, was sie doch nicht behalten können. Ich hatte als Accoucheur mehrmals das dringende Bedürfnis, eine 
Bombe zu sein und zu platzen, daß der ganze Bau in Trümmern gegangen wäre.’] Bismarck to his wife 
Johanna, 21 January 1871, printed in Deuerlein, Augenzeugenberichte, p. 308. 
2  On Bismarck’s mood swings during the unification, see Jonathan Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 8 'The Unification of Germany, 1866-70', pp. 258-311. 
3  See for example Treitschke's Die Zukunft der norddeutschen Mittelstaaten (Berlin: Reimer, 1866), his essay 
“Der Krieg und die Bundesreform,” Preußische Jahrbücher 17 (1866): 677–96, and his short manifesto Was 
fordern wir von Frankreich? (Berlin: Reimer, 1870). 
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history. After the proclamation of the new nation, the Prussian historian Heinrich von Sybel 
expressed his euphoria: 
 
What have we done to deserve the grace of God in being permitted to experience such great and 
mighty things? And how will one live afterwards? What had been the object of all wishes and 
desires for twenty years has now been fulfilled in such an incredibly wonderful way! From where 
will I now, at my age, be able to derive a new purpose for the rest of life?4 
 
When the Empire collapsed in 1918, this teleological perspective became obsolete. Instead, 
the historiographical debate developed a strong focus on Bismarck. During the Weimar 
Republic, the Nazi dictatorship, and the first two decades after the Second World War 
German historians usually portrayed the unification as a product of his ingenious 
statesmanship. This interpretation was only revised in the 1970s when the historiographical 
discussion shifted from diplomatic and military questions to social and economic issues. 
Historians now began to see the unification as a complex process that involved many different 
domestic and international factors. Manifold structural approaches since have highlighted 
different aspects of the unification, often revolving around the counterfactual question 
whether a German nation state could also have been brought about democratically.5  
In the century and a half over which this historiographical debate has evolved, the federal 
dimension of the unification has received little attention. Most studies barely mention that the 
nation state created between 1866 and 1871 was a federal union. There seem to be two main 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  [‘Wodurch hat man die Gnade Gottes verdient, so große und mächtige Dinge erleben zu dürfen? Und wie 
wird man nachher leben? Was zwanzig Jahre der Inhalt alles Wünschens und Strebens gewesen, das ist nun 
in so unendlich herrlicher Weise erfüllt! Woher soll man in meinen Lebensjahren noch einen neuen Inhalt für 
das weitere Leben nehmen?’] Printed in Julius Heyderhoff, ed., Die Sturmjahre der preussisch-deutschen 
Einigung 1859-1870. Politische Briefe aus dem Nachlass liberaler Parteiführer, Deutscher Liberalismus im 
Zeitalter Bismarcks 1 (Bonn: Schroeder, 1925), p. 494. On Sybel's political views on unification, see Hellmut 
Seier, Die Staatsidee Heinrich von Sybels in den Wandlungen der Reichsgründungszeit 1862-71, Historische 
Studien 383 (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1961). 
5  On the development of historiography, see the overviews in John Breuilly, The Formation of the First 
German Nation-State, 1800-1871, Studies in European History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 5ff; 
Elisabeth Fehrenbach, “Die Reichsgründung in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung,” in Reichsgründung, 
1870-71: Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen, ed. Theodor Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein (Stuttgart: 
Seewald, 1970), 259–90; Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Verfassungsstaat und Nationsbildung 1815-1871 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1992), pp. 113f.; and Ewald Frie, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004), pp. 21-
31. 
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reasons for this. On the one hand, the discussion has largely centred on questions of the nation 
and nationalism, not least because this has given historians a chance to advance their 
ideological viewpoints in broader political debates. This national focus brings the pan-
German features of the unification automatically into view, while pushing those issues aside 
that were related to the individual states.   
On the other hand, the neglect of federal questions is also a consequence of the strict 
chronological approach that most histories of the unification have adopted. If we concentrate 
on the sequence of three more or less national wars, the framing of the national constitution, 
and the proclamation of the German Emperor, it is easy to overlook that the underlying, 
longer-term problem of unification was federal in nature: how to transform the loose 
structures of the German Confederation into a more integrated union.6  
These observations suggest that two things are necessary if we want to understand how the 
unification process influenced the federal order. First, we have to consider the diverse 
interests of the various monarchical and parliamentary actors involved from the perspective of 
the individual states rather than of Germany as a whole. Second, we have to examine the 
overarching characteristics of the unification process rather than the chronology of events.  
The main risk besetting such an analysis is we will wind up reading history backwards. It 
would be wrong to look at the unification process from the point where it ended, namely from 
the perspective of the 1871 constitution. The unification was a dynamic process that could at 
any time have taken a different direction.  
One way to correct for teleological bias is to anchor the analysis in contemporary sources 
that are innocent of later developments. This chapter will do so by looking at the unification 
through the lens of contemporary caricatures. After the 1848 revolution had ended censorship 
across the European continent, a rich landscape of political caricatures emerged in Germany 
and her neighbouring countries. Satirical magazines such as the national-liberal, pro-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  On the centrality of this problem, see Wolfram Siemann, Vom Staatenbund zum Nationalstaat. Deutschland 
1806-1871, Neue Deutsche Geschichte 7 (München: Beck, 1995), especially pp. 15, 389f. 
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Bismarckian Kladderadatsch, the Bavarian, particularistic Münchener Punsch, and the 
French, republican Le Charivari commented on Germany’s political transformation in the 
1860s and 1870s with much wit. The different perspectives of the caricatures they published 
can help us greatly in exposing the diverse interests involved in the unification process. 
Moreover, the irony of political satire makes it much easier to spot the main threads of the 
unification, which we might otherwise miss in the dense network of events.7 
On the basis of this approach, this chapter will first expose the four most important 
structural birthmarks that the unification process left on the federal union: a lack of 
coordination between the states and the different levels of government; an interdependent 
relationship between the Prussian and federal government; a general inequality between the 
states; and a temporary compromise between the monarchical governments and German 
parliaments. Examining these birthmarks will involve revising several conventional views 
about the unification. After that, this chapter will demonstrate that the creation of Germany as 
a federal state lacked any deeper legitimacy. The unification made power rather than law the 
main principle of the new union. 
This analysis will make clear that there was much more to the unification than just the 
common story of blood and iron. It was a complex process that was driven by the interplay of 
monarchical and parliamentary actors who tied the transformation of Germany from a loose 
confederation into a nation state to the problem of what form of government she should adopt. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  An excellent collection of caricatures on the unification has been gathered by the Haus der Bayerischen 
Geschichte for the 1999 exhibition Bayern und Preußen. Eine historische Beziehung in Karikaturen. The 
exhibition has been moved online and can be retrieved from 
http://www.hdbg.de/karikatur/de/a_home/a_fr.htm. Arthur Ehrhardt, Der Junker und der deutsche Traum: 
die Wiedergründung des Reiches durch Otto von Bismarck (Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1959) has 
considered caricatures, but has composed an apotheosis of Bismarck rather than a critical examination. On 
the depiction of Franco-German relations in contemporary caricatures, see the historico-cultural study by 
Michael Siebe, Von der Revolution zum nationalen Feindbild: Frankreich und Deutschland in der 
politischen Karikatur des 19. Jahrhunderts: “Kladderadatsch” und “Charivari,” Imaginarium 3 (Münster: 
Lit, 1995). On political satire in Imperial Germany more generally, see Ann Taylor Allen, Satire and Society 
in Wilhelmine Germany: Kladderadatsch & Simplicissimus, 1890-1914 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984). 
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The unification thus established many conditions that shaped the federal evolution of the 
Empire right until its demise. 
Birthmarks 
 
Just after the end of the Austro-Prussian War in late summer 1866, Kladderadatsch 
made a ‘prognosis for the Reich’ in the form of a sequence of four images that commented on 
the past, present, and future of Germany (see Caricature 1). By controlling the German 
Customs Union, the magazine argued, Prussia had kept the German states on a short leash, 
preventing any of them from getting closer to Austria. When the states had tried to run away 
from Prussia after the Confederation collapsed, some into the arms of Austria, the Prussian 
military got hold of them in the war. Next, the journal predicted, Prussia would tighten her 
grasp around the northern states by creating a new union. In particular in military terms, the 
North German Confederation would be so attractive, Kladderadatsch forecasted, that the 
Southern states would eventually want to join it on their own initiative.  
This prognosis shows that contemporary observers understood the unification of Germany 
as a gradual process. For Bismarck, it was a matter of political strategy to pursue a ‘policy of 
[…] small steps’, as the German historian Thomas Nipperdey has called it.8 After their 
humiliating defeat alongside Austria, the southern states fiercely resisted national unification. 
It was therefore much easier to consolidate Prussia’s power and security piece by piece and to 
see German unity as a possible by-product rather than a necessary end-goal to which all 
strategic decisions had to be subordinated.  
At the heart of this pragmatic approach was the idea of solving the constitutional before the 
national question. This is why in 1866/67 Bismarck criticized the national liberals for acting 
prematurely when they called for the North and the South to be united right away. As King 
William of Prussia put it in the speech he read when he opened the constitutive Reichstag: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  [‘Politik [...] der kleinen Schritte’] Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. 2: Machtstaat 
vor der Demokratie, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1991), p. 28. 
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‘Today, the crucial matter is to not miss the advantageous moment for building the house; its 
expansion we can leave confidently to the future common effort of the German princes and 
people.’9 
The priority that the Prussian government assigned to constitutional consolidation over 
national unification has often been overlooked. Indeed, many historians have claimed that the 
national state and the constitution were created at the same time and that this simultaneity was 
one of the main reasons for the democratic deficit of Germany. Too many problems had to be 
solved at once, they have argued, with the result that the creation of a parliamentary system 
was impossible without jeopardising unification altogether.10 
Such views misunderstand the real chronological problem of the unification: the federal 
constitution was adopted four years before the national state was founded. This becomes clear 
as soon as we consider how the constitution entered into force. It was issued as an ordinary 
law, the Law concerning the Constitution of the German Empire from 16 April 1871, number 
628 of the federal law gazette.11 Its character as a piece of federal legislation presupposed that 
the constitution came into being after Germany had already been founded. Otherwise, neither 
the two legislative organs that adopted the law – the Bundesrat and the Reichstag – nor the 
Emperor who promulgated it could have existed. Moreover, there would have been no law 
gazette that could have published it.  
And indeed it is true that, according to the treaties of unification, the Empire had come into 
existence already on New Year’s Day 1871. This is why contemporary constitutional lawyers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  [‘Heute kommt es vor Allem darauf an, den günstigen Moment zur Errichtung des Gebäudes nicht zu 
versäumen; der vollendetere Ausbau desselben kann alsdann getrost dem ferneren vereinten Wirken der 
Deutschen Fürsten und Volksstämme überlassen bleiben.’] King William in the constitutive Reichstag, 
opening session, 24 February 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 73. 
10  See for example Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. 2, p. 879. In a federal context, see Holste, 
Bundesstaat, pp. 97ff. In the broader context of German history, see Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Der deutsche Weg 
in die Moderne. Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen als Grundproblem der deutschen Geschichte 1789-
1871,” in Deutschlands Weg in die Moderne. Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Harm-
Hinrich Brandt and Wolfgang Hardtwig (Munich: Beck, 1993), 9–31. 
11  Gesetz, betreffend die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches, 16 April 1871, BGBl. NDB (1871), no. 16, pp. 63-
85.  
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saw the treaties as the contractual foundations of Germany.12 The law of 16 April outlined 
these foundations with great care. On 15 November 1870, the North German Confederation, 
Baden, and Hesse created the ‘German Union’.13 Bavaria and Wurttemberg acceded to this 
union in two separate treaties eight and ten days later, respectively.14 The German nation state 
was born the day these treaties entered into force, namely on 1 January 1871.  
The legal basis for this unification of the northern and southern states was the constitution 
of the North German Confederation. The German Union of 15 November 1870 adopted it 
without any great changes.15 Later, the treaties with Bavaria and Wurttemberg supplemented 
it by some special rights and interim regulations. When the treaties entered into force, it 
became binding for the whole of Germany. As a consequence of this expansion of the 
constitution, all laws that had been adopted by the North German Confederation now became 
federal laws and, as such, were also introduced in the southern states.16 Moreover, the new 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  See in particular Albert Hänel, Die vertragsmässigen Elemente der deutschen Reichsverfassung, Studien zum 
deutschen Staatsrechte 1 (Leipzig: Haessel, 1873). See also Georg Jellinek, Die Lehre von den 
Staatenverbindungen (Vienna: Hölder, 1882);, pp. 255ff.; Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Tübingen: Laupp, 1876), p. 89; Hermann Schulze, Lehrbuch des Deutschen 
Staatsrechtes, vol. 2: Das Deutsche Reichsstaatsrecht, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1886), pp. 1f.; 
Meyer, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, 1919, pp. 194-202; and Zorn, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen 
Reiches, vol. 1, pp. 17-60. Max von Seydel, “Der Bundesstaatsbegriff,” Zeitschrift für die gesammte 
Staatswissenschaft 28 (1872): 185–256, especially pp. 208-42 argued that these contractual foundations 
implied that Germany was a confederation rather than federation. 
13  Protokoll, betreffend die Vereinbarung zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde, Baden und Hessen über die 
Gründung des Deutschen Bundes und Annahme der Bundesverfassung, 15 November 1870, BGBl. NDB 
(1870), no. 51, pp. 650-3. Baden and the North German Confederation also concluded a military convention. 
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bund und Baden, 25 November 1870, printed in Huber, 
Dokumente, vol. 2, no. 226, pp. 343-6. 
14  Vertrag, betreffend den Beitritt Bayerns zur Verfassung des Deutschen Bundes, nebst Schlußprotokoll, 23 
November 1870, BGBl. NDB (1871), no. 5, pp. 9-26. Vertrag zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde, Baden 
und Hessen einerseits und Württemberg andererseits, betreffend den Beitritt Württembergs zur Verfassung 
des Deutschen Bundes, nebst dazu gehörigem Protokoll, 25 November 1870, BGBl. NDB (1870), no. 51, pp. 
654-65, including the Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Würtemberg, pp. 658ff.  
15  Compare the Verfassung des Deutschen Bundes, 31 December 1870, BGBl. NDB (1870), no. 51, pp. 627-49 
and the Publikandum, die Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes betreffend, 26 July 1867, BGBl. NDB 
(1867), no. 1, pp. 1-23. 
16  For an overview, see Georg Hirth, ed., “Tabellarische Übersicht über die Einführung Norddeutscher 
Bundesgesetze in Norddeutschland, Bayern, Württemberg, Baden und Hessen,” Annalen, 1871, 389–94. As 
an example for an introductory law, see Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung Norddeutscher Bundesgesetze in 
Bayern, 22 April 1871, RGBl. (1871), no. 17, pp. 87-90. 
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German constitution replaced the old terms ‘union’ and ‘Federal Presidency’ with names that 
had a more national connotation: ‘German Empire’ and ‘German Emperor’.17   
All that the law of 16 April 1871 did was to harmonise such measures and to implement 
the provisions of the unification treaties. In other words, there was no new constitution. 
Rather, the Empire essentially took over the constitutional charter of the North German 
Confederation. This meant that the federal order of Germany was born neither when the 
Empire was founded on 1 January 1871 nor when the constitution was introduced on 16 April 
of the same year, but when the North German Reichstag had adopted the constitution exactly 
four years earlier, on 16 April 1867.  
It is therefore misleading to suggest that the national state and the federal constitution were 
created at the same time. One could only uphold this assumption if one sees the years between 
1867 and 1871 as a dead period in which nothing happened.18 But this, too, would be wrong. 
The North German Confederation unfolded dynamic legislative activities in all fields of 
government. In particular, its social and economic legislation was strikingly progressive. This 
made the Confederation very attractive to the southern parliaments, which copied many North 
German laws. At the same time, a common defence system developed in which secret military 
alliances tied the southern states to the Confederation. In the economic arena too, there were 
important developments: several reforms to the German Customs Union further intensified 
the relations between North and South. All of these developments made the four years after 
1867 a period of dynamic change.19 The federal constitution and the national state were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  For the debate in the Reichstag, see Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1870, session 10, 9 December, pp. 
150f. 
18  For this view, see for example Egmont Zechlin, Die Reichsgründung, 3rd ed., Deutsche Geschichte. 
Ereignisse und Probleme (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1978), p. 141. 
19  See for example Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Das Ringen um den nationalen Staat. Die Gründung und der innere 
Ausbau des Deutschen Reiches unter Otto von Bismarck 1850 bis 1890, Propyläen Geschichte Deutschlands 
7.1 (Berlin: Propyläen, 1995), pp. 197ff., 216f; Klaus Erich Pollmann, Parlamentarismus im Norddeutschen 
Bund 1867-1870, Handbuch der Geschichte des deutschen Parlamentarismus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1985); and 
Rolf Wilhelm, Das Verhältnis der süddeutschen Staaten zum Norddeutschen Bund (1867-1870), Historische 
Studien 431 (Husum: Matthiesen, 1978), a study that looks in particular on the indirect ways by which the 
southern states were integrated into the North German Confederation . For a contemporary view on the great 
changes in this period, see Karl von Hofmann, Vom norddeutschen Bund ins deutsche Reich: 
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therefore not just created at different times, but also under very different political 
circumstances.  
This asynchronicity had an impact on the German federal union that was in many ways 
highly problematic. First of all, it made the time-frame of federal evolution quite paradoxical. 
The federal order began to evolve before the Empire had been founded, namely in April 1867. 
For this reason, a discussion of the constitutional principles that governed Germany must look 
at the negotiations of the constitutional assembly of 1867 rather than at the proceedings of its 
1871 counterpart. The first constitutive Reichstag made a number of important amendments 
to the constitutional draft that Bismarck and the monarchical governments had proposed. The 
second made no relevant changes and adopted the law of 16 April 1871 without much ado.  
Moreover, the fact that the national state and constitution were not created at the same time 
contributed greatly to the ambiguity of Germany’s federal structures. One of the most 
important reasons why they were so complicated was that they had been the product of two 
compromises at two different stages of the unification process: first between the monarchical 
governments and the constitutive Reichstag in spring 1867; and then between the 
governments of the North German Confederation and the southern states in autumn 1870.20  
It was another problem when and how to introduce the laws of the Confederation into the 
South. This touched not only on questions of government, but also on practical issues that 
influenced the life of citizens directly, such as the legal regulation of marriage. In the first few 
years after unification, the introduction of North German laws was thus a subject that kept 
Bismarck and the evolving federal administration very busy.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Gesandtschaftsberichte und Briefe des grossherzoglich hessischen Gesandten Karl Hofmann aus Berlin, 
1866-1872, ed. Frank Zimmer, Arbeiten der Hessischen Historischen Kommission 16 (Darmstadt: 
Hessischen Historische Kommission, 2001). 
20  See Hermann-Josef Blanke, Deutsche Verfassungen. Dokumente zu Vergangenheit und Gegenwart 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), p. 33. 
21  See Bismarck’s report to Emperor William, 20 April 1871, and his letter to the Prussian minister of War 
Albrecht von Roon, 3 February 1873, printed in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1, no. 64 and 391, pp. 67-70, 460f. 
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Most problematic of all was the fact that the federal constitution did not entirely fit the 
political needs of the Empire, because it had been taken over from another state. In 1870/71, a 
state was created for a constitution rather than vice versa. By admitting the southern states to 
the union, the unification treaties squeezed twenty-five states into a constitutional order that 
had been designed for only twenty-one. Complex constructions such as the Bavarian and 
Wurttemberg special rights were evidence that the federal constitution was not made to 
measure for the new polity. The North German Confederation had to balance the interests of 
Prussia and twenty more or less small principalities. Once united, the challenge for Germany 
was even greater. Four additional states – the two grand duchies of Hesse and Baden and the 
two relatively powerful kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurttemberg – further complicated the 
federal fabric. In order to provide a solid legal framework for the union, then, the creation of 
the national state would have needed to go hand in hand with the framing of a new 
constitution. As it did not, one of the most important birthmarks of the federal state was a lack 
of constitutional coordination between the states and the different levels of government.  
This was all the more problematic in light of the extreme dominance of Prussia. The 
unification excluded Austria from Germany, created a lesser-German federal state, and made 
Prussia its undisputable hegemon. Most historiographical accounts hold that there was no 
alternative to this development, that it simply reflected the balance of power among the 
constituent entities.22 However, before the defeat of Austria in 1866 it was far from clear that 
Germany would assume the shape of a Prussian-dominated federation rather than of a 
reformed greater-German confederation, in which Prussia and Austria would continue to face 
each other.23   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  The latest work to advance this view is Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, 1866: Bismarcks Krieg gegen die Habsburger 
(Darmstadt: Theiss, 2016), see especially pp. 272-81. For an overview on this historiographical perspective, 
see Frie, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, pp. 21ff. 
23  On the role of contingency and possible alternatives to the lesser-German unification, see Breuilly, The 
Formation of the First German Nation-State, 1800-1871, especially the closing reflections 'Results'. 
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To this, one might object that after the 1848 revolution the German Confederation had 
demonstrated that a solution of the German national question that included both great powers 
could never have worked. And indeed it is true that the conflicting interests of Prussia and 
Austria left the Confederation in a state of paralysis for much of the 1850s and 1860s. None 
of the many reform proposals that aimed to transform the Confederation into a more 
integrated union ever came close to political implementation. The discussion ranged from a 
variety of models that wanted to divide the leadership of the Confederation between Austria 
and Prussia to concepts that proposed to establish the middling states as a third column that 
could moderate between the great powers.24 In the end, all such proposals failed because 
Berlin rejected them categorically. Most spectacular was the failure of the Fürstentag in 1863. 
To this congress in Frankfurt the Habsburg Kaiser had invited all German princes in order to 
agree on a reform of the Confederation. The Prussian king, however, simply did not come, 
even though he was passing through Frankfurt on his way home from taking the waters in 
Baden-Baden.25   
But this paralysis of the German Confederation did not imply that the idea of a greater-
German ‘confederate nation’ had failed in general. To the contrary: the Confederation had 
made great progress in terms of practical reforms that could have been the basis for a 
‘confederate nationalism’. Most importantly, the Confederation had succeeded to a great 
extent in standardising the German legal landscape. The climax of this gradual unification of 
law was the adoption of the General German Commercial Code in 1861, the first 
comprehensive commercial code applicable to the whole of Germany.26 Moreover, in the 
1860s the thirty-five states of the Confederation got better and better at formulating their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24  On the various reform proposals, see Jürgen Müller, Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation. 1848-1866 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), pp. 276-360. 
25  On the Frankfurt Fürstentag, see Norbert Wehner, Die deutschen Mittelstaaten auf dem Frankfurter 
Fürstentag 1863, Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 3, Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 548 
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1993) and Kurt Dorien, Der Bericht des Herzogs Ernst II. von Koburg über den 
Frankfurter Fürstentag 1863: ein Beitrag zur Kritik seiner Memoiren, Historische Bibliothek 21 (Munich 
and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1910). 
26  [‘föderative Nation’], [‘föderativer Nationalismus’] Müller, Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation. 1848-
1866, p. 24. On the standardisation of laws, see ibid., pp. 391ff. 
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individual policies in harmony with rather than against the growing German national 
identity.27  
From this perspective, the collapse of the Confederation and the creation of a Prussian-
dominated federation was not a ‘natural’ evolution. Rather, the unification was a ‘disruption 
of history’, as the distinguished historian of German nationalism Dieter Langewiesche has 
called it, because it did not continue the loose greater-German tradition that had shaped 
Germany since the Holy Roman Empire.28  
The extent of this disruption becomes clear when we consider the nature of the 1866 war. 
The traditional characterisation of this conflict as an ‘Austro-Prussian War’ is a euphemism.29 
On the battlefield, two coalitions of German states faced each other, eighteen under Prussian 
and eleven under joint Austrian and Bavarian command. When the fighting was over, the 
peace excluded several million German speakers from becoming a part of the new German 
nation state. The Austro-Prussian War was therefore in reality a civil war.30 This is why 
contemporaries called it ‘Bruderkrieg’, a war amongst brothers. 31  Already in 1865, 
Kladderadatsch had realised that a military conflict between the great powers would probably 
draw the whole of Germany into a civil war. For the satire magazine, the fight for supremacy 
in Germany was like a pistol duel between Austria and Prussia, in which the bullets would hit 
the other states sooner or later (see Caricature 2).  
If the 1866 war was a civil war, then the unification started with a partition. A hundred 
years later, when the Berlin Wall divided Germany into a western and eastern part, Thomas 
Nipperdey called the exclusion of Austria from Germany ‘the first modern partition of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  See Abigail Green, Fatherlands. State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
28  [‘Geschichtsbruch’] Dieter Langewiesche, “Was heißt ‘Erfindung der Nation’? Nationalgeschichte als 
Artefakt - oder Geschichtsdeutung als Machtkampf,” HZ 277 (2003), p. 612. On this issue, see also 
Langewiesche's book Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat: in Deutschland und Europa (Beck, 2000), 
especially chapter 3 'Föderativer Nationalismus als Erbe der deutschen Reichsnation. Über Föderalismus und 
Zentralismus in der deutschen Nationalgeschichte'. 
29  For an example, see Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 
1866 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
30  Niall Ferguson, Civilization (London: Penguin, 2012), p. 214. 
31  See for example Treitschke, “Der Krieg und die Bundesreform”, p. 388. 
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nation’.32 This was a rough start for a process that intended to unite the German states, 
because it alienated all those who had fought on the side of Austria rather than Prussia.  
Moreover, the exclusion of Austria made Prussia overwhelmingly strong in the new 
national union. The prospect of establishing this dominance was the driving factor behind the 
unification policy of the Prussian government. Bismarck was clear about this motivation as 
early as 1853:  
 
Our policy takes place on no other parade ground but Germany […], a ground to which Austria too 
lays claim. […] We are sucking away the air from each other’s mouths, one has to give way or the 
other will make him give way.33  
 
In order to preserve the power of the Prussian monarchy, so Bismarck believed, it had to 
become the hegemon of a German federal state. The unification was therefore not a process in 
which the different states came together in order to form a union on equal terms, but a process 
in which the strongest amongst them merged them to its own advantage. The French 
magazine Le Charivari illustrated this with reference to one of the greatest works of German 
drama. From the journal’s point of view, Prussia was a ‘new Faust’ that ushered the innocent 
German Gretchen into the national house, while Bismarck, the Prussian Mephistopheles, kept 
the greater-German doctrine at bay (see Caricature 3). 
To understand what this dominance of a single state meant for the union of twenty-five 
states we have to move our perspective from Prussia to that of the middling and small states. 
As soon as Austria was excluded from Germany, the governments of the small principalities 
and minor kingdoms could no longer resort to the strategy that had proven most effective in 
defending their independence in the Confederation: playing the great powers off against each 
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32  [‘die erste moderne Teilung der Nation’] Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866, vol. 1:  
Bürgerwelt und starker Staat, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1983), p. 791. 
33  [‘Unsere Politik hat keinen anderen Exerzierplatz als Deutschland […] und gerade diesen glaubt Österreich 
auch für sich zu gebrauchen. […] Wir atmen einer dem anderen die Luft vor dem Munde fort, einer muss 
weichen oder vom anderen gewichen werden.’] Quoted in ibid., p. 685. 
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other, often by seeking the support of outside powers.34 Before 1866, the middling and small 
states had always been able to play the ‘Tri-Ace’ in the poker game of German politics, as 
Kladderadatsch put it (see Caricature 4). With Prussia now being the only remaining great 
power in the union, it was impossible for them to pursue this kind of triangular policy. A 
‘Third Germany’ that manoeuvred between two great powers no longer existed. The tripartite 
structure of Germany had changed into a constellation in which Prussia faced all the rest. 
Given Prussia’s overwhelming dominance in terms of population, territory, and economic, 
financial, and military capabilities, this left the middling and small states with little chance to 
remain independent factors in German politics. The princes were well aware of this dilemma. 
During the ceremonial dinner after the proclamation of the Emperor in Versailles, the young 
prince of the tiny Thuringian state Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt addressed the assembled royal 
personage with the words: ‘Greetings to you, fellow vassals!’35 
The key problem was that without Austria, a national government that was independent of 
Prussia could not exist. There was no other option for the government of the union than to 
rely mainly on Prussian staff, money, and troops. In the long run, the crucial question would 
thus be whether the Prussians would manage to control the federal government or vice versa. 
In other words, it was one of the most important birthmarks of the imperial union that the 
links between the Prussian and federal government were so close that the fate of the whole 
union depended on how their relationship would evolve. 
So great was the superiority of Prussia over the other states that to many contemporary 
observers it seemed perfectly clear that the unification created a Prussian rather than German 
Empire. In 1870, the Viennese magazine Kikeriki depicted ‘Germany’s future’ as a spiked 
helmet that Prussia would impose on all German people (see Caricature 5). One year later, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34  On this strategy, see for example Brendan Simms, The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779-1850, 
European History in Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 105-17, especially pp. 110f. and 
Wolfram Siemann, Vom Staatenbund zum Nationalstaat. Deutschland 1806-1871, Neue Deutsche Geschichte 
7 (München: Beck, 1995), pp. 393f., where he examines the ‘Triaspolitik’ of the middling states in the 
context of the failure of the Erfurt Union. 
35  Cited in Steinberg, Bismarck, p. 308. 
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after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, Le Charivari adopted a similar 
perspective when it published a new Prussian crest. The eagle of the Hohenzollern, carrying 
the reparations and the bloody sword of the war in his claws, now featured the wings of a bat, 
which represented the other German states (see Caricature 6).  
But the hegemonic character of the federal union was only one of many structural 
imbalances that the unification produced. Among the middling and small states, the 
unification did not establish perfect equality either. The biggest losers of the unification were 
Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, and the Free City of Frankfurt. They lost their independence 
altogether. Although each of them had been a sovereign entity since the Vienna Congress, 
Prussia annexed them without further ado when they sided with Austria in the war of 1866. In 
an exercise of power politics, the Prussian Gulliver simply erased these dwarfs from the 
German map, as Le Charivari observed (see Caricature 7).  
The differences in the status of the other states originated mainly in the negotiations 
between the governments of the North German Confederation and the southern states in 
autumn 1870.36 The two southern kingdoms, Bavaria and Wurttemberg, firmly insisted on 
their formal supremacy over the grand duchies, duchies, and other principalities of Germany. 
For this reason, they made their accession to the union dependent on the granting of 
prerogatives. As Bismarck wanted them to join on their own initiative, he was ready to 
rearrange the federal framework of the union like a coat that had to be tailored to their needs, 
as Kladderadatsch complained (see Caricature 8).  
The unification treaties thus established a wide variety of special rights. Each of the 
kingdoms received a permanent seat in certain committees of the Bundesrat. Bavaria was 
granted the presidency over the committee on foreign relations. Unlike the other princes, the 
Bavarian king retained the command of his regiments during peace time. Various other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36  On this topic, see Karl Bosl, “Die Verhandlungen über den Eintritt der süddeutschen Staaten in den 
Norddeutschen Bund und die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung,” in Reichsgründung, 1870-71: Tatsachen, 
Kontroversen, Interpretationen, ed. Theodor Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), 148–
63. 
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special rights guaranteed some of the states authority in economic matters that otherwise fell 
within the remit of the national government, such as the taxation of beer and wine or the 
administration of railways, telegraph systems, and postal services. 37  This plethora of 
individual prerogatives implied that in addition to a federal hegemon the constitution also 
established second- and third-class states. A further birthmark that the unification left on the 
federal union was therefore a general inequality between the states.  
In an environment obsessed with issues of status and prestige, this was political dynamite. 
This problem had become obvious even before the ink under the unification treaties was dry. 
During the negotiations in Versailles, Bavaria’s demands were so extensive that the success of 
the unification was in jeopardy. Bismarck came down with gallbladder problems and the 
Bavarian delegation threatened to leave Versailles several times.38 Only after Hesse, Baden, 
and Wurttemberg had signed the treaties did the threat of political isolation make the Bavarian 
government more cooperative. The conflict was finally resolved when both parties agreed on 
a deal: Bismarck accepted a comprehensive list of special rights for Bavaria, while the 
Bavarian government gave its consent to the Prussian king receiving the title of German 
Emperor.39  
Still, this deal was only successful because it involved bribery. Ludwig II of Bavaria 
vehemently opposed the plan to make the Prussian king Emperor. For him, it was terrible to 
imagine that the Hohenzollern dynasty could ever be higher in rank than the House of 
Wittelsbach. But as he was always in need of money for building his fairy-tale castles, most 
famously Neuschwanstein, it was easy for Bismarck to persuade him. It is an irony of history 
that the money for this bribe came from the expropriation of another ancient German dynasty. 
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37  For a good overview of the special rights, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 806-8. 
38  See the letter by the Baden prime minister Julius Jolly to his wife, 17 November 1870, printed in Deuerlein, 
Augenzeugenberichte, p. 216. 
39  See the documents printed in ibid., pp. 196-202 and also the earlier report of the Bavarian envoy Graf von 
Berchem to the foreign minister Graf von Bray-Steinburg, 14 October 1870, pp. 232f. 
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Bismarck generated the necessary funds from the assets of the House of Guelph, which he had 
confiscated when Prussia had annexed Hannover in 1866.40  
Such episodes made the unification a bizarre mix of princely theatre and serious political 
conflict. This became perhaps most evident when the Wurttemberg government decided to 
postpone the ratification of the unification treaty at the last minute. A court intrigue had 
moved King Karl I to suddenly insist that his kingdom would only join the union if it received 
as many special rights as Bavaria.41 As absurd as Karl’s and Ludwig’s behaviour may seem 
today, it does point to the core problem of the inequality between the states. Since all special 
rights were totally insignificant when compared to the Prussian hegemony, their existence had 
more to do with political psychology than with real power. 
The state where this was most obvious was Bavaria. Opposition to the Prussian-dominated 
unification was widespread there. In the 1869 elections to the parliament of the German 
Customs Union, the parties that defended Bavarian independence celebrated a landslide 
victory. This was a clear signal to the Bavarian government that it would be unable to 
overcome the local scepticism against unification, unless it came home from Versailles with 
far-reaching special rights. While this strategy worked out in the autumn and winter of 1870, 
the disappointment was great when the hard-won prerogatives soon turned out to be 
meaningless. Already in April 1871, Bismarck made clear that in the peace talks with France, 
Bavaria’s ‘participation will have to remain – to cut the matter short – more ornamental, in 
order to satisfy a point of honour’.42 In the following months, it became clearer and clearer 
that Prussia’s dominance in the Bundesrat and the federal administration made most special 
rights worthless. The committee of foreign affairs over which Bavaria presided was the best 
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40  See Lothar Gall, Bismarck. Der weisse Revolutionär, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 2002), pp. 
517f. See also the documents in Deuerlein, Augenzeugenberichte, pp. 254ff.  
41  See Bosl, “Die Verhandlungen über den Eintritt der süddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen Bund und 
die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung”, p. 160. 
42  [‘Betheiligung wird, um es kurz auszudrücken, eine mehr ornamentale zu bleiben haben, zur Befriedigung 
eines Ehrenpunctes’] Bismarck to the Prussian envoy in Brussels, 22 April 1871, printed in Gesammelte 
Werke, vol. 1, no. 68, p. 74. 
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example. It did not convene a single time, because the Chancellor took all diplomatic matters 
in his own hands. Bismarck even denied Bavarian envoys the right to represent the Empire at 
foreign courts when the imperial ambassador was absent. As early as June 1871, he called this 
prerogative a purely ‘honorary right’ that had no practical effect.43  
Such humiliations spread the feeling in Bavaria that the kingdom had been deceived and 
manipulated. For many, the German national state turned out to be an expansion of the 
Prussian military monarchy that robbed the states of their independence. The Bavarian 
satirical magazine Die Bremse expected in 1874 that the Prussian snake would soon devour 
even the last remaining special rights of Bavaria (see Caricature 9). In the opinion of the 
journal, the kingdom had become so weak that the proud Bavarian lion, a veteran of the 
unification wars, was now in chains (see Caricature 10). From this point of view, the fears had 
become true which the leader of the Party of Bavarian Patriots, Edmund Jörg, had voiced in 
the Bavarian parliament just before the vote on the ratification of the unification treaties:  
 
If we manage […] to avert disaster in the last moment and to save the free, legitimate existence of 
Bavaria within the German nation, then, Gentlemen, we have done a great work […]. But if we do 
not manage, the free and legitimate independence and existence of Bavaria within the German 
nation must perish.44 
 
Opinions such as this point out that for the middling and small states, one of the main 
concerns about unification was whether they would be able to organise most of their affairs 
on their own and to participate in federal decision-making independently. The general 
inequality between them made this very unlikely, because it weakened them vis-à-vis the 
federal hegemon Prussia even further. 
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43  [‘Ehrenrecht’] Bismarck to the Prussian ambassador in London von Bernstorff, 22 June 1871, printed in ibid., 
no. 138, p 143. It became practice that lower-ranking officials from the Foreign Office rather than Bavarian 
diplomats took the place of the ambassador when he was unavailable.    
44  [‘Gelingt es uns […] im letzten Augenblick noch das Unheil abzuwenden und die freie, berechtigte 
Staatsexistenz Bayerns innerhalb der deutschen Nation zu retten, dann, meine Herren, haben wir ein Werk 
getan […]. Gelingt es uns aber nicht, muß die freie, berechtigte Selbständigkeit und Staatsexistenz Bayerns 
innerhalb der deutschen Nation untergehen.’] Edmund Jörg in the Bavarian House of Representatives, 21 
January 1871, printed in Deuerlein, Augenzeugenberichte, p. 276. 
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Another feature of the unification process that greatly shaped federal structures was its 
allegedly undemocratic character. Historians have usually argued that the governments rather 
than the people founded the Empire. Unlike the unsuccessful attempt in 1848, they maintain, 
the unification of 1871 was not an act of popular, but of monarchical sovereignty. In other 
words, the unification was a revolution from ‘above’ rather than from ‘below’. As evidence 
for this interpretation, it has often been cited that in 1848 the prime mover of the unification 
was a national constitutional assembly, while in 1870/71 a series of intergovernmental 
negotiations stood in the centre of action.45  
This view of the democratic dimension of the unification process is simplistic. It, too, rests 
on the wrong assumption that the national state and the federal constitution were created at 
the same time. If we confine our view to the negotiations of the unification treaties in autumn 
1870, it appears indeed as if the officials of the state governments were the only decision-
makers. The delegation of the Reichstag entered the scene only at the very end in order to 
offer the Prussian king the imperial crown after the princes had already done so.46 If we 
broaden our perspective to the whole period between 1866 and 1871, however, we realise that 
in every step and on all of levels of government the federal constitution was adopted with 
parliamentary consent.47  
The constitutive Reichstag of 1866/67 was no constitutional assembly in the conventional 
sense, because it did not frame the constitution. The original proposal was drafted by 
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45  On the controversy about the unification as a revolution from ‘above’ or ‘below’, see Hagen Schulze, The 
Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 97-101. 
46  Mommsen, Das Ringen um den nationalen Staat. Die Gründung und der innere Ausbau des Deutschen 
Reiches unter Otto von Bismarck 1850 bis 1890, pp. 253ff.. 
47  For a similar view, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, “Die Bismarcksche Reichsverfassung im Zusammenhang der 
deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 
1981), 171–207, where he speaks of an 'agreed constitution' ['vereinbarte Verfassung'], p. 173. See also his 
essay “Bismarck und der Verfassungsstaat,” in Nationalstaat und Verfassungsstaat. Studien zur Geschichte 
der modernen Staatsidee (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), 188–223, especially p. 202 and vol. 3 of his 
Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 773-80.  Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism, pp. 97-101 embraces more 
or less the same view, characterising the unification as a ‘team-game between Bismarck and the nationalist 
movement’, p. 100. 
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Bismarck, either in a creative outburst of one night, as legend has it, or, more likely, with the 
help of several officials from the Prussian Ministry of Commerce.48 After the governments of 
the North German states had accepted the draft, they presented it to the Reichstag for review 
and approval. This gave the newly elected national parliament a legitimising function. 
Moreover, the Reichstag had the power to propose amendments that the united governments 
needed to approve. This gave the parliamentarians real political power that became manifest 
in how drastically they changed the original draft. The most important amendment, the so-
called Lex Bennigsen, did nothing less – as we will see in the next chapter – than redefine the 
role of the Chancellor in federal government. 
In 1870/71, the Reichstag did not assume such a prominent role. The reason was simply 
that what happened was not the creation of a new constitution, but the admission of four 
additional states to the already existing union of the North. Still, the federal parliament 
approved both the constitution – now for a second time – and the unification treaties when it 
adopted the Law concerning the Constitution of the German Empire on 16 April.  
On the national level, then, the unification process was democratically legitimised in 1867 
as well as in 1871. Kladderadatsch highlighted the importance of the constitutive Reichstag in 
a caricature that addressed the distrust of the French Emperor Napoleon III towards the 
emerging German union at the time when the parliament negotiated the federal constitution 
(see Caricature 11). The caricaturist depicted the North German states, represented by their 
heraldic animals, as prisoners in a cage that was based on the fundament of a common 
parliament.  
Parliamentary consent to the unification was not limited to the national level alone. In each 
of the twenty-five states, a Landtag – most often composed of a democratically elected lower 
house and an aristocratic upper house – approved either the federal constitution of 1867 or the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48  See Walter Bußmann, “Bismarck: Seine Helfer und seine Gegner,” in Reichsgründung, 1870-71: Tatsachen, 
Kontroversen, Interpretationen, ed. Theodor Schieder and Ernst Deuerlein (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), pp. 
129f. and the detailed study by Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung, ed. Alexander 
Scharff (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1958), part 3 'Das Keimen der deutschen Verfassung', pp. 211-89. 
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unification treaties of 1870, depending on when the state joined the union. This was the main 
reason for why it took so long for the unification process to be completed after the 
monarchical governments had agreed on the treaties in November 1870. The Bavarian House 
of Representatives gave its approval as late as 21 January 1871, three weeks after the Empire 
had legally come into existence. This retarding effect of the parliaments on unification was 
often subject to public criticism. In March 1869, for example, the Kladderdatsch complained 
that in trying to find a solution to the German national question the Prussian chambers, the 
parliament of the Customs Union, and the North German Reichstag were like riders on a 
carousel – they constantly went round in circles and got nowhere (see Caricature 12).   
If we consider this parliamentary consent to the unification on both the national and the 
state levels, we can no longer speak of the constitution as an imposed charter. However, the 
extent to which it really was a consensual agreement between the monarchical governments 
and the people depended on how much scope of action the parliaments actually had. Would it 
have been possible for them to reject the constitutional draft or the unification treaties? And, 
if so, what would have happened? 
The state parliaments, it seems, could hardly have said no. In 1867, they were under 
intense pressure because they voted on the constitution only after the united governments and 
the Reichstag had already agreed on it. In 1870/71, too, the state parliaments did not really 
have a choice, as the Bavarian case illustrates. The particularistic parties in the House of 
Representatives managed to delay the vote on the unification treaties for some time. But as 
soon as the other southern parliaments had given their approval, the threat of political 
isolation became so great that the majority of Bavarian parliamentarians gave up resistance. 
Only if they had cooperated could the southern parliaments have hoped to prevent unification. 
But this was totally unrealistic as the great majority of MPs in the lower chambers of Baden 
and Hesse were eager to join the union – the former because of strong national sentiments, the 
latter because of a basic interest in uniting the North and South German parts of Hesse.  
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Chances were much better for the Reichstag. On the national level, it enjoyed a monopoly 
of popular representation that gave the parliamentarians at least some leverage. At the same 
time, however, the national enthusiasm after the military victories against Austria and France 
put a lot of pressure on the MPs to adopt the constitution. From this perspective, the 
constitutive Reichstag of 1867 probably made most of its possibilities when it pushed through 
several important amendments.   
This seems all the more true if we consider that in the event of a parliamentary rejection 
Bismarck had already prepared a secret treaty between the governments of Prussia, Saxony, 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, and Hesse-Darmstadt that would have imposed the constitution on 
the states in the form of an international treaty.49 The consent of the Reichstag was thus not a 
constitutive element of the unification. Nevertheless, it was politically important. Otherwise, 
the strategy to impose the constitution by an international treaty would have been plan A 
rather than B. For Bismarck, the search for parliamentary consent was crucial to overcoming 
the different interests of the state governments. As he put it in a letter to the Prussian envoy in 
St Petersburg in April 1866, ‘one cannot hope […] that the governments will agree without 
the participation of a national parliament’.50  
In order to gain parliamentary consent, then, Bismarck enshrined into the constitutional 
draft a peculiar balance of monarchical and parliamentary power that the amendments of the 
constitutive Reichstag further refined. The federal constitution was therefore a compromise 
between the monarchical governments and the German parliaments. This character of the 
constitution was one of the most important birthmarks of the union, because it made federal 
evolution dependent on how long the compromise that had been reached between 1866 and 
1871 would last.  
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49  See Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 654f., in particular fn. 27. 
50  [‘Auf Einigung der Regierungen darüber ohne die Mitwirkung einer Vertretung der Nation ist [...] nicht zu 
hoffen.’] Bismarck to the Prussian envoy in St Petersburg Graf von Redern, 17 April 1866, cited in Holste, 
Bundesstaat, p. 98. 
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Legitimacy 
 
We have seen that the unification process imposed certain structural features that would 
shape the subsequent evolution of the federal order.  But if we want to fully understand what 
impact the events and decisions of the unification era had on Germany’s future, we also need 
to address the legitimacy of that order. What was the legitimacy of the federal organisation of 
the Empire made of? And how did the character of this legitimacy shape the further 
development of the federal state?  
The foundation of a federal union could not draw on any distinct historical legitimacy. To 
the contrary: the unification process deliberately broke with the tradition of a greater-German, 
confederate order that had shaped Germany since the Holy Roman Empire.51 Le Charivari 
made this clear to its readers already shortly after the Austro-Prussian War had broken out. 
Bismarck’s unification policy, the magazine argued, had smashed the porcelain of Germany’s 
confederate tradition on the floor of history (see Caricature 13).  
The creation of the imperial crown did not establish any historical legitimacy either.52 
Except for a few nostalgists, no one seriously claimed that the new German Emperor was in 
any way linked to his Holy Roman counterpart.53 The Bavarian lawyer Joseph von Held 
described this general opinion with the help of a biblical metaphor: ‘It is as untenable to claim 
that a remnant of old times has been re-inaugurated, as it is to maintain that new wine has 
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51  On this point, see Hans Boldt's essay on the occasion of the conference Historikergespräch Österreich - 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1989 “Der Föderalismus in den Reichsverfassungen von 1849 und 1871,” in 
Die Amerikanische Verfassung und Deutsch-Amerikanisches Verfassungsdenken, ed. Hermann 
Wellenreuther and Claudia Schnurmann, Krefelder Historische Symposien: Deutschland und Amerika. 
Zweites Symposion, veranstaltet in Krefeld 28.-31. Mai 1987 (New York & Oxford: Berg, 1990), p. 31f. 
52  On the legitimacy of the imperial crown more generally, see Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Wandlungen des 
Deutschen Kaisergedankens 1871-1918, Studien zur Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts 1 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1969). 
53  For an example of this outsider perspective, see for example Albert von Ruville, Das Deutsche Reich ein 
monarchischer Einheitsstaat. Beweis für den staatsrechtlichen Zusammenhang zwischen altem und neuem 
Reich (Berlin: Guttentag, 1894). 
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been put into old wineskins.’54 Although the proclamation of the Emperor in Versailles spoke 
of the ‘recreation of the German Empire’, neither Bismarck nor the monarchical governments, 
parliamentarians, or the wider public were interested in historical continuities with the old 
Empire, whose structural weaknesses were seen as having rendered Germany subject to 
permanent foreign interference and domestic strife.55 When the Reichstag approved the 
unification treaties in December 1870, the liberal MP Carl von Sänger summarised the 
emotions behind this view: 
 
And now, Gentlemen, this new German Empire, it is certainly no imitation of the old Holy Roman 
Empire – that was a sad conglomerate of conflicting forces – the new Empire has grown out of the 
soil of the general patriotic sentiment that has moved Germany’s princes and people alike and that 
is documented in splendid feats of arms in a manner that has never been before in German 
history.56 
 
In a public lecture, Heinrich Geffcken, law professor in Rostock, illustrated this general 
rejection of a Holy Roman tradition with the help of a rhetorical question: ‘And this mummy 
we are said to have raised from the dead to new artificial life by the hard work of more than 
sixty years of fighting for unification?’57  
Even if it did not refer to any historical predecessor, the establishment of the imperial 
crown suggested that monarchical sovereignty was a legitimising principle of the new union. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes obvious that the unification did more to 
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54  [‘Wie wenig man sagen kann, ein Ueberbleibsel vergangener Zeiten sei wieder inauguriert worden, so wenig 
könnte man behaupten, neuer Wein sei in alte Schläuche gegossen.’] Josef von Held, Das Kaiserthum als 
Rechtsbegriff (Würzburg: Thein, 1879), p. 36. 
55  [‘Wiederherstellung des Deutschen Reiches’] Proclamation of the German Emperor in Versailles, 18 January 
1871, printed in Johannes Hohlfeld, ed., Dokumente der deutschen Politik und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur 
Gegenwart. Ein Quellenwerk für die politische Bildung und staatsbürgerliche Erziehung, vol. 1: Die 
Reichgründung und das Zeitalter Bismarcks 1848–90 (Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag, 1951), p. 296. 
56  [‘Und nun, meine Herren, dies neue Deutsche Reich, es ist gewiß nicht die Nachahmung des alten 
ehemaligen heiligen römischen Reiches – das war ein trübseliges Konglomerat widerstrebender Kräfte – das 
neue deutsche Reich das ist erwachsen aus dem Boden der allgemeinsten, Fürsten und Völker Deutschlands 
gleichmäßig durchdringenden patriotischen Erhebung, bekundet durch glänzende Waffenthaten in einer Art, 
wie sie bisher in der deutschen Geschichte noch nicht dagewesen sind.’] Carl von Sänger in the North 
German Reichstag, session 7, 6 December 1870, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 3, p. 222. 
57  [‘Und diese Mumie sollten wir in der harten Arbeit eines mehr den sechzigjährigen Einigungskampfes zu 
neuem künstlichen Leben auferweckt haben?’] Heinrich Geffcken, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 
Sechs Hochschulvorträge gehalten zu Rostock im Sommer 1900 (Leipzig: Deichert, 1901), p. 41. 
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undermine than to strengthen the idea of monarchical legitimacy. In fact, this concept lost 
most of its credibility when Prussia annexed Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse-Kassel in 1866. It 
was difficult to argue that these annexations were anything other than an act of flagrant crown 
robbery, given that Prussia expropriated three dynasties that had ruled in their principalities 
since the days of the Holy Roman Empire.58 As Le Charivari observed, Prussia incorporated 
the annexed states into her territory like a seamstress who sewed together different parts of a 
blanket (see Caricature 14).  
The fact that the Prussian king condemned Bismarck’s annexation policy as a violation of 
monarchical sovereignty, but was unable to stop it only shows how passive the role of the 
princes had become.59 They were no longer the prime agents of Germany’s transformation. 
Rather, their ministers and bureaucrats now formed the centre of action. The last initiative to 
reform Germany that had emanated from the princes had been the unsuccessful Frankfurt 
Fürstentag in 1863. After that, Bismarck reduced the princes to the rank of lackeys on the 
Prussian state coach, as Le Charivari observed in the context of the negotiations for the 
unification treaties (see Caricature 15). 
When we shift our perspective from monarchical to democratic legitimacy, the picture 
does not look much better. The parliamentary consent to the unification was driven by high 
levels of opportunism, a state of affairs that greatly reduced the legitimising effect of the 
parliamentary vote. This opportunism became manifest in the dramatic change that the 
liberals underwent in the course of unification. Before the summer of 1866, they had 
condemned Bismarck’s German reform policy strongly, because they had disagreed with his 
conservative objectives as a matter of principle. Prussia’s victory against Austria in the Battle 
of Königgrätz changed this attitude over night. As the longed-for goal of national unification 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58  See Hans A. Schmitt, “Prussia’s Last Fling: The Annexations of Hanover, Hesse, Frankfurt, and Nassau, 
June 15-October 8, 1866,” Central European History 8, no. 4 (1975): 316–47. 
59  On this issue, see Mommsen, Das Ringen um den nationalen Staat. Die Gründung und der innere Ausbau 
des Deutschen Reiches unter Otto von Bismarck 1850 bis 1890, pp. 170f., 174f. 
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came within reach, most liberals put their demands for civil rights, a unitary state, and 
parliamentary government to one side and opted to cooperate with Bismarck.60 
The political expression of this change of heart was the creation of the National Liberal 
Party in November 1866, which left stranded the few remaining left liberals who continued to 
oppose Bismarck. Already two months earlier, the national liberals had completed their 
reorientation toward Bismarckian realpolitik by adopting a bill in the Prussian House of 
Representatives that approved – or rather indemnified in retrospect – Bismarck’s 
unconstitutional policy in the Prussian budget crisis of the 1860s. Half a year later, the 
national liberals provided the biggest share of the votes that approved the constitutional draft 
in the constitutive Reichstag. This pragmatic U-turn did not raise cheers everywhere. In the 
South, in particular, criticism was sharp. The Münchener Punsch saw the national liberals as 
gravediggers who had buried their own ideals for the sake of Bismarck’s unification policy 
(see Caricature 16). Views such as this suggest that the parliamentary consent to the 
unification did little to equip the new federal union with a deeper democratic legitimacy. 
The political debates of the unification did nothing to rectify this situation: questions of 
systemic legitimacy played almost no role in them. There was hardly any exchange of 
arguments about the advantages and drawbacks of a federal system. Rather, the entire 
discussion was characterised by a pragmatic consensus that understood a federal organisation 
of Germany to be the only way to bring about national unification. A fundamental critique of 
the federal solution hardly emerged. In the Reichstag, most of the few dissenting voices 
confined themselves to criticising Prussia’s hegemony. Whenever anyone dared to raise 
concerns about Germany’s confederate tradition or the violation of dynastic legitimacy, the 
national liberals immediately either accused him of trying to keep the fragmentation of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60  On the behaviour of the liberals in the unification era, see James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), chapter 3, pp. 79-122, and especially 123-40. 
See also Gerhard Eisfeld, Die Entstehung der liberalen Partei in Deutschland 1858-78. Studie zu den 
Organisationen und Programmen der Liberalen und Demokraten, Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1969). 
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nation alive or simply held him up to ridicule. A good example is their reaction to the 
warnings issued by the world-famous orientalist Heinrich von Ehwald, MP for Hanover and 
member of the oppositional Guelph Party, which remained loyal to the deposed Hanoverian 
crown. During his ten-minute speech, the protocol notes ‘amusement’, ‘great amusement’, 
and ‘objection’ from the ranks of the liberals no less than seventeen times.61  
Nor was the intellectual world much interested in the systemic legitimacy of the union. 
Constitutional lawyers focussed on questions of legality rather than legitimacy. The arts and 
humanities too were largely uninterested in this topic. While there was a comprehensive 
discussion on the nature of Germany as a cultural nation that deserved to unfold its potential 
in a national state, there was only one eminent scholar who made the concrete form of 
organisation of this new state – the federalness of the union – a topic of analysis, namely the 
philosopher Constantin Frantz. In his 1870 work The Dark Side of the North German 
Confederation, he criticised Bismarck’s model of federalism sharply. He argued that Prussia’s 
vast power and the simultaneous weakness of the other states made the federal union a 
cleverly constructed system of oppression.62 As he put it in a later work: ‘The lion and the 
mouse cannot form a federation’.63 But his arguments were not taken seriously, because he 
proposed in the same breath to create a European confederation that would replace the 
individual nation states. At a time when German nationalism was at its zenith, this appeal to 
Europe was unrealistic. The great historian of German public law Michael Stolleis has called 
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61  [‘Heiterkeit’], [‘Große Heiterkeit’], [‘Widerspruch’] Heinrich Ehwald in the North German Reichstag, 
session 7, 6 December 1870, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 3, pp. 214-20. 
62  Constantin Frantz, Die Schattenseite des Norddeutschen Bundes vom preussischen Standpunkte betrachtet: 
eine staatswissenschaftliche Skizze (Berlin: Stilke & van Muyden, 1870). 
63  [‘Der Löwe und die Maus können sich nicht conföderiren.’] Constantin Frantz, Der Föderalismus, als das 
leitende Prinzip für die soziale, staatliche und internationale Organisation unter besonderer Bezugnahme 
auf Deutschland kritisch nachgewiesen und konstruktiv dargestellt (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1879), p. 232. See 
also the edited volumes Deutschland und der Föderalismus, ed. Eugen Stamm (Stuttgart & Berlin: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1921) and Der Föderalismus als universale Idee. Beiträge zum politischen Denken der 
Bismarckzeit, ed. Ilse Hartmann, Beiträge zur Erneuerung des geschichtlichen Denkens (Berlin: Oswald 
Arnold Verlag, 1948). 
Chapter I 
Unification 
 
49!
it a ‘quixotism’.64 It is therefore unsurprising that Frantz’ work failed to fuel any broader 
debate about the structural nature of federalism.  
From this point of view, the fact that the union’s federal character lacked legitimacy 
became manifest in that there was no serious discussion about it at all. Only two features of 
the unification process did appear to legitimise the creation of a small-German federation at 
least to some extent: war and political pragmatism. As sources of legitimacy for a new and 
complex federal order, however, both of these factors were highly problematic. 
Germany’s transformation from a confederation into a federal nation state was achieved 
primarily on the basis of military victory. From a long-term perspective, the unification 
process included one confederate war between the German Confederation and Denmark, one 
civil war among the German states, and one European great power war between the North 
German Confederation and its Southern allies on one side and France on the other. In 1866, 
the Prussian triumph against Austria was the main reason behind the conversion of the 
liberals, whose support was crucial to Bismarck’s strategy for overcoming the division 
between the different state governments. Four years later, the common war effort against 
France broke the widespread opposition in the South against a Prussian-dominated 
unification. As Kladderadatsch pointed out one month after the outbreak of the war, the North 
and the South reached out to each other in a national baptism of blood (see Caricature 17). 
When the constitutive Reichstag approved the unification treaty with Bavaria in December 
1870, Rudolf von Bennigsen, leader of the national liberals, put it with similar pathos:  
 
We admit to the union no opponents, but German brothers, […] who stand the test of an incredibly 
glorious fight for the position that our fatherland deserves and that will now find its expression in 
the German constitution, which first had to be won against a distrustful Europe and a hostile 
France.65 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64  [‘Donquichotterie’] Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. 2, 4 vols. 
(Munich: Beck, 1992), p. 434. 
65  [‘Wir nehmen keine Gegner in den Bund auf, sondern deutsche Genossen, [...] bewährt in einem unerhört 
glorreichen Kampfe für die unserem Vaterlande gebührende Stellung, welche jetzt ihren Ausdruck finden 
wird in einer deutschen Gesamtverfassung, die dem mißtrauischen Europa und dem feindlichen Frankreich 
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On New Year’s Day 1871, Kladderadatsch exposed this legitimising effect of the unification 
wars even more clearly by depicting the birth of the union as the emergence of the Emperor 
from the fire that Napoleon III had stirred in order to destroy Germany. With reference to 
Goethe’s Faust, the subtitle of the caricature noted that by declaring war on Germany the 
French Emperor was ‘part of that power which eternally wills evil and eternally works good’ 
(see Caricature 18). 
While making the unification possible, however, war was not a sustainable source of 
legitimacy. The national enthusiasm that the wars evoked was by its very nature temporary. 
Moreover, it had little to do with the federal structure of the new nation state. Already in 
1871, therefore, it was clear that as soon as the war-trumpets fell silent and technical 
questions of government began to dominate daily political business, it would no longer be 
feasible to justify the federal organisation of Germany by reference to the wars that had 
brought it into existence.  
Aside from war, the only other source from which the federal order could draw some 
legitimacy was the contingent convergence of political interests. Neither the monarchical 
governments nor the German parliaments adopted the federal option for historical, 
monarchical, democratic, or systemic reasons, but because this solution appeared best to 
accommodate the plurality of forces engaged in the process of unification. 
For the Prussian government, a federal solution to the national question was the easiest 
way to establish hegemony over Germany. Le Charivari realised this less than a month after 
the North German Confederation had been founded. The oil of the Prussian military 
monarchy, the journal pointed out, was spreading across the German map and would soon 
reach the southern states as well (see Caricature 19). 
The governments of the other German states, most of which were monarchies of one kind 
or another, endorsed a federal organisation of Germany primarily because they saw it as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
erst abgewonnen werden mußte.’] Rudolf von Bennigsen in the North German Reichstag, session 10, 9 
December 1870, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 130, p. 443. 
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only chance of preserving monarchical sovereignty in a national state whose creation they 
could no longer prevent. Since the dissolution of the German Confederation, confederate 
solutions were no longer a realistic option. A unitary state, on the other hand, was 
incompatible with the idea of leaving the sovereign status of each of the twenty-five princes 
unchanged. When he gave in to the pressure of offering the Prussian king the imperial crown, 
Ludwig II of Bavaria bemoaned his dilemma in a letter to his brother Otto: 
 
If Bavaria could be on her own, independent from the union, then it wouldn’t matter; but as this 
would literally be a political impossibility, as the people and the army would be against it and as 
the crown would therefore lose all support in the country, it is, as dreadful and terrible as it 
remains, an act of political prudence, and indeed of necessity in the interest of the crown and the 
country if the King of Bavaria makes this offer, […] because after all Bavaria must join the union 
for political reasons […].66 
 
For similar reasons of political necessity, a federal solution seemed to be the least bad option 
to most princes. Very few adopted a different view. The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was the 
only monarch who advocated the creation of a German unitary state. But he was an outsider 
among the princes anyway. He had supported the liberal German National Club, the 
Deutscher Nationalverein, and its campaign for a lesser-German national state since the late 
1850s and endorsed the idea of a parliamentarily responsible national government. It is no 
surprise, then, that his voice counted for little among the princes.  
The parliaments, finally, accepted that Germany would be organised federally because they 
saw this as their best chance of achieving what the popular movement had been fighting for 
since the Napoleonic Wars: the creation of a German national state. The national liberal 
majority of MPs certainly harboured other ideals. As they ultimately desired a unitary state 
with a parliamentary government, they understood the federal constitution of 1871 only as a 
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66  [‘Könnte Bayern allein, frei vom Bunde, stehen, dann wäre es gleichgültig, da dies aber geradezu eine 
politische Unmöglichkeit wäre, da Volk und Armee sich dagegen stemmen würden und die Krone mithin 
allen Halt im Land verlöre, so ist es, so schauderhaft und entsetzlich es immerhin bleibt, ein Akt von 
politischer Klugheit, ja von Notwendigkeit im Interesse der Krone und des Landes, wenn der König von 
Bayern jenes Anerbieten stellt, [...] nachdem Bayern nun doch einmal aus politischen Gründen in den Bund 
muß [...]’] Ludwig II to his brother Otto, November 1870, printed in Deuerlein, Augenzeugenberichte, p. 239. 
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partial success.  They approved it because the failure of the 1848 revolution had ‘taught’ them 
that they could not found a nation state against the will of the monarchical governments. In 
light of this experience, their strategy was to adopt the federal constitution as a compromise 
that they would later try to renegotiate in the direction of greater centralisation and 
parliamentary government.67 As the national liberal MP for Hagen, Freiherr von Finke, put it 
in the constitutive Reichstag of 1867: ‘First close the deal for the house, and then, perhaps, 
make it cosier.’68 
Pragmatic views such as this guided the decisions of both the monarchical governments 
and the German parliaments in the unification. Federalism was thus adopted as Germany’s 
future form of organisation not because it was anybody’s ideal, but simply because it 
promised to address the greatest range of political interests. In other words, the unification 
was an act of realpolitik on every side.  
Its foundations in pragmatism and convenience had one advantage: they made unification 
work. In contrast to the manifold other proposals that circulated in the first half of the 1860s, 
Bismarck’s federal solution always had a good chance of success because it aimed to 
accommodate the interests of all important political actors at least to some degree. Exactly the 
opposite was true, for example, for the Southern Union Plan hatched by the Bavarian prime 
minister and later Chancellor Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst. He proposed to create 
an independent southern federation and to unite it with the North German Confederation in 
another confederate union. Since it failed to take into account the desire of the parliaments for 
a uniform national state, this plan flopped no fewer than three times, twice in the late 1860s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67  Dieter Langewiesche, “Bismarck und die Nationalliberalen,” in Otto von Bismarck und die Parteien, ed. 
Lothar Gall, Wissenschaftliche Reihe / Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung 3 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), 73–89. 
68  [‘bringen Sie das Haus erst unter Dach, um es dann vielleicht wohnlicher einzurichten.’] Freiherr von Finke 
in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12, 13 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, 
p. 287. 
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and finally in November 1870 when the Bavarian government brought it up again in an act of 
last minute panic.69  
However, the downside of making the legitimacy of the union dependent on shared 
political interests was that these could easily change over time and, as a result, denude the 
federal order of its raison d’être. The unification thus placed Germany’s organisation as a 
federal state at the mercy of how the confrontation between monarchical and parliamentary 
power would subsequently develop. In April 1867, Kladderadatsch exposed this dilemma 
nicely. Since the federal constitution had been ‘conceived on the earth of reality’, the satire 
magazine argued, the true shape of the infant union would only become clear once it had 
grown out of it swaddling clothes (see Caricature 20). 
As this observation suggests, the fact that the unification did not equip the federal 
organisation of the new nation state with any deep and abiding source of legitimacy had an 
extremely problematic impact on the evolution of the union in the long run. In forging 
Germany’s future, Le Charivari had already pointed out in the context of the war against 
Denmark in 1864, Prussia acted like a rough blacksmith who replaced law by power (see 
Caricature 21). To put it in more concrete terms, the unification made power rather than law 
the main principle of the new federal union. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the 
special rights of the southern states. The fact that these had been incorporated into the 
constitution demonstrated to everyone that Germany’s federal structures were little more than 
an instrument of power that could be changed for political purposes at any time.  
Kladderadatsch exposed this lack of any deeper legitimacy of the federal union with a 
great sense for the importance of symbolic policies (see caricature 22). With reference to the 
Latin proverb ‘the end crowns the work’, the satirical magazine suggested that as the endpoint 
of the unification process the creation of the imperial crown revealed the true nature of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69  On the Southern Union Plan, see Wilhelm, Das Verhältnis der süddeutschen Staaten zum Norddeutschen 
Bund (1867-1870), pp. 79-96. See also Mommsen, Das Ringen um den nationalen Staat. Die Gründung und 
der innere Ausbau des Deutschen Reiches unter Otto von Bismarck 1850 bis 1890, pp. 196f. 
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union: the establishment of the Kaisertum was intended to draw a cloak of imperial splendour 
over the disagreeable nudity of the federal order’s origins in expedience, as manifested in the 
unification treaties. ‘There are certain things’, the journal observed, ‘that one gladly covers 
with the Emperor’s cloak of love’. 
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Caricature 1: ‘Reichsprognostikon’, Kladderadatsch (September 1866), vol. 19, no. 41, p. 
166.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Prognosis for the Reich 
Subtitles (from top to bottom): How it was so far./How it then became./How it will come./And what will be 
inevitable.  
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Caricature 2: ‘Der deutsche Bürgerkrieg in Bismarck’scher Auffassung’, Münchener Punsch 
(27 August 1865), vol. 18, no. 35, p. 275.  
 
 
 
 
Title: The German Civil War according to Bismarck’s point of view 
Subtitles: The three at the table: Gosh! – what the hell does that mean? 
Bismarck: Calm down, just stay neutral! We are just shooting localised bullets! 
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Caricature 3: ‘Un Nouveau Faust’, Le Charivari (6 May 1867), vol. 36.  
 
 
 
 
Title: News 
Subtitles: A new Faust – scene of seduction. Margaret, close your eyes! 
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Caricature 4: ‘Die Tri-Aß’, Münchener Punsch (24 January 1864), vol. 17, no. 4, p. 25. 
 
 
Title: The Tri-Ace 
Subtitles: Bavaria: I got all of the ‘hearts’ already, now I’ll play my biggest trump! If you have the courage, 
make a trick! 
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Caricature 5: ‘Deutschlands Zukunft’, Kikeriki (1870).  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Germany’s future. 
Subtitles: Will it be kept together under one hat? I rather think it will be kept under a spiked helmet!  
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Caricature 6: ‘Le Nouveau Blason Prussien’, Le Charivari (30 August 1871), vol. 40.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: The new Prussian crest. 
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Caricature 7: ‘Der Neue Gulliver’, Le Charivari (1866).  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: The new Gulliver 
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Caricature 8: ‘A tout prix’, Kladderadatsch (December 1870), vol. 23, no. 56, p. 484.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: At any cost. 
Subtitles: The small ones: The coat doesn’t fit. 
The tall one: Go right ahead! We’ll make it fit. Everybody’s measurements will be taken, and then the coat will 
be changed until it will fit comfortably. Go right ahead! 
Word on the coat: union 
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Caricature 9: ‘Preußens idealer Reichsgedanke und sein Verhältnis zu Bayern’, Die Bremse (4 
April 1874), vol. 3, no. 14, p. 105.  
 
 
 
 
Title: Prussia’s ideal conception of the Reich 
Subtitles: and its relation to Bavaria. The rabbit will perhaps be eaten last, but it will be eaten.  
Word above the rabbit’s head: special rights. 
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Caricature 10:  ‘Auch ein Veteran’, Die Bremse (9 May 1874), vol. 3, no. 19, pp. 145f.  
 
 
 
 
Title: Also a veteran, 
Subtitles: who was there in 1866 and 1870/71 and on other occasion, but who does not participate in the 
veterans’ celebration.  
Poem: I was not invited to the proud celebrations,/even though I was there/in the war and on the battlefield; I 
gave my best,/you can read it in the history books. 
For the prince and fatherland I/fought with every foe,/I did it without thanks – /has of all this been forgotten? 
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Caricature 11: ‘Die friedliche Familie’, Kladderadatsch (December 1866), vol. 19, no. 59f., p. 
248.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: The peaceful family. 
Subtitles: Foreigner: I don’t trust them yet; if they see my red trousers, they’ll certainly run wild! 
Native: Fear not, good Sir. As long as you stay calm, they’ll not do anything to you.   
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Caricature 12: ‘Constitutionelle Drehscheibe’, Kladderadatsch (March 1869), vol. 22, no. 
14f., p. 100.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Constitutional Carrousel. 
Subtitles: The House of Lords is old, the Reichstag young again, but man hopes for the better. 
Label on the four riders (clock-wise): Landtag (Prussian House of Representatives); House of Lords; customs 
(parliament of the customs union); Reichstag 
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Caricature 13: ‘Actualitès’, Le Charivari (9 July 1866), vol. 35.  
 
 
 
 
Title: News 
Subtitles: You fool, why did you break this plate into a thousand pieces? – Madam, it’s all because of politics! I 
just wanted to see how matters are with the German Confederation these days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
Unification 
 
68!
Caricature 14: ‘Ce que c’est pourtant que de savoir se servir d’une aiguille’, Le Charivari 
(September 1866).  
 
 
 
 
Subtitles: It is one thing to know how to use the needle…but it is a skill that should not be abused. 
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Caricature 15: ‘Comment Bismarck comprend l’unite allemande’, Le Charivari (26 December 
1870), vol. 39.  
 
 
 
 
Title: News 
Subtitles: How Bismarck understands German unity 
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Caricature 16: ‘Das Alles ruht, und noch manches Andere.’, Münchener Punsch (April 1868).  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: All of this and many other things lie buried. 
Subtitles: From the works of the national-liberal gravediggers.  
Inscriptions on the gravestones (from left to right): freedom of speech; fight against the military budget; right of 
self-determination for the people in Schleswig-Holstein; 1831 constitution of Electoral Hesse 
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Caricature 17: ‘Mit Blut getauft’, Kladderadatsch (August 1870), vol. 23, no. 37, p. 344.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Baptised with blood. 
Subtitles: The true bridge over the Main River. 
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Caricature 18: ‘Glück auf zum neuen Jahr’, Kladderadatsch (Januar 1871), vol. 24, no. 1, p. 
4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Happy New Year! 
Subtitles: A part of that power which eternally wills evil and eternally works good. (Goethe, Faust) 
Label on the cauldron: Germany’s downfall. 
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Caricature 19: ‘Une tache d’huile’, Le Charivari (2 May 1867), vol. 36.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: News 
Subtitles: An oil stain. 
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Caricature 20: ‘Illustrierter Rückblick’ (segment), Kladderadatsch (Juni 1867), vol. 20, no. 
29f., p. 160.  
 
 
 
 
 
Subtitles: On the earth of reality, the North German Confederation has conceived the Reich constitution, of 
which we will know whether it makes sense only after it has grown out of its swaddling clothes.  
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Caricature 21: ‘Actualitès’, Le Charivari (2 September 1864), vol. 33.  
 
 
 
 
Title: News 
Subtitles: The professor of the new Prussian law develops his guiding principle: power trumps law – Tense your 
biceps, by the Devil! A good blow with the fist! That’s all you need! 
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Caricature 22: ‘Finis coroant opus.’, Kladderadatsch (December 1870), vol. 23, no. 59f., p. 
528.  
 
 
 
 
 
Title: The end crowns the work. 
Subtitles: There are certain things that one gladly covers with the Emperor’s cloak of love. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONSTITUTION 
 
 
 
When we look at the map of Germany in 1871, we realise how diverse the imperial 
federal state was. Although rather uniform in comparison to the patchwork of more than three 
hundred territories that had made up the Holy Roman Empire, Imperial Germany still 
comprised twenty-five very different states: the federal hegemon Prussia; the four middling 
states Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Saxony, and Baden; and the twenty small states Hesse, 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, 
Map 1: Imperial Germany in 1871. 
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Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-
Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Waldeck-Pyrmont, Reuß Senior Line, Reuß Junior 
Line, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. Among these were four 
kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies, seven lower-ranking principalities, and three 
Hanseatic republics. Even after unification, diversity thus remained one of the main 
characteristics of Germany.1  
How did the constitutional principles look that held this diverse union together? In other 
words, what was the legal framework in which the federal state evolved? Legal historians 
have composed several outstanding studies about the normative structures of the imperial 
constitution.2 But in order to understand the political motives behind these structures it is not 
enough to focus on constitutional provisions alone. Rather, we have to look at the constitution 
in light of the contemporary political debate about it.  
The main forum of this debate was the Reichstag that negotiated the constitutional draft of 
the united governments between February and April 1867. This constitutive constitutional 
assembly was elected according to the electoral law that the revolutionary Frankfurt 
constitution had established in 1849.3 It determined that the parliament was elected by 
universal and direct election with a secret ballot. This regulation was much more progressive 
than the relevant provisions for most of the state parliaments, in particular the Prussian three-
class franchise. Bismarck embraced this progressive electoral law not because he was a 
supporter of universal suffrage, but because he saw it as a strategic move that would gain him 
the support of the liberals for his unification policy. Moreover, he was relatively sure that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  On the cultural aspects of this diversity, see for example Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: 
Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill and London: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1997). 
2  See above all Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 128-243 and Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 785-1074. 
3  See FC (1849), § 94.2 and Gesetz, betreffend die Wahlen der Abgeordneten zum Volkshause, 12 April 1849, 
FRGBl. (1849), pp. 79-83. A treaty between Prussia and the other North German governments determined 
that each state had to organise the elections according to the Frankfurt provisions. See Bundesvertrag 
Preußens mit den norddeutschen Staaten, 18 August 1866, art. 5, printed in  Huber, Dokumente, vol. 2, no. 
196, pp. 268f. On the electoral law of the Frankfurt Assembly, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 2, pp. 
606-8 and Manfred Botzenhart, Deutscher Parlamentarismus in der Revolutionszeit: 1848-1850, Handbuch 
der Geschichte des deutschen Parlamentarismus (Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1977), pp. 141-63. 
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elections would not produce a radical majority, as the 1848 revolution had ‘taught’ him that 
the people tended to vote conservatively.4 His strategy worked out perfectly: the elections of 
12 February produced a conservative liberal majority that largely backed his course of action.5 
Most of the chief problems discussed by the Reichstag concerned the relationship between 
the federal level and the constituent states. Five out of six special debates on the agenda dealt 
with this issue in some form or another.6 The federal nature of Germany thus determined the 
parliamentary debate about the constitution more than any other topic. This dominance offers 
us the chance to expose the different political motives behind the federal structures of the 
constitution by looking at the main points of controversy between the parliamentarians and 
the monarchical governments. 
In the Reichstag, the political aspirations of the liberals were particularly important 
because they constituted slightly more than half of all MPs, who numbered 297 in total. Three 
issues were crucial. First, the liberals preferred a unitary organisation of Germany. Bismarck 
and the united governments insisted on the sovereignty of the states. Second, the liberals 
wanted to establish a national catalogue of civil rights and political liberties, just like the 
Frankfurt constitution had done in 1849. The state governments rejected this idea as an 
infringement of their sovereignty. Third, the liberals called for the introduction of federal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  On Bismarck’s understanding of elections, see Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Lehrjahre der Demokratie. 
Wahlen und politische Kultur im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009), p. 33; Andreas 
Biefang, Die andere Seite der Macht: Reichstag und Öffentlichkeit im “System Bismarck” 1871-1890, 
Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 156 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2009), 
p. 45; and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918, Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 1380 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), p. 61. 
5  For the distribution of seats in the constitutive Reichstag, see Georg Hirth, ed., Hirth’s Parlaments-Almanach 
(Berlin: Duncker, 1867), pp. 105-8. On the influence of the constitutive Reichstag in general, see Klaus Erich 
Pollmann, “Parlamentseinfluß während der Nationalstaatsbildung 1867-1871,” in Regierung, Bürokratie und 
Parlament in Preußen und Deutschland von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Gerhard Albert Ritter (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 1983), pp. 56–75, and chapter 1 in Pollmann's book Parlamentarismus im Norddeutschen Bund 
1867-1870, Handbuch der Geschichte des deutschen Parlamentarismus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1985), pp. 21-
36. 
6  See Ernst Bezold, ed., Alphabetisches Sprech- und Sach-Register nebst zwei Congruenz-Registern zu der 
Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes und der Deutschen Reichsverfassung, sowie zu den Verhandlungen 
und Verträgen der verbündeten norddeutschen und beziehungsweise der süddeutschen Regierungen und den 
Reichstags- beziehungsweise Landtags-Verhandlungen (Berlin: Habel, 1873), pp. 10-12. 
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ministries that would be responsible to the national parliament, while Bismarck and the 
princes were determined to prevent the creation of parliamentary government at all costs.  
In discussing these issues and the federal structures of the constitution the parliamentarians 
very often adopted a historical perspective. For them, it was a matter of great importance how 
far the constitution was linked to Germany’s recent constitutional past. In fact, their decisions 
were often shaped by the experiences of how previous constitutional orders had developed. In 
the preliminary proceedings of the Reichstag, this issue became most clear in the comments 
by Benedict Waldeck. The MP for Berlin had been one of the leaders of the Prussian left 
liberals during the 1848 revolution, when he had prepared a progressive constitutional charter 
that had introduced parliamentary government. Even though he had been reduced to a second-
rank figure after the failure of the revolution, his words still carried a lot of weight. Drawing 
on his political experience, he now warned his colleagues that  
 
if we want to speak about this constitutional draft properly, it is absolutely necessary that we 
familiarise ourselves thoroughly with the conditions […] under which the German Confederation 
succeeded the Holy Roman Empire and with those efforts that arose in Frankfurt, in Erfurt, and 
then also in other projects […].7 
 
As Waldeck’s warning indicated, three historic constitutions stood at the centre of discussion. 
The first was the constitution of the German Confederation, consisting of two international 
treaties between the German states, the Bundesacte of 1815 and the Vienna Final Act of 1820; 
the second was the federal constitution of the Frankfurt Assembly, framed in the context of 
the 1848 revolution; and the third was the 1849 draft constitution of the Erfurt Union, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  [‘Es ist durchaus nothwendig, daß, wenn man gründlich über diesen Verfassungs-Entwurf sprechen will, man 
sich in diejenigen Zustände vertieft, [...] welche auf das Deutsche Reich den Deutschen Bund folgen ließen, 
in die Bestrebungen, welche in Frankfurt, welche in Erfurt und dann nachher auch in anderen Projecten 
theilweise auftauchten [...].’] Franz Duncker in the constitutive Reichstag, session 9, 9 March 1867, printed 
in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 92. 
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attempt by Prussia to outmanoeuvre Austria in the struggle for control over German 
unification by revising the Frankfurt draft in a conservative way.8  
But there was no general consensus on how much this legacy shaped – or should be 
allowed to shape – the new constitution. In the opening debate, Benedict Waldeck argued that 
the constitutional draft contained ‘reminiscences of almost all parts of the German 
development’.9 His national liberal colleague Johannes von Miquel refuted this assertion by 
claiming that  ‘great people do not copy’.10  
It was clear to the MPs, however, that any structural references that the new constitution 
would make to the German Confederation would automatically strengthen the monarchical 
governments, because the Confederation had been designed to protect the princes. In the same 
manner, it was clear that any elements that the constitution would take over from the 
constitutional drafts of Frankfurt and Erfurt would enhance the power of the Reichstag, as 
these revolutionary charters were role models for a parliamentary German federal state. In 
short, the question of whether and how the new constitution would draw on its predecessors 
was directly linked to the balance of monarchical and parliamentary interests involved in the 
process of deliberation. In order to understand the character of the constitution and its 
underlying motives, then, we need to establish the extent to which the federal strands of the 
new document derived from Frankfurt, Erfurt, or the Confederation.11  
This chapter will examine the genealogy of the Empire’s federal structures. It will first 
look at how the constitution guaranteed a federal mode of organisation and how it distributed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  On the Erfurt Union, see Gunther Mai, ed., Die Erfurter Union und das Erfurter Unionsparlament 1850 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2000) and the reference book by Jochen Lengemann, Das Deutsche Parlament (Erfurter 
Union) von 1850. Ein Handbuch: Mitglieder, Amtsträger, Lebensdaten, Fraktionen (Jena: Urban & Fischer, 
2000). 
9  [‘Reminiscenzen fast aus allen Teilen der deutschen Entwickelung’] Benedict Waldeck in the constitutive 
Reichstag, session 9, 9 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 95. 
10  [‘große Völker kopieren nicht’] Johannes von Miquel in the constitutive Reichstag, session 9, 9 March 1867, 
printed in ibid, p. 106. 
11  For brief structural comparisons, see Hans Boldt, “Der Föderalismus in den Reichsverfassungen von 1849 
und 1871,” in Die Amerikanische Verfassung und Deutsch-Amerikanisches Verfassungsdenken, ed. Hermann 
Wellenreuther and Claudia Schnurmann, Krefelder Historische Symposien:Deutschland und Amerika. 
Zweites Symposion, veranstaltet in Krefeld 28.-31. Mai 1987 (New York & Oxford: Berg, 1990), pp. 297–
333 and Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 109-16.  
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competences between the national level and the states. In this context, it will become obvious 
why the liberals gave up their demands of creating a unitary state and a national catalogue of 
basic rights. After that, this chapter will examine the functions of the different federal 
constitutional organs. This will make clear that the Bundesrat was the actual centre of the 
constitution – a state of affairs that made the introduction of parliamentarily responsible 
federal ministries structurally impossible. 
This analysis will demonstrate that the federal structures of the constitution protected 
monarchical power by combining different features from previous German constitutions in a 
new way. The ill-defined juxtaposition of confederate and unitary elements that resulted from 
this combination made it likely that over the course of the pending economic, social, and 
cultural integration of the union federal structures would dissolve and give way to a more 
centralised order, in which the parliament would enjoy much more power. The Reichstag 
further reinforced this predisposition of the constitution by using amendments to transform 
the role of the Chancellor. This move, in turn, helps to explain why the liberals gave up many 
of their key desires in 1867: they had good reason to believe that their objectives would 
materialise in the long run. 
 
States 
 
The constitution opened with the solemn declaration of the princes that they ‘conclude 
an everlasting union’.12 Very similar in wording to the introductory clause of the Bundesacte, 
this declaration suggested that the constitution was a treaty among monarchs who were 
founding a confederate league of princes.13 But while the Bundesacte confined the purpose of 
the Confederation to defence, the preamble of the imperial constitution held that the Empire 
had been founded for more general reasons, namely not only ‘for the protection of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  [‘schließen einen ewigen Bund’] RV (1871), preamble. 
13  Bundesacte (1815), art. 1. 
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territory of the union and the law that applies there’, but also for the purpose of ‘caring for the 
welfare of the German people’.14 
This general purpose of the union implied that the Empire was more integrated than a 
confederation. The articles following the preamble then established a federal order, most 
importantly by defining a federal territory, introducing a common nationality for the citizens 
of all constituent states, and creating a wide range of federal constitutional organs.15  
But the constitution did not make this federal organisation of the union an irrevocable 
feature of Germany. In contrast to the Vienna Final Act and most other constitutions, it left 
the question completely open of what kind of entity the union was under constitutional and 
international law.16  In theory, Germany could thus be reorganised as a centralised or 
confederate state any time. Many of the most basic provisions necessary for establishing a 
stable federal order were not addressed by the constitution at all. It neither determined the 
status of the states in the union, nor did it guarantee their permanent existence. Moreover, 
unlike in the Frankfurt draft there were no regulations about the procedure and limits of a 
possible reorganisation of the federal territory.17 Under the constitution, it was thus perfectly 
legal to abolish all states and to create one uniform German territory that would be run by a 
central government on its own.  
This meant that the princes did not enjoy a constitutional guarantee of their sovereign 
status. Why, then, did they propose such a potentially dangerous charter for a union that they 
had created primarily in order to protect monarchical power? On the one hand, this was a 
question of flexibility. Bismarck wanted to prevent a further expansion of parliamentary 
rights by being able to react to all possible scenarios. At the heart of this strategy was the idea 
of giving the constitution such ‘elastic, inconspicuous, but far-reaching’ structures that he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  [‘zum Schutze des Bundesgebietes und des innerhalb desselben gültigen Rechts’], [‘zur Pflege der Wohlfahrt 
des Deutschen Volkes’] RV (1871), preamble. See also Bundesacte (1815), art. 2. 
15  RV (1871), art. 1, 3, 6-32. 
16  WSA (1820), art. 1. 
17  FC (1849), § 90. 
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could, if necessary, devolve the union into a loose confederation or upgrade it to a centralised, 
greater-Prussian state.18 On the other hand, he and the princes probably deemed an explicit 
guarantee superfluous, because they had made monarchical sovereignty the underlying 
principle of the whole constitution.19 
It is also not straightforward why the Reichstag agreed to a constitution that did not clearly 
determine what kind of union Germany was. The strong confederate elements of the 
constitution contradicted the unitary desires of the liberal majority of MPs sharply. But there 
was one factor that influenced their behaviour more than all political ideals or logical 
considerations: the fear that history might repeat itself. Memories of how the Frankfurt and 
Erfurt drafts had failed were still fresh, especially because some of the MPs had already been 
part of the revolutionary parliaments. The president of the Reichstag, Eduard von Simson, had 
held this position already in the Frankfurt Assembly and the parliament of the Erfurt Union.20   
Bismarck and the united governments were clever enough to exploit this historical trauma. 
In his first speech before the Reichstag, Bismarck told the parliamentarians to ‘take the 
lessons to heart […] that we have drawn from the failed attempts of Frankfurt and Erfurt’.21 
He put it even clearer in the declaration that King William read out when he opened the 
parliament: 
 
If these attempts [to found a national state] have not achieved their aim, if they have enhanced 
rather than cured the fragmentation, because one was misled about the merit of the present by 
hopes and memories, about the meaning of facts by ideals, we thus acknowledge the necessity of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  [‘elastischen, unscheinbaren, aber weitgreifenden Ausdrücken’] Bismarck in his famous Putbuser Diktat, 30 
October 1866, quoted in Reinhart Koselleck, “Bund,” ed. Otto Brunner and Werner Conze, Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett, 1997), 
p. 668. 
19  On this point, see Holste, Bundesstaat im Wandel, p. 110. 
20  On Simson, who later became the first president of the Imperial Court, and his role in the national 
assemblies, see Günther Meinhardt, Eduard von Simson. Der Parlamentspräsident und die Reichseinigung 
(Bonn: Habelt, 1981). 
21  [‘die Lehren zu Herzen genommen haben, die wir aus den verfehlten Versuchen von Frankfurt und von 
Erfurt ziehen mußten’] Bismarck in the constitutive Reichstag, accompanying remarks to the Speech from 
the Throne, 24 February 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 76. 
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striving for the unification of the German people on the basis of facts rather than sacrificing once 
more what we can achieve for what we desire.22 
 
Warnings such as this urged the parliamentarians to restrain their demands and to adopt the 
constitutional draft quickly. They did not fail to have the desired effect. In the opening debate, 
the great fear that the creation of a national constitution might fail again became most 
manifest in an emotional appeal that the national liberal MP Carl Braun made to his 
colleagues: 
 
Think of Frankfurt, be humble in your demands, do not demand everything at once, be content 
with a part, so that unlike in 1849 the whole thing will not fade away in the air like a Fata 
Morgana.23 
 
The top priority of the national liberals was therefore to make sure that this time a national 
state would be founded, regardless of how its constitutional arrangements might materialise in 
detail. Once unification was achieved, they thought, they could change the constitution 
according to their desires. As Georg Freiherr von Vincke, MP from Westphalia, put it:  
 
Let us rather speak about existence. Unity and freedom are impossible without existence. What we 
have to make sure here is the existence of the German fatherland, first of the North German 
Confederation. Once we have secured this, let us continue to talk about how this will lead to unity 
and freedom.24  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  [‘Wenn diese Bestrebungen bisher nicht zum Ziele geführt, wenn sie die Zerrissenheit, anstatt sie zu heilen, 
nur gesteigert haben, weil man sich durch Hoffnungen oder Erinnerungen über den Werth der Gegenwart, 
durch Ideale über die Bedeutung der Thatsachen täuschen ließ, so erkennen wir daraus die Nothwendigkeit, 
die Einigung des Deutschen Volkes an der Hand der Thatsachen zu suchen, und nicht wieder das Erreichbare 
dem Wünschenswerthen zu opfern’] King William I of Prussia, Speech from the Throne in the constitutive 
Reichstag, 24 February 1867, printed in ibid., p. 72. 
23  [‘Denkt an Frankfurt, seid bescheiden in Euren Ansprüchen, verlangt nicht Alles auf einmal, begnügt Euch 
mit einem Theile, damit das ganze nicht wieder wie im Jahre 1849 als Fata Morgana in der Luft zerinne.’] 
Carl Braun in the constitutive Reichstag, session 10, 11 March 1867, printed ibid., p. 154. 
24  [‘Wir wollen lieber von der Existenz reden. Einheit und Freiheit ist nicht möglich ohne Existenz. Was wir 
hier zu sichern haben, ist die Existenz der Deutschen Vaterlandes, zunächst die Existenz des Norddeutschen 
Bundes. Haben wir die, so lassen Sie uns weiter reden, wie er zur Einheit und zur Freiheit führt.’] Georg 
Freiherr von Vincke in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12, 13 March 1867, printed in ibid, p. 304. 
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This perspective suggests that it is wrong to accuse the liberals – as some historians have done 
– of having chosen unification over freedom.25 Rather, they decided to bring them about one 
after another, because the attempt to achieve both at the same time had failed in 1848/49. This 
strategy made it necessary for them to accept that for now Germany would take the form of an 
ill-defined federation rather than a unitary state. If one was serious about uniting Germany, 
the left liberal Franz Duncker maintained, it made little sense to uphold the ‘illusion’ of a 
unitary state. In light of the experience of Frankfurt and Erfurt, he concluded, it was perfectly 
acceptable to adopt a compromise, even if the constitution that resulted ‘[did] not even reach 
the ideal of a federal state [and] essentially [bore] the character of an alliance of independent 
governments’.26  
This attitude sanctioned a prodigious act of renunciation. It required the liberals not only to 
sacrifice many of their core ideals for the time being, but also to turn a blind eye to many 
passages of the constitution that were obviously ill-defined. For the lawyers among them in 
particular, this was very hard. Carl Braun, who had worked at the Wiesbaden court of appeal 
and was now a barrister in Berlin, made no secret of this dilemma:  
 
The form of the draft has been criticised, and, indeed, the draft shares few similarities with what 
we are used to call a constitution in ordinary terms. From this perspective, [the draft] is not really 
correct, even less “elegant”; but what use would the most correct and elegant draft be if it 
remained a piece of paper, as happened to the extraordinarily correct and elegant Reich 
constitution of the year 1849?27 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  See for example Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, vol. 1: Deutsche Geschichte vom 
Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Beck, 2000), chapter 4 'Einheit 
vor Freiheit', pp. 131-265. On this view, see also Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. 
2: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie, 2 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1991), pp. 314ff.  
26  [‘Illusion’], [‘nicht einmal das Ideal eines Bundesstaates erreicht, [...] sondern wesentlich nur den Charakter 
des Bündnisses selbständiger Regierungen trägt’] Franz Duncker in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12, 13 
March, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 278. 
27  [‘Man hat auch die Form des Entwurfes getadelt, und allerdings hat der Entwurf wenig Aehnlichkeit mit 
dem, was wir nach gewöhnlichen Begriffen eine Constitution zu nennen pflegen. Er ist in dieser Beziehung 
gerade nicht correct, noch viel weniger „elegant“, allein, was würde der correcteste und eleganteste Entwurf 
helfen, wenn er ein Stück Papier bliebe, wie die außerordnetlich correcte und elegante Reichsverfassung vom 
Jahre 1849 geblieben ist.’] Carl Braun in the constitutive Reichstag, session 10, 11 March 1867, printed in 
ibid., pp. 150f. 
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Another important consequence of this attitude was that the liberals gave up their demand 
for the establishment of a catalogue of basic rights similar to those in the Frankfurt and Erfurt 
constitutions. 28  This decision has often been criticised as one of the quintessential 
shortcomings of the unification, because it contributed to delaying a proper democratisation 
of Germany.29 But this objection needs to be assessed within the broader processual context 
of the constitution. The liberals decided to abandon a national basic rights catalogue not least 
because there was a certain degree of compensation. On the one hand, the constitution 
determined that some basic rights, such as the freedom of the press and the right to form 
associations, would be regulated by way of federal legislation.30 As no federal law could be 
passed without the consent of the Reichstag, these rights were in fact constitutionally 
protected.  
On the other hand, civil rights and political liberties were usually guaranteed by the 
constitutions of the states. Except for the two duchies of Mecklenburg, all of the Länder had 
adopted a basic rights catalogue either during or after the 1848 revolutions, most importantly 
Prussia.31 From a systemic perspective, Germany’s federal nature thus made the inclusion of 
basic rights into the national constitution superfluous. The national-liberal MP Friedrich 
Wilhelm Grumbrecht pointed out that it would not be worth jeopardising the creation of a 
national state by insisting on a catalogue of rights that the constitutions of the states 
guaranteed anyway. Negotiations about basic rights would take a very long time, he argued, 
and might thus alienate the princes. For him, the lesson from 1848 was clear: ‘I was a member 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  FC (1849), section VI ‘Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes’, §§ 130-189. EC (1849), section VI ‘Die 
Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes’, §§ 128-187. 
29  On this discussion, see Konrad Remmele, “Bürgerliche Freiheit ohne verfassungsrechtliche 
Freiheitsverbürgungen? Zur Diskussion um das Fehlen der Grundrechte in der Verfassung des Deutschen 
Reiches von 1871,” in Grundrechte im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Gerhard Dilcher et al., Rechtshistorische Reihe 
19 (Frankfurt am Main and Bern: Lang, 1982), 189–213. 
30  RV (1871), art. 4.16. 
31  PC (1850), Title II ‘Von den Rechten der Preußen’, art. 3-42. 
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of the Frankfurt national assembly […] and I know that in Frankfurt the constitutional opus 
failed to a large degree because of the negotiations about basic rights.’32 
Very few voices disagreed with this empirical logic. Serious objections were only raised 
three years later. When the Reichstag voted on the unification treaties in December 1870, the 
leader of the Catholic Centre Party, Ludwig Windthorst, claimed that the constitution made 
the guarantee of basic rights by the states ineffective. As the Reich rather than the Länder 
enjoyed the power to determine the allocation of competences, he argued that the former 
could easily deprive the latter of their right to regulate basic rights. Whatever the state 
constitutions determined, he concluded, they could not protect basic rights adequately.33 
Windthorst’s concerns arose primarily from the fact that in the negotiations of the 
unification treaties with the southern states the monarchical governments had changed the 
way the constitution could be amended. While the North German constitution of 1867 had 
required a two-third majority of all votes in the Bundesrat for an amendment, the 1871 
constitution did not set the bar as high. The constitution could now be amended by way of 
ordinary legislation, without any special requirements.34 This made it much easier to change 
the allocation of competences between the Reich and the Länder, because Prussia needed the 
support of only a few more states in order to reach a simple majority in the Bundesrat. From 
Windthorst’s perspective, the state constitutions thus no longer offered any guarantee for 
basic rights because the states would sooner or later lose their independent authority. If the 
revised constitution entered into force, he argued, ‘then the mediatisation of all German states 
is undoubtedly a foregone conclusion, even the mediatisation of the most powerful state, 
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32  [‘Ich bin Mitglied der Frankfurter National-Versammlung gewesen [...] und ich weiß, daß das 
Verfassungswerk in Frankfurt wesentlich mit gescheitert ist durch die Berathungen über die Grundrechte.’] 
Friedrich Wilhelm Grumbrecht in the constitutive Reichstag, session 15, 19 March 1867, printed in 
Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 417. 
33  Ludwig Windthorst in the North German Reichstag, session 6, 5 December 1870, printed in Fenske, 
Reichsgründung 1850-1870, no. 129, pp. 439-41. 
34  NDBV (1867), art. 78. RV (1871), art. 78. 
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Prussia, because it is within the discretion of the federal authorities to extend their 
competences […]’.35   
This warning points to a more general problem, namely the way in which the constitution 
distributed competences between the national level and the states. The only competences that 
the constitution defined were those of the Reich. All powers that it did not explicitly mention 
automatically remained with the Länder. But unlike the Frankfurt draft, the constitution did 
not make this principle of enumeration a general legal norm.36 This meant that there were no 
limits on the right of the federal constitutional organs to expand national competences by 
amending the constitution.  
The structural framework of the division of competences thus strongly favoured the 
national level. This unitary orientation of the constitution was further reinforced by the kind 
of competences that were conferred upon the Reich. The most important powers included the 
regulation of the freedom of movement, domicile and settlement affairs, all issues relating to 
citizenship, the customs and commercial legislation, postal and telegraphic affairs, the general 
administration of railways, the banking system, and the regulations of the system of coinage, 
weights, and measures.37  
 All of these competences were of major importance for the regulation of the economy and 
society. The power of the national level over the economic market was further underlined by 
the fact that as the successor of the German Customs Union, the Empire was declared a 
uniform customs and commerce area.38 These arrangements left the states with little control 
over the flow of people, goods, and money. This engendered sharp criticism among 
conservatives who tried to protect the sovereignty of the states. In the Prussian House of 
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35  [‘dann ist unzweifelhaft die Mediatisierung aller deutschen Staaten ausgesprochen, auch die Mediatisierung 
des mächtigsten Staates, Preußen, denn es steht bei den Bundesauoritäten, ihre Kompetenz auszudehnen 
[...]’] Ludwig Windthorst in the North German Reichstag, session 6, 5 December 1870, printed in Fenske, 
Reichsgründung, no. 129, p. 440. 
36  FC (1849), § 5. 
37  See RV (1871), art. 4. 
38  Ibid, art. 33.  
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Lords, for example, Leopold zur Lippe-Biesterfeld-Weißenfeld complained that the 
constitution made the federal legislature responsible for ‘matters […] whose uniform 
regulation is possible only in a unitary state’.39 
Such conservative criticism was further fuelled by the fact that the federal competence 
catalogue was taken over from the revolutionary constitutions of Frankfurt and Erfurt. A 
comparison of the relevant articles shows impressively how all the relevant provisions of 
1849 were included into the constitutions of the North German Confederation and the Empire 
(see Table 1). Considering this process of absorption, the unitary character of the federal 
division of competences is no surprise, because it had been one of the main concerns of the 
Frankfurt Assembly to create a uniform German political landscape.  
This original motivation behind the competence catalogue contradicted Bismarck’s 
intention to protect the sovereignty of the states and princes. Why, then, did he include the 
Frankfurt provisions into the constitutional draft? He probably saw it, most importantly, as a 
necessary concession to the national liberals in order to garner their support for adopting the 
constitution. But there was also another reason. In the broader framework of the constitution, 
the unitary character of the competence catalogue actually supported Bismarck’s goals of 
expanding Prussian and protecting monarchical power. Due to the close structural connections 
that the constitution established between the Prussian and federal government, every 
competence that fell within the national remit increased the influence of Prussia over both the 
other states and Germany as a whole. Prussia’s hegemonic constitutional status and her role as 
protector of monarchical power often implied that unitary provisions actually promoted 
particularistic and princely interests.  
The specific regulations of the different national competences went into great detail. They 
comprised no fewer than forty of the seventy-eight articles of the constitution. As the legal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39  [‘Materien [...], deren einheitliche Regelung überhaupt nur in einem Einheitsstaate möglich ist’] Leopold zur 
Lippe-Biesterfeld-Weißenfeld in the Prussian House of Lords, 17 November 1869, printed in Fenske, 
Reichsgründung, no. 119, p. 409. 
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historian Hans Boldt has pointed out, this accuracy reflected the ‘bureaucratic perfectionism’ 
of the administrative officers in the Prussian Ministry of Commerce who helped Bismarck 
draft the constitution. But the meticulousness of these provisions was also due to the fact that 
in a monarchical environment, the matters they regulated could often be very delicate.40 The 
two traditional monarchical prerogatives of military and foreign affairs illustrate this point 
nicely. After the common victory in the unification wars, the constitution maintained the 
division of the army into individual regiments of the states.41 It also determined, however, that 
the forces formed ‘a single army which in war and peace is under the command of the 
Emperor’.42 These regulations represented an obvious contradiction that resulted from the 
attempt to respect the military sovereignty of the princes and at the same time to address the 
need for a centralised system of national defence.  
Things looked similar in foreign affairs. In order to provide a uniform framework for the 
formulation of foreign policy, the constitution obliged the Emperor to ‘represent the Reich 
internationally, to declare war and to conclude peace in the name of the Reich, to enter into 
alliances and other treaties with foreign states, to credit and to receive ambassadors’.43 
Despite this provision, the princes maintained most of their diplomatic privileges. Many of 
them even continued to exchange envoys among each other and with foreign courts. Although 
the constitution was not clear in this point, they were allowed to do so, most lawyers agreed, 
as long as their diplomatic activity did not conflict with national foreign policy.44  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40  [‘bürokratischer Perfektionismus’] Boldt, “Der Föderalismus in den Reichsverfassungen von 1849 und 
1871”, p. 324. 
41  RV (1871), art. 66. 
42  [‘einheitliches Heer, welches in Krieg und Frieden unter dem Befehle des Kaisers steht’] Ibid., art. 63. 
43  [‘das Reich völkerrechtlich zu vertreten, im Namen des Reichs Kriege zu erklären und Frieden zu schließen, 
Bündnisse und andere Verträge mit fremden Staaten einzugehen, Gesandte zu beglaubigen und zu 
empfangen’] Ibid., art. 11. 
44  See for example: Albert Hänel, Deutsches Staatsrecht. Die Grundlagen des deutschen Staates und die 
Reichsgewalt, vol. 1, 2 vols., Systematisches Handbuch der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft 5.1 (Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1892), pp. 556f.; Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 5th ed., vol. 3, 
4 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1913), p. 3; and Curt Riess, Auswärtige Hoheitsrechte der deutschen Einzelstaaten 
(Breslau: Marcus, 1905). 
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The importance of this right varied greatly. While the envoys of the individual state 
governments in Berlin played an important role in coordinating federal politics, as the next 
two chapters will show, those at foreign courts were largely irrelevant. As the Bavarian 
lawyer Philipp Zorn put it, they were merely ‘a remnant of the German obsession with 
titles’.45 Most of the princes could not afford the maintenance of diplomatic mission abroad 
anyway. Their willingness to pay for diplomats declined further when the first few decades 
after unification showed that they were politically superfluous. While in 1869 seven German 
states had still sent envoys to foreign courts, only Bavaria and Saxony continued this tradition 
after the turn of the century, with the former being represented in six European states and the 
latter only in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.46 In the constitutive Reichstag, Johannes von 
Miquel, one of the leading national liberals, was therefore right when he predicted that the 
remaining diplomatic privileges of the princes would be of no practical significance: ‘We 
doubt that any parliament will be willing to squander money from the pocket of the people for 
useless reporters of court gossip.’47 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of such representative rights into the constitution was essential 
for gaining the support of the princes. The conservative MP Curt von Watzdorf underlined 
this fact when he warned his colleagues that the constitutional project of Erfurt had failed – 
among many other reasons –because it had denied the princes the right to maintain their 
diplomatic privileges:  
 
But, Gentlemen, back then a whole series of trifles also played a role, and the provision of the 
constitution of the [Erfurt] Union that the individual governments were not allowed to send and 
receive permanent envoys was one issue that hurt some authorities very much and harmed the 
realisation of the project greatly.48 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45  [‘Überbleibsel deutscher Titelsucht’] Quoted in Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 187. 
46  Ibid. 
47  [‘Wir zweifeln daran, ob irgend eine einzelne Volksvertretung geneigt sein wird, Geld hinwegzuwerfen aus 
der Tasche des Volkes für unnütze Berichterstatter von Hofneuigkeiten.’] Johannes von Miquel in the 
constitutive Reichstag, session 9, 9 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 107. 
Also quoted in Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 188. 
48  [‘Aber, meine Herren, es wirkte damals eine ziemlich Reihe von Kleinigkeiten auch mit, und die 
Bestimmung in der Unionsverfassung, daß die einzelnen Regierungen keine ständigen Gesandten empfangen 
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As this observation points out, the monarchical nature of the German states made the design 
of the federal constitution a problem as much of psychology as of law and politics. 
Fiscal affairs were less a question of princely sentiment than of monarchical power. This 
was the only field in the division of competences between the national level and the states that 
greatly favoured the latter. The constitution did not introduce any direct federal taxes. Rather, 
it determined that the Reich had no other regular source of income but the revenues from 
customs duties, postal and telegraphic services, and the consumption taxes on salt, tobacco, 
brandy, beer, sugar, syrup, and other productions made from sugar beet.49 Wurttemberg and 
Bavaria were exempted from this rule and retained their tax authority over beer and brandy as 
part of their special rights.50 Given the wide scope of national competences, this small basis of 
direct income made it likely that the Reich would not have enough money to cover its 
expenses. In such cases of a federal deficit, the constitution obliged the states – which 
retained their right to raise any direct and indirect taxes – to subsidise the Reich. Their 
financial contributions, the so-called Matrikularbeiträge, were calculated annually in 
proportion to their population size.51 This fiscal system made the Reich, as Bismarck put it in 
the Reichstag in 1879, ‘an annoying boarder of the constituent states’.52 
The motivations behind these particularistic arrangements were complex. The lack of 
direct federal taxes was largely due to the fact that as Prussian Prime Minister, Bismarck had 
to consider the interests of the powerful East Elbian large landowners, the Junkers. As they 
feared an increase of taxes on ground and property, it was safer to keep the taxation of these 
assets in the hands of the predominantly conservative state parliaments rather than to grant it 
to the Reichstag, where the progressive electoral law of 1849 was prone to produce more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
und abschicken dürften, war ein Moment, was an einzelnen Stellen sehr tief verletzte und das Eingehen in die 
Bestrebungen wesentlich mit schädigte.’] Curt von Watzdorf in the constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 
March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, pp. 619f. 
49  RV (1871), art. 38, 70. 
50  Ibid., art. 35.2. 
51  Ibid., art. 70. 
52  [‘ein lästiger Kostgänger bei den Einzelstaaten’] Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1879, session 36, 2 May, p. 
927. 
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dangerous majorities.53 Moreover, a right to determine the rate of taxes would have further 
increased the influence of the Reichstag over federal finances. The traditional parliamentary 
power to approve the budget was its most important political leverage anyway. Keeping the 
Reich financially dependent on the Länder was a way for Bismarck to prevent the Reichstag 
from gaining an even stronger bargaining position.   
For exactly this reason, the liberals in the constitutive Reichstag tried everything they 
could to broaden the independent financial basis of the Reich. At least to some degree they 
were successful. While the constitutional draft of the monarchical governments had limited 
federal legislation regarding fiscal matters to issues of customs and commerce, the Reichstag 
adopted an amendment that extended national authority to all ‘taxes that are to be applied to 
the requirements of the Reich’.54 This broad provision left the door open for the evolution of a 
more centralised system of taxation. The most important step in that direction was that the 
liberals included into the constitution the possibility of introducing direct federal taxes 
through the backdoor. They did so by determining that the system of financial subsidies by 
the states would only be a temporary measure for ‘as long as Reich taxes are not 
introduced’. 55  In light of the political motivations behind the fiscal structures of the 
constitution, this amendment made it inevitable that in the evolution of the federal state 
taxation would become a major battleground in the confrontation between monarchical and 
parliamentary power. It was also clear that in this conflict, the Reichstag would do everything 
to introduce federal taxes, while the united governments would try to prevent precisely that.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 198. See also Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. 2, pp. 166ff. On the 
importance of the Junker class in the political and economic system of the Empire more gnerally, see 
Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Voter, Junker, Landrat, Priest: The Old Authorities and the New Franchise in 
Imperial Germany,” American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (1993): 1448–1174; Hanna Schissler, “Die Junker. 
Zur Sozialgeschichte und historischen Bedeutung der agrarischen Elite in Preußen,” in Preußen im 
Rückblick, ed. Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 
89–122; and Cornelius Torp, “The ‘Coalition of “Rye and Iron”’ under the Pressure of Golabilization: A 
Reinterpretation of Germany’s Political Economy before 1914,” Central European History 43, no. 2 (2010): 
401–27.  
54  [‘die für die Zwecke des Reichs zu verwendenden Steuern’] RV (1871), art. 4.2. 
55  [‘so lange Reichssteuern nicht eingeführt sind’] Ibid., art. 70. 
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In addition to the particularistic arrangements of federal finances, the constitution also 
established a system of administration that favoured the states. This too was intended to offset 
the preponderance of national over state competences and thus to mitigate the influence of the 
Reichstag. Like the Frankfurt draft, the imperial constitution distinguished between the power 
to legislate and the power to implement laws. But it tightened this distinction between 
responsibilities further by giving the Reich no other powers in those fields that fell within the 
national remit than to adopt laws and to monitor how they were executed.56 The actual 
implementation of both federal and state laws remained the exclusive responsibility of the 
Länder. Hence, the monarchical governments retained a considerable degree of control over 
the laws that were applicable in their states, regardless of what legislation the Reichstag 
managed to push through on the national level.  
Moreover, the administrative sovereignty of the states implied that the constitution 
established no national agencies except in those few areas where the Reich enjoyed both 
legislative and administrative competences, most importantly in naval, postal, and telegraphic 
affairs.57 Under the constitution, there was therefore no comprehensive body of executive 
departments or ministries that the Reichstag could try to control. The governmental agencies 
of the states were out of its reach anyway, as they belonged to a different level of government.   
All this shows that thanks to the conflicting monarchical and parliamentary interests the 
regulation of national and state competences featured both a unitary and a particularistic 
dimension. The main structural concern of the constitution was to keep these two 
potentialities in balance, because otherwise neither the princely governments nor the 
Reichstag would have approved it. The range of competences that were exclusively reserved 
for the national level was very limited. In most areas, the legislative responsibilities of the 
Reich and Länder overlapped. Shared legislative competences were the rule rather than the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56  Ibid., art. 4.  
57  Ibid., art. 50, 53. 
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exception.58 At the same time, the particularistic tendencies of some areas were kept in check 
by the provision that ‘Reich laws take precedence over state laws’, a strong unitary principle 
that was taken over from the Frankfurt draft.59 The superiority of the national level was 
further underlined by the right of the Reich to intervene in the states if they violated their 
federal duties.60  
This unitary-particularistic ambiguity of the distribution of competences meant that the 
federal state could theoretically evolve in either direction. But if we consider the nature of the 
competences that were conferred upon the national level, it becomes clear that a gradual 
centralisation of the union was very likely. The Reich enjoyed above all those competences 
that were necessary to create a common market. Most important were its powers over customs 
and commercial legislation, banking, weights and measures, the currency, intellectual 
property, patents, commercial and bill of exchange law, communication, and infrastructure.61 
It was thus relatively clear in 1867 that ongoing industrialisation would make the Reich more 
powerful, because the constitution put the responsibility of regulating the most important 
framework conditions of the economy in its hand. This effect was further reinforced by the 
fact that the Reich also enjoyed the power to integrate the union socially and culturally, for 
example by its control over the freedom of movement, citizenship affairs, the press, and penal 
law.62 Hence, the division of competences between the states and the national level implied 
that it was predominantly the latter that would benefit from the dynamic development of a 
modern industrial economy and society. The constitution therefore made it very likely that the 
union would become more centralised. 
This was one of the main reasons for the readiness of the economically minded liberals to 
drop their demand for a catalogue of basic rights and to approve the constitution. They put !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58  On this issue, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 163f. 
59  [‘Reichsgesetze den Landesgesetzen vorgehen’] RV (1871), art. 2. FC (1849), § 66. 
60  RV (1871), art. 19. This broad provision left much room for manipulation, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate in 
detail.  
61  Ibid., art. 4. 
62  Ibid. 
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their hopes on precisely that development which Windthorst dreaded: a gradual mediatisation 
of the states, including Prussia, and the emergence of a unitary state, in which the national 
parliament would have so much power that it could easily incorporate civil rights and political 
liberties into the constitution by way of legislation. Friedrich Wilhelm Grumbrecht, MP for 
Harburg, put this view in a nutshell: 
 
[A]nd if I consider the substance of the constitution […], if I ignore conceptual definitions and that 
sort of thing, I can make no pretence of the fact that the constitutional draft, whatever name it 
might bear, has the purpose of creating a public entity that prepares us for a German popular 
unitary state.63 
 
The problem with this logic was, as the left liberal Franz Duncker warned his colleagues in 
March 1867, that one could not expect the monarchical governments to stay as cooperative as 
they currently were. Once the national enthusiasm of the unification wars ebbed away, he 
predicted, the governments would hardly accept a gradual centralisation that would make the 
Reichstag the centre of power. He concluded that in regard to the creation of basic rights it 
was wrong to rely on ‘the development of the future, the driving force of things’: 
 
For this reason, I believe that it is indeed our duty neither to set our hope on men, nor to leave the 
greatest part of the work to our successors, but to put our hope on the power of institutions, and 
thus to arrange the constitution of the North German Confederation in a way that its institutions 
are […] strong […].64  
 
Such subtle voices had little chance of prevailing, given the general fear among the liberals 
that the creation of a constitution might fail again.  In reality, there was a potentially serious 
systemic problem in the argument that the union would tend in the longer term to undergo !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63  [‘und wenn ich den Inhalt der  […] Verfassung näher prüfe, wenn ich absehe von Begriffsdefinitionen und 
dergleichen, so kann ich mir nicht verhehlen, daß dieser Verfassungsentwurf, welchen Namen er auch führen 
mag, den Zweck hat, ein Staatsgebilde zu schaffen, welches uns vorbereitet zu einem Deutschen 
Einheitsvolksstaate’] Friedrich Wilhelm Grumbrecht in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12, 13 March 
1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 307. 
64  [‘die Entwickelung der Zukunft, die treibende Kraft der Dinge’], [‘Darum glaube ich, ist es allerdings unsere 
Pflicht, unsere Hoffnungen nicht zu setzen auf Männer, noch weniger unseren Nachfolgern den größten Theil 
der Arbeit zu überlassen, sondern unsere Hoffnungen zu setzen auf die Kraft der Institutionen, und darum 
diese Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes so einzurichten, daß die Institutionen in demselben [...] stark 
sind [...].’] Franz Duncker in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12, 13 March 1867, printed in ibid., pp. 284f. 
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centralisation. Unlike the Frankfurt draft, the imperial constitution did not require the states 
and the national level to have the same kind of governmental system, meaning either 
monarchical or parliamentary government.65 This lack of a homogeneity requirement implied 
that if the Reichstag gained much more power because of a general centralisation of the union 
while the states maintained the constitutional status quo, it would be likely that the different 
levels of government would lose coordination, with the Reich changing into a parliamentary 
system and the Länder remaining monarchical. The liberals did not seem to care about this 
problem. Secretly, they probably even endorsed it. Due to the provisions that national laws 
took precedence over state laws and that the federal constitutional organs could amend the 
constitution by way of ordinary legislation, a possible lack of coordination between the states 
and the Reich threatened the monarchical state governments most of all.  
This inherent risk of the constitution is not without irony, because the lack of a 
homogeneity requirement was actually intended to preserve monarchical power. Bismarck did 
not include such a clause into his draft – as we will see in the context of the analysis of later 
constitutional disputes in Chapter 5 – because he did not want to provide the Reichstag with 
any mechanism that it could use to foster parliamentary government in the states, for example 
by requiring them to introduce the progressive electoral law already operative at the national 
level. The likelihood of a gradual centralisation of the union made this safeguard all the more 
important from his perspective. Moreover, a legal requirement seemed superfluous at the time 
of unification because the coordination of the Länder and the Reich was guaranteed by the 
homogeneity of their executive elites. The three republican city-states Hamburg, Bremen, and 
Lübeck did not weaken this anchor of stability, because their electoral laws were so restrictive 
that they were ruled by a quasi-aristocratic elite of Hanseatic merchants.66  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65  FC (1849), § 186. 
66  On the lack of an homogeneity requirement, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 143f. and Kurt Nieding, Das 
Prinzip der Homogenität in den Verfassungen des Deutschen Reiches von 1849, 1871 und 1919 unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des Artikels 17 der geltenden Reichsverfassung (Gotha: Seitz, 1926). 
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But there was no guarantee that this homogeneity of elites would persist. On the contrary: 
a centralisation of the union would greatly undermine it, most importantly because a more 
powerful Reichstag might try to staff the national government with parliamentarians. From 
this point of view, the unitary predisposition of the federal competence catalogue made a loss 
of coordination between the states and the Reich likely. The constitution did not provide a 
structural framework that could protect the union from gradually imploding in case the 
confrontation between monarchical and parliamentary power should intensify and render the 
compromise of the unification era obsolete. 
 
Reich 
 
In the relations between the states and the Reich, the struggle between monarchical and 
parliamentary interests depended on the division of competences. The crucial question on the 
national level was, in contrast, where among the organs of federal government the 
constitution defined the seat of power. What role in federal government did the constitution 
assign to the Bundesrat, the Reichstag, the Emperor, and the Chancellor? This question 
requires us to survey their different functions in relation to each other. 
In the constitutive Reichstag, the powers and relations of the different federal 
constitutional organs were discussed in great depth. The historian Heinrich von Sybel, who 
served as MP for the national liberals, pointed out that ‘the creation of a viable central 
authority for Germany’ was ‘perhaps the most difficult problem any statesman had to face in 
this century’. The key problem was to find a constitutional arrangement that granted the 
national parliament enough participation to satisfy the liberals without compromising the 
monarchical sovereignty of the princes. The constitutional projects of Frankfurt and Erfurt 
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had failed precisely because they did not manage to solve this problem. ‘In light of these 
experiences’, Sybel concluded, the imperial constitution ‘has left well-trodden paths’.67 
The new approach of the constitution was most obvious in how it defined the centre of 
federal government around which the operations of all other organs revolved. Unlike in the 
Frankfurt and Erfurt draft, this role was not conferred upon the parliament or the Emperor. 
Neither was it – as some historians have claimed – bestowed upon the Chancellor.68 Rather, 
the pivot of the constitution was the Bundesrat. Its powers spanned all three branches of 
government. Together with the Reichstag, it formed the federal legislature. Before entering 
into force, most bills were approved by the Bundesrat twice: in a first session after one of the 
state governments had introduced it and, if the Reichstag demanded amendments, in a second 
following the parliamentary negotiations.69  
The Bundesrat was also the central executive organ. It enjoyed many traditional 
monarchical prerogatives that the Frankfurt draft had bestowed upon the Emperor, such as the 
right to decree administrative ordinances necessary for the implementation of federal laws, 
the power to adjudicate defects in how federal laws were executed, and the right to intervene 
in constituent states if they failed to fulfil their federal duties.70  
Finally, the Bundesrat also held a central position in the judiciary. Unlike the drafts of 
Frankfurt and Erfurt, the constitution did not establish a federal constitutional court.71 The 
responsibility for dispute settlement among the states fell to the Bundesrat, which in this 
respect resembled the Bundestag of the German Confederation.72 The close reference to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67  [‘das schwierigste Problem, welches im Laufe dieses Jahrhunderts irgend einem Staatsmanne sich 
entgegengestellt hat’], [‘durch diese Erfahrungen [...] die viel betretenen Straßen vollständig verlassen’] 
Heinrich von Sybel in the constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 March 1867, Bezold/Holtzendorff, 
Materialien, vol. 1, pp. 581f. 
68  See for example Hans-Peter Ullmann, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Neue Historische Bibliothek 
edition suhrkamp 546 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), p. 33 and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3, 5 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1987ff.), p. 357. 
69  RV (1871), art. 5, 7.  
70  Ibid., art. 7, 19. FC (1849), §§ 54, 80, 82. 
71  FC (1849), section V ‘Das Reichsgericht’, §§ 125-129. EC (1849), section V ‘Das Reichsgericht’, §§ 123-
127. The consequences that flowed from the lack of a constitutional court will be the subject of Chapter 5. 
72  RV (1871), art. 76. 
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judicial structures of the Confederation was most obvious in the verbatim adoption of the 
provisions of the Vienna Final Act regarding what the council of states had to do when the 
judicial organs of a state refused to deal with a legal matter that fell within their remit.73   
It is easy to see why Bismarck preferred the Bundesrat to address cases of constitutional 
conflict. For him, it was not an option – as Chapter 5 will discuss – to establish an 
independent constitutional court similar to the Reichsgericht of the Frankfurt and Erfurt 
constitutions, a court that could intervene in the political struggle between monarchical and 
parliamentary power and possibly take sides with the latter. Why, however, did his 
constitutional draft designate the Bundesrat as the central executive organ rather than the 
Emperor or the Chancellor, an office that he would assume himself? The main reason was that 
the status of the Bundesrat guaranteed that the federal executive could not be made 
responsible to the Reichstag. In other words, it prevented the introduction of parliamentary 
government.  
The Bundesrat was a collective council of the twenty-five state governments, to which 
they sent their plenipotentiaries in order to participate in the decision-making process of the 
national level. With reference to the total number of plenipotentiaries in the North German 
Confederation, Bismarck called the Bundesrat a ‘government front bench with forty-three 
seats’.74 As this collective executive was composed of envoys who were accountable to their 
home governments in the states and who thus did not belong to the federal level of 
government it could not be held responsible by the national parliament. This made the 
Bundesrat in national politics the central protective device of monarchical interest. Bismarck 
stressed this emphatically when the demands of the liberals to introduce parliamentary 
government became louder and louder in the 1880s: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73  Ibid., art. 77. WSA (1820), art. 29. 
74  [’43 Plätze umfassende Ministerbank’] Bismarck in his Putbuser Diktat ‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über 
Bundesverfassung’, 19 November 1866, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 100, p. 342. 
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I see the preservation of the federal state as a much better protection against the republican offence 
[…] than a centralised state where only one government rather than a multitude of governments 
faces the Reichstag.75 
 
In the constitutive Reichstag of 1867, the left liberals criticised this anti-parliamentary 
function of the Bundesrat sharply. Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, for example, complained that 
‘such a collegial executive, in which the representatives of the German dynasties have the 
word, prevents the introduction of responsible governmental organs at the top of the union 
categorically’ and thus ‘opens the door […] for absolutism’. 76  In order to create 
parliamentarily responsible ministries, he therefore demanded that the competences of the 
Bundesrat should be limited to the legislature. This could happen, his left-liberal colleague 
Benedict Waldeck suggested, by transferring all executive powers to the Emperor who on that 
basis could appoint federal ministers that would be responsible to the Reichstag.77  
As he wanted to prevent this scenario, Bismarck rejected all proposals to transform the 
Bundesrat. Particularly fierce was his resistance to suggestions oriented towards changing the 
council of states into an ordinary upper house of a bicameral legislature, with the Reichstag 
forming the lower chamber. Such an arrangement, he believed, would complicate the 
machinery of federal government greatly and would pave the way for a centralisation of the 
union that would make the emergence of parliamentary government likely.78  
Interestingly, one of the arguments of the supporters of a bicameral system was that it was 
precisely the absence of a proper upper house that would result in a change of the form of 
government. In the parliamentary debate on the unification treaties in December 1870, 
Ludwig Windthorst predicted that the Reichstag – if left on its own – would get into conflict !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75  [‘In der Erhaltung des Föderativ-Staats erblicke ich eine viel größere Widerstandsfähigkeit gegen das 
republikanische Andrängen, [...] als sie dem Einheitsstaate zu Gebote stehen würde, wo nur eine einzige 
Regierung, nicht eine Mehrheit von Regierungen, dem Reichstage gegenüber stehen würde.’] Quoted in 
Poschinger, Bundesrat, vol. 4, p. 165. 
76  [‘eine solche collegialische Executive, in der den Vertretern der einzelnen Deutschen Dynastien ein Wort 
zusteht, hindert absolut die Einsetzung verantwortlicher Regierungs-Organe an der Spitze des Bundes’], 
[‘dem Absolutismus [...] die Thüren geöffnet’] Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch in the constitutive Reichstag, 
session 11, 12 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, pp. 207f. 
77  Benedict Waldeck in the constitutive Reichstag, session 20, 27 March 1867, printed in ibid., p. 742.  
78  See Bismarck’s Putbuser Diktat ‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über Bundesverfassung’, 19 November 1866, 
printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 100, p. 343. 
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with the states. ‘From this friction’, he argued, ‘either absolutism or the republic will 
eventually emerge’.79 Bismarck did not see such a risk, because he understood the Bundesrat 
as the guarantor of the status quo. In 1874, he wrote to the Bavarian king that ‘at present 
Germany has in the institution of the Bundesrat […] a solid guarantee against any 
radicalisation or exaggeration of unitary efforts’.80   
As soon as contemporaries heard the name ‘Bundesrat’, it was clear to them that this organ 
was a safeguard of princely interest. In contrast to the prefix ‘Reich’, ‘Bund’ had a 
confederate connotation that suggested that the council of states was the forum of a league of 
princes. This is why Bismarck vehemently opposed proposals to change its name into 
‘Reichsrat’. 81  In fact, when the southern states joined the union in 1870/71 he even 
contemplated giving it the name ‘Bundestag’. Only after the Prussian Crown Prince had 
condemned this explicit reference to the central organ of the hated German Confederation did 
Bismarck drop this idea.82  
But the new label did not change the fact that the Bundesrat was very closely modelled on 
its confederate predecessor. In the constitutive Reichstag, Benedict Waldeck posed the 
rhetorical question: ‘This Bundesrat, what is it then? A reproduction of the German 
Bundesacte.’ 83  Just as in the Confederation, the state governments participated in the 
decision-making process of the union via a permanent congress of envoys. This was a 
German confederate tradition that dated as far back as the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman 
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79  [‘aus dieser Reibung wird schließlich der Absolutismus oder die Republik unzweifelhaft hervorgehen’] 
Ludwig Windthorst in the North German Reichstag, session 6, 5 December 1870, printed in ibid., no. 129, p. 
441f. 
80  [‘Deutschland hat gegenwärtig in der Institution seines Bundesrathes [...] eine feste Bürgschaft gegen jede 
Ausartung oder Uebertreibung der einheitlichen Bestrebungen.’] Bismarck’s letter to King Ludwig II of 
Bavaria, 10 August 1874, printed in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, no. 125, p. 182. 
81  Bismarck’s letter to Kaiser William I, 29 March 1871, printed in ibid., no. 25, pp. 22f. 
82  Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung, ed. Alexander Scharff (Heidelberg: Quelle & 
Meyer, 1958), pp. 288f. 
83  [‘Dieser Bundesrat, was ist er denn? Eine Reproduction der Deutschen Bundesacte.’] Benedict Waldeck in 
the constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 
598. 
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Empire. Bismarck revived this arrangement because it preserved the sovereignty of the 
princes as well as possible in a federal state.  
The constitution also adopted from the Confederation the distribution of votes in the 
council of states, with one essential difference: in 1867, the votes of those states that Prussia 
had annexed the previous summer – Hannover, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, and the Free City of 
Frankfurt – were added to the Prussian vote, a practice that the Vienna Final Act had 
explicitly forbidden.84 The distribution of votes in the Bundesrat thus reflected Prussia’s 
dominance in the unification process. After the admission of the southern states, there were 
fifty-eight votes in total, with Prussia accounting for seventeen, Bavaria for six, Saxony and 
Wurttemberg for four each, Baden and Hesse for three each, and each of the remaining states 
for one.85  
This distribution of votes gave Prussia a quantitative supremacy in the council of states 
that she had enjoyed neither in the Confederation nor in the draft of the Frankfurt Assembly. 
As Bismarck noted, ‘the danger that in important questions […] the Prussian government will 
be […] in the minority is not likely’.86 It was this overwhelming dominance in the central 
organ of federal government that was the basis of Prussia’s constitutional hegemony. This 
implied that the Prussian cabinet would dominate federal government for as long as it would 
retain control over its Bundesrat plenipotentiaries.  
But it is important to keep things in perspective. The constitution did not make Prussia’s 
dominance in the Bundesrat as great as it could have been. The Bundesacte of 1815 based the 
number of votes that the states enjoyed on the size of their population.87 As the population 
grew constantly over the course of the century, in particular in urban areas – of which most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84  WSA (1820), art. 6. 
85  RV (1871), art. 6. On the adoption of the distribution of votes from the Bundestag of the Confederation, see 
Bismarck’s Putbuser Diktat ‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über Bundesverfassung’, 19 November 1866, printed 
in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 100, p. 341. 
86  [‘Die Gefahr, daß die preußische Regierung in erheblichen Fragen [...] in die Minorität geriete, ist [...] nicht 
wahrscheinlich.’] Bismarck in his Putbuser Diktat ‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über Bundesverfassung’, 19 
November 1866, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 100, p. 341f. 
87  Bundesacte (1815), art. 6. 
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lay in Prussia – the ratio of population size to number of votes had become extremely 
disproportionate by 1867. By refraining from adjusting the distribution of votes, Bismarck 
heavily favoured the small states. As Prussia had a population of about 24 700 000 at the time 
of unification, she would have been entitled to no less than 772 votes, considering that 
Schaumburg-Lippe, with 32 000 people the smallest state, enjoyed one vote.88 Such a ratio of 
votes, Bismarck noted, ‘would have muzzled the other governments[…] completely’.89 For 
the same reason, the constitution gave each member of the Bundesrat the right to speak in the 
Reichstag, even if his view differed from that of the majority of state governments.90 All these 
arrangements demonstrate that the central motivation behind the internal structures of the 
Bundesrat was not to make Prussia as dominant as possible, but to preserve the sovereignty of 
the princes.  
As this construction principle strengthened the sense of solidarity among the monarchical 
governments, it also supported the way the Bundesrat shielded the federal executive from the 
Reichstag. Despite this anti-parliamentary function, the overwhelming majority of the liberals 
in the constitutive Reichstag eventually adopted the provisions that Bismarck’s constitutional 
draft had proposed regarding the Bundesrat. The main reason for this approval was that the 
constitution also granted to the national parliament a relatively strong position that had great 
evolutionary potential. On the one hand, the elevated status of the parliament was due to the 
adoption of the progressive electoral law of the Frankfurt Assembly.91 The broad franchise 
that it established would make it very hard for the federal executive to ignore permanently the 
popular demands that the Reichstag would articulate. 
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88  Population numbers are taken from Hubert Kiesewetter, Industrielle Revolution in Deutschland: Regionen 
als Wachstumsmotoren (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), p. 126. 
89  [‘die übrigen Regierungen [...] vollständig mundtot gemacht würden’] Bismarck in his Putbuser Diktat 
‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über Bundesverfassung’, 19 November 1866, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, 
no. 100, p. 341f. 
90  RV (1871), art. 9.  
91  Ibid., art. 20.  
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On the other hand, the parliament had a pivotal role in the legislative process. Just like the 
state governments in the Bundesrat, the Reichstag had the right to propose laws.92 Moreover, 
it could forward petitions to the Bundesrat and the Chancellor.93 Most importantly, however, 
no law could be passed without parliamentary consent, including the budgetary laws.94 
Without the cooperation of the Reichstag, it was therefore impossible to govern the union. 
This was perhaps the greatest concession that Bismarck had to make to the liberals in order to 
generate support for his unification policy.  
These arrangements of the legislative process had profound implications for federal 
evolution. In light of the distribution of competences between the Reich and the states, the 
pending economic, legal, and social integration of the new union made it likely that the 
national level would gain a great number of competences. This automatically implied that the 
power of the Reichstag would increase, because its help was needed to adopt the legislation 
necessary to regulate the process of domestic integration. Every new national competence 
meant that the Reichstag gained influence vis-à-vis the monarchical state governments. In this 
sense, a future expansion of parliamentary power was inbuilt into the constitution. When they 
negotiated the organisation of federal authority, the liberals were well aware of this long-term 
factor. Heinrich von Sybel, for example, stressed that it was  
 
a great advantage of this draft that it […] does not define the competences of the individual forces 
too anxiously, in too much detail, but that it leaves a lot of room for the dynamic, productive 
evolution, the future, and the joint effort of the cooperating forces.95  
 
This consideration suggests that the liberals adopted the structural arrangements of 
Bismarck’s draft not least because they were optimistic that the future evolution of the union !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92  Ibid., art. 23. 
93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid., art. 5.  
95  [‘einen großen Vorzug des Entwurfs, daß er [...] die Competenzen der einzelnen Kräfte nicht zu ängstlich, 
nicht zu detailliert abgrenzt, sondern der lebendigen, productiven Entwickelung, der Zukunft und dem 
gemeinsamen Wirken der verbundenen Kräfte einen breiten Spielraum gestattet.’] Heinrich von Sybel in the 
constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 
584. 
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would offset the anti-parliamentary function of the Bundesrat by gradually giving 
preponderance to the Reichstag. 
But this hope was of course no guarantee. This is why the liberals continued to insist on 
the introduction of parliamentarily responsible federal ministries. In the way of this demand, 
however, there stood a fundamental problem: the constitution did not establish any federal 
government at all. The federal executive was formed not by a government in the conventional 
sense, but by the Bundesrat. There was neither a prime minister nor a ministerial apparatus 
under the constitution. The efforts of the liberals thus concentrated on trying to turn the 
rudimentary structures of the national administration created by the constitution into a proper 
ministerial system that – in future – could be made subject to parliamentary control. 
The head of the federal administration was the Emperor. As such, he appointed, 
inaugurated, and dismissed all federal officials, including the Chancellor.96 Moreover, he 
monitored the implementation of federal laws by the state governments and reported 
deficiencies to the Bundesrat, which then decided upon the countermeasures that he had to 
put into action.97 In addition, he possessed many other executive powers that corresponded to 
those of the Kaiser under the Frankfurt constitution: as we saw earlier, he represented 
Germany internationally, declared war and concluded peace, entered into treaties with foreign 
countries, accredited and received ambassadors, and summoned, opened, prorogued, and 
closed both the Bundesrat and the Reichstag.98  
Yet, he lacked many core monarchical powers that the Kaiser of the Frankfurt draft had 
enjoyed. The general right to decree administrative ordinances rested with the Bundesrat.99 In 
the legislature, he did not enjoy any substantial powers at all. The constitution restricted his 
role to promulgating and publishing federal laws.100 In particular, he lacked a legislative veto 
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96  RV (1871), art. 15, 18. 
97  Ibid., art. 7.1.3, 17, 19. 
98  Ibid., art. 11. 
99  Ibid., art. 7.2. Compare FC (1849), § 80. 
100  RV (1871), art. 17.  
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and the right to introduce bills, two traditional monarchical prerogatives.101 Moreover, he did 
not have the right automatically to assume all powers that were not explicitly conferred upon 
one of the other federal organs.102  
The Emperor was therefore not a constitutional monarch.103 This was perhaps most 
obvious in that his only honorary right was the title ‘Deutscher Kaiser’, which the constitution 
conferred upon the King of Prussia in his capacity as holder of the Federal Presidency.104 But 
the imperial title did not turn the institution into a monarchical office. For the liberals, this 
was a serious problem. Their demand to create responsible ministries only made sense in a 
constitutional monarchy. Heinrich von Sybel explained this complicated matter in simple 
words: 
 
Our draft does not establish a constitutional monarchy; it does not create a monarchical holder of 
the highest state function, the legislature. I do not understand how one can speak on this basis 
about the possibility of ministerial responsibility. […] How do you want to imagine a juristically 
responsible ministry, which officially cannot exercise any influence on the formation of laws? In a 
constitutional monarchy, it is the monarch that appears as the source of legislation, and his 
responsible servants, the ministers, have the crucial influence on the direction of legislation. […] 
But here, in our draft, Gentlemen, there is no such reciprocal relationship. Legislation is made by 
the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. 105 
 
Sybel concluded that in order to introduce responsible federal ministries it was first necessary 
to make the Prussian King ‘the source and holder of the legislative power’ of the union.106 As 
the Prussian king automatically assumed the office of the Emperor, this reform would have 
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101  Compare FC (1849), §§ 80, 101. 
102  Compare FC (1849), §, 84. 
103  On this issue, see Oliver F. R. Haardt, “The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918),” German History 34, 
no. 4 (2016), pp. 529-554, especially p. 538f. The article can be found in the appendix of this thesis. 
104  RV (1871), art. 11.1. 
105  [‘Unser Entwurf giebt uns keine constitutionelle Monarchie; er hat keinen monarchischen Träger der 
höchsten Staatsfunction, der Legislative. Ich verstehe nicht, wie man auf diesem Boden überhaupt von der 
Möglichkeit einer Ministerverantwortlichkeit reden soll. [...] Wie wollen Sie sich ein im juristischen Sinne 
verantwortliches Ministerium denken, welches auf die Entstehung der Gesetze officiell nich den mindesten 
Einfluß nehmen kann? In der constitutionellen Monarchie ist es der Monarch, der als Quelle der 
Gesetzgebung erscheint, und seine verantwortlichen Diener, die Minister, haben thatsächlich den 
entscheidenden Einfluß auf die Richtung der Gesetzgung. [...] Hier aber, in unserem Entwurfe, meine Herren, 
ist von einem solchen Wechselverhältnis gar keine Rede. Die Gesetzgebung wird gemacht vom Bundesrathe 
und vom Reichstage. ’] Heinrich von Sybel in the constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 March 1867, printed 
in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 589. 
106  [‘Quell und Inhaber der gesetzgebenden Gewalt’] Ibid., p. 590. 
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made the Kaiser a proper constitutional monarch, who could have appointed responsible 
ministers.  
This line of argument points to the fact that the head of union appeared in the constitution 
in several different capacities, namely as Prussian king, Emperor, and supreme commander. 
In other words, the single most important person in the executive held three different offices. 
There were two main reasons for this. On the one hand, in addition to the numerical 
dominance in the Bundesrat the personal union between the Prussian and imperial crown 
formed the basis for Prussia’s constitutional hegemony. This dominance was further 
buttressed by the privileges that the Prussian king enjoyed in the Bundesrat in comparison to 
the other princes. The Prussian government did not only decide in the event of a tied vote, but 
it could also veto any bill that intended to change the status quo of certain consumption taxes, 
customs duties, and military and naval affairs.107 All of these provisions were additional 
safety mechanisms that Bismarck incorporated into the constitution in order to guarantee that 
Germany could not be governed against the will of the Prussian government.108 
On the other hand, the division of powers between the three most important executive 
offices was an essential element of Bismarck’s attempt to create structural conditions that 
prevented the introduction of federal ministries. This strategy becomes most clear in military 
affairs, because here all three offices overlapped. The Kaiser was the supreme commander of 
both the army and the navy.109 But as the constitution preserved the military sovereignty of 
the princes by maintaining the division of the army into individual regiments, this office was 
part of the Prussian rather than imperial crown.110 This was manifest in the provision that all 
administrative military ordinances by the Prussian king were automatically binding for the 
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107  RV (1871), art. 5, 35, 37. 
108  See Bismarck’s Putbuser Diktat ‘Unmaßgebliche Ansichten über Bundesverfassung’, 19 November 1866, 
printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 100, p. 341f. 
109  RV (1871), art. 53.1, 63.1. 
110  Ibid., art. 66.  
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regiments of the other states too.111 These arrangements implied that the Reichstag had no 
control over the supreme commander, because he did not belong to the national, but to the 
Prussian level of government. It was impossible to create a federal ministry of war that could 
be made accountable to the parliament.  
For this reason, some liberals condemned the organisation of military and naval affairs as 
‘Roman imperatorship’ and ‘military dictatorship of the worst kind’.112 Things were made 
worse, from their perspective, by the fact that they failed to make the military budget subject 
to annual parliamentary control. After a fierce controversy, they agreed with Bismarck on the 
compromise that after four years a federal law should reassess the peacetime size of the army 
and the costs it involved.113 In order to compensate for this loss of budgetary control, they 
demanded that the fragmentation of the highest executive offices be resolved through transfer 
of all federal powers vested in the Prussian king to the institution of the Emperor. This, they 
argued, would at least allow for the ‘possibility of accountable ministers and responsible 
government in all areas of government’.114 As long as the complex conglomerate of executive 
powers existed, it was impossible to establish any clear accountability.  
But as Bismarck opposed any changes to the constitutional status of the Emperor and the 
Prussian king vehemently, the liberals eventually gave up the idea of introducing an array of 
responsible ministries. Instead, they refocused their quest for ministerial responsibility on the 
only national administrative office that the constitution established apart from the Emperor: 
the Chancellor.  
Rudolph von Delbrück, who became the first president of the Federal Department of the 
Chancellor, the Kanzleramt, in August 1867, described in his memoirs how Bismarck had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111  Ibid., art. 63.5. 
112  [‘römische Imperatorenthum’] [‘Militairdictatur der schroffsten Art’] Benedict Waldeck (left liberal) and 
Friedrich Wilhelm Grumbrecht (national liberal) in the constitutive Reichstag, session 12 and 20, 13 and 27 
March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, pp. 308, 740. 
113  RV (1871), art. 62. On this issue, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 663f. 
114  [‘Möglichkeit verantwortlicher Minister und verantwortlicher Regierung nach allen Seiten’] Hermann 
Schulze-Delitzsch in the constitutive Reichstag, session 18, 23 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, 
Materialien, vol. 1, p. 626.  
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originally envisaged the position of the Chancellor. The constitutional draft gave him no other 
role but that of a chairman of the Bundesrat, who received instructions from the Prussian 
foreign minister. This position was modelled on the presidential envoy of the Bundestag in 
the German Confederation, who had acted on the command of the Austrian foreign minister. 
The function of the Chancellor was to help the Federal Presidency – the Emperor and 
Prussian king – to deal with the Bundesrat, for example by organising majorities or preparing 
legislative proposals. But it was unclear how the Chancellor was supposed to do this, as the 
draft – like the constitution that was eventually adopted – did not establish any federal 
bureaucracy. Delbrück speculated that it had probably been Bismarck’s plan to turn the 
Bundesrat committees into larger administrative offices that could support him. From 
Bismarck’s perspective, this would have had the great advantage that there would have been 
no need for any independent ministries that might have been susceptible to becoming 
responsible to the parliament.115  
But things turned out differently. The constitutive Reichstag changed the status of the 
Chancellor completely by adopting an amendment to article 17 that Rudolf von Bennigsen, 
one of the leaders of the national liberals, had proposed. The Lex Bennigsen made the 
Chancellor responsible for all official acts of the Emperor by way of countersignature. This 
transformed his role from that of a presidential envoy into the only responsible minister of the 
Reich. In fact, it gave him a position very similar to that of the federal ministers in the 
Frankfurt draft. They too had been supposed to countersign the acts of the Kaiser.116 As 
Delbrück pointed out, this new position implied that the Chancellor could no longer rely on 
the Bundesrat committees alone. Since his duties now spanned all areas over which the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115  Martin Friedrich Rudolph von Delbrück, Lebenserinnerungen von Rudolph von Delbrück, 1817-1867: mit 
einem Nachtrag aus dem Jahre 1870 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905), p. 399. On Bismarck's original 
plan, see also Rudolf Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, Neue Münstersche 
Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957), especially pp. 24, 28ff. and Heinrich Otto 
Meisner, “Bundesrat, Bundeskanzler und Bundeskanzleramt (1867-1871),” in Moderne deutsche 
Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue Wissenschaftliche 
Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 1981), especially p. 81. 
116  FC (1849), §§. 73.2, 74. 
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Emperor presided as head of the federal administration, it was inevitable that a number of 
proper federal administrative agencies would evolve that could help him to prepare bills, to 
draft ordinances, and to monitor the implementation of federal laws in the states.117 
The Lex Bennigsen did not, however, establish parliamentary government, because it did 
not define the responsibility of the Chancellor in any specific terms. In particular, it did not 
create a juristic responsibility that the parliament could claim in court. The Chancellor was 
therefore not accountable to the Reichstag. What kind of responsibility did he have, then? 
After fierce controversy in the constitutive Reichstag, the liberals left this question more or 
less open, as otherwise Bismarck and the united governments would not have accepted the 
amendment. If anything, Heinrich von Sybel noted, the Lex Bennigsen established a general 
accountability of the Chancellor to public opinion. Most liberals eventually accepted this 
rather vague definition, because they believed that in light of the pivotal position of the 
Reichstag in the federal legislature, it would be impossible in the longer run to govern 
Germany against the demands of public opinion. As Sybel put it: ‘Under modern conditions 
no government can thrive that does not survive the judgment of this court in the length of 
time.’118  
Indeed, it was very unlikely at the time of unification that the Chancellor would risk a 
permanent standstill of federal government by refusing to cooperate with the Reichstag. There 
was simply too much to do. The entire domestic integration of the union needed to be 
addressed by way of federal legislation, not least in regard to economic and military affairs, 
which were vital for Germany’s international security. In light of these circumstances, only a 
few MPs rejected the Lex Bennigsen as a matter of principle. Most outspoken among them 
were some left liberals, such as Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch: ‘But, Gentlemen, to base this 
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117  Delbrück, Lebenserinnerungen, pp. 399f. 
118  [‘Keiner Regierung hat in den modernen Verhältnissen Bestand, die auf Dauer vor dem Ausspruch dieses 
Gerichtes nicht besteht.’] Heinrich von Sybel, session 18, 23 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, 
Materialien, vol. 1, p. 592-4, quote on p. 593. 
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matter in a constitutional state on a moral responsibility rather than a juristic one: – well, if 
you want to do that, then we do not need a constitution at all, Gentlemen!’119 
This harsh criticism points to one of the reasons why Bismarck accepted the Lex 
Bennigsen: it seemed relatively harmless, in particular if one considers how the negotiations 
in the constitutive Reichstag had evolved. The liberals had shown convincingly that Bismarck 
was wrong in arguing that responsible federal ministries were incompatible with a federal 
organisation of the Empire. As the left-liberal MP Albert von Carlowitz put it, it was simply 
not true ‘that you steer toward a unitary state only because you want ministerial 
responsibility’.120 Due to the prevalence of such views, there was a serious risk that the 
Reichstag would propose to make the Chancellor directly responsible to the parliament. From 
Bismarck’s perspective, the Lex Bennigsen was therefore far from being the worst possible 
outcome of the parliamentary negotiations.  
Moreover, he also understood it as a lesser evil in comparison to the introduction of a 
whole set of federal ministries. He despised all collegial systems of government whole-
heartedly because of his experience as Prussian prime and foreign minister. In the Prussian 
cabinet, the so-called State Ministry, he quarrelled with the other ministers all the time, 
because decisions were taken by majority vote. Since he wanted to avoid a similar nuisance 
on the national level, he tried all he could to preserve the independence of the Chancellor 
from other federal executives.121  
Furthermore, Bismarck realised that despite all the complications, the Lex Bennigsen 
created an advantage for the Chancellor, because it strengthened his position vis-à-vis the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119  [‘Aber, meine Herren, in dem constitutionellen Staate auf diese moralische Verantwortlichkeit die Sache zu 
gründen und von der jruistischen absehen: - ja, wenn man das thun will, dann braucht man überhaupt keine 
Constitution, meine verehrten Herren!’] Hermann Schluze-Delitzsch in the constitutive Reichstag, session 
18, 23 March 1867, printed in ibid., p. 623. 
120  [‘daß man auf den Einheitsstaat lossteuere, wenn man überhaupt die Ministerverantwortlichkeit wolle’] 
Albert von Carlowitz in the constitutive Reichstag, session 19, 26 March 1867, printed in ibid., p. 705.  
121  Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung, 243ff. On Bismarck's contempt for and 
cooperation with the Prussian State Ministry more generally, see Helma Brunck, Bismarck und das 
preussische Staatsministerium 1862-1890, Quellen und Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und 
preussischen Geschichte 25 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), especially the overview on pp. 312-17. 
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Emperor. In case they disagreed, the Chancellor could use his accountability to public opinion 
as leverage, for example if he refused to countersign one of the Emperor’s official acts. The 
Lex Bennigsen thus broadened the Chancellor’s scope of action within the federal executive 
considerably.122 
But the main reason why Bismarck was willing to accept the Lex Bennigsen was probably 
that it left the most important structural arrangement for the protection of monarchical power 
untouched. It was somewhat irrelevant that the Chancellor was made subject to a general 
responsibility, because he was not the centre of the executive that faced the Reichstag in the 
legislative process. This role fell to the Bundesrat. Even if the constitutive Reichstag had 
made the Chancellor directly accountable to the parliament, the Bundesrat would have 
continued to protect the federal executive from parliamentary influence to some degree. In 
order to guarantee that this anti-parliamentary structure would stay permanently intact, 
Bismarck included in the constitution a clause of incompatibility stipulating that no one could 
be a member of both the Reichstag and the Bundesrat at the same time.123  
Why, then, did the great majority of the liberals decide to adopt the Lex Bennigsen instead 
of risking a conflict with Bismarck and the united governments about proper ministerial 
responsibility? Fears that the creation of the constitution could fail at the last moment, similar 
to the attempts at Frankfurt and Erfurt, did play an important role. But the liberals were also 
motivated by an optimistic vision of the future. Their great hope was that the pending 
domestic integration of Germany would trigger a great process of centralisation. The unitary 
predisposition of the federal competence catalogue, which they had adopted just before the 
discussion on the organisation of the constitutional organs, nourished this hope. Like Rudolph 
von Delbrück, they expected that a centralisation of the union would go hand in hand with the 
emergence of federal administrative agencies around the Chancellor. This ministerial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122  Becker, Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung, pp. 388f. Boldt, “Der Föderalismus in den 
Reichsverfassungen von 1849 und 1871”, p. 330.  
123  RV (1871), art. 9. 
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apparatus, they speculated, would gradually replace the Bundesrat as the centre of federal 
government and thus dissolve the key constitutional arrangement that protected the executive 
from parliamentary influence. Over the course of this development, the Reichstag could try to 
turn the newly emerged federal administration into a parliamentarily responsible body. This 
way, the liberals would eventually get what they had always wanted: responsible federal 
ministries.  
The problem with this logic was that the constitution left it completely open in what 
direction the union would evolve. It was deeply ambiguous, embracing unitary and 
confederate as well as parliamentary and monarchical elements. Moreover, it did not define 
any limits to federal evolution. It was therefore not a stable legal framework that made the 
future development of the union in any sense predictable. If federal ministries emerged, they 
could as well serve as the basis for a new absolute regime rather than for parliamentary 
government.  
This ambiguity and open-endedness of the constitution was mainly due to the fact that it 
was a new combination of those structural elements that had shaped the conflict between 
monarchical and parliamentary power since the beginning of the nineteenth century. For the 
evolution of the imperial federal state, this composite character of the constitution was a great 
burden, because it meant that the basic structural framework of Germany not only lacked any 
greater coherence, but was also burdened by the historical legacy of its predecessors. 
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Table 1: List of National Competences in the Federal Constitutions of 1849, 1867, and 1871  
 
 
Subject Matter 
1849 Draft 
Constitution of 
the Frankfurt 
Assembly 
1849 Draft 
Constitution of 
the Erfurt Union  
1867 Constitution 
of the North 
German 
Confederation 
1871 
Constitution of 
Imperial 
Germany 
Freedom of movement, domicile and 
settlement affairs, right of 
citizenship, passport and police 
regulations for aliens, transacting 
business including insurance affairs 
§§ 58, 57, 39, 136 §§ 56, 55, 39, 134 art. 4.1 art. 4.1 
Customs and commercial legislation, 
taxes that are applied to the 
requirements of the Reich 
§§ 34, 38, 51 §§ 34, 38, 49 art. 4.2 art. 4.2 
System of coinage, weights, and 
measures, establishment of the 
principles for the issues of funded 
and unfunded paper money 
§§ 46, 45, 47 §§ 45, 44, 46 art. 4.3 art. 4.3 
General regulations as to banking § 47 § 46 art. 4.4 art. 4.4 
Granting of patents for inventions, 
protection of intellectual property 
§ 40 § 40 art. 4.5, 4.6 art. 4.5, 4.6 
Organisation of the common 
protection of German commerce in 
foreign countries, of German vessels 
and their flags at sea; arrangement of 
a common consular representation 
§§ 38, 6 §§ 38, 6 art. 4.7 art. 4.7 
Railway affairs; construction of land 
and water communications for the 
defence of the country and for 
general transport 
§§ 28, 32, 31 §§ 28, 32, 31 art. 4.8 art. 4.8, 46 
Rafting and navigation affairs on 
waterways belonging in common to 
several of the States; condition of the 
waterways; river or other water dues  
§§ 24, 25 §§ 24, 25 art. 4.9 art. 4.9 
Postal and telegraphic affairs §§ 41, 44 §§ 41, 43 art. 4.10 art. 4.10, 52 
Regulations as to the reciprocal 
execution of judgments in civil 
affairs; settlement of requisitions in 
general 
§ 183 § 181 art. 4.11 art. 4.11 
Regulations as to the verification of 
public documents 
§ 60 § 58 art. 4.12 art. 4.12 
General legislation as to obligatory 
rights, penal law, commercial and bill 
of exchange laws, and judicial 
procedure 
§ 64 § 61 art. 4.13 art. 4.13 
Military and naval affairs of the 
union 
§ 13 § 13 art. 4.14 art. 4.14 
Measures of medicinal and veterinary 
police 
§ 61 § 59 art. 4.15 art. 4.15 
Regulations for the press and for 
associations 
§ 143.4 § 141.3 --- art. 4.16 
 
Based on: FC (1849); EC (1849); NDBV (1867); RV (1871); Ernst Bezold, ed., Alphabetisches Sprech- und 
Sach-Register nebst zwei Congruenz-Registern zu der Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes und der Deutschen 
Reichsverfassung, sowie zu den Verhandlungen und Verträgen der verbündeten norddeutschen und 
beziehungsweise der süddeutschen Regierungen und den Reichstags- beziehungsweise Landtags-Verhandlungen 
(Berlin: Habel, 1873), pp. 5f.; and Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 110f., fn., 57.  
 
 
! 117!
CHAPTER III 
GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Figure 1: Federal Budget in Billion Goldmark, 1871-1918. Based on Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, ed. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1880-1918). Available online 
at Das Deutsche Digitale Zeitschriftenarchiv, https://www.digizeitschriften.de/dms/toc/?PID=PPN514401303 
(first retrieved February 2015). 
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Over the course of the imperial era, federal government changed completely. While the 
Empire had been founded as a decentralised federation, it gradually evolved into a centralised 
state. More clearly than anywhere else, this transformation was reflected in the development 
of the national budget (see Figure 1). In the first decade after unification, both expenditures 
and receipts actually decreased, from around 1.4 billion Goldmark in 1872 to half a billion in 
1880/81. This decline was largely due to the military demobilisation and the end of the French 
reparation payments after the unification wars. For a nation of the size of Imperial Germany, 
the national budget of these early years was strikingly small. Its low level reflected the 
financial dependence of the Reich on the states, which funded the national level by a complex 
system of subsidy payments. After the end of the 1870s, however, there was a clear trend 
toward centralisation. Between 1880 and 1914, expenditures and receipts gradually grew from 
500 million to more than three billion. This rise flowed from the ever-increasing national 
remit and the growing number of funds that the Reich generated independently from the 
states. Following the outbreak of the First World War, this process of centralisation reached a 
new level. In 1917/18, national expenditures and receipts skyrocketed to an all-time high of 
over fifty and thirty billion, respectively. The budget exploded because wartime Germany had 
practically become a unitary state that centralised all its resources on the national level.  
What did this transformation of the Empire from a federal into a centralised state look like? 
How did the relations evolve between the Reich and the states on the one hand and among the 
federal constitutional organs on the other? In short: what changes did federal government 
undergo and what were the underlying dynamics? This chapter will demonstrate that the 
states were gradually marginalised by a newly emerged national government around the 
Chancellor. As a consequence of this concentration of power, the anti-parliamentary 
structures of the federal order dissolved and the national executive became dependent on the 
Reichstag, which replaced the Bundesrat as the central organ of national decision-making.  
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The main feature of this development, from the unification until the wartime collapse of 
the monarchy, was systemic instability. To a large extent, this instability was due to the fact 
that the constitution established neither mediating organs with the power to resolve disputes 
in a negotiated and – if possible – consensual way nor proper forums of communication in 
which the most important decision-makers of federal government could have coordinated 
their policies. A constitutional court did not exist. Until 1917, there was no cabinet in which 
the Chancellor and the state secretaries could have conferred with each other. The plenary 
assembly of the Bundesrat was no setting for an open debate between the state governments, 
because the plenipotentiaries were bound by the instructions of their home governments. 
Direct relations between the Reichstag and the federal executive were not provided for by the 
constitution at all.  
This lack of coordinating institutions was an important part of Bismarck’s attempt to 
protect monarchical power. Soon after the adoption of the constitution, however, it turned out 
that the union could not be governed without any exchange between the state governments, 
the federal administration, and the Reichstag. For this reason, a number of auxiliary practices 
evolved over the years: the state governments conferred with each other via their diplomatic 
missions; the highest-ranking federal executives became part of the Prussian cabinet, the State 
Ministry; and the federal administration and the Reichstag negotiated in the parliamentary 
committees.  
While these informal practices kept the machinery of federal government running, they 
also produced new problems, such as frictions between the federal and Prussian 
administration. Moreover, they could be abandoned at any time. The Wilhelmine Chancellors, 
for example, discontinued Bismarck’s policy of including the state governments in important 
decisions of national government. It was most problematic, however, that the newly evolved 
governmental practices did not manage to balance monarchical and parliamentary interests. 
While the Reichstag gradually moved to the centre of national decision-making, the state 
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governments were pushed to the margins. As a result, the complex system of federal 
government lost coordination and eventually imploded. 
The changes that took place in the functions of the federal constitutional organs and in the 
competences of the Reich and the states were of such weight that historians have long made 
them a subject of research. Several studies have analysed how the roles of the Bundesrat, the 
Reichstag, and the administration around the Chancellor changed over time. 1  The 
participation of the most important states in federal politics – Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and 
Baden – has also been examined.2  Due to Prussia’s hegemonic status, the relationship 
between the Prussian and national executive has received special attention.3 These studies on 
individual problems notwithstanding, historians have not so far scrutinised how federal 
government evolved in its entirety.  
This neglect is probably due to the fact that such an analysis must avoid two potential 
pitfalls. On the one hand, it must refrain from framing a priori the evolution of federal 
government in terms of the two dichotomies that have dominated historical writing on the 
Empire’s federal structures: nationalism vs particularism; and Borussification vs 
mediatisation, meaning the question of whether Prussia ruled the Reich or vice versa. If we 
allow these dichotomies to frame the investigation, we automatically classify our observations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  See for example Binder, Reich; Walther Peter Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat,” in Zur 
Problematik “Preußen und das Reich,” ed. Oswald Hauser, Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-
preussischen Geschichte 4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1984), 83–104; Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 201-30; Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 809-907 and vol. 4, pp. 129-347; and Manfred Rauh's two studies 
Föderalismus and Parlamentarisierung. 
2  On Bavaria, see Binder, Reich; Rauh, Föderalismus; and Rauh, Parlamentarisierung. On Württemberg, see 
Binder's study and Georg Helmut Kleine, Der württembergische Ministerpräsident Freiherr von Mittnacht, 
Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg 50 (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1961). On Baden, see Hans Klaus Reichert, Baden am Bundesrat 1871 bis 1890 (Heidelberg: 
Berenz, 1966) and Walther Peter Fuchs’ source collection Großherzog Friedrich I. von Baden und die 
Reichspolitik 1871-1917, 4 vols., Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in 
Baden-Württemberg 15, 24, 31, 32 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968). 
3  See in particular the collection of essays in Oswald Hauser, ed., Zur Problematik “Preußen und das Reich,” 
Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-preussischen Geschichte 4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1984); Kersten Rosenau's 
study Hegemonie und Dualismus. Preußens staatsrechtliche Stellung im Deutschen Reich, 
Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Studien zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Regensburg: Roderer, 
1986); and the source collection printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf. 
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under one of the four rubrics, thus obstructing from view a range of developments that cannot 
be captured by any of them.  
On the other hand, an analysis of forty-seven years of federal government in a union of 
twenty-five states must find a way to deal with the plethora of information that the records of 
the different federal organs and the various actors on the national and state level provide. It is 
crucial to find a conceptual vessel that steers clear of the Scylla of a superabundance of details 
without being sucked down into the Charybdis of overgeneralisation and abstractness. This 
does not mean saddling the enquiry with external criteria. Rather, by establishing the 
structural conditions for federal evolution, the constitution itself can tell us where we should 
direct our attention.  
First, the constitution determined that the states participated in federal decision-making in 
the Bundesrat. A study of federal government must therefore consider how wide a scope for 
action the Bundesrat granted the state governments in practice and in how far they became 
active in national politics beyond this institutional framework.4 This need not mean charting 
the activities of every individual state in the decision-making processes of the Reich; as we 
shall see in this chapter and the next, the middling and small states can for most purposes be 
considered as one group that cooperated and competed with Prussia, the federal 
administration, and the Reichstag. 
Second, in order to protect the power of the monarchical governments, the constitution 
established no national government and made the Bundesrat the central organ of the executive 
and legislature. The evolution of federal government thus greatly depended on how the role of 
the Bundesrat developed and on who assumed the ministerial tasks of preparing and 
implementing laws. These are issues of central importance to any analysis of how the 
functionality of the federal constitutional organs developed over time.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  On the importance of the informal influence of the states, see Paul Hähnel, Philipp Höfer, and Julia Liedloff, 
“Föderale Mitbestimmung im Deutschen Kaiserreich - Der Einfluss der Länder auf die Reichsgesetzgebung,” 
in Föderalismus in historisch vergleichender Perspektive, ed. Gerold Ambrosius, Christian Henrich-Franke, 
and Cornelius Neutsch, vol. 2 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 101–34. 
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Third, the power of the Reichstag depended greatly on the division of competences 
between the national level and the states. The more competences the national level assumed, 
the more influential was the federal parliament, because its consent was required for the 
adoption of every federal law, including the annual budget. In order to chart the evolution of 
federal government, it is therefore necessary to chart the development of the federal remit by 
looking at what legislative powers the Reich – and thus the Reichstag – gained over the years 
in comparison to the states.  
Fourth, it makes sense to pay special attention to how fiscal affairs developed. The 
constitution protected monarchical power by making the Reich financially dependent on 
subsidies from the states, because this system minimised the leverage that the Reichstag had 
by virtue of its budgetary powers. The conflict between the monarchical governments and the 
parliament thus depended not least on whether the latter would manage to introduce direct 
federal taxes. Finally, a look at the development of national finances will also help us better to 
understand the relationship between the Prussian and federal executives. As long as subsidies 
by the states remained the main source of income for the Reich, the Prussian cabinet had a 
major influence on federal government, simply because Prussia was by far the greatest payer.5  
In examining these issues, this chapter can draw on a rich body of literature. What it has to 
do in order to compose a comprehensive narrative of federal government is to bring the 
different threads together and to reconsider the sources that historians have rendered 
accessible in a new light. For this purpose, it will look at federal government as a dynamic 
network of constantly changing relationships between the Reich, Prussia, and the other states 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  On the fiscal system of the union, see Julia Cholet, Der Etat des Deutschen Reiches in der Bismarckzeit 
(Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012); Hans-Peter Ullmann, Der deutsche Steuerstaat. Geschichte 
der öffentlichen Finanzen (Munich: Beck, 2005), part 2; and Peter-Christian Witt, “Finanzen und Politik im 
Bundesstaat - Deutschland 1871-1933,” in Föderalismus in Deutschland, ed. Jochen Huhn and Peter-
Christian Witt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 75–99. For a legal perspective, see Stefan Korioth, Der 
Finanzausgleich zwichen Bund und Ländern, Jus Publicum 23 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), pp. 309-24 
and Jürgen W. Hidien, Der bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich in Deutschland: geschichtliche und 
staatsrechtliche Grundlagen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). For a good contemporary analysis, see Wilhelm 
Gerloff, Matrikularbeiträge und direkte Reichssteuern (Berlin: Simion, 1908). 
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on the one hand and between the Reichstag, the Bundesrat, and the federal administration on 
the other.6 
By adopting this mode of analysis, this chapter wants to add a new perspective to the 
debate about the parliamentarisation of the Empire. At the centre of this controversy is the 
work by Manfred Rauh, who has argued that over the course of the Wilhemine era the 
Reichstag managed to make the national executive dependent on it, even though there was no 
official constitutional reform. For this subtle change toward a parliamentary system he has 
coined the term ‘silent parliamentarisation’.7   
Since Rauh published his theory in the 1970s, it has become subject to manifold criticism. 
Political and social historians such as Dieter Langewiesche have criticised the theory on the 
basis that it focuses solely on the institutional level. In the Empire, they argue, German 
society never underwent a democratisation strong enough to support the emergence of 
parliamentary government.8 More recently, this argument has been turned around. Christoph 
Schönberger has maintained that democratisation was stronger than parliamentarisation and 
thus obstructed it in its development.9 Both of these arguments dismiss the view that before 
the outbreak of the war Germany was on the verge of introducing parliamentary government. 
Thomas Kühne put this opinion, which now dominates the debate on the evolutionary 
potential of the Empire’s constitutional system, in a nutshell. ‘The thesis of […] “silent” 
parliamentarisation’, he criticised, ‘is the product of unhistorical wishful thinking’.10 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6   The powers of the Emperor changed so much in the context of federal evolution that I have published an 
article on this hitherto neglected topic, which can be found in the appendix: Oliver F. R. Haardt, “The Kaiser 
in the Federal State (1871-1918),” German History 34, no. 4 (2016): 529-54. This chapter will briefly 
summarise the main findings of the article. The book that will grow out of this thesis will use the article as 
the basis for an additional chapter on ‘Monarchy’ (see Introduction). 
7  [‘stille Parlamentarisierung’] Rauh, Föderalismus and Rauh, Parlamentarisierung. Rauh’s view is a further 
development of the interpretation first advanced by Werner Frauendienst, “Demokratisierung des deutschen 
Konstitutionalismus in der Zeit Wilhelms II.,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 113 (1957): 
721–46. 
8  Dieter Langewiesche, “Das Deutsche Kaiserreich - Bemerkungen zur Diskussion über Parlamentarisierung 
und Demokratisierung Deutschlands,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 19 (1979): 628–42. 
9  Christoph Schönberger, “Die überholte Parlamentarisierung. Einflußgewinn und fehlende 
Herrschaftsfähigkeit des Reichstags im sich demokratisierenden Kaiserreich,” HZ 272, no. 3 (2001): 623–66. 
10  [‘Die These von der [...] „stillen“ Parlamentarisierung ist Produkt eines unhistorischen Wunschdenkens [...]’] 
Thomas Kühne, “Demokratisierung und Parlamentarisierung: Neue Forschungen zur politischen 
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It is striking that in this debate only Rauh has considered the federal dimension of the 
Empire a central factor of the constitutional development. He has argued that after Bismarck 
had left office the system of Prussian hegemony disintegrated and that the Reichstag used this 
opportunity to make the national government around the Chancellor dependent on it. Most 
other contributors to the parliamentarisation debate have either treated Germany’s federal 
structures as a side issue or have ignored them completely. This way, the development of the 
Empire’s form of government has been severed from the evolution of its federal system. As a 
result, the parliamentarisation debate lacks a coherent view on Germany’s governing 
institutions and their structural framework.11 
This chapter wants to overcome this fragmentation by linking the functional evolution of 
the federal constitutional organs to a matter that even Rauh has largely neglected, namely the 
changing distribution of competences between the national level and the states. First, it will 
look at the period of Bismarck’s Chancellorship, in which federal government was shaped by 
the cooperation of the monarchical state governments. Then, it will turn to the Wilhelmine era 
and demonstrate how the newly established ministerial bureaucracy of the Reich took control 
over national policy-making while it became more and more dependent on the Reichstag. 
After that, the chapter will close with some brief interpretative reflections on the 
parliamentarisation debate.  
Over the course of this analysis, this chapter will argue that Germany changed from a 
federal union in which the monarchical governments determined the course of federal 
government into a unitary system that was governed jointly by the national administration 
around the Chancellor and the Reichstag. In other words: the centralisation that set in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Entwicklungsfähigkeit Deutschlands vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 31, no. 2 
(2005), pp. 315f. 
11  On this issue, see Marcus Kreuzer, “Parliamentarization and the Question of German Exceptionalism: 1867-
1918,” Central European History 36, no. 3 (2003): 327–57. Kreuzer argues that the fragmentation of the 
historiographical debate is related to the dominance of an exceptionalist view on the German constitutional 
development, which holds that 'the Reichstag's limited and arrested parliamentarisation set Germany apart 
from European countries and constituted a key factor in Weimar's collapse', quote on p. 328.  
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immediately after the adoption of the constitution went hand in hand with the demise of 
monarchical and the rise of parliamentary government.  
 
The Twilight of Monarchical Government (1867-1890) 
 
After the adoption of the constitution in 1867, Bismarck’s agenda for federal 
government was twofold. His main concern was to prevent the establishment of 
parliamentarily responsible federal ministries. In order to make the machinery of federal 
government function, he also made great efforts to bring the Prussian State Ministry, in which 
decisions were taken by majority vote among the ministers, under his control. Against the 
threats of Prussian particularism and the introduction of responsible ministries, Bismarck tried 
to employ the collective power of the princes. During his chancellorship, national decision-
making was therefore shaped by a close cooperation of the state governments.  
Between 1867 and 1879, Bismarck pursued his objectives by centralising the developing 
national administration under the Kanzleramt, the Federal Department of the Chancellor. 
When this system led to the emergence of a growing number of federal departments and thus 
encouraged rather than obstructed demands for the introduction of responsible ministers, he 
changed his strategy. Until he left office in 1890, he adopted a wide range of measures that 
were supposed to reduce the responsibilities of the Chancellor, to restrain the independence of 
the newly established departments, and to reinvigorate the Bundesrat as the principal 
antagonist of the Reichstag. But even Bismarck could not turn back the clock and restore the 
confederate structures of the unification era. The federal system had developed its own 
dynamic towards centralisation that made inevitable the demise of the power of the 
monarchical governments. 
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I. Administrative Centralism: The Coordination of Domestic Integration by the 
Kanzleramt and the Emergence of Federal Departments (1867-1879) 
 
By adopting the Lex Bennigsen, the constitutive Reichstag turned the Chancellor – as 
we have seen in the previous chapter – into the only responsible minister of the Reich. In this 
position, he needed the support of a central administrative agency that could help him prepare 
bills, draft ordinances, and monitor the implementation of federal laws in the states. For this 
purpose, the Kanzleramt was founded in August 1867.12 It was directly responsible to the 
Chancellor and featured a central office, the Zentralbehörde, which supervised a gradually 
increasing number of directorates. At the beginning, there were three of these subdivisions, 
which dealt with consular, postal, and telegraphic affairs, respectively.13  
During the first years of its existence, the Kanzleramt greatly relied on the staff and 
administrative structures of the Prussian ministries. But the national administration quickly 
developed a life of its own. This became most manifest in the practice of presidential 
proposals. The governments of the middling and small states lacked both the expertise and the 
resources necessary to address the economic, legal, and social integration of the young union. 
Most of the relevant laws were therefore prepared either by the Prussian ministries or the 
Kanzleramt. But the latter faced the problem that it could not introduce draft bills into the 
legislative process, because the constitution reserved this right to the state governments and 
the Reichstag.14 Out of this lacuna evolved the customary right of the Emperor – the head of 
the federal administration – to introduce bills into the Bundesrat. He usually did so via the 
Prussian bench. Over the late 1860s, more and more of these so-called presidential proposals 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Allerhöchster Präsidial-Erlaß, betreffend die Errichtung des Bundeskanzler-Amtes, 12 August 1867, BGBl. 
NDB (1867), no. 3, p. 29. On the creation of this institution, see the memoirs of its first president Martin 
Friedrich Rudolph von Delbrück, Lebenserinnerungen von Rudolph von Delbrück, 1817-1867: mit einem 
Nachtrag aus dem Jahre 1870 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905), pp. 399-401. 
13  Rudolf Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, Neue Münstersche Beiträge zur 
Geschichtsforschung 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957), pp. 28ff., 36. 
14  RV (1871), art. 7, 23. 
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were prepared in the Kanzleramt, rather than in the Prussian ministries, as had previously 
been the norm. Already by the time the southern states joined the union in 1871, presidential 
proposals had become the rule rather than the exception. This gave the Kanzleramt the 
opportunity to extend its competences into all fields of legislation, including the national 
budget.15  
At the same time, presidential proposals implied a loss of Prussian control over federal 
policy making. As the Kanzleramt took over more and more competences and staff from the 
Prussian ministries, it slowly began to replace them as the most important administrative 
institution of the union. In a letter to his home government, the Saxon envoy Richard von 
Koenneritz concluded as early as September 1867 that the union, ‘rather than bringing about 
the desired expansion of the [Prussian] ministries, will deprive them of a good deal of their 
importance and prestige’. High-ranking Prussian executives, he reported, already started 
complaining: ‘This Bismarck will ruin the whole Prussian state for us!’16  
The governments of the middling and small states welcomed this development, because the 
Kanzleramt tended to take their interests more into account than the Prussian ministries did. 
This was not least due to Rudolph von Delbrück, its first president. The professional Prussian 
bureaucrat, a liberal expert on commerce, managed the Kanzleramt as a ‘collective ministry 
of the united governments’, as the historian Heinrich Otto Meisner has called it.17 Delbrück 
not only usually chaired the meetings of the plenary assembly of the Bundesrat. He also saw 
to it that the Kanzleramt provided the Bundesrat with administrative staff. Moreover, under 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  On the practice of presidential proposals, see Haardt, “The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918)”, pp. 539-
42 and Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, pp. 52, 310. 
16  [‘anstatt diesen Ministerien die verhoffte Erweiterung zu bringen, denselben gar noch ein gutes Teil von ihrer 
Bedeutung und ihrem Nimbus abzunehmen im Begriff steht’], [‘Der Bismarck ruiniert uns noch den ganzen 
preußischen Staat!’] Richard von Könneritz in a letter to the Saxon Foreign Ministry, 25 September 1867, 
printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 3, pp. 138f. 
17  [‘Gesamtministerium der verbündeten Regierungen’] Heinrich Otto Meisner, “Bundesrat, Bundeskanzler und 
Bundeskanzleramt (1867-1871),” in Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1914), ed. Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, 2nd ed., Neue Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek Geschichte 51 (Königsstein: Athenäum, 
1981), p. 88. 
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his supervision the Kanzleramt prepared legislative bills in close cooperation with the 
Bundesrat committees.18  
Most of the time, the Kanzleramt began consulting the state governments even before 
legislative proposals were introduced into the committees. This consultation took place via 
the diplomatic missions of the states in Berlin, a practice that greatly eroded the ministerial 
function of the Bundesrat committees, which shifted more and more to the Kanzleramt. The 
plenary assembly of the Bundesrat did not play any active role in the negotiation process, but 
merely voted on bills that the state governments and the Kanzleramt had previously agreed 
upon.19 
The great advantage of making use of the diplomatic missions was that the state envoys 
could engage in a more open exchange among each other and with the Kanzleramt than in the 
plenary assembly of the Bundesrat, where the plenipotentiaries were bound by the 
instructions of their home governments. But the shift of political decision-making from the 
Bundesrat to a forum outside the official constitutional framework implied that the state 
governments depended on the willingness of the Chancellor and the national administration to 
hear them and to take their interests into account. This worked well enough for as long as 
there was at least a partial overlap of interests. But whenever a serious conflict arose between 
the state governments and Bismarck, such as in 1878 over the introduction of a tobacco tax, 
he did not hesitate to threaten that Prussia would dissolve the union, annex the other states, 
and create a unitary German-Prussian state. With reference to his famous remark in the 
constitutive Reichstag, he made clear that ‘then one could build a monument for the German 
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18  Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive biographical study of Delbrück (1817-1903), even though his 
Lebenserinnerungen are an incredibly rich source on the transformation of the Prussian and German state 
between the pre-March era and the late 1870s. For a short, but good overview of his life see Marko 
Kreutzmann, Die höheren Beamten des Deutschen Zollvereins: eine bürokratische Funktionselite zwischen 
einzelstaatlichen Interessen und zwischenstaatlicher Integration (1834-1871) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2012), p. 248f. 
19  Binder, Reich, p. 188. Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, pp. 51ff. 
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Empire and place an inscription on there: “It was put into the saddle, but it did not know how 
to ride.”’20 
Most of the time, however, Bismarck made great efforts to accommodate the wishes of the 
state governments, because he wanted to unite their powers against the Reichstag. The 
‘careful consideration of the sensitivities of the other constituent states’ was so central to his 
approach to federal government that he coined an own term for it: ‘Bundesfreundlichkeit’ or 
federal good will.21 His commitment to this principle became obvious, for example, when he 
dismissed the idea of merging the federal with the Prussian judicial administration in 1878 
with one single comment: ‘If we are going to do everything that’s constitutionally possible, 
let’s do Greater Prussia instead of Germany and the others can go to blazes!’22 
The great importance that Bismarck assigned to Bundesfreundlichkeit gave the state 
governments a profound influence over federal government. This was perhaps most obvious 
in the framing process of the 1878 Proxy Law.23 The constantly increasing federal remit 
meant that the Chancellor was obliged to delegate his responsibility to countersign laws and 
ordinances to functional substitutes. At the beginning, the President of the Kanzleramt took 
over this responsibility for all fields of legislation. But after the Kanzleramt had been split 
into several administrative agencies, the Reichsämter (see below), this practice could not be 
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20  [‘Man könne dann dem Deutschen Reiche ein Denkmal errichten und darauf die Inschrift setzen: „In den 
Sattel hat man ihm geholfen, aber zu reiten verstand es nicht.“’] Reported by the Baden envoy Hans von 
Türckheim in a letter to the President of the Baden State Ministry Ludwig Karl Friedrich von Turban, 12 
January 1879, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 60, p. 244. For Bismarck’s speech in the constitutive 
Reichstag, session 10, 11 March 1867, where he made his famous remark ‘Let us put Germany […] into the 
saddle! It will know how to ride.’ [‘Setzen wir Deutschland […] in den Sattel! Reiten wird es schon 
können.’], see Bezold/Holtzendorff, Materialien, vol. 1, p. 181. 
21  [‘die sorgfältig geschonte Empfindlichkeit der übrigen Bundesstaaten’] Bismarck in a letter to the vice-
president of the Prussian State Ministry Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, 5 November 1879, printed in 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 71, p. 269. For a concrete example of Bismarck’s usage of the term, see for 
example his remarks on the discussion of a railway reform in the Prussian House of Representatives, 28 April 
1876, printed in Alfred von der Leyen, Die Eisenbahnpolitik des Fürsten Bismarck (Berlin: Springer, 1914), 
pp. 211f. On the principle of Bundesfreundlichkeit, see Binder, Reich, pp. 181ff. 
22  [‘Wenn wir alles thun was in der Richtung staatsrechtlich zulässig ist so machen wir Groß-Preußen statt 
Deutschland und stoßen die anderen vor den Kopf!’] Marginal note by Bismarck in a memorandum prepared 
by the Prussian minister of justice Heinrich von Friedberg, 2 November 1879, printed in Goldschmidt, 
Kampf, no. 67, p. 265. 
23  Gesetz, betreffend die Vertretung des Reichskanzlers, 17 March 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 4, pp. 7f. On the 
negotations concerning the Proxy Law, see Binder, Reich, chapter 2, pp. 71-112. 
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continued and the substitution of the Chancellor needed to be redefined. The first draft of the 
bill provided that the Chancellor should choose his substitutes from the Prussian Bundesrat 
plenipotentiaries. This plan aroused fierce opposition among the governments of the middling 
states, as they feared that Prussia’s hegemony would grow into total domination.24 In light of 
this resistance, Bismarck soon dropped the idea of creating – in the words of the 
administrative historian Rudolf Morsey – a ‘federal administration painted in black and 
white’, the colours of the Prussian flag.25 Instead, the final version of the law determined that 
the Chancellor had to choose his substitutes from the state secretaries that headed the 
Reichsämter.  
In terms of legislative output, the system of monarchical cooperation under the guidance of 
the Kanzleramt was very effective. This was not least due to favourable circumstances. 
Delbrück could rely on a national-liberal majority in the Reichstag, which shared with him the 
belief in free trade and minimal legal regulation. On this basis, federal legislation made great 
progress in the economic and legal integration of the union, in particular between 1867 and 
the mid-1870s (see Table 2). Milestones included the Trade Regulation Act of 1869 and the 
German Penal Code of 1870. With the exception of the 1877 laws on the judiciary, which 
limited the judicial sovereignty of the states, none of the laws that were adopted until 1879 
changed the fundamental distribution of competences between the Reich and the states.26 
Nevertheless, by including new economic and judicial matters into the list of federal 
responsibilities national legislation did shift the centre of decision-making closer to the 
national level.  
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24  See the report by the President of the Kanzleramt Karl von Hofmann to Bismarck, 11 February 1878, printed 
in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 53, pp. 237f. 
25  [‘Reichsverwaltung mit schwarz-weißem Anstrich’] Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 
1867-1890, p. 307. 
26  On the 1877 judiciary laws, see the introduction, overview, and source collection by Werner Schubert, Die 
deutsche Gerichtsverfassung (1869-1877): Entstehung und Quellen, Ius commune 16 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1981). For a brief overview, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, pp. 92ff. 
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Despite the legislative productivity of these years, the regime of administrative centralism 
proved problematic over time. There were several reasons for this. Bismarck and Delbrück, 
the two leading figures of the system, increasingly got into conflict with each other. As the 
driving force of Germany’s domestic integration, the president of the Kanzleramt had gained 
such a pivotal position that Bismarck, whose energies were bound in the arena of foreign 
politics in the first years after unification, started to see him as a threat to his own authority. 
The silent disagreement between the two broke out into open conflict in the context of the 
reorientation of Germany’s economic policies in the mid-1870s. For Delbrück, a free trade 
activist, Bismarck’s turn to protectionist policies was simply unacceptable. In 1876, he 
handed in his resignation.27  
Another major reason for the demise of the system of administrative centralism was that it 
eroded the anti-parliamentary function of federal structures. The fact that many federal bills 
were now prepared by the Kanzleramt rather than by the Prussian ministries nurtured 
demands for the introduction of parliamentarily responsible federal ministries. So did the 
great number of federal laws that were adopted. In April 1869, the liberals put forward a 
motion in the Reichstag that called for the creation of responsible ministries.28 In the ensuing 
parliamentary debate, Bismarck had to admit for the very first time that the Bundesrat 
committees could no longer fulfil all ministerial functions.29  
It was also problematic that the system of administrative centralism lacked coordination 
between the Prussian and federal executive. Whenever the Prussian cabinet pursued other 
interests than the Kanzleramt, federal government was locked in paralysis. This became most 
obvious in the failure of the 1869 fiscal reform. Under the leadership of the Prussian State !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  Oswald Schneider, Bismarcks Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik. Eine Darstellung seiner volkwirtschaftlichen 
Anschauungen, Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen 166 (Munich and Leipzig: Dunker & 
Humboldt, 1912), p. 49. See also Cholet, Der Etat des Deutschen Reiches in der Bismarckzeit, p. 199 and 
Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, pp. 73f. 
28  Motion by Karl von Twesten and Georg Herbert zu Münster in the North German Reichstag, 
Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1869, session 20, 16 April, pp. 389ff. 
29  See ibid., pp. 401-5, especially p. 403. On this issue, see Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter 
Bismarck 1867-1890, p. 57. 
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Ministry, the governments of the middling and small states prevented the introduction of a 
small set of direct federal taxes that the Kanzleramt had proposed in order to cover the 
increasing costs of domestic integration. In contrast to Bismarck, the state governments 
perceived this reform as too great a risk for monarchical power, because it would have given 
the Reichstag control over direct taxation for the first time.30  As the State Ministry continued 
to obstruct the progress of federal politics in important matters such as this, Bismarck 
concluded in 1877 that Prussian particularism was the ‘worst enemy of the Reich’ and that 
therefore ‘the experiment of establishing a federal administration independent [of Prussia] had 
failed’.31  
Bismarck’s main problem was that he could not find a way to loosen the grip of the State 
Ministry on national policy-making. He skipped back and forth between different initiatives:  
some aimed to establish a system of personal unions between the Prussian and national 
administration, others to separate the two completely. In January 1873, the Chancellor handed 
his office as Prussian prime minister over to Albrecht von Roon, the minister of war.32 While 
this move was also intended to reduce Bismarck’s workload, the main motive behind it was to 
decrease the influence of the State Ministry by severing its relationship with the Chancellor. 
Bismarck remained a member of the cabinet by retaining his office as Prussian foreign 
minister, the position that gave him the right to instruct the Prussian Bundesrat 
plenipotentiaries. But it quickly became clear that his plan was unworkable. Without being 
prime minister, Bismarck lacked the authority in the State Ministry to generate support for the 
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30  On the failure of the 1869 fiscal reform, see Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-
1890, pp. 54-61 
31  [‘schlimmster Gegner des Reichs’] Bismarck in a conversation with the state secretary of the Federal 
Department of Justice Heinrich von Friedberg, December 1877, quoted in Goldschmidt, Kampf, p. 33.  
[‘Versuch einer selbständigen Reichsverwaltung für gescheitert’] Bismarck in a letter to the state secretary of 
the Federal Foreign Office Bernhard von Bülow, 15 December 1877, printed in ibid., no. 38, p. 193. 
32  Protokolle (PSM), vol. 6/II (January 1867-December 1878), p. 760. 
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federal projects and policies that he pursued as Chancellor. After no more than eleven months, 
the experiment was over and Bismarck became prime minister again.33  
There were two major attempts to overcome the dualism between the Prussian and federal 
executive: the first in 1869 and the second at the turn of 1877/78, when the growth of the 
national deficit made a tax reform inevitable. On both occasions, Bismarck tried to harmonise 
the Prussian and federal fiscal administration by establishing a system of personal unions. His 
idea was to make the Prussian minister of finance responsible for the fiscal affairs of the 
whole union, a system similar to the organisation of military matters.34 But Bismarck’s plan 
failed. Neither in the Prussian nor in the federal administration was there any support among 
high-ranking officials for the introduction of a personal union. Most bureaucrats had started 
their careers in one of the Prussian ministries long before unification. Still Prussians at heart 
and aware of the process of centralisation that was underway, many of them feared that a 
system of personal unions might come at the expense of Prussia, ultimately leading to her 
mediatisation. This, indeed, was the reason that Delbrück gave when he declined the offer to 
assume the office of Prussian minister of finance in addition to his position as president of the 
Kanzleramt.35  
The state governments also rejected a system of personal unions, but for the opposite 
reason. Their great fear was that fiscal affairs would be taken over by exclusively Prussian-
minded staff, and thus further enlarge Prussia’s hegemony over the union. Both the Bavarian 
and Saxon governments complained vehemently that personal unions would in fact exempt 
Prussia from the national supervision of how the states implemented federal laws.36 In 
particular with regard to railway affairs, the state governments also feared that the 
federalisation of the Prussian administration might just be the first step towards making this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33  Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, pp. 27-9. 
34  On Bismarck’s plan, see the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 41-68. 
35  Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, p. 58. 
36  See for example the letter by the Saxon envoy Oswald von Nostitz-Wallwitz to his brother, the Saxon foreign 
minister Hermann von Nostitz-Wallwitz, 30 December 1877, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 44, pp. 
215f. 
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area a national competence, with the result that they would lose all their rights.37 The national 
liberals fanned the flames by claiming, as the historian and MP Heinrich von Treitschke put 
it, that a national system of railway administration would be ‘the sure road to a unitary 
state’.38  
Due to this resistance, no personal union was introduced but in the field of commerce, 
where most matters automatically had a national character. Bismarck himself took over the 
Prussian ministry of commerce in 1880.39 That he failed to introduce a system of personal 
unions in any other field meant that the dualism between the Prussian and federal executive 
stayed intact. After 1877/78, there was no further attempt to overcome it by means of a 
structural reform. Judicial, fiscal, and railway affairs thus remained permanently divided 
between the national and Prussian administration, with the former preparing and the latter – 
like the ministries of the other states – implementing federal laws.  
The institutions that were responsible for the preparation of bills were the Reichsämter. 
Their emergence was the main reason why the regime of administrative centralism under the 
Kanzleramt came to an end. In the course of the domestic integration of the union, the federal 
remit became so big that a single institution could no longer handle the workload. Moreover, 
the Reichstag demanded that the Kanzleramt structure its exploding expenses according to its 
different directorates. Otherwise, the parliament warned, it would no longer approve the 
budget.40 All this made it necessary to transform the Kanzleramt into a number of separate 
administrative agencies. The proper model of organisation was the Auswärtige Amt, the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which had been established in 1870 by turning the 
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37  See Bismarck’s letters to the Prussian minister of commerce Heinrich von Achenbach, 15 December 1877, 
and to the state secretary of foreign affairs Bernhard von Bülow, 15 December 1877, printed in ibid., no. 37 
and 38, pp. 190-6. See also the analysis by Goldschmidt in ibid., pp. 31f., 53f. and the study by the 
contemporary professor for railway law Alfred von der Leyen, Die Eisenbahnpolitik des Fürsten Bismarck. 
38  [‘der sichere Weg zum Einheitsstaate’] Heinrich von Treitschke in a letter to Gustav Freytag, 19 December 
1875, printed in Fenske, Bismarcksches Reich, no. 46, p. 157. 
39  See Bismarck’s letter to William I, 12 October 1880, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 80, p. 283. 
Protokolle (PSM), vol. 7 (January 1879-March 1890), p. 508. 
40  Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, pp. 46ff., 291ff. 
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Prussian foreign ministry into an independent federal agency under the direction of a state 
secretary.41  
Starting in 1873, the Kanzleramt was gradually split up into a wide range of independent 
Reichsämter (see Table 3). The departments of railway affairs, postal services, Alsace 
Lorraine, and justice had all emerged by 1877. With reference to this great increase in 
national competences and administrative agencies, Bismarck spoke of a ‘Reich flood’ during 
the parliamentary negotiations of the federal budget in the same year.42 When responsibility 
for fiscal matters was transferred to the newly found Federal Treasury, the Reichsschatzamt, 
in 1879, the Kanzleramt was renamed Reichsamt des Innern, Federal Department of the 
Interior.43 Its field of competence had shrunk considerably, as it now managed only those 
matters of national administration that were not explicitly conferred upon any other federal 
department. Within the first eight years after unification, a functionally differentiated system 
of federal administration had been established. The era of administrative centralism was over.  
Despite their responsibility for preparing bills and monitoring the implementation of 
federal laws in the states, the Reichsämter were not proper federal ministries. The state 
secretaries that headed them did not form a collegial cabinet. Rather, they stood under the 
direct control of the Chancellor, who remained the only federal minister. There was not even 
a regular meeting where the state secretaries came together in order to coordinate the policies 
of their respective departments.  
Nevertheless, the creation of the Reichsämter offered the Reichstag the chance to renew its 
call for the introduction of responsible federal ministers in a more concrete way than ever 
before. It could now demand quite simply that the state secretaries be declared parliamentarily 
accountable. In their campaign for the Reichstag election of 1877, the national liberals !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41  For a detailed analysis of how the different Reichsämter emerged, see Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung 
unter Bismarck 1867-1890, chapter 2, pp. 63-241. 
42  [‘Reichsflut’] Bismarck in the Reichstag, Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1877, session 6, 10 March, pp. 69-
74, quote on p. 73. 
43  Allerhöchster Erlaß, betreffend die Benennung des Reichskanzler-Amts und den Titel des Vorstandes dieser 
Behörde, 24 December 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 37, p. 321. 
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claimed that ‘with the growing scope and the increasing expansion of national authority the 
need for the introduction of responsible holders of the different branches of legislation and 
administration is becoming more and more urgent’.44  This demand gained even more 
momentum after the 1879 Proxy Law had been adopted. As the state secretaries took on the 
functional substitution of the Chancellor, their positions came to resemble even more closely 
those of federal ministers.45  
With structural change appearing to favour its cause, the Reichstag became more self-
confident and began to wield more influence. When confronting the federal executive, the 
parliamentary parties now occasionally advocated the interests of the different states, because 
they saw this as an opportunity to diminish the importance of the Bundesrat. The Catholic 
Centre Party made the defence of the independence of the states one of its top priorities, most 
importantly because it wanted to protect the Catholics in the southern states against the 
repressive measures of the Culture Wars and, more generally, against the dominant Prussian-
Protestant interest in the union.46  
That this strategy could have momentous consequences for federal government became 
clear in the tariff reforms of 1878/79. The Centre Party made great efforts to maintain the 
financial dependence of the Reich on the Länder by adopting the Franckenstein Clause, which 
was named after one of the parties’ leading members. This provision obliged the Reich to 
distribute all tariff revenues in excess of 130 million Goldmark among the states.47 Together 
with the subsidies that the Länder had to pay to the Reich in case of a federal deficit, the 
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44  [‘Mit dem wachsenden Umfang und der steigenden Ausdehnung der Reichsgewalt wird das Bedürfnis nach 
Einsetzung verantwortlicher Träger der einzelnen Zweige der Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung des Reiches 
immer dringender.’] Manifesto of the National Liberal Party, 28 December 1876, printed in Fenske, 
Bismarcksches Reich, no. 52, p. 170. 
45  Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, chapter 4, pp. 287-312, especially p. 309. 
46  On the Centre Party as the ‘party of federalism’ [‘Partei des Föderalismus’], see Albert Funk, Kleine 
Geschichte des Föderalismus: vom Fürstenbund zur Bundesrepublik (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), pp. 235. 
On the guiding political principles of the Centre Party more generally, including the advocacy of federalism 
and regionalism, see Winfried Becker, ed., Die Minderheit als Mitte. Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei in der 
Innenpolitik des Reiches 1871-1913 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1986). 
47  Gesetz, betreffend den Zolltarif des Deutschen Zollgebiets und den Ertrag der Zölle und der Tabaksteuer, 15 
July 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 27, § 8, p. 244. 
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Franckenstein Clause – whose unconstitutional character will be analysed in Chapter 5 – 
established a complex system of financial redistribution that denied the Reich an independent 
financial basis for many years. This dependency limited considerably the scope of action of 
the federal executive.48 
What particularly worried Bismarck about the negotiations leading to the tariff reforms 
was the fact that the Bundesrat no longer monopolised the representation of the interests of 
the states. This marginalisation of the council of monarchical governments implied that its 
function as a bulwark against the advance of parliamentary power was crumbling. At the turn 
of the decade, Bismarck thus took action to redefine the system of federal government that 
had emerged since the unification. 
 
II. Confederate Restoration: The Failed Revitalisation of the Bundesrat (1879-1890) 
 
Bismarck realised that in order to prevent a further expansion of parliamentary 
influence he had to bring the process of centralisation that had set in since unification to a 
standstill. For this purpose, he wanted to restore the confederate structures that the 
constitution had originally established. At the centre of this strategy was the idea to 
reinvigorate the Bundesrat as the central organ of government, so it could shield the 
Chancellor and the heads of the newly established Reichsämter from the demands of the 
Reichstag. Rather than relying on the cooperation of the diplomatic missions outside the 
constitutional framework, Bismarck considered, the monarchical governments had to oppose 
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48  On the Franckenstein Clause, see Cholet, Der Etat des Deutschen Reiches in der Bismarckzeit, p. 480; 
Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 196f; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 950-2; and Rosenau, Hegemonie 
und Dualismus, pp. 100-102. For a brief overview of the relevant fiscal questions, see Winfrid Halder, 
Innenpolitik im Kaiserreich 1871-1914, 3. ed. (Darmstadt: WBG, 2011), pp. 13f. 
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the parliament collectively in the Bundesrat: ‘If I have the choice between strengthening 25 
constituent state governments or the power of the Reichstag, I choose the former!’49 
The implementation of this plan seemed all the more necessary to him because the federal 
parliament had not only become more powerful, but was also becoming increasingly difficult 
to handle. Under pressure from the land-owning Prussian Junkers, who feared that the global 
economic downturn would depress grain prices even further, Bismarck had begun to adopt 
protectionist economic policies in 1878. This decision ended his alliance with the national 
liberals and forced him to collaborate with a much more volatile coalition of the Centre Party 
and the Conservatives. While he managed to conclude peace with the Centre Party by 
gradually rescinding the repressive measures of the Culture Wars, his predicament worsened 
after the 1881 election, in which the left liberals won a quarter of all seats. The age of 
comfortable majorities had evidently come to an end.  
As this change of circumstances forced the Chancellor to adopt a more accommodating 
view of the demands of the Reichstag, the creation of a collegial cabinet suddenly appeared a 
real possibility. The monarchical governments recognised this danger. When in April 1879 
Bismarck convened a meeting of the state secretaries for the very first time, they warned him 
that if he made this conference a permanent institution, it might easily be transformed into a 
responsible cabinet as soon as he – the guarantor of the status quo – left office.50 The prospect 
of Crown Prince Frederick’s imminent ascent to the throne made this threat even more 
serious, because he and his English wife Victoria showed open sympathies for the left liberals 
and their agenda of introducing parliamentary government.51  
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49  [‘Wenn ich die Wahl habe, entweder 25 Partikularregierungen zu stärken oder die Macht des Reichstages, 
dann wähle ich das erstere!’] Bismarck in a conversation with the Prussian minister of finance Arthur 
Hobrecht, 29 June 1879, quoted in Goldschmidt, Kampf, p. 69. 
50  See the letter by the Saxon envoy Oswald von Nostitz-Wallwitz to his brother, the Saxon foreign minister 
Hermann von Nostitz-Wallwitz, 14 April 1879, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 65, pp. 258-60. 
51  Binder, Reich, p. 147. On Frederick's liberal inclinations, see the biographical studies by Patricia Kollander, 
Frederick III. Germany’s Liberal Emperor, Contributions to the Study of World History 50 (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1995) and Frank Lorenz Müller, Our Fritz: Emperor Frederick III and the Political 
Culture of Imperial Germany (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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But the monarchical governments needed not worry. Bismarck did not intend to introduce 
regular meetings with the state secretaries. The creation of such a round-table of the highest-
ranking national executives would have contradicted the very reason why he held the 
conference in the first place. He had summoned the state secretaries in order to inform them 
that by restoring the original structures of the constitution he would eliminate all 
governmental practices that offered the Reichstag a point of attack.52  
This plan comprised two basic parts. First, Bismarck wanted to make the plenary assembly 
of the Bundesrat an active forum of decision-making again, a function that it had largely lost 
since unification. Second, he wanted to reduce the position of the Chancellor – the only 
federal minister – to what it had been before the adoption of the Lex Bennigsen: the chairman 
of the Bundesrat. In order to put these ideas into practice, Bismarck issued a series of 
measures over the course of the 1880s that intended to increase his control over the 
Bundesrat; to strengthen the Bundesrat as the legislative counterpart of the Reichstag; and to 
hide the state secretaries and the Chancellor behind the anonymous majority decisions of the 
Bundesrat.53  
These goals made it necessary first to limit the independence that the federal 
administration had gained over the previous decade. The executives of the Reichsämter 
became active in the machinery of federal government – as we will see in the next chapter – 
via their position as Prussian Bundesrat plenipotentiaries. Bismarck therefore attempted to 
increase the control that he enjoyed as Prussian foreign minister over the Prussian Bundesrat 
bench. From 1880 onwards, plenipotentiaries could no longer propose motions without first 
showing them to the foreign minister.54 Moreover, the explicit instruction of the foreign 
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52  See the protocol of the conference of the state secretaries, 9 April 1979, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 
64, pp. 250-8. 
53  On these measures, see Binder, Reich, pp. 142-56; the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, 69-93; and Rauh, 
Föderalismus, pp. 77-84. 
54  See the protocol of the conference of state secretaries, 9 April 1979, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 64, 
pp. 253f. Bismarck later reinforced this measure in a directive to the state secretaries of the Reichsämter, 25 
May 1885, printed in ibid., no. 92, pp. 311f. 
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minister became a prerequisite for casting the Prussian vote in the Bundesrat, regardless of 
whether this instruction reflected a personal choice by the minister or a majority decision of 
the State Ministry.55  
In order to reactivate the Bundesrat as a forum of decision-making, all Prussian ministers 
were appointed plenipotentiaries.56 Bismarck hoped that the other state governments would 
follow this example.57 In addition, he wanted to abolish the practice of presidential proposals 
in favour of a system based on Prussian proposals. He explained the complex rationale behind 
this idea in a letter to one of the state secretaries in 1883. Presidential proposals, Bismarck 
argued, strengthened the role of the Chancellor in the executive at the expense of the 
Bundesrat, because they made the latter appear as a ministry in a government that was headed 
by the former. As a consequence, presidential proposals made the Chancellor more vulnerable 
to the demand that he should be turned into a parliamentarily responsible prime minister. In 
contrast, Prussian proposals treated the Bundesrat merely as the legislative counterpart of the 
Reichstag. Hence, Bismarck concluded, they protected the executives of the Reichsämter who 
were Prussian plenipotentiaries by making them part of the anonymous majority in the 
Bundesrat.58  
Bismarck wanted to reinforce this protective effect by transforming the Bundesrat into a 
purely legislative body. For this purpose, he played with the idea of shifting the few executive 
functions that the Bundesrat committees still had – most importantly the preparation of 
guidelines for the framing of proposals – to consultative bodies outside the official 
constitutional framework, in which national executives would be safe from ‘the danger […] of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55  See Bismarck’s letter to the state secretary of the Federal Department of the Interior Karl Hofmann, 8 March 
1880, printed in ibid., no. 73, pp. 271-3. 
56  Compare Handbuch, 1880, pp. 4-6 with Protokolle (PSM), vol. 7 (January 1879-March 1890), pp. 508-10. 
57  See the protocol of the Prussian State Ministry, 16 March 1884, printed in ibid., no. 89, pp. 303-6, especially 
p. 305.  
58  See Bismarck’s letter to the state secretary of the Federal Department of Justice Hermann von Schelling, 21 
December 1883, printed in ibid., no. 86, pp. 295-7. See also his letter to the state secretary of the Federal 
Foreign Office Herbert von Bismarck, his son, 15 December 1889, printed in ibid., no. 97, pp. 317-19. 
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becoming subject to a direct government of changing parliamentary majorities’.59 At different 
times, his plans included the foundation of a Reichsrat and the revival of the Prussian 
Staatsrat. It is hard to see the difference between them, as Bismarck wanted both of them to 
comprise the state secretaries of the Reichsämter, the Prussian ministers, and other executives 
chosen by the Kaiser or the Prussian king.60 But his favourite project was the creation of a 
national economic council, the Volkswirtschaftrat. He imagined this body as an ancillary 
parliament that would marginalise the Reichstag, be totally submissive to the Chancellor, and 
undermine the growing success of the Social Democrats by comprising representatives of the 
working class.61 
As early as 1880, Bismarck pushed a reform of the by-laws through the Bundesrat.62 The 
new rules were intended to make the plenary assembly more active by increasing the 
attendance of high-ranking executives from the states, above all the ministers. The state 
governments were now prohibited from conferring their vote upon the plenipotentiary of 
another state in consecutive sessions.63 At the same time, the different affairs that the 
Bundesrat had to deal with were categorised according to their importance.64 This made it 
possible for the executives from the states to pick the sessions they would attend. As 
Bismarck put it: ‘Certainly, no minister will be enticed to participate in the decision-making 
about the product approval of rose petals as a surrogate for tobacco […].’65 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59  [‘Gefahr [...] der direkten Regierung durch wechselnde Parlamentsmajoritäten [zu] verfallen’] Bismarck in a 
letter to the state secretary of the Federal Department of the Interior Karl Heinrich von Boetticher, 13 January 
1884, printed in ibid., no. 87, p. 299. 
60  On the creation of a Reichsrat, see ibid. On the revival of the Prussian Staatsrat, see the protocol of the 
Prussian State Ministry, 16 March 1884, printed in ibid., no. 89, pp. 303-6. See also Goldschmidt’s 
interpretation of these sources, ibid., pp. 83-7. 
61  See Bismarck’s report to William I, 10 September 1880, printed in ibid., no. 79, pp. 280f. See also 
Goldschmidt’s interpretation of this report, ibid., pp. 76-9. 
62  On this issue, see Binder, Reich, pp. 127-34; the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 71f.; and Rauh, 
Föderalismus, pp. 77-80. 
63  Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 2. 
64  Ibid., § 3. 
65  [‘Freilich werde sich kein Minister angelockt fühlen, an einem Beschlusse über Zulassung der Rosenblätter 
als Tabaksurrogat mitzuwirken [...]’] Reported by the Wurttemberg envoy Carl von Spitzemberg in a letter to 
the Wurttemberg prime minister Hermann von Mittnacht, 15 March 1880, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, 
no. 74, p. 274. 
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But the new by-laws were also meant to put the Bundesrat under Bismarck’s control. The 
underlying idea of the revised regulations was to shift the centre of consultation from the 
committees to the plenary assembly, for example by introducing two readings for each bill.66 
Here, Prussia held by far the biggest share of votes. As Bismarck instructed the Prussian 
bench in his capacity as Prussian foreign minister, this shift gave him much more control over 
what happened in the Bundesrat. The losers of this reform were the middling states, as they 
dominated the committees. In light of Bismarck’s control over the plenary assembly, the 
Mecklenburg plenipotentiary Karl Oldenburg complained that the reform of the by-laws 
reduced the Bundesrat to a ‘voting machine’ of the Prussian and federal executive ‘every bit 
as bad as the Frankfurt Bundestag’.67  
Despite this limitation of their scope of action, the protest of the state governments against 
the reform of the by-laws was relatively muted. In general, they bowed to Bismarck’s 
pressure much more readily in the 1880s than in the decade before. This was partly due to the 
fact that Bismarck became more rigorous. In particular when dealing with the small states, he 
lost his patience quickly and often treated them in a way that was hardly compatible with his 
principle of Bundesfreundlichkeit. This was most obvious in a conflict over the definition of 
the Hamburg customs area, which raised the question whether the Bundesrat had a right to 
interpret the constitution. Bismarck threatened the state governments that Prussia would leave 
the union if they decided to create a precedent for such a right.68 Given this threat, the state 
governments had little choice in this dispute – which we will examine further in Chapter 5 – 
but to eventually follow Bismarck’s will. 
But the main reason why the monarchical governments supported Bismarck’s reform of 
the federal system was that the increasing influence of the Reichstag made the introduction of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66  See Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 16. On this issue, see Binder, Reich, p. 133.  
67  [‘Stimmaschine [...] wie sie im Frankfurter Bundestag nicht schlimmer war’] Quoted in Binder, Reich, p. 
133. 
68  See Bismarck’s letter to the Prussian envoy in Oldenburg, Prinz zu Ysenburg, 9 May 1880, printed in 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 75, p. 276. See also Goldschmidt's interpretation of this issue, ibid., pp. 73-6. On 
the conflict over the Hamburg customs area, see Binder, Reich, pp. 134-40. 
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parliamentary government more likely than ever before. They had no option but to stand 
together under his leadership, unless they wanted to give in to the advance of parliamentary 
power. The issue came to a head in April 1884, when the new left-liberal German Radical 
Party, the Freisinnige Partei, was founded. 69  Its manifesto made the creation of a 
parliamentarily responsible cabinet the main goal of the party.70 As a reaction, Bismarck 
made the monarchical governments issue a joint declaration in the Bundesrat. In almost 
aggressive terms, the note argued that the introduction of responsible ministries was 
incompatible with the federal nature of Germany, because it would come ‘at the expense of 
the sum of contractual rights that […] the united governments exercised in the Bundesrat’. 
Since ‘the united governments are determined without exception to abide in undying 
allegiance by the contracts on which our federal institutions are based’, the declaration made 
clear, they would meet any attempt to ‘submit the government of the Reich to the majority 
decisions of the Reichstag’ with the ‘dissolution of the German union’.71  
While Bismarck was successful in creating a phalanx of the monarchical governments, he 
did not manage to restructure the functions of the federal executive and legislature. Most of 
his measures failed miserably, because they were either ignored or foundered on practical 
difficulties. A few examples must suffice. The ever-growing volume of legislative and 
executive activity made it impossible for the Prussian foreign minister to coordinate the 
relationship between the Bundesrat and the Reichsämter on his own. In 1885, Bismarck 
suspended the ban of direct contact between the state secretaries and the Bundesrat for all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69  On the April crisis, see the letter by the Saxon envoy Oswald von Nostitz-Wallwitz to the Saxon foreign and 
prime minister Alfred von Fabrice, 14 March 1884, the protocol of the Prussian State Ministry, 16 March, 
1884, and the letter by William I to Bismarck, 13 April 1884, which are printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 
88-90, pp. 300-8. See also Binder, Reich, pp. 150-3; Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 
1867-1890, pp. 297ff.; and Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 81. 
70  Manifesto of the German Radical Party, 5 March 1884, printed in Fenske, Bismarcksches Reich, no. 93, pp. 
315f. 
71  [‘auf Kosten der Summe von vertragsmäßigen Rechten, welche die Verbündeten Regierungen [...] im 
Bundesrat üben’], [‘die Verbündeten ohne Ausnahme entschlossen sind, die Verträge, auf welchen unsere 
Reichsinstitutionen beruhen, in unverbrüchlicher Treue zu erhalten’], [‘Unterwerfung der Regierungsgewalt 
im Reich unter die Mehrheitsbeschlüsse des Reichstages’], [‘Wiederauflösung der deutschen Einheit’] 
Protokolle (DR), 1884, session 16, 5 April, § 180, pp. 96-8. The declaration will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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‘insignificant matters of the ongoing administration’.72 This definition was so imprecise that 
in the following years it happened more and more often that motions were proposed without 
his knowledge and that the Prussian vote was cast without his instructions.73  
None of the consultative bodies that Bismarck had envisaged was made a permanent 
institution. This failure was mainly due to the fact that these assemblies embraced the same 
set of office holders, who could not possibly take part in all of them.74  
But the biggest flop was probably the revision of the Bundesrat by-laws. The centre of 
consultation shifted back from the plenary assembly to the committees within a few months, 
not least because here the plenipotentiaries could rely on the assistance of expert clerks (see 
Chapter 4). The attendance of the ministers from the states – an issue that the next chapter 
will examine in more detail – dropped rather than increased over the 1880s. They simply 
despised the conditions under which the Bundesrat had to work. Most annoying were the 
political pressure from the Chancellor, the short periods of consultation, and the lack of 
information from the Reichsämter.75  
Bismarck’s programme for a confederate restoration therefore achieved partly the opposite 
of what it had intended: the Bundesrat slowly eroded from within rather than experiencing a 
revival as a forum of decision-making. The middling states in particular continued to make 
their voices heard via their diplomatic missions rather than in the Bundesrat, even though the 
growing number of national laws implied that the influence of the federal legislative organs 
on the states was greater than ever before.76  
A restoration of the constitutional conditions of 1867 had simply become impossible by the 
1880s. Already in December 1883, the Wurttemberg Prime Minister Hermann von Mittnacht !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72  [‘unerheblichen Gegenstände der laufenden Verwaltung’] Bismarck’s directive to the state secretaries of the 
Reichsämter, 25 May 1885, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 92, p. 312. 
73  See for example Bismarck’s letter to Homeyer, an undersecretary of state in the Prussian State Ministry, 25 
March 1889, printed in ibid., no. 95, pp. 315f, where he complained about not having been informed about a 
motion concerning the collection of certain statistical data, a measure that he deemed unnecessary. 
74  See the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 87f. 
75  Binder, Reich, pp. 133f., 154-6. Rauh, Föderalismus, pp. 79f. 
76  Binder, Reich, p. 145. 
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told Bismarck that he ‘deemed a backwards revision impossible because of the Reichstag’.77 
The crux of the matter was that Bismarck could not recapture the spirits that he had released: 
the increasing independence of the Reichsämter; the competition between the Prussian and 
national administration; the apathy of the state governments in the Bundesrat; and – not least 
– the steadily growing federal remit at the expense of the states. The legislation of the 1880s 
concerned primarily the creation of the public insurance sector that Bismarck developed in the 
context of his campaign against the Social Democrats (see Table 2). While these laws did not 
encroach upon the competences of the states directly, they shifted the centre of public activity 
further to the Reich, most importantly because they made national rather than state-based 
institutions responsible for regulating the insurance sector.  
When he realised that he could not bring about a confederate restoration, Bismarck 
abandoned his plans and tried to preserve at least the status quo. After 1885, his measures 
against the Reichstag became more defensive. Most importantly, he wanted to prevent high-
ranking executives of the Reichsämter, who were usually also part of the Prussian Bundesrat 
bench, from working closely together with the Reichstag. To this end, he prohibited Prussian 
Bundesrat plenipotentiaries from replying to the Reichstag in the name of the monarchical 
governments and from helping the parliament with framing and amending bills unless they 
had the explicit permission of the Prussian king.78  
These measures show that Bismarck was still looking for an effective remedy against the 
steadily growing influence of the parliament. This was also the reason why in December 1885 
he decided to convene – for the second time ever – a conference of the state secretaries.79 But 
in the end he came to the same conclusion that he had already reached five years before, 
namely that he could not make the conference a permanent institution without risking that it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77  [‘eine Rückwärtsrevidierung mit dem Deutschen Reichstag halte ich für ausgeschlossen’] Quoted in ibid., p. 
147. 
78  See Bismarck’s directive to the Prussian Bundesrat plenipotentiaries, 27 January 1885, and his letter to the 
state secretary of the Federal Department of the Interior Karl Heinrich von Boetticher, 4 December 1888, 
printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 91, 94, pp. 308-11, 314f. 
79  See the analysis by Goldschmidt, ibid., pp. 66, 89f. See also Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 71. 
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would evolve into a federal cabinet. Fifteen years after the unification, there was therefore 
still no forum in which the highest-ranking federal executives could coordinate their policies.  
Moreover, Bismarck’s defensive measures were a denial of political reality. By the mid-
1880s, the negotiation of most bills took place long before they were introduced into the 
official legislative process. Compromises were often reached in informal negotiations that 
included envoys of the state governments, executives from the Reichsämter, and more and 
more often even members of the majority parties in the Reichstag.80 
After William I and Frederick III had died within a few months and William II had 
ascended to the throne in 1888, most of Bismarck’s measures gradually became obsolete. As 
he no longer enjoyed the unconditional trust of the Emperor, his authority was no longer 
sufficient to control the complex system of federal government that had evolved. His main 
worry remained the advance of the Reichstag. But he did not have new ideas of how to keep 
the parliament at bay. Like a mantra, he repeated his view that the federal executive had to 
hide behind the majority decisions of the Bundesrat, even though the last years had 
demonstrated that this system was impractical.81  
In 1890, as his relationship with the new Kaiser deteriorated and the Kartell parties lost 
their majority, he came up with the plan of a confederate coup d’état. With reference to the 
unification treaties, he proposed that the princes could terminate the union and reconstitute the 
Empire on the basis of a constitution that would give the parliament less power. In light of his 
crumbling authority, however, this scheme – which we will consider more closely in Chapter 
5 – was no more than a desperate figment of his imagination.82  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80  Christian Henrich-Franke, “Wandlungen föderalen Regierens im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Die 
Entscheidungsfindung im Fall der Sozialgesetzgebung,” HZ 293, no. 2 (2011), pp. 378-80. 
81  See Bismarck’s letter to the state secretary of the Federal Foreign Office Herbert von Bismarck, his son, 15 
December 1889, printed in ibid., no. 97, pp. 318f. See also the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 91f. 
82  Protocol of the Prussian State Ministry, 2 March 1890, printed in Zechlin, Staatsstreichpläne Bismarcks und 
Wilhelms II. 1890-1894, pp. 180ff. On Bismarck’s plans for a coup d’état, see Michael Stürmer, 
“Staatsstreichgedanken im Bismarckreich,” HZ 209, no. 3 (1969): 566–615. In a federal context, see also 
Binder, Reich, pp. 156-63 and the comments by Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 75, 92.  
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There was no way back to the confederate structures that he had established in 1867. In the 
two decades that had elapsed since the adoption of the constitution, the federal system had 
developed a strong drive towards centralisation that concentrated power in the Chancellor and 
the increasingly independent federal departments, expanded the influence of the Reichstag, 
and thus went hand in hand with the demise of the power of the monarchical governments. 
Even Bismarck could not stop this development, so big was the momentum that it had gained. 
When he left office, the way for the emergence of parliamentary government had long been 
paved. 
 
The Dawn of Parliamentary Government (1890-1918) 
 
After Bismarck’s dismissal, the centralisation of the union gathered speed, with the 
result that the federal structures designed to protect the power of the monarchical 
governments disintegrated and parliamentary government gradually emerged. In the 1890s, 
the old system of Prussian hegemony was largely dismantled. The Chancellor lost his 
function of coordinating the Prussian and national executive, while the Prussian State 
Ministry began to focus on particularistic interests. These changes in federal policy-making 
made the Chancellor and the state secretaries of the Reichsämter more independent from 
Prussia and thus increased the concentration of power in the central posts of the national 
rather than Prussian executive. This development was facilitated by the enhanced capacity of 
the office of the Emperor, who had gained several important legislative and executive rights 
since the unification that were not directly related to his position as Prussian king. 
The new independence of the national from the Prussian executive had the effect that the 
Chancellor and the state secretaries evolved into an unofficial federal government, the 
Reichsleitung, which presided over a fully-fledged ministerial bureaucracy, the Reichsämter. 
This development made the national executive much more susceptible to the attacks of the 
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Reichstag. During the chancellorships of Bernhard von Bülow (1900-1909) and Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg (1909-1917), the parliament gradually increased its control up to the point 
where the Reichsleitung became dependent on it. As a result, the Reichstag replaced the 
Bundesrat as the central organ of the national decision-making process, while the state 
governments were pushed to the margins. The government of Germany was no longer 
determined by the collaboration of the monarchical governments, but by the cooperation and 
competition of the Reichsleitung with the Reichstag.  
After the outbreak of the First World War, the Bundesrat was formally revived by 
equipping it with the power to issue emergency decrees in more or less all fields of 
government. In practice, however, this power was exercised by the executives of the 
Reichsleitung rather than by the state governments. The Bundesrat was no more than a 
sanctioning machine in a volatile system of wartime government, which was shaped by the 
dynamic relationships between the Reichsleitung, the Reichstag, and the Supreme Army 
Command, the Oberste Heeresleitung. The monarchical governments played hardly any role.  
From 1917 onwards, the Reichstag penetrated the national executive more and more. 
When the first parliamentarians were appointed state secretaries in 1918, the old federal order 
– which had been established in order to prevent parliamentary forces from assuming 
governmental power – had practically dissolved. Germany had changed into a unitary system 
in which the Reichstag controlled the Chancellor and the state secretaries as if they had been 
legally responsible to the parliament. When the constitution was eventually amended to this 
effect in October 1918, this revision was merely a matter of form for which the centralisation 
of the union had set the stage since the late 1860s. 
 
I. The Formation of a Federal Government: Cooperation and Competition between the 
Reichsleitung and the Reichstag (1890-1914) 
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‘I fear that as soon as Prince Bismarck will disappear from the scene, devastating storms 
will be raised – also within Germany. What arm will be strong enough to take the helm, what 
eye sharp enough to find the right path to the right destination?’ 83  When August 
Reichensperger, one of the leading members of the Centre Party, made this observation in 
February 1890, he was probably thinking – among other things – about the complex 
machinery of federal government. On the basis of his personal authority, Bismarck had 
managed to reconcile the competing interests of the Prussian and federal administration most 
of the time. After his resignation in March 1890, the Prussian-federal dualism broke out with 
new force. From 1892 until his dismissal two years later, Chancellor Leo von Caprivi left the 
Prussian prime ministership to Botho von Eulenburg, after having failed to reform the 
Prussian school system. Since Karl Heinrich von Boetticher’s resignation in 1897, the state 
secretary of the Federal Department of the Interior was no longer automatically appointed 
vice-president of the Prussian State Ministry.84 This meant that now the Chancellor and 
Prussian prime minister had two general proxies, one for his federal and the other for his 
Prussian office.85 
The abolition of these personal unions implied that the federal executive lost influence 
over Prussia. This became most manifest in the permanent quarrel over the right to tell the 
Prussian Bundesrat plenipotentiaries how to vote. While Caprivi insisted that this right rested 
with him as Prussian foreign minister, Eulenburg argued that the majority decisions of the 
State Ministry were binding.86 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83  [‘Ich fürchte, daß, sobald der Fürst Bismarck von der Bildfläche verschwindet, verheerende Stürme entfesselt 
werden – auch im Innern Deutschlands. Welcher Arm wird dann kräftig genug sein, um das Steuer zu führen, 
welches Auge scharfblickend genug, um den rechten Weg zum rechten Ziele hin zu erschauen?’] August 
Reichensperger in a letter to Mrs von Hilgers, 11 February 1890, printed in Fenske, Bismarcksches Reich, no. 
139, p. 455. 
84  See Protokolle (PSM), vol. 8.II (March 1890-October 1900), p. 718. Boetticher’s successor as vice-president 
of the State Ministry was Johannes von Miquel, the Prussian minister of finance, while Arthur Graf von 
Posadowsky-Wehner became the new state secretary of the interior.  
85  On the gradual loss of coordination, see the exchange of letters between Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg, the Prussian minister of the interior Friedrich von Moltke, and the Prussian minister of finance 
August Lentze, September 1909-November 1911, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 104-7, pp. 334-8. 
86  See for example Caprivi’s letter to Eulenburg, 23 June 1894, printed in ibid., no. 101, pp. 324-7. 
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To a great extent, the growing divergence of Prussian and federal interests was the result of 
the different electoral laws in Prussia and the union. The three-class franchise of the Prussian 
House of Representatives produced much more conservative majorities than the universal 
suffrage of the Reichstag, in which the share of the left liberals and Social Democrats grew 
constantly. The Chancellor thus had to deal with parliamentary demands that were completely 
different from those that the Prussian State Ministry had to consider. Without Bismarck’s 
imposing authority, the federal and Prussian executive moved in different directions over 
time.87  
Due to Prussia’s hegemonic position in the constitution, the growing focus of the State 
Ministry on exclusively Prussian interests hampered federal government greatly. The 
historian Hans Goldschmidt has therefore characterised the 1890s as a period of 
‘particularistic degeneration’, in which the federal administration lost its Prussian power base 
and fell into permanent conflict with the State Ministry.88 This became obvious in 1893, for 
example, when the Prussian finance minister, Johannes von Miquel, sabotaged the tax plans 
of the Federal Treasury in order to push through his own project of introducing a wine tax. In 
reaction to this defeat, the state secretary of the Federal Treasury, Helmut von Maltzahn, 
resigned.89 
Such conflicts between the federal and Prussian administration drove a wedge between the 
monarchical governments. The ministers of the middling and small states tended to side with 
the national authorities, because they usually took their interests into greater consideration 
than the Prussian departments. This situation could give rise to serious frictions that made the 
common opposition of the monarchical governments against the parliament crumble, as the 
negotiation process of the wine tax after Maltzahn’s resignation illustrates. The bill that was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87  On the problem of the diverging electoral laws, see the letter by the state secretary of the interior Clemens 
von Delbrück to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 18 November 1912, printed in ibid., no. 108, 
338-44, especially p. 341. 
88  [‘partikularistische Entartung’] Ibid., p. 112. 
89  On this controversy, see Rauh, Föderalismus, pp. 139-43.  
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framed on Miquel’s initiative largely ignored the interests of the wine-producing southwest 
German states. In light of the Prussian dominance in the Bundesrat, the prime minister of 
Wurttemberg, Hermann von Mittnacht, saw no other possibility to prevent the adoption of the 
bill but to complain about it in the Reichstag, speculating that the parliamentarians might 
reject it on behalf of the southern states.90 By adopting this approach, he brought a fight 
between the state governments, which they were supposed to resolve in the Bundesrat, up for 
discussion in the parliament. While this manoeuvre was successful in preventing the adoption 
of the tax, it was a clear sign that the Bundesrat no longer fulfilled its functions of pooling the 
forces of the monarchical governments and of advocating their collective interests vis-à-vis 
the Reichstag.91   
In addition to the disintegration of the anti-parliamentary phalanx of the state governments, 
the shift of the Prussian cabinet’s focus from national to Prussian interests had another 
important consequence: it made the Chancellor and the state secretaries more independent. In 
1892, an internal report that the Federal Department of Justice had prepared for the 
Kanzleramt acknowledged for the first time that an independent federal government had 
evolved:  
 
The Emperor and the Chancellor now form the holders of an independent governmental and 
executive authority of the Reich, which is different and separate from the Prussian state authority, 
and they pursue independent federal policies, which do not necessarily coincide with Prussian 
policies.92 
 
This unofficial federal government became commonly known as Reichsleitung. It comprised 
all the leading members of the national ministerial bureaucracy: the Chancellor and the state 
secretaries of the Reichsämter. Within a few years, the Reichsleitung managed to gain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90  Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1894, session 31, 20 January, pp. 763-5. 
91  On Mittnacht’s manoeuvre, see Rauh, Föderalismus, pp. 148-50.  
92  [‘Kaiser und Reichskanzler bilden jetzt die Träger einer eigenen Regierungs- und Exekutivgewalt des Reichs, 
die von der preußischen Staatsgewalt begrifflich verschieden und getrennt ist, und sie vertreten eine eigene 
Reichspolitik, die mit der preußischen Politik nicht notwendig überall zusammenfällt.’] Report by the 
Federal Department of Justice about the constitutionality of presidential proposals, 31 March 1892, printed in 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 100, pp. 323. 
Chapter III 
Government 
 
152!
supremacy over the Prussian State Ministry. This development became obvious in 1899, when 
the state secretary of the Federal Treasury replaced the representative of the Prussian Treasury 
as chairman of the Bundesrat committee of finance.93 
The ascent of the Reichsleitung was a natural consequence of the fact that in the 1890s the 
centre of public activity shifted further to the national level. The political arena was 
dominated by nationally relevant questions, such as naval construction and colonial 
expansion. But the increasing independence of the Reichsleitung from Prussia was also due to 
a major change in structural circumstances. Since the unification, the head of the national 
administration, the Emperor, had become more independent from his position as Prussian 
king and had evolved into an important factor of federal government. For structural reasons of 
federal evolution, he had gained not only the power to initiate legislation by presidential 
proposals, but also – as my article that can be found in the appendix has shown – to veto laws, 
to decree ordinances across all fields of government, and to appoint most executives of the 
Reichsämter and other newly-created national agencies.94  
These powers greatly enhanced the capacity of the office of the Emperor and enabled him 
to play a more active role in the national decision-making process. In particular under the 
weak Chancellor Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1894-1900) and his successor 
Bernhard von Bülow (1900-1909), William II took advantage of this opportunity and 
sporadically intervened in the legislative process.95 
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93  See Goldschmidt’s analysis in ibid., pp. 97f. 
94  Haardt, “The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918)”, especially pp. 539-51. 
95  See John C. G Röhl, Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 
(London: Batsford, 1967) and Katherine Anne Lerman, The Chancellor as Courtier: Bernhard von Bülow 
and the Governance of Germany 1900-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  On William 
II's alleged personal regime more generally, see Röhl's monumental biographical study Wilhelm II., 3 vols. 
(Munich: Beck, 1993-2008), the concise summary of his lifetime work on Wilhelmine government Kaiser 
Wilhelm II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), his earlier study Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm 
II. und die deutsche Politik. 3rd ed. (Munich: Beck, 1988), and the edited volume John C. G Röhl and 
Nicolaus Sombart, eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations: The Corfu Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). Among the studies that reject the idea of a personal regime, see in particular 
Christopher Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm (London: Longman, 2000) and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, War der Kaiser 
an Allem Schuld?: Wilhelm II. und die preussisch-deutschen Machteliten (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002). 
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Whether or not we believe in the existence of a personal regime, these interventions did 
contribute to a functional change of federal government. The negotiations of the military code 
of criminal procedure, which dragged on for most of the 1890s, are a good example.96 At the 
behest of the Emperor, the Prussian war minister prepared a bill that was based on the 
conservative Prussian code of procedure from 1845, which was generally seen as out of date, 
mainly because it stressed the absolute authority of the military leadership. Chancellor and 
Prussian Prime Minister Hohenlohe never authorised the framing of this bill. He favoured the 
idea of adopting a revised version of the much more liberal Bavarian code of procedure, 
which had been framed during his time as Bavarian prime minister in the 1860s, for the whole 
of Germany – so did the other state governments. Nevertheless, they decided to adopt the 
Prussian proposal in the Bundesrat for tactical reasons. They knew that the progressive 
majority in the Reichstag would reject the bill. Waving it through the Bundesrat was thus an 
easy way to avoid a conflict with the Emperor and to make sure that he would not blame the 
Chancellor for failing to organise a majority among the states. But this consideration for 
Hohenlohe’s position came at a high price. Instead of taking the dispute about the military 
code of procedure in their own hands by rejecting the Prussian proposal in the Bundesrat, the 
state governments left the decision to the Reichstag. This way, the parliament rather than the 
council of states acted as the ultimate decision maker of federal government.97  
Due to incidents such as this, the Reichstag gradually replaced the Bundesrat as the 
primary partner of the Reichsleitung in the framing of legislative proposals. The more the 
Reichsleitung converged with the Reichstag, the less the Bundesrat could shape federal 
legislation. Rather than on the state governments, the Reichsleitung began to rely on the 
majority parties in the parliament. This became clear in 1900 when the Second Naval Law 
was adopted.98 After the state governments had failed to agree on how to finance the naval !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96  Militärstrafgerichtsordnung, 1 December 1898, RGBl. (1898), no. 53, pp. 1189-1288. 
97  On the framing process of the Military Code of Criminal Procedure, see Rauh, Föderalismus, pp. 151-207.  
98  Gesetz, betreffend die deutsche Flotte, 14 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 21, pp. 255-9. 
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construction programme, the state secretary of the Federal Department of the Navy, Alfred 
von Tirpitz, approached the Centre Party for help. This was the very first time that in order to 
prepare a bill a member of the Reichsleitung undertook independent negotiations with the 
biggest Reichstag party.99  
The massive costs of the naval construction programme and of the ongoing colonial 
expansion made closer cooperation between the Reichsleitung and the Reichstag necessary 
anyway. Otherwise, parliamentary approval of the annual budget would have been uncertain. 
Moreover, the exploding national budget (see Figure 1) made it likely that the Reich would 
sooner or later need to redefine its financial system in order to generate more revenue. At the 
turn of the century, it was therefore likely that federal government would undergo major 
structural changes.  
The reorganisation of federal affairs began with the Reichsleitung claiming control over 
the Prussian State Ministry after Hohenlohe’s resignation in 1900. The ever-growing 
dependency of the Chancellor and the state secretaries on the Reichstag implied that they now 
had to prioritise national over Prussian interests as a matter of principle. Driven by this 
necessity, they tried to dominate the Prussian executive as much as possible. This became 
manifest in the so-called ‘Staatssekretarisierung’ of the Prussian cabinet. From 1900, the 
Prussian king and Emperor appointed an increasing number of state secretaries from the 
Reichsämter Prussian ministers without portfolio.100 By this practice – which the next chapter 
will analyse in more detail – they became full members of the State Ministry. As this council 
of ministers worked by majority vote, the infiltration of national executives was nothing else 
than a mediatisation of Prussia.101  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99  On the framing process of the Second Navy Law, see ibid., 220-41, especially pp. 224, 229f. 
100  See Protokolle (PSM), vol. 9 (October 1900- July 1909), p. 455 and vol. 10 (July 1909-November 1918), pp. 
470f. On this practice, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, pp. 32-8. 
101  See the letter by the Prussian envoy Graf von Schwerin to the Prussian foreign and prime minister Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, 11 July 1914, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 113, pp. 349f. 
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The loss of independence was reflected in the fact that more and more often the Prussian 
government was forced to adopt bills against its will. In 1905, for example, the state secretary 
of the Federal Department of the Interior, Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, forced the State 
Ministry to revise the Prussian mining law in order to put a stop to the general strike of the 
workers in the coal mines of the Ruhr region, which were crucial for the supply of the 
national armament industry.102 
The procedure of legislative negotiations too changed to Prussia’s disadvantage. Proposals 
were no longer first discussed with the Prussian ministers and then referred to the relevant 
Bundesrat committee. Rather, negotiations shifted to the committees of the Reichstag, where 
the executives of the Reichsämter could bargain with the parliamentary parties directly. Often, 
these consultations also included envoys of those state governments that had an interest in the 
matter at stake and whose votes were necessary to reach a majority in the Bundesrat.103  
This new practice of legislative negotiations reduced Prussia to the rank of a normal state. 
She was no longer able to act as a hegemon that could always impose her will on national 
government. The best example for Prussia’s demise was perhaps the failed attempt of the 
State Ministry to introduce a federal levy on the usage of canals in 1909/10, a measure 
intended to protect the estates of the Junkers from cheap agricultural imports. While in 1878 
the Prussian government had managed to force protective tariffs upon the union, it failed 
miserably forty years later, because the Prussian hegemony was no longer intact.104 
In the 1910s, this downgrading of Prussia led to a growing antagonism between the State 
Ministry and the Reichsleitung. This was mainly due to the fact that it became almost 
impossible for Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to satisfy the conservative 
interests of the Prussian House of Representatives while he had to deal with a Reichstag in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102  Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, p. 37. 
103  Henrich-Franke, “Wandlungen föderalen Regierens im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Die Entscheidungsfindung im 
Fall der Sozialgesetzgebung”, pp. 380-2. On the influence of the states via such informal channels, see also 
Hähnel, Höfer, and Liedloff, “Föderale Mitbestimmung im Deutschen Kaiserreich - Der Einfluss der Länder 
auf die Reichsgesetzgebung”. 
104  On the framing process of the levy on the usage of canals, see Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 55-122. 
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which the left-wing parties got stronger with each election. In this situation, the Reichsleitung 
not only treated Prussia more and more like any other state. But it also increasingly 
cooperated with other state governments in order to push legislative projects through the 
Bundesrat. Between 1909 and 1914, the cooperation with Bavaria became so close that the 
liberal Berlin newspaper Vossische Zeitung argued in March 1912 that ‘under the fifth 
Chancellor the hegemony in the German Empire has shifted from Prussia to Bavaria’.105 
At the same time as the Reichsleitung rose over the Prussian State Ministry, the state 
secretaries became more independent from the Chancellor. They took over an increasing 
number of responsibilities on their own rather than as his substitutes. There were two major 
reasons for this. From the turn of the century, the preparation of nearly all bills passed from 
the Prussian ministries to the Reichsämter. Moreover, the cooperation between the 
Reichsämter and the Reichstag grew closer every year, with the effect that the state secretaries 
evolved into independent negotiators. These developments enhanced their scope of action so 
much that they began to resemble proper federal ministers.106 
It seemed only a matter of time until this transformation would be completed, because after 
1900 the Reichstag permanently replaced the Bundesrat as the centre of the legislature. Under 
the Chancellors Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg, the cooperation of the Reichsleitung with the 
majority parties reached the point of total dependency. Between 1900 and 1906/07, Bülow 
largely relied on the Centre Party and the Conservatives. During these years, the 
Reichsleitung established the practice of negotiating bills with the MPs before they entered 
the Bundesrat. This procedural marginalisation of the state governments became worse after 
the elections of 1907, when Bülow made his government dependent on the support of a fragile 
coalition of the conservatives, national liberals, and left liberals, the so-called ‘Bülow 
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105  [‘Unter dem fünften Reichskanzler ist die Hegemonie im neuen Deutschen Reich von Preußen auf Bayern 
übergegangen.’] Quoted in ibid., p. 154, fn. 23. 
106  Ibid., pp. 32ff., 152f. 
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bloc’.107 The dependency of the Reichsleitung on the parliament eventually reached its pre-
war climax under Bethmann Hollweg, as he tried to govern on the basis of flexible majorities 
that included even the Social Democrats.108 
Due to the growing control of the Reichstag, the main priority of the Reichsleitung shifted 
from finding a common position with the state governments to reaching a compromise with 
the majority parties. This change of focus, which took place under the aegis of Arthur von 
Posadowsky-Wehner, Bülow’s State Secretary of the Interior until 1907, put the Bundesrat in 
an increasingly bad position. While the Reichstag took as much time as it pleased to discuss 
the federal budget, the Bundesrat received the budgetary draft closer to the end of the fiscal 
period each year. The resulting time pressure made thorough negotiations impossible. 
Moreover, the Reichsämter provided information about upcoming legislative projects no 
longer to the state governments, but to the parties that the Reichsleitung needed in order to 
secure a majority in the parliament. This practice gave the Reichstag more scope of action. In 
1906, it amended a legislative proposal for the first time directly instead of referring it back to 
the Bundesrat and the national administration for corrections.109  
Around the same time, the Reichstag started to address more and more resolutions to the 
Bundesrat, above all regarding budgetary issues. This procedure added to the overload of 
administrative matters that the Bundesrat had to deal with as a consequence of the ongoing 
centralisation. As the number of public petitions about tax and customs matters skyrocketed in 
the 1900s, the Bundesrat became paralysed by the thousands of trifles it had to take care of 
every year. For example, it needed to approve the licence of each product that was launched 
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107  On Bülow’s reliance on first the Centre Party and then the bloc parties, see Heinrich August Winkler, Der 
lange Weg nach Westen, vol. 1: Deutsche Geschichte vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der 
Weimarer Republik, 2 vols. (Beck, 2000), pp. 296-301. See also Rauh, Föderalismus, pp. 245-62, 298-346. 
108  On Bethmann Hollweg’s scope of action in domestic policy, see Hans-Günter Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg 
als Reichskanzler, 1909-1914: Studien zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner innerpolitischen Machtstellung, 
Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 11 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1957). 
109  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 18-22, 289. 
Chapter III 
Government 
 
158!
in Germany and the pensions of all officials of the national administration, including the tens 
of thousands of customs and postal officers.110  
The more the Reichsleitung turned away from the Bundesrat and toward the Reichstag, the 
harder it was for the state governments to make their interests heard. Bundesfreundlichkeit 
was no longer a central principle of federal government. The middling states were only 
occasionally included in the framing of legislative projects. For the small states, the situation 
was even worse. They played no role at all anymore.  
In light of this marginalisation of the state governments, it is no surprise that the functional 
change of the federal constitutional organs further intensified the intrusion into the 
competences of the states, in particular in the field of finance. As the Reichsleitung now 
depended on the Reichstag anyway, the parliamentary parties that had defended the financial 
dependence of the Reich on the states in the Bismarckian era, above all the Centre Party, no 
longer opposed a reform of the fiscal system that would generate more national revenues. By 
1909, the Franckenstein Clause had been gradually abolished, with the result that the states 
had lost their share in the revenues from customs and tariffs. At the same time, new federal 
taxes were introduced. Aside from creating new consumption taxes, for example on 
champagne, cigarettes, and matches, the Reich began to violate the monopoly of the states on 
direct taxation.111 In 1906, the inheritance tax was practically transformed into a federal tax 
by determining that while the states retained the right to raise it, the Reich received the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110  See for example the table of contents in Protokolle (DR), 1916, pp. 38f., which includes no less than three 
columns listing the federal officials whose pension the Bundesrat had to approve in 1916. On the 
Bundesrat’s overload of work, see also Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 22ff., 27ff.  
111  Schaumweinsteuergesetz, 9 May 1902, RGBl. (1902), no. 24, pp. 155-63. Gesetz, betreffend die Ordnung des 
Reichshaushalts und die Tilgung der Reichsschuld, 3 June 1906, RGBl. (1906), no. 31, pp. 620-74, appendix 
2 ‘Zigarettensteuergesetz’, pp. 631-42. Zündwarensteuergesetzes, 15 July 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 44, pp. 
814-24. 
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revenues from it.112 Seven years later, a comprehensive fiscal reform introduced two proper 
direct federal taxes: a capital gains tax and an extraordinary defence contribution.113  
These reforms made the Reich financially much more independent from the states. By the 
outbreak of the war, national receipts had swollen to around three billion Goldmark (see 
Figure 1), to which the states contributed no more than fifty-two million. Even though the 
level of independent national revenues was still low comparative to other European states and 
the Reich still suffered from considerable financial constraints, as Niall Ferguson has pointed 
out in the context of the debate on the outbreak of the world war, the Reichsleitung was no 
longer incapable of doing anything without the subsidies from the states.114 This growing 
financial independence of the federal government greatly reduced the influence of the 
states.115 
How insignificant the monarchical state governments had become is reflected in the fact 
that their marginalisation did not affect the legislative productivity of federal government at 
all. To the contrary: due to the close cooperation between the Reichsleitung and the Reichstag, 
the output of federal laws was extremely high between 1890 and 1914 (see Table 2). In 
regulating the expanding federal administration and new fields in the rapidly growing 
industrial economy, the parliament often seized the initiative. The majority situation in the 
Reichstag, where the conservatives were greatly outnumbered by the Centre Party, the 
liberals, and the Social Democrats, very often gave the resulting laws a pronounced liberal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112  Gesetz, betreffend die Ordnung des Reichshaushalts und die Tilgung der Reichsschuld, 3 June 1906, RGBl. 
(1906), no. 31, pp. 620-74, appendix 4 ‘Erbschaftssteuergesetz’, pp. 654-74. 
113  Gesetz über den einmaligen außerordentlichen Wehrbeitrag and Gesetz zur Besteuerung des 
Vermögenszuwachses, 3 July 1913, RGBl. (1913), no. 41, pp. 524-43 and 505-21.  
114  Niall Ferguson, “Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War 
Revisited,” Past and Present 142 (1994): 141–68. Ferguson’s argument will be further considered in Chapter 
5, which will show that the restriction of the national budget by the Franckenstein Clause was a gross 
violation of the constitution that was made possible by the lack of judicial review.  
115  On the fiscal reforms between 1900 and 1914, see Peter-Christian Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen 
Reiches von 1903 bis 1913. Eine Studie zur Innenpolitik des Wilhelminischen Deutschland, Historische 
Studien 415 (Lübeck & Hamburg: Matthiesen, 1970). For a brief overview, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und 
Dualismus, p. 102f. Two good contemporary accounts are the studies by the economics professor Karl 
Theodor von Eheberg, “Finanzen und Steuern,” in Deutschland unter Wilhelm II, ed. Siegfried Körte et al., 
vol. 1, 3 vols. (Berlin: Hobbing, 1914), 99–120 and the lawyer Wilhelm Gerloff, Die 
Reichsfinanzgesetzgebung von 1913 (Berlin: Springer, 1914). 
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and social character. Examples include the legalisation of the cooperation between domestic 
associations, the broadening of the accident insurance system, and the prohibition of most 
forms of child labour.116 The expansion of federal legislation therefore implied not only 
another wave of centralisation, but also – in terms of policy content – a great nationwide 
liberalisation, which made the states and their monarchical regimes appear backward.  
Taken together, all the changes in the functions of the federal constitutional organs and in 
the competences of the Reich and the states meant that the federal structures that were 
supposed to contain parliamentary influence slowly dissolved. As a result, the Reichstag 
became more and more powerful. Bülow was the first Chancellor who resigned as a 
consequence of a defeat in parliament. When the coalition of his ‘bloc parties’ broke apart 
because of a disagreement about the fiscal reform in 1908/09, Bülow – who had fallen out 
with the Emperor over the Daily Telegraph Affair a few months earlier – left office. His 
resignation, which will be further discussed in Chapter 5, was a clear sign that due to the ever-
increasing centralisation Germany had travelled halfway down the road to parliamentary 
government.117  
Under Bethmann Hollweg, this transformation toward a fully-fledged parliamentary 
system gathered further pace. The parliamentary parties, above all the Social Democrats, used 
every possible opportunity to bring forward motions demanding that the Chancellor be made 
parliamentarily responsible. After the 1912 elections, a broad coalition ranging from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116  Gesetz, betreffend das Vereinswesen, 11 December 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 48, p. 699. Gesetz, betreffend 
die Abänderung der Unfallversicherungsgesetze, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 26, pp. 335-535. Gesetz, 
betreffend die Unfallfürsorge für Gefangene, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 26, pp. 536-45. 
Unfallfürsorgegesetz für Beamte und für Personen des Soldatenstandes, 18 June 1901, no. 26, pp. 211-16. 
Gesetz, betreffend Kinderarbeit in gewerblichen Betrieben, 30 March 1903, RGBl. (1903), no. 14, pp. 113-
21.  
117  Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 253 speaks of 'semi-parliamentarism' [‘Halbparlamentarismus’]. On the dis-
integration of the ‘Bülow bloc’ and Bülow’s resignation, see ibid., pp. 331-46. On the impact of the Daily 
Telegraph Affair, see Terence F. Cole, “The Daily Telegraph Affair and its Aftermath: The Kaiser, Bülow 
and the Reichstag, 1908-1909,” in Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations: The Corfu Papers, ed. John C. G. 
Röhl and Nicolaus Sombart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 249–68. The Daily Telegraph 
Affair was a diplomatic and political crisis that was caused by an interview, in which William II insulted the 
British. The affair had a much bigger impact in Germany than abroad. Bülow – who as Chancellor was 
responsible for all official acts of the Kaiser – came under fire mainly because he had failed to authorise the 
interview. 
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Social Democrats to the national liberals amended the parliamentary by-laws. The new rules 
gave the Reichstag the right to pass a vote of no confidence against the Chancellor.118 Even 
though such a vote was not yet legally binding, this gave the parliament another important 
source of leverage, which it applied no less than three times before 1914, most famously in 
the context of the Saverne Affair (see Chapter 5).119 
The main reason for this advance of parliamentary power was the marginalisation of the 
Bundesrat and the state governments. By the last years before the war, the federal structures 
of the constitution had disintegrated so much that it is difficult to speak of federal government 
at all. Rather, Germany now featured a centralised system of government that was managed 
by the Reichsleitung and the Reichstag and that reduced the state governments to mere 
bystanders. 
This state of affairs became obvious in the negotiations of the last great reform project 
before the war: the introduction of the aforementioned capital gains tax in 1913. In order to 
satisfy the state governments, the Chancellor and the state secretaries decided to support a 
proposal of the Bundesrat, which wanted to increase the subsidy payments for the Reich. But 
they only did so because they knew that the majority parties of the Reichstag would reject the 
proposal anyway and replace it by a bill that suggested the introduction of another direct 
federal tax. This triangle strategy of the Reichsleitung treated the Bundesrat as an ordinary 
upper house and made the states appear as a superfluous appendix of a system of centralised 
government.120  
In light of this erosion of federal structures, Clemens von Delbrück, state secretary of the 
Federal Department of the Interior, proposed a total revision of the constitution in May 1914. 
His ideas centred on establishing new forums of communication that would allow the 
Reichsämter, the Chancellor, and the Reichstag to coordinate their activities better. Most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118  § 33a. See Bernhard Jungheim, ed., Die Geschäftsordnung für den Reichstag mit Anmerkungen (Berlin: 
Reichsdruckerei, 1916), pp. 86f. 
119  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 185ff. 
120  On the framing process of the capital gains tax, see ibid., pp. 240-85, especially pp. 269f. 
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important, he argued, would be the creation of regular cabinet meetings of the state secretaries 
and the Chancellor and the foundation of institutions that would facilitate the negotiation of 
legislative proposals between the Reichsleitung – which he called ‘government’ – and the 
Reichstag, where the Social Democrats had become the biggest fraction in the 1912 election. 
The monarchical governments and the Bundesrat played absolutely no role in his plans.121 
This lack of consideration demonstrates that the federal structures of the constitution had 
become obsolete and that the rise of parliamentary government was in full swing. Only the 
outbreak of the war three months later prevented a fundamental reform of the German 
constitutional system.  
 
II. Wartime Collapse: The Implosion of the Imperial State and the Introduction of 
Responsible Government (1914-1918) 
 
The wartime order of government was based on the Enabling Act of 4 August 1914:  
 
The Bundesrat is empowered to decree during the time of the war legal measures that are deemed 
necessary in order to prevent economic damage. These measures must be brought to the 
knowledge of the Reichstag in its next meeting and must be revoked on its demand.122  
 
As more or less any public activity was related to the wartime economy, this inconspicuous 
regulation gave the Bundesrat the power to issue decrees in all fields of government. The 
Enabling Act thus returned to the Bundesrat its status as the central executive organ of federal 
government, a renaissance that was reflected in the flood of petitions that it received from 
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121  On Delbrück’s memorandum, see ibid., pp. 38-43. 
122  [‘Der Bundesrat wird ermächtigt, während der Zeit des Krieges diejenigen gesetzlichen Maßnahmen 
anzuordnen, welche sich zur Abhilfe wirtschaftlicher Schädigung als notwendig erweisen. Diese Maßnahmen 
sind dem Reichstag bei seinem nächsten Zusammentritt zur Kenntnis zu bringen und auf sein Verlangen 
aufzuheben.’] Gesetz über die Ermächtigung des Bundesrats zu wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen und über die 
Verlängerung der Fristen des Wechsel- und Scheckrechts im Falle kriegerischer Ereignisse, 4 August 1914, 
RGBl. (1914), no. 53, §, 3, p. 327. See also Protokolle (DR), 1914, session 30, 4 August, § 696, p. 424f. 
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concerned citizens during the war.123 At the same time, the statute took account of the 
prominent position that the Reichstag had gained over the last decades by giving the 
parliament a veto power.124 
But the recovery of the Bundesrat’s central constitutional position did not mean that the 
monarchical governments were put in charge of national politics again. To the contrary: as the 
Bundesrat had long become a subservient instrument of the Reichsleitung, the Enabling Act 
empowered the Chancellor and the state secretaries rather than the monarchical governments. 
By 1914, almost all Prussian plenipotentiaries were executives from the federal 
administration, as we will see in the next chapter. This domination of the Prussian bench 
enabled the Reichsleitung to impose its will upon the Bundesrat whenever it deemed it 
necessary. Moreover, similar to the Reichstag parties, the state governments declared their 
universal support for the wartime efforts of the Reichsleitung.125 In contrast to the MPs on the 
extreme right and left, the state governments kept this pledge throughout the war and passed 
every important decision in the Bundesrat unanimously, even though the Reichsleitung and 
the Reichstag excluded them completely from the negotiations of bills.  
The Enabling Act so enhanced the reach of the Reichsleitung that it gained the status of an 
official national government. In 1915, presidential proposals started to speak of a 
‘Reichsregierung’ for the first time. One year later, Chancellor Georg von Hertling introduced 
regular cabinet meetings of the state secretaries.126  
By officially adopting the status of a government, the Reichsleitung became more and 
more accountable to the Reichstag. Taking advantage of the wartime pressure on the 
executive, which intensified the more difficult the military situation became, the national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123  To gain an impression of the sheer number of petitions, see any wartime meeting in Protokolle (DR), 1914-
1918. Petitions are listed at the end of each protocol.  
124  On the Enabling Act, which – relative to its importance – has received little scholarly attention, see Michael 
Frehse, Ermächtigungsgesetzgebung im Deutschen Reich 1914-1933 (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1985), pp. 
299ff. and Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 928ff. and vol. 5, pp. 33-8, 62-73. 
125  See the speech by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in the Bundesrat and the subsequent 
approval by the states in Protokolle (DR), 1914, session 27, 1 August, § 664, pp. 405-406b. 
126  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 311, 324f., especially fn. 104. See also the analysis by Goldschmidt, Kampf, 
pp. 66, 123. 
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parliament constantly increased its control over the Chancellor and the state secretaries by 
bombarding them, for example, with interpellations and by forcing them to collaborate with 
various parliamentary committees. Most important were the budgetary commission or 
Hauptausschuß, which gained the right to discuss foreign policy matters in 1916, and the 
Interfraktionelle Ausschuß, a bipartisan committee that pushed for the introduction of a legal 
responsibility of the national government. Within the first two and a half years of the war, 
these committees integrated parliamentarians more closely than ever before into the 
formulation of federal policies.127  
This integration further diminished the role of the state governments. Under Bethmann 
Hollweg, it became normal practice that the Reichsleitung negotiated proposals for emergency 
decrees with the whips of the parliamentary parties before informing the Bundesrat about the 
upcoming measures.128 Political decision-making during the war no longer included the state 
governments, but took place between the Reichsleitung, the Reichstag, and the Supreme 
Army Command.  
In this triangular relationship, the power of the Reichsleitung and the Supreme Army 
Command gradually shrank while they fought over the governmental authority over Germany. 
Since the Chancellor refused to undertake a reform of the constitutional system, he could not 
rely on the full support of the parliamentary parties in this conflict. As a result, the 
Reichsleitung was slowly worn down by the Supreme Army Command’s bid for power on the 
one hand and the increasing pressure from the centre-left parties, which called for the 
introduction of parliamentary government and the abolition of the Prussian three-class !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127  On this development, see Reinhard Schiffers, Der Hauptausschuß des Deutschen Reichstags 1915-1918: 
Formen und Bereiche der Kooperation zwischen Parlament und Regierung, Beiträge zur Geschichte des 
Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 67 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); Udo Bermbach, Vorformen 
parlamentarischer Kabinettsbildung in Deutschland. Der interfraktionelle Ausschuß 1917/18 und die 
Parlamentarisierung der Reichsregierung (Cologne: Isar, 1967); Klaus Epstein, “Der Interfraktionelle 
Ausschuss und das Problem der Parlamentarisierung 1917-1918,” HZ 191 (1960): 562–84; and Rauh, 
Parlamentarisierung, pp. 344ff. For a collection of relevant sources, see Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, 
eds., Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss 1917-18, 2 vols., Quellen zur Geschichte der Parlamentarismus und der 
politischen Parteien 1 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1959). 
128  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 328ff., 337f. 
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franchise, on the other. This problem became manifest when Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
had to withdraw from office in July 1917 after he had failed to find enough backing in 
parliament for his rejection of the Army Command’s call for unrestricted submarine 
warfare.129 
The crumbling position of the Reichsleitung did not mean, however, that the Army 
Command came to determine the course of national government on its own. It never 
succeeded in establishing a military dictatorship.130 Rather, its control over the Reichsleitung 
fluctuated, depending on the persons in charge and the military situation. In 1917, the 
dominance of the Army Command reached its peak, not least thanks to the support of the 
Kaiser, who was easy to manipulate and – as Supreme Warlord or Oberster Kriegsherr – 
failed to coordinate the military and civilian leadership. The two commanding generals, Paul 
von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, dictated many crucial decisions to William II, not 
least the acceptance of Bethmann Hollweg’s resignation.131  
But the supremacy of the Army Command depended on military success. When defeat 
became imminent in summer 1918, its power swiftly dissipated. Since the conflict over 
governmental authority had also greatly weakened the Reichsleitung, the demise of the 
military leadership left the Reichstag as the only nationwide institution still capable of 
political decision-making.132  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129  Ibid., pp. 309f. On Bethmann Hollweg’s downfall, see Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm, pp. 236-8. 
130  See Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, 3rd ed., New Approaches to 
European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 76f. and Wilhelm Deist, ed., Militär 
und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-18, vol. 1, 2 vols., Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der 
politischen Parteien: Militär und Politik, 1/I (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1970), pp. LXIVff. The traditional view 
that Hindenburg and Ludendorff did succeed in establishing a military dictatorship, at least in political terms, 
dominated historical writing on the war for a long time and still persists. See the classic work by Gerhard 
Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 2., vol. 3: “Die” Tragödie der Staatskunst. Bethmann Hollweg als 
Kriegskanzler (1914-1918), 4 vols. (München: Oldenbourg, 1964), p. 551 and - as a recent example - the 
biographical study by John Lee, The Warlords: Hindenburg and Ludendorff (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2005). 
131  See Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm, pp. 237f. On the relationship of the Supreme Army Command and the 
Reichsleitung in general, see Erwin Direnberger, Oberste Heeresleitung und Reichsleitung 1914-1918 
(Berlin: Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1939). 
132  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 326, 352ff, 362. 
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For the constituent states, the system of wartime government was a further blow. The 
emergency decree power of the Reich made obsolete the constitutionally guaranteed 
distribution of competences. Decrees and laws issued in reference to wartime necessity 
regularly infringed on the competences of the states. Extraordinary defence contributions and 
new consumption taxes, for example on mineral water, violated the remaining authority of the 
states over direct taxation in order to cover the exploding costs of the war.133 Moreover, the 
declaration of the state of war on 31 July 1914 transferred most executive functions of the 
state governments to military governors. These were responsible to the Kaiser only, except for 
in Bavaria where – as a consequence of the kingdom’s special rights under the constitution – 
the governor was subordinate to the minister of war.134 
The governors were the heads of a system of military administration that competed with 
the civilian administration for resources and staff. The chief loser in money and expertise was 
the Prussian ministry of war, because the military authorities took over most of its 
subordinated special agencies. But this system of military administration proved so inefficient 
that it was abolished after less than two years. When the peacetime structures were gradually 
re-established in 1916, starting in the area of food supply, this occasion was used to centralise 
the administration of military affairs. The most important element of this centralisation was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133  Frehse, Ermächtigungsgesetzgebung im Deutschen Reich 1914-1933, pp. 28-35. For the introduction of an 
extraordinary defence contribution, see Protokolle (DR), 1918, session 40, 19 July, § 662, p. 423 and Gesetz 
über eine außerordentliche Kriegsabgabe für das Rechnungsjahr 1918, 26 July 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 101, 
964-74. For the introduction of the tax on mineral water, see Protokolle (DR), 1918, session 40, 19 July, § 
656, p. 421 and attachment 5, pp. 467ff as well as Gesetz, betreffend die Besteuerung von Mineralwässern 
und künstlich bereiteten Getränken sowie die Erhöhung der Zölle für Kaffee und Tee, 26 July 1918, RGBl. 
(1918), no. 97, pp. 849-61. 
134  Verordnung, betreffend die Erklärung des Kriegszustandes, 31 July 1914, RGBl. (1914), no. 47, p. 263. 
Königlich-bayerische Verordnung betreffend die Verhängung des Kriegszustands in Bayern, 31 July 1914, 
and Königlich-bayerische Verordnung betreffend den Übergang der vollziehenden Gewalt auf die 
Militärbehörden in Bayern, 31 July 1914, printed in  Huber, Dokumente, vol. 3, no. 71f., pp. 127f. On the 
legal and institutional consequences of the state of war, see Christian Schudnagies, Der Kriegs- oder 
Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des Ersten Weltkrieges: eine Studie zur Entwicklung und 
Handhabung des deutschen Ausnahmezustandsrechts bis 1918, Rechtshistorische Reihe 115 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Lang, 1994). 
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the foundation of a special department in the Prussian ministry of war, the Kriegsamt, which 
was made responsible for the few remaining military competences of the states.135 
In all areas but military affairs, the wartime centralisation did not make use of Prussian 
institutions, but created several new federal departments: the Wartime Agency of Food 
Supply (Kriegsernährungsamt) was founded in May 1916; the Federal Department of 
Economics (Reichswirtschaftsamt) in August 1917; and the Federal Department of Labour 
(Reichsarbeitsamt) in October 1918 (see Table 3). 
The state that felt this expansion of the national administration most keenly was Prussia. 
While the other states simply became even more marginalised than before, she was 
mediatised. Since the Reichsämter lacked their own apparatus of supporting agencies, they 
simply incorporated the relevant institutions of the Prussian administration. This development 
began in the field of wartime food supply, but soon spilled over to other areas.136 In these 
fields, Prussia lost her independence and was transformed into a territory that stood under the 
direct control of the national government, a status similar to that of Alsace-Lorraine and the 
colonies.137  
At the same time, the coordination between the Prussian State Ministry and the 
Reichsleitung was lost altogether. After Clemens von Delbrück, State Secretary of the Federal 
Department of the Interior, had resigned in May 1916, his office as vice-president of the State 
Ministry was never again taken over by a member of the Reichsleitung.138 The result of the 
dissolution of this personal union, which had been crucial for the harmonious management of 
the Prussian and national governments, was a disaster. As the State Ministry became largely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135  On the system of military administration, see Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 
1914-1918, pp. 33-35 and Wilhelm Deist's source collection Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-18, 
which examines all important institutional problems. See also Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 300ff., 316-
18. 
136  See the letter by the president of the Wartime Agency of Food Supply Adolf Tortilowicz von Batocki-Friebe 
to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 31 January 1917, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 115, 
p. 351f. 
137  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 311-14, and especially 415 f. 
138  Protokolle (PSM), vol. 10 (July 1909-November 1918), p. 469. See Delbrück’s letter of resignation to 
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 14 November 1915, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 114, 
pp. 350f. On Delbrück’s resignation, see also Goldschmidt’s interpretation, ibid., pp. 116-8. 
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excluded from national decision-making, it engaged in a permanent fight with the 
Reichsleitung that made wartime government all the more difficult. The newly created cabinet 
meetings of the state secretaries spent most of their time settling disagreements between 
Prussian and federal institutions about conflicting competences. Some of these disputes were 
simply grotesque. When defeat at the Western front was imminent in autumn 1918, the 
Prussian minister of finance complained that the state secretary of the Federal Treasury had 
passed internal information of the State Ministry on to Georg von Hertling in a letter that was 
addressed to the Chancellor rather than the Prussian prime minister. As Hertling held both 
offices, this complaint was not only bizarre, in particular at that point in time, but also a clear 
sign of how paralysed the relations between the Prussian and federal executive had 
become.139  
In combination with each other, the exclusion of the Prussian State Ministry from national 
decision-making, the downgrading of the Bundesrat to a rubber stamp, and the enormous 
centralisation resulting from the war changed the constitutional system to the effect that 
Germany was no longer governed as a federal, but as a unitary state. This collapse of the 
federal order – the structural framework designed to make parliamentary government 
impossible – enabled the Reichstag to penetrate the national executive from 1917 onwards. 
The Chancellors Georg Michaelis (July-November 1917) and Georg von Hertling (November 
1917-September 1918) made parliamentarians part of their staff. Hertling himself had been an 
MP for the Centre Party. His was the first cabinet that became appointed after consulting the 
majority parties in the Reichstag. Even though he rejected a constitutional reform towards the 
introduction of parliamentary government, he put confidants of the majority parties in key 
positions of the federal administration. Friedrich von Payer, MP for the left liberals, became 
Hertling’s Vice-Chancellor in November 1917. In this position, Payer was the first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139  See the letter by the Prussian minister of finance Oskar Hergt to the Prussian prime minister Georg von 
Hertling, 28 June 1918, printed in ibid., no. 116, pp. 353f. 
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parliamentarian to preside over the meetings of the Bundesrat – even though he was not a 
member of the Prussian cabinet.140 
Hertling’s successor Max von Baden (October-November 1918), the last Chancellor of the 
Empire, appointed parliamentarians as state secretaries for the first time. In addition, several 
representatives of the biggest parliamentary parties entered the cabinet without taking over a 
department, among them such prominent figures as the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann 
and Matthias Erzberger of the Centre Party, who later proclaimed the republic and headed the 
armistice commission, respectively.141  
At the same time as MPs entered the national executive, the Reichstag further expanded its 
power via the various wartime committees. Already in 1917, the parliament appointed as 
many members to the newly created war council, the Siebenerausschuß, as the Reichsleitung. 
In the context of the discussion about a reform of the Prussian three-class franchise, the 
Reichstag created a constitutional committee. Having expanded its competences step by step, 
the committee eventually made concrete proposals of how to make the Reichsleitung legally 
responsible to the parliament in May 1917.142 
Fifteen months later, when the situation at the front had become hopeless, the draft of a 
new enabling act determined that both the Bundesrat and the Reichsleitung would be put 
under the control of the Reichstag.143  The system-changing reform eventually came in 
October 1918. Under the pressure of military defeat, the looming revolution, and the decision 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140  On the integration of parliamentarians into the executive under Hertling, see Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 
407-21, especially p. 412f. On Hertling’s chancellorship more generally, see the account by his son Karl von 
Hertling, Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei: Erinnerungen an die Kanzlerschaft meines Vaters (Freiburg: Herder, 
1919). 
141  On the development under Max von Baden, see Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, Die Regierung des 
Prinzen Max von Baden (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1962) and Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 422-69. 
142  On the Siebenerausschuß and the constitutional committee, see Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 345ff, 365-
76. On the Siebenerausschuß, see also Bermbach, Vorformen parlamentarischer Kabinettsbildung in 
Deutschland, pp. 130ff. 
143  Drucksachen (DR), 1918, vol. 2, no. 179. On the draft, see Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, p. 421. 
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of the American President Woodrow Wilson to negotiate about peace only with a democratic 
government, the Chancellor was made responsible to the parliament.144 
One consequence of this galloping development towards the introduction of responsible 
government in the last two years of the war was that the state governments sank into total 
insignificance. It became practice, for example, that the Reichstag committees voted on 
legislative proposals before the Bundesrat had even seen them. After summer 1917, hardly 
any higher-ranking executive of the state governments attended the Bundesrat meetings. It did 
not make sense for them to do so, because the Reichsleitung granted the Bundesrat so little 
time for voting on proposals that a proper review was impossible. Besides, the Reichsleitung 
now dealt with the representatives of economic, social, and other interest groups from the 
states directly rather than via their state governments.145 
In spring 1918, the governments of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Baden, and Hesse 
made one last attempt to reverse the situation by preparing a joint declaration that condemned 
the exclusion of the states from the legislative and executive decision-making process. But 
before they could agree on the right time to issue the protest note, Germany’s military defeat 
and the November Revolution had made the whole plan obsolete.146 The imperial state had 
imploded.   
 
The readiness with which the revolutionaries seized the reins in 1918/19 shows that the 
Reichstag had moved to the centre of national decision-making long before. Otherwise, 
parliamentarians could not have been so prepared to take over the executive. Indeed, the rise 
of parliamentary government had begun immediately after the adoption of the constitution. It 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144  Gesetz zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung, 28 October 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 144, pp. 1274f. See also 
Protokolle (DR), 1918, session 55, 8 October, § 904, p. 1435 and Drucksachen (DR), 1918, vol. 2, no. 203. 
On the three notes issued by Wilson in response to the German request for an armistice, see Bullitt Lowry, 
Armistice 1918 (Kent, Ohio and London: Kent State University Press, 1999), pp. 26-42. The third note 
demanded far-reaching constitutional reforms, which aimed for the creation of a German republic.  
145  Rauh, Parlamentarisierung, pp. 413ff. 
146  Ibid., pp. 420f. 
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came about by five developments, which unfolded simultaneously and were related to each 
other. First, the centre of government shifted from the states to the national level, because the 
latter steadily gained competences at the expense of the former. Secondly, this centralisation 
strengthened the Reichstag and – thirdly – led to the emergence of a national government, the 
Reichsleitung. Fourthly, the resulting cooperation between the parliament, the Chancellor, and 
the state secretaries pushed the Bundesrat to the margins of national decision-making. As the 
council of state governments could thus no longer shield the national executive from 
parliamentary control, the Reichsleitung – fifthly – became dependent on the Reichstag.  
What does this complex process mean for the historiographical debate on 
parliamentarisation? What is left of Rauh’s thesis and the arguments of his critics? Rauh was 
right to point out that, in the context of the disintegration of federal structures, the Reichstag 
expanded its influence so much over the years that it came to control the national government. 
But his thesis has two great flaws. On the one hand, its timeframe is wrong. The rise of 
parliamentary government did not start in the Wilhelmine era, but already under Bismarck. 
The centralisation that brought it about set in the minute the constitution had been adopted in 
1867.  
On the other hand, by looking at the development of federal government solely from the 
perspective of the Reichstag, Rauh has missed the point. The driving factor behind the change 
of Germany’s system of government was not a ‘silent parliamentarisation’, but a ‘silent 
federalisation’, meaning the emergence of a national government and the subsequent 
concentration of power therein. This federalisation, which was brought about by the steady 
shift of competences from the states to the national level (centralisation) and by the resulting 
reconfiguration of the functions of the federal constitutional organs, made the increasing 
control of the Reichstag over the executive possible in the first place, because it dissolved the 
constitutional structures that stood in the way of parliamentarisation.  
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If federalisation rather than parliamentarisation was the central problem of imperial 
government, this means that Rauh’s critics too have been misguided. There is no way to deny 
the Empire’s centralisation and the expansion of parliamentary power that resulted from it. 
From which point in time onwards we speak of parliamentary government depends on what 
degree of parliamentary control over the executive we deem necessary for this classification. 
Is it the dependency of the executive on the parliament as the main partner for the framing 
and adoption of laws? Or the integration of parliamentarians into the executive? Or the legal 
responsibility of the government to the parliament? Depending on our answer, parliamentary 
government was established in the 1900s, in the course of 1917, or in October 1918, 
respectively. Regardless of what view we take, it remains a matter of fact that federalisation 
led to parliamentarisation.  
Hence, one cannot uphold the argument that, because of the relative strength or weakness 
of the democratisation of German society, a parliamentarisation of the Empire’s governing 
institutions did not happen before the war. Federalisation was independent of democratisation, 
and parliamentarisation resulted from the former rather than the latter. Historians should 
therefore redefine their focus and pay more attention to the development of the federal context 
when discussing the evolutionary potential of the Empire’s constitutional system.  
The next two chapters of this book will try to contribute to such a reorientation of the 
historiographical debate by establishing a better understanding of the process of 
federalisation. While the next chapter will examine the mechanisms by which the national 
government gained control over the Bundesrat, the last chapter will show what consequences 
the lack of a constitutional court had for federal evolution. 
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Table 2: Evolution of National Legislation, 1867-1914 
 
Period Selection of Important Pieces of National Legislation 
1867-1870 • Gesetz, betreffend die privatrechtliche Stellung der Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften, 4 
July 1868, BGBl. (1868), no. 24, pp. 415-33. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung der Allgemeinen Deutschen Wechsel-Ordnung, der Nürnberger 
Wechsel-Novellen und des Allgemeinen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuchs als Bundesgesetz, 5 June 
1869, BGBl. (1869), no. 32, pp. 379-81. 
• Gewerbeordnung für den Norddeutschen Bund, 21 June 1869, BGBl. (1869), no.26, pp. 245-82. 
• Strafgesetzbuch für den Norddeutschen Bund, 31 May 1870, BGBl. (1870), no. 16, pp. 197-273. 
• Gesetz über den Unterstützungswohnsitz, 6 June 1870, BGBl. (1870), no. 20, pp. 360-73. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften, 11 June 
1870, BGBl. (1870), no. 21, pp. 375-86. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen 
und dramatischen Werken, 11 June 1870, BGBl. (1870), no. 19, pp. 339-53. 
1870s • Seemannsordnung, 27 December 1872, RGBl. (1872), no. 33, pp. 409-32. 
• Münzgesetz, 9 July 1873, RGBl. (1873), no. 22, pp. 233-40. 
• Lex Miquel-Lasker, 20 December, RGBl. (1873), no. 34, p. 379. 
• Gesetz über die Presse, 7 May 1874, RGBl. (1874), no. 16, pp. 65-72. 
• Strandungsordnung, 17 May 1874, RGBl. (1874), no. 17, pp. 73-83. 
• Gesetz über Markenschutz, 30 November 1874, RGBl. (1874), no. 28, pp. 143-6. 
• Gesetz über die Beurkundung des Personenstands und die Eheschließung, 6 February 1875, RGBl. 
(1875), no. 4, pp. 23-40. 
• Bankgesetz, 14 March 1875, RGBl. (1875), no. 15, pp. 177-98. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Künste, 9 January 1876, RGBl. 
(1876), no. 2, pp. 4-8. 
• Gesetz, betreffend den Schutz der Photographien gegen unbefugte Nachbildung, 10 January 1876, 
RGBl. (1876), no. 2, pp. 8-10. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Urheberrecht an Mustern und Modellen, 11 January 1876, RGBl. (1876), 
no. 2, pp. 11-14. 
• Reichsjustizgesetze: Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 27 January 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 4, pp. 41-76; 
Civilprozeßordnung, 30 January 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 6, pp. 83-243; Strafprozeßordnung, 1 
February 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 8, pp. 253-346; Konkursordnung, 10 February 1877, RGBl. 
(1877), no. 10, pp. 351-89; Gesetz, betreffend die Anfechtung von Rechtshandlungen eines 
Schuldners außerhalb des Konkursverfahrens, 21 July 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 30, pp. 277-80. 
• Patentgesetz, 25 May 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 23, pp. 501-10. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Vertretung des Reichskanzlers, 17 March 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 4, pp. 7f. 
• Gerichtskostengesetz, 18 June 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 22, pp. 141-65.  
• Gebührenordnung für Gerichtsvollzieher, 24 June 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 22, pp. 166-72. 
• Gebührenordnung für Zeugen und Sachverstädnige, 30 June 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 22, pp. 173-
6. 
• Rechtsanwaltsordnung, 1 July 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 23, pp. 177-98. 
• Gebührenordnung für Rechtsanwälte, 7 July 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 23, pp. 176-92. 
• Gesetz, betreffend den Zolltarif des Deutschen Zollgebiets und den Ertrag der Zölle und der 
Tabaksteuer, 15 July 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 27, pp. 207-44. 
1880s • Gesetz, betreffend die Abwehr und Unterdrückung von Viehseuchen, 23 June 1880, RGBl. (1880), 
no. 16, pp. 153-68. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter, 15 June 1883, RGBl. (1883), no. 9, pp. 
73-104. 
• Gesetz gegen den verbrecherischen und gemeingefährlichen Gebrauch von Sprengstoff, 9 June 
1884, RGBl (1884), no. 17, pp. 61-4. 
• Unfallversicherungsgesetz, 6 July 1884, RGBl. (1884), no. 19, pp. 69-111. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften, 18 July 
1884, RGBl. (1884), no. 22, pp. 123-70. 
• Aichordnung für das Deutsche Reich, 27 December 1884, RGBl. (1885), no. 5, attachment to p. 14, 
pp. I-LVIII.  
• Gesetz über die Ausdehnung der Unfall- und Krankenversicherung, 28 May 1885, RGBl. (1885), 
no. 19, pp. 159-64. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Rechtsverhältnisse der deutsche Schutzgebiete, 17 April 1886, RGBl. 
(1886), no. 10, pp. 75f.  
• Gesetz, betreffend die Unfall- und Krankenversicherung der in land- und forstwirtschaftlichen 
Betrieben beschäftigten Personen, 5 May 1886, RGBl. (1886), no. 14, pp. 132-78. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallversicherung der bei Bauten beschäftigten Personen, 11 July 1887, 
RGBl. (1887), no. 25, pp. 287-306. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallversicherung der Seeleute und anderer bei der Seeschiffahrt 
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beteiligter Personen, 13 July 1887, RGBl. (1887), no. 27, pp. 329-73. 
• Gesetz, betreffend den Schutz von Vögeln, 22 March 1888, RGBl. (1888), no. 13, pp. 111-14. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften, 1. May 1889, RGBl. (1889), no. 
11, pp. 55-93. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung, 22 June 1889, RGBl. (1889), no. 13, 
pp. 97-144. 
1890s • Neufassung des Patentgesetzes, 7 April 1891, RGBl. (1891), no. 12, pp. 79-90. 
• Gesetz, betreffend den Schutz von Gebrauchsmustern, 1 June 1891, RGBl. (1891), no. 18, pp. 290-
3. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, 20 April 1892, RGBl. (1892), no. 
24, pp. 477-99. 
• Gesetz zum Schutz der Waarenbezeichnungen, 12 May 1894, RGBl. (1894), no. 22, pp. 441-8. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Abzahlungsgeschäfte, 16 May 1894, RGBl. (1894), no. 23, pp. 450f. 
• Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 27 May 1896, RGBl. (1896), no. 13, pp. 145-
9. 
• Börsengesetz, 22 June 1896, RGBl. (1896), no. 15, pp. 157-76. 
• Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 18 August 1896, RGBl. (1896), no. 21, pp. 195-603. 
• Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und Zwangsverwaltung, 24 March 1897, RGBl. (1897), no. 
14, pp. 97-134. 
• Grundbuchordnung, 24 March 1897, RGBl. (1897), no. 15, pp. 139-157. 
• Handelsgesetzbuch, 10 May 1897, RGBl. (1897), no. 23, pp. 219-436. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Auswanderungswesen, 9 June 1897, RGBl. (1897), no. 26, pp. 463-72. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die deutsche Flotte, 10 April 1898, RGBl. (1898), no. 15, pp. 165-168. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit, 17 May 1898, RGBl. 
(1898), no. 21, pp. 189-229. 
• Militärstrafgerichtsordnung, 1 December 1898, RGBl. (1898), no. 53, pp. 1189-1288. 
• Hypothekenbankgesetz, 13 July 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 32, pp. 375-91. 
• Invalidenversicherungsgesetz, 13 Juli 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 33, pp. 393-462. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die gemeinsamen Rechte der Besitzer von Schuldverschreibungen, 4 December 
1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 47, pp. 691-8. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Vereinswesen, 11 December 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 48, p. 699. 
• Telegraphenwegegesetz, 18 December 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 51, pp. 705-10. 
• Fernsprechgebührenordnung, 20 December 1899, RGBl. (1899), no. 51, pp. 711-14. 
• Reichschuldenordnung, 19 March 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 11, pp. 129-34. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Schlachtvieh- und Fleischbeschau, 3 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 27, pp. 
547-55. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die deutsche Flotte, 14 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 21, pp. 255-9. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Bekämpfung gemeingefährlicher Krankheiten, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), 
no. 24, pp. 306-17. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Abänderung des Krankenversicherungsgesetzes, 30 June 1900, RGBl. 
(1900), no. 25, pp. 332f. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Abänderung der Unfallversicherungsgesetze, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), 
no. 26, pp. 335-535. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallfürsorge für Gefangene, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 26, pp. 536-
45. 
1900-1914 • Gesetz, betreffend die deutsche Flotte, 14 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 21, pp. 255-9. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Abänderung der Unfallversicherungsgesetze, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), 
no. 26, pp. 335-535.  
• Gesetz, betreffend die Unfallfürsorge für Gefangene, 30 June 1900, RGBl. (1900), no. 26, pp. 536-
45. 
• Gesetz über die privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen, 12 May 1901, RGBl. (1901), no. 18, pp. 
139-73. 
• Unfallfürsorgegesetz für Beamte und Personen des Soldatenstandes, 18 June 1901, RGBl. (1901), 
no. 26, pp. 211-16. 
• Gesetz über das Verlagsrecht, 19 June 1901, RGBl. (1901), no. 27, pp. 217-26. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Tonkunst, 19 June 1901, 
RGBl. (1901), no. 27, pp. 227-39. 
• Schaumweinsteuergesetz, 9 May 1902, RGBl. (1902), no. 24, pp. 155-63. 
• Seemannsordnung, 2 June 1902, RGBl. (1902),no. 27, pp. 127-211. 
• Zolltarifgesetz, 25 December 1902, RGBl. (1902), no. 52, pp. 303-441. 
• Gesetz, betreffend Kinderarbeit in gewerblichen Betrieben, 30 March 1903, RGBl. (1903), no. 14, 
pp. 113-21. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Ordnung des Reichshaushalts und die Tilgung der Reichsschuld, 3 June 
1906, RGBl. (1906), no. 31, pp. 620-74, in particular appendix 2 ‘Zigarettensteuergesetz’, pp. 631-
42 and appendix 4 ‘Erbschaftssteuergesetz’, pp. 654-74. 
• Gesetz, betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Künste und der Photographie, 9 
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January 1907, RGBl. (1907), no. 3, pp. 7-18. 
• Beamtenhinterbliebenengesetz, 17 May 1907, RGBl. (1907), no. 21, pp. 208-14. 
• Militärhinterbliebenengesetz, 17 May 1907, RGBl. (1907), no. 21, pp. 214-32. 
• Scheckgesetz, 11 March 1908, RGBl. (1908), no. 12, pp. 151-7. 
• Gesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag, 30 May 1908, RGBl. (1908), no. 30, pp. 263-305. 
• Weingesetz, 7 April 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 20, pp. 393-402. 
• Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen, 3 May 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 26, pp. 437-44. 
• Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettberwerb, 7 June 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 31, pp. 499-506. 
• Viehseuchengesetz, 26 June 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 34, pp. 519-42. 
• Besoldungsgesetz, 15 July 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 38, pp. 573-660. 
• Zündwarensteuergesetzes, 15 July 1909, RGBl. (1909), no. 44, pp. 814-24. 
• Gesetz über die Haftung des Reichs für seine Beamten, 22 May 1910, RGBl. (1910), no. 29, pp. 
798-800. 
• Stellenvermittlergesetz, 2 June 1910, RGBl. (1910), no. 34, pp. 860-65. 
• Kolonialbeamtengesetz, 8 June 1910, RGBl. (1910), no. 37, pp. 881-96. 
• Reichsversicherungsordnung, 19 July 1911, RGBl. (1911), no. 42, pp. 509-838. 
• Hausarbeitsgesetz, 20 December 1911, RGBl. (1911), no. 68, pp. 976-85. 
• Versicherungsgesetz für Angestellte, 20 December 1911, RGBl. (1911), no. 68, pp. 989-1061. 
• Gesetz über den einmaligen außerordentlichen Wehrbeitrag, 3 July 1913, RGBl. (1913), no. 41, 
pp. 524-43  
• Gesetz zur Besteuerung des Vermögenszuwachses, 3 July 1913, RGBl. (1913), no. 41, pp. 505-21. 
• Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, 22 July 1913, RGBl. (1913), no. 46, pp. 583-93. 
1914-1918 
(Wartime 
Laws, 
without 
Emergency 
Decrees of 
the 
Bundesrat) 
• Gesetz über die Ermächtigung des Bundesrats zu wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen und über die 
Verlängerung der Fristen des Wechsel- und Scheckrechts im Falle kriegerischer Ereignisse, 4 
August 1914, RGBl. (1914), no. 53, §, 3, p. 327. 
• Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdient, 5 December 1916, RGBl. (1916), no. 276, pp. 1333-9. 
• Gesetz über die Besteuerung des Personen- und Güterverkehrs, 8 April 1917, RGBl. (1917), no. 
73, pp. 329-39. 
• Gesetz über eine außerordentliche Kriegsabgabe für das Rechnungsjahr 1918, 26 July 1918, 
RGBl. (1918), no. 101, 964-74. 
• Biersteuergesetz, 26 July 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 98, pp. 863-85. 
• Weinsteuergesetz, 26 July 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 97, pp. 831-46. 
• Gesetz, betreffend die Besteuerung von Mineralwässern und künstlich bereiteten Getränken sowie 
die Erhöhung der Zölle für Kaffee und Tee, 26 July 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 97, pp. 849-61. 
• Gesetz zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung, 28 October 1918, RGBl. (1918), no. 144, pp. 1274f. 
 
Based on: BGBl. NDB, 1867-70; RGBl. 1871-1914; and Kersten Rosenau's study Hegemonie und Dualismus. 
Preußens staatsrechtliche Stellung im Deutschen Reich, Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Studien zur 
Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Regensburg: Roderer, 1986), pp. 70-6; Bundesgesetzblatt, 1867-70; 
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1871-1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
Government 
 
176!
Table 3: Evolution of the National Ministerial Bureaucracy, 1867-1918 
 
Founding 
Date 
Federal Department Way of 
Formation  
Legal Act 
Creating the 
Department 
Competences Further 
Development 
1867 Bundeskanzleramt 
[Department of the 
Federal Chancellor] 
Newly established  Allerhöchster 
Präsidial-Erlaß, 
betreffend die 
Errichtung des 
Bundeskanzler-
Amtes, 12 August 
1867, BGBl. NDB 
(1867), no. 3, p. 
29.  
All matters of 
national 
administration 
Renamed 
Reichskanzleramt 
in 1871 
1870 Auswärtiges Amt 
[Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs] 
Integration of the 
Prussian Foreign 
Ministry into the 
federal budget and 
thus 
transformation into 
an independent 
federal agency 
Gesetz, betreffend 
die Feststellung 
des Haushalts-
Etats des 
Norddeutschen 
Bundes für das 
Jahr 1870, 13 June 
1869, BGBl. NDB 
(1869), no. 23, pp. 
211-227, appendix, 
chapter 4, 
‘Ministerium der 
auswärtigen 
Angelegenheiten’. 
See also Protokolle 
(NDB), 1869, 
session 2, 22 
February, § 21, p. 
2; the official 
motion in 
Drucksachen 
(NDB), 1869, no. 
18; and Bismarck’s 
decree to the 
Prussian 
diplomatic 
missions abroad, 
10 January 1870, 
printed in Huber, 
Dokumente, vol. 2, 
no. 193. 
Foreign affairs --- 
1871 Reichskanzleramt 
[Federal Department 
of the Reich 
Chancellor] 
Renaming of the 
Bundeskanzleramt  
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Abänderung 
der bisherigen 
Bezeichnung 
“Bundeskanzler-
Amt” in 
“Reichskanzler-
Amt”, 12 May 
1871, RGBl. 
(1871), no. 21, p. 
102.  
All matters of 
national 
administration that 
were not explicitly 
conferred upon any 
other federal 
department 
Postal and 
telegraphic 
competences 
transferred to the 
newly found Amt 
des 
Generalpostmeiste
rs in 1880; 
competences over 
Alsace-Lorraine 
transferred to the 
newly found 
Reichskanzleramt 
für Elsaß-
Lothringen in 
1876; judicial 
competences 
transferred to the 
newly found 
Reichsjustizamt in 
1877; fiscal 
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competences 
transferred to the 
newly found 
Reichsschatzamt in 
1879; renamed 
Reichsamt des 
Innern in 1879 
1872 Kaiserliche 
Admiralität 
[Imperial Admiralty] 
Renaming of the 
Prussian Navy 
Department 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die oberste 
Marinebehörde, 1 
January 1872, 
RGBl. (1872), no. 
2, p. 5.  
Command and 
administration of 
the navy 
Split into the High 
Command 
[Oberkommando] 
and the 
Reichsmarineamt 
in 1889  
1873 Reichseisenbahnamt 
[Federal Department 
for Railway Affairs] 
Newly established Gesetz, betreffend 
die Errichtung 
eines Reichs-
Eisenbahn-Amtes, 
27 June 1873, 
RGBl. (1873), no. 
18, pp. 164f. 
Supervision of 
railway affairs  
(the construction 
and operation of 
railways were 
responsibilities of 
the states)  
--- 
1876 Amt des General-
Postmeisters 
[Federal Agency of 
the Postmaster 
General]  
Transformation of 
the directorates for 
postal and 
telegraphic affairs 
in the 
Reichskanzleramt 
into an 
independent 
federal department 
Verordnung, 
betreffend die 
Verwaltung des 
Post- und 
Telegraphen-
wesens, 22 
December 1875, 
RGBl. (1875), no. 
34, p. 379.  
Administration of 
postal and 
telegraphic affairs  
Transformed into 
the Reichspostamt 
in 1880 
1876 Reichskanzleramt für 
Elsaß-Lothringen 
[Federal Department 
for Alsace-Lorraine] 
Transformation of 
the directorate for 
the administration 
of Alsace-Lorraine 
in the 
Reichskanzleramt 
into an 
independent 
federal department 
 Administration of 
Alsace-Lorraine 
Transformed into 
the Ministerium für 
Elsaß-Lothringen 
in 1879  
1877 Reichsjustizamt 
[Federal Department 
of Justice] 
Transformation of 
the directorates for 
judicial affairs in 
the 
Reichskanzleramt 
into an 
independent 
federal department 
in the context of 
budgetary 
negotiations with 
the Reichstag 
Gesetz, betreffend 
die Feststellung 
des Haushalts-
Etats des 
Deutschen Reichs 
für das Vierteljahr 
vom 1. Januar bis 
31. März 1877, 23 
December 1876, 
RGBl. (1876), no. 
28, pp. 239-74. See 
section 
‘Ausgaben’, 
chapter 8a.   
Administration of 
federal judicial 
affairs: preparation 
and 
implementation of 
the federal 
judiciary laws and 
all other laws 
concerning the 
administration of 
justice; preparation 
of expert opinion 
reports on 
legislative 
proposals; 
supervision of the 
implementation of 
the federal 
judiciary laws by 
the states 
--- 
1879 Reichsamt für die 
Verwaltung der 
Reichseisenbahnen 
[Federal Department 
for the Administration 
of National Railways] 
Merging and 
transformation of 
different 
subdivisions of the 
Reichskanzleramt 
into an 
independent 
federal department 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Errichtung des 
Reichsamts für die 
Verwaltung der 
Reichseisen-
bahnen, 27 May 
1878, RGBl. 
(1879), no. 24, p. 
Construction and 
operation of the 
railways that the 
Reich owned in 
Alsace-Lorraine 
and Luxembourg 
--- 
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193.  
1879 Reichsschatzamt 
[Federal Treasury]  
Transformation of 
the directorate for 
fiscal affairs in the 
Reichskanzleramt 
into an 
independent 
federal department 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Errichtung des 
Riechsschatzamts, 
14 July 1878, 
RGBl. (1879), no. 
25, p. 196. 
Administration of 
the financial affairs 
and assets of the 
Reich, in particular 
concerning matters 
of national 
customs and 
duties, federal 
taxes, and currency  
--- 
1879 Reichsamt des Innern 
[Federal Department 
of the Interior] 
Renaming of the 
Reichskanzleramt 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Benennung des 
Reichskanzler-
Amts und den Titel 
des Vorstandes 
dieser Behörde, 24 
December 1879, 
RGBl. (1879), no. 
37, p. 321. 
All matters of 
national 
administration that 
were not explicitly 
conferred upon any 
other federal 
department 
 
--- 
1879 Ministerium für 
Elsaß-Lothringen 
[Ministry for Alsace-
Lorraine] 
Created by the 
constitutional 
reform of the 
Reichsland in 
1879, which 
merged the 
responsibilities of 
the 
Reichskanzleramt 
für Elsaß-
Lothringen with 
those of the office 
of the 
Oberpräsident in 
Straßbourg 
 
 
Gesetz, betreffend 
die Verfassung und 
die Verwaltung 
Elsaß-Lothringens, 
4 July 1879, RGBl. 
(1879), no. 22, pp. 
165-9. 
Administration of 
Alsace-Lorraine 
--- 
1880 Reichspostamt 
[Federal Department 
for Postal Affairs] 
Reorganisation and 
renaming of the 
Amt des General-
Postmeisters  
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Bennennung 
der obersten 
Reichsbehörde für 
die dem Ressort 
des General-
Postmeisers 
zugewiesenen 
Verwaltungs-
zweige, 23 Februar 
1880, RGBl. 
(1880), no. 5, p. 
25. 
Administration of 
postal and 
telegraphic affairs 
--- 
1889 Reichsmarineamt 
[Federal Department 
of the Navy] 
Emerged from the 
Kaiserliche 
Admiralität by 
separating the 
command from 
administration of 
the navy (the 
command was 
conferred upon the 
High Command 
[Oberkommando]) 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Trennung des 
Oberkommandos 
der Marine von 
der Verwaltung 
derselben, 30 
March 1889, 
RGBl. (1889), no. 
7, p. 47. 
Administration of 
naval affairs 
--- 
1907 Reichskolonialamt 
[Federal Department 
for Colonial Affairs] 
Transformation of 
the colonial 
department of the 
Auswärtige Amt 
into an 
independent 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß, betreffend 
die Errichtung des 
Reichs-
Kolonialamts, 17 
May 1907, RGBl. 
Administration of 
the German 
colonies 
--- 
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federal department (1907), no. 22, p. 
239.  
1916 Kriegsernährungsamt 
[Wartime Agency of 
Food Supply] 
Newly established  Bekanntmachung 
über die 
Errichtung eines 
Kriegsernährungs-
amts, 22 May 
1916, RGBl. 
(1916), no. 102, 
pp. 402f. 
Organisation of the 
wartime food 
supply 
Transformed into 
the 
Reichsernährungs-
amt in 1918 
1917 Reichswirtschaftsamt 
[Federal Department 
of Economics] 
 
Newly established Allerhöchster 
Erlaß über die 
Errichtung des 
Reichswirtschaftsa
mts, 21 October 
1917, RGBl. 
(1917), no. 188, p. 
963. 
Administration of 
the economic and 
social affairs of the 
Reich 
Socio-political 
competences 
transferred to the 
newly-established 
Reichsarbeitsamt 
in 1918 
1918 Reichsarbeitsamt 
[Federal Department 
of Labour] 
 
Transformation of 
the directorates for 
socio-political 
affairs from the 
Reichswirtschaftsa
mt into an 
independent 
federal department 
Allerhöchster 
Erlaß über die 
Errichtung des 
Reichsarbeitsamts, 
4 October 1918, 
RGBl. (1918), no. 
136, p. 1231. 
Labour 
management and 
administration of 
social affairs  
--- 
1918 Reichsernährungsamt 
[Federal Department 
of Food Supply] 
Renaming of the 
Kriegsernährungsa
mt 
Namensänderung 
des 
Kriegsernährungs-
amts, 19 
November 1918, 
RGBl. (1918), no. 
158, p. 1319. 
Organisation of the 
wartime food 
supply 
--- 
 
Based on: BGBl. NDB, 1867-1870; RGBl., 1871-1918; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 833-46; and 
Rudolf Morsey’s two studies Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890 (Münster: Aschendorff, 
1957) and “Zur Geschichte der obersten Reichsverwaltung im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (1890-1900),” 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 24, no. 86 (1971): 8–16. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Picture 3: Bundesrat assembly hall in the Reichstag building 
 
Berlin, 27 February 1905. On days like this, Franz Bumm, a Bavarian-born official in 
the Federal Department of the Interior, could not believe his eyes. One of his duties was to 
keep the minutes of the Bundesrat meetings. The agenda of this day included decisions about 
the customs tariff law and the supplementary budget, two very important matters. But when 
he walked into the wood-panelled hall where the state governments usually met around a 
large U-shaped table, it was half empty. Of the twenty-five governments only seven had sent 
at least one of their officials to the meeting. All the other governments had either simply 
failed to show up – Waldeck-Pyrmont and Hamburg – or were represented by the 
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plenipotentiary of another state. Most popular was the financial expert Arnold Paulssen from 
the Grand Duchy Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach. He acted on behalf of no fewer than twelve 
governments that had fifteen votes in total, only two short of Prussia. When Bumm turned to 
the Prussian bench, he saw another odd constellation. There were five plenipotentiaries, but 
none of them came from the Prussian government. Rather, all of them held an office in one of 
the federal departments, the Reichsämter.1 
It was with such strange patterns of attendance in mind that the Baden prime minister 
Julius Jolly complained as early as 1872 that ‘the activity of the Bundesrat is a farce in which 
it is not worth participating’.2 The southern German statesman had a point. The plenary 
assembly of the Bundesrat could not function as a forum for negotiations, because the 
plenipotentiaries were bound by the instructions of their home governments. Everyday 
consultations between the monarchical governments usually took place via their diplomatic 
missions rather than in the council. Protracted exchanges of arguments were felt to be out of 
place in the plenary assembly. When a newly-appointed Hanseatic plenipotentiary, unaware 
of this unspoken rule, started a lengthy speech, his Bavarian colleague Hugo Graf von und zu 
Lerchenfeld-Köfering reproached him by snoring briefly, but loudly. 3  Nor could the 
Bundesrat be described as an independent deliberative organ. It had no secretaries, books, or 
files of its own, but relied in all these matters on the support of the Federal Department of the 
Interior.4 The state governments did not even convene in a palace put aside for this purpose, 
but used either one of the halls in the Federal Department of the Interior or – very rarely – a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Protokolle (DR), 1905, session 11, 27 February, pp. 65f. For biographical information on Paulsen, see Lilla, 
Föderalismus, pp. 470f.  
2  [‘im übrigen ist die Tätigkeit des Bundesrates eine Farce, an der sich zu beteiligen die Mühe nicht lohnt’] 
Quoted in Walther Peter Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat,” in Zur Problematik “Preußen 
und das Reich,” ed. Oswald Hauser, Neue Forschungen zur brandenburg-preussischen Geschichte 4 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 1984), p. 93 and Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 91. 
3  Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 111. 
4  See for example the note in Handbuch, 1884, p. 12. 
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suite of ponderously furnished rooms that was reserved for them in the new Reichstag 
building (see Picture 3).5 
It is mistaken, however, to see the Bundesrat as a dusty band of representative-automata 
that did nothing but cast votes as ordered by their governments. Such views are based on a 
misunderstanding of how the Bundesrat worked and what it did. The plenary assembly was 
indeed no forum of consultation. But the real work took place in the committees. Here, the 
plenipotentiaries of the state governments negotiated and revised bills. According to the 
constitution, there were eight committees in total, which were responsible for the army and 
fortresses, naval affairs, customs and taxes, commerce and transportation, railway, postal and 
telegraphy affairs, the judicial system, accounting, and foreign affairs.6 Soon after unification, 
four additional committees were established. These dealt with questions concerning Alsace-
Lorraine, the constitution, the by-laws, and the fare system of rail cargo.7  
Each committee consisted of the representatives of at least four state governments. In most 
committees, this number increased to seven after 1890. The seats in the committees were 
allocated to the states on the basis of annual elections by the plenary assembly. There were 
three exceptions. As part of her special rights, Bavaria had a permanent seat in the committee 
for the army and fortresses. She also enjoyed the privilege of a permanent seat in the 
committee for foreign affairs, as did Wurttemberg and Saxony. The members of the naval 
committee, finally, were nominated by the Emperor.8  
Those state governments that were elected into a committee appointed the members from 
the ranks of their Bundesrat plenipotentiaries.9 In the committees, each state had one vote.10 
Unlike in the plenary assembly, where the number of votes greatly differed among the states, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 110f. 
6  RV (1871), art. 8. 
7  On the committees, see Lilla, Föderalismus, p. 11. The committees for foreign affairs and for the fare system 
of rail cargo only existed on paper.  
8  For these regulations, see RV (1871), art. 8. 
9  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 17. Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 18. 
10  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 17. Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 19. 
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decision-making in the committees was therefore egalitarian. At least in theory, this 
arrangement gave the states – in particular the middling states, which usually held most seats 
in the committees – the chance to advocate their interests on an equal footing with the federal 
hegemon Prussia.  
The work of the committees and the voting process in the plenary assembly were closely 
intertwined. Legislative proposals – usually prepared by one of the federal departments – 
were first introduced into the plenary assembly, which referred them to the relevant 
committee for negotiation and revision. After the committee had discussed the bill, its speaker 
or Referent – a position that, depending on the subject, traditionally belonged to a specific 
state, such as to Bavaria for fiscal issues and to Saxony for constitutional questions – 
presented the suggestions of the committee to the states in the plenary assembly, either orally 
or in writing.11 The plenipotentiaries of the states could then propose amendments before the 
assembly took a vote on the bill. If adopted, the proposal was referred to the Reichstag. The 
parliament could either adopt the bill without changes or demand revisions, in which case it 
came back to the Bundesrat. The plenary assembly could then either vote on the bill directly 
or reintroduce it into the relevant committee before referring it back to the Reichstag for final 
adoption or rejection.12  
This procedure made the Bundesrat one of the main engines of federal government. In 
April 1871, Bismarck characterised the council of states as ‘a kind of Palladium for our 
future, a great guarantee for the future of Germany’.13 This was true in the sense that – as we 
have seen in Chapter 2 – within the broader structure of the constitution the position of the 
Bundesrat guaranteed Prussia’s hegemony and prevented the introduction of parliamentary 
government. The fact that the proceedings of the Bundesrat did not stand in the centre of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 18. Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 19. On the position of the speakers, see Lilla, 
Föderalismus, pp. 11, 15. 
12  On the complex course of procedure in the Bundesrat that is described in this paragraph, see especially 
Geschäftsordnung (1871), art. 12 and Geschäftsordnung (1880), art. 15 and 16. 
13  [‘ein Palladium für unsere Zukunft, eine große Garantie für die Zukunft Deutschlands’] Quoted in Fuchs, 
“Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat”, p. 89 and in Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 91. 
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public interest and were not in the least exciting did not change anything about its important 
role in federal government. As the contemporary constitutional lawyer Heinrich Triepel put it, 
the Bundesrat resembled a ‘good housewife’ that kept the house running, ‘because, as we 
know, that wife is the best that you talk about the least’.14 
Due to the central constitutional position of the Bundesrat and its complex internal 
procedures, it was a matter of great importance whom the state governments chose to 
represent them in the council. The plenipotentiaries they nominated did more than just raise 
their hands in the plenary assembly. They were also responsible for negotiating bills in the 
committees and for reporting back to their home governments in order to enable them to make 
an informed decision on how to vote.  
The composition of the ranks of the plenipotentiaries is therefore a measure for what parts 
of the complex constitutional system came to wield influence in and over the Bundesrat. If all 
the states had attended in the person of officials from their own government, they could have 
negotiated and voted relatively independently. The Bundesrat would have been a proper 
representation of the states, which would have advocated their genuine interests vis-à-vis the 
federal government. While the middling states could have used their position in the 
committees to create a counterweight to Prussia, the Prussian State Ministry could have used 
its numerical superiority in the plenary assembly to push its own agenda.  
If, in contrast, federal officials had infiltrated the Prussian delegation, this would mean that 
the national government could have used the Bundesrat as a platform for its own interests. 
Both in the plenary assembly and in the committees, federal officials could have used the 
great resources and expertise of the Reichsämter to overwhelm the other state governments. If 
the latter had succumbed to the dominance of the Prussian bench and had refrained from 
sending officials of their own ministries to the meetings, the Bundesrat would have lost its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  [‘gute Hausfrau’], [‘denn bekanntlich sei die Frau die beste, von der man am wenigsten spreche’] Heinrich 
Triepel, Unitarismus und Föderalismus im Deutschen Reiche. Eine staatsrechtliche und politische Studie 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), p. 85. 
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function as a representation of the states and would have become a satellite organ of the 
federal government.  
We know from the previous chapter that this is precisely what happened. The national 
government around the Chancellor and the state secretaries gradually established control over 
the council and used it for its own purposes. An examination of the patterns of representation 
in the Bundesrat can show us how exactly this happened. In other words: it can expose the 
mechanisms by which the federal government turned the Bundesrat into an obedient 
sanctioning machine.  
How, then, did the participation of the states in the Bundesrat evolve over the years? And 
how was it linked to the development of the council’s role in federal government? Historians 
have not paid much attention to these questions, because they have often failed to understand 
the pivotal role of the Bundesrat in the decision-making process of the union. There are a few 
doctoral studies from the 1960s that have examined the Bundesrat delegations of individual 
states, most importantly of Baden and the Hanseatic city-states.15 The participation of the four 
middling states has been relatively well researched by works that have looked at broader 
questions about Germany’s federal nature. These studies have demonstrated that while Baden 
was one of the most loyal supporters of the Prussian bench, the Bavarian and Wurttemberg 
government pursued more or less independent policies for most of the time.16 Just recently, 
the first comprehensive collection of short biographies of the Bundesrat plenipotentiaries has 
been published.17 However, none of these studies has provided quantitative evidence for how 
the states were represented in the Bundesrat. It is unknown how patterns of attendance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  Hans Klaus Reichert, Baden am Bundesrat 1871 bis 1890 (Heidelberg: Berenz, 1966). Helmut Paul Dahl, 
Lübeck im Bundesrat 1871-1914. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einzelstaatlicher Politik im Deutschen Reich 
(Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1969). Hans-Georg Schönhoff, Hamburg im Bundesrat. Die Mitwirkung 
Hamburgs an der Bildung des Reichswillens 1867-1890 (Hamburg: Christians, 1967). 
16  On Bavaria, see Binder, Reich and Rauh's two studies Föderalismus and Parlamentarisierung. On 
Wurttemberg, see Binder's book and Georg Helmut Kleine, Der württembergische Ministerpräsident 
Freiherr von Mittnacht, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-
Württemberg 50 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961). On Baden, see Reichert, Baden am Bundesrat 1871 bis 
1890. On the participation of the middling states more generally, see also Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: 
Der Bundesrat”. 
17  Lilla, Föderalismus. 
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evolved in terms of who represented which state in what function, for what purpose, and to 
what effect.  
In light of the special relationship between the Prussian and federal government, we should 
concentrate on the plenipotentiaries of Prussia and the twenty small states. There are 
structural reasons for proceeding in this way. For a majority in the Bundesrat, thirty votes 
were required. As the Prussian bench possessed seventeen votes on its own, it needed the 
support of at least thirteen other votes in order to adopt legislative proposals, ordinances, and 
other decisions.18 Since the middling states put great emphasis on pursuing independent 
policies, these thirteen votes usually came from the group of small states, which had twenty-
four votes in total. As the small principalities were financially, economically, and militarily 
dependent on the Prussian and federal government, most of them were – as we will see in the 
course of this chapter – loyal followers of the Prussian bench.  
The only way to measure the attendance of the states in the Bundesrat is to undertake a 
statistical analysis of its protocols. These were collected in annual volumes, which were 
distributed to the twenty-five state governments only. The protocols do not record debates, 
but merely list technical matters, such as agenda points and voting results. Each of them starts 
with a list of attendance that shows by which plenipotentiaries the states were represented in 
the meeting of the plenary assembly and which offices most of these envoys held in the states 
or the Reich.19 For each meeting, we can thus categorise the plenipotentiaries according to 
their function. If we add the numbers of all meetings that took place in any given year and 
sort the resulting aggregates chronologically, we can determine how patterns of attendance 
evolved over the whole period between 1871 and 1918. 
The main challenge of such a statistical analysis is the large volume of data. Between 1871 
and 1913, the Bundesrat usually met between forty and fifty times per year. During the war, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  See RV (1871), art. 6. 
19  Protokolle (DR), 1871-1918. Geschäftsordnung (1871), §14.  
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this figure doubled (see Figure 2). The number of plenipotentiaries also skyrocketed over 
time, in particular on the Prussian bench. In 1876, Prussia was represented by 161 
plenipotentiaries in total. Thirty-eight years later, their number had swollen to 729 (see Figure 
3).  
Moreover, the statistical analysis has to take two further official records into account, 
namely the protocols of the Prussian State Ministry and the annual handbook of the federal 
constitutional organs and administrative agencies. 20  The protocols contain lists of the 
members of the Prussian cabinet that make it possible to determine which Bundesrat 
plenipotentiaries were part of the Prussian government. In the handbook, we find the annual 
registry of the Bundesrat. This list shows which officials the state governments registered as 
regular and proxy plenipotentiaries. With reference to the handbook, we can thus determine 
what registration status the participants in the Bundesrat meetings had and how membership 
(who was registered as a plenipotentiary?) compared to attendance  (who actually showed 
up?).21  
On the basis of this approach, this chapter will undertake the first reliable analysis of how 
the participation of the state governments in the Bundesrat evolved from the unification to the 
wartime collapse of the monarchy. It will first expose the tools by which the federal 
government around the Chancellor gained control over the Bundesrat: the proxy 
plenipotentiaries of Prussia and a complex system of substitutions among the small states. 
While the former enabled the federal administration to sneak its executives into the Bundesrat 
through the back door and to take control over the Prussian delegation, the latter guaranteed 
that most of the small states usually voted with the Prussian bench.  After that, this chapter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  Protokolle (PSM), vol. 6/II-11/I, 1867-1918. Handbuch, 1874-1918. 
21  The registry was published in the Handbuch from 1874 onwards. For the first three years after unification, 
registration lists can be found in the protocols of the Bundesrat. See Protokolle (DR), 1871, session 1, 20 
February, § 2, pp. 2-4; 1872, session 7, 13 March, § 63, pp. 38-40; and 1873, session 3, 17 February, § 33, 
pp. 18-21. 
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will examine what role these tools of federalisation played in the different periods of federal 
government. 
Over the course of this analysis, it will become clear that Prussia became completely 
mediatised through the years and that the small states never managed to participate in the 
decision-making of the plenary assembly independently. As a result, the Bundesrat became a 
compliant instrument of the federal administration. By the end of this process, it had turned 
from a political organ of the monarchical governments into a purely administrative body of 
bureaucratic specialists.  As such, it could no longer prevent the parliamentarisation of federal 
government.  
 
Tools of Federalisation 
 
According to the constitution, each state government could appoint as many 
plenipotentiaries in the Bundesrat as it had votes. All states that had more than one vote could 
cast their votes in their entirety only. It was not allowed to split them.22 This rule implied that 
it was irrelevant how many plenipotentiaries a state sent to a meeting. The actual voting was 
the responsibility of the so-called ‘directing plenipotentiary’, the ‘stimmführender 
Bevollmächtigter’. As long as he was present, the state could cast its vote. In case of his 
absence, any other plenipotentiary could substitute for him.23 A state was therefore able to 
participate in the voting process as long as it was represented by at least one plenipotentiary.  
The plenipotentiaries were told by their home governments how to vote on legislative 
proposals.24 In Prussia, the instruction of the Bundesrat delegation was the right of the foreign 
minister. For this reason, each chancellor held this office in the Prussian State Ministry at all 
times. Without control over the Prussian Bundesrat vote, the Chancellor could not hope to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  RV (1871), art. 6. 
23  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 2. 
24  On the instruction of the plenipotentiaries, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 856f. 
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push projects through the Bundesrat. In Bismarck’s words: ‘The relevance of the Reich 
Chancellor is based on his position as Prussian minister of foreign affairs’.25 For the daily 
operation of federal government, this personal union was more important than that of the 
Chancellor and the Prussian prime minister, which – as we have seen in the previous chapter 
– was suspended twice before the turn of the century.26  
But in order to make the machinery of federal government work, it was not enough to give 
the Chancellor control over the Prussian Bundesrat vote. The problem was that the number of 
constitutionally determined plenipotentiaries on the Prussian bench was simply too small. 
Seventeen plenipotentiaries could not provide the administrative expertise that was needed to 
introduce legislative proposals from all fields of government, to negotiate them in the 
committees, and to defend them in the plenary assembly. As one remedy for this problem, the 
by-laws granted the plenipotentiaries the right to engage expert clerks – the so-called 
Kommissare –  to assist them in the various committees.27 But this measure alone did not 
solve the problem. In order to lend more weight to its views, the Prussian-federal executive 
needed more representatives with managing authority in the various branches of 
administration. Already in the very first meeting after the unification, it was necessary that 
three high-ranking executives from the Prussian ministries of war, justice, and the interior 
attended the Bundesrat, even though they were not registered as regular plenipotentiaries.28   
The main reason why an expansion of the Prussian bench was necessary, however, was the 
lack of constitutionally defined rights of the federal administration. Assuming the position of 
a plenipotentiary was the only way for federal executives to enter the Bundesrat in order to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  [‘Die Bedeutung des Reichskanzlers beruht auf seiner Stellung als preußischer Minister des Auswärtigen.’] 
Quoted in Kersten Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus. Preußens staatsrechtliche Stellung im Deutschen 
Reich, Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Studien zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Regensburg: 
Roderer, 1986), p. 27. 
26  On the importance of the personal union between the Chancellor and the Prussian foreign minister, see for 
example Georg Meyer, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. Gerhard Anschütz, 7th ed. (Leipzig & 
Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1919), pp. 524-6. 
27  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 18. On the commissioners, see Fuchs, “Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der 
Bundesrat”, p. 95. 
28  Protokolle (DR), 1871, session 1, 20 February, pp. 1-12. 
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defend legislative proposals that had been prepared in one of the Reichsämter. The 
constitution did not establish any direct means – as the previous chapter has shown – by 
which the federal administration around the Chancellor could introduce bills into the 
legislative process. In light of the close structural connection between the Prussian and federal 
executive, the most pragmatic solution to this problem was to make federal officials part of 
the Prussian Bundesrat delegation.  
With federal executives reinforcing the ranks of their Prussian colleagues, it was necessary 
that Prussia could appoint more than seventeen plenipotentiaries. It thus became practice that 
in addition to their regular plenipotentiaries the states could appoint proxy plenipotentiaries. 
Already in 1872, an amendment of the Bundesrat by-laws made them an official institution.29 
Whereas the number of regular plenipotentiaries was limited to the number of votes that a 
state had in the Bundesrat, the number of proxies was not.  
In the first few years after unification, each proxy substituted a specific regular 
plenipotentiary in one of the committees and was therefore allowed to participate only in 
those meetings of the plenary assembly that concerned matters of the relevant committee.30 
This limitation became gradually irrelevant. When Bismarck started his attempt to reorganise 
federal government in 1880, the states adopted several amendments to the by-laws that – 
among other things – equipped the proxies with a universal status. From now on, they were 
general members of the Bundesrat that could participate in any meeting of the plenary 
assembly and the committees.31  
Both regular and proxy plenipotentiaries were registered at the beginning of each 
parliamentary year at the office of the Bundesrat, which was at first part of the Kanzleramt 
and then – after the Kanzleramt had been renamed in 1879 – of the Federal Department of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  Protokolle (DR), 1872, session 9, 25 March, § 87, pp. 51f. 
30  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 17 in conjunction with Protokolle (DR), 1872, session 9, 25 March, §§ 87.3, 
87.5, p. 52. 
31  Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 1. On the gradual development of the status of the proxies, see also Rauh, 
Föderalismus, p. 103. 
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Interior. This registry was published in the handbook. But the state governments could also 
appoint regular and proxy plenipotentiaries ad hoc, for example in case one of their 
plenipotentiaries died or they needed an additional expert on a certain matter. Such 
spontaneous registrations were recorded in the Bundesrat protocols.  
The Prussian government usually registered between fifteen and seventeen regular 
plenipotentiaries, thus making use of the maximum amount of registrations that the 
constitution allowed (see Figure 4). The development of the proxy plenipotentiaries that were 
on record for Prussia in the registry was much more dynamic. Their number rose steadily 
from two in 1873 to a level of forty in the first years of the war, before skyrocketing to 
seventy-one in 1918 (see Figure 4). The great increase of the overall number of Prussian 
plenipotentiaries– from fifteen in 1871 to eighty-seven in 1918 – was therefore due to the rise 
of the proxies. Between 1888 and 1890 the registry comprised roughly as many proxy as 
regular plenipotentiaries for Prussia. In 1891, the former outnumbered the latter for the first 
time. The gap gradually widened until the turn of the century, when the share of proxy 
plenipotentiaries reached sixty per cent (see Figure 5). Until the last year of the war, the ratio 
between registered proxy and regular plenipotentiaries stayed at a level of two to one.  
This development towards a dominance of the proxies was even more pronounced in 
constitutional practice. Figure 6 shows how many Prussian proxy and regular 
plenipotentiaries appeared in the Bundesrat each year between 1871 and 1918. In the first 
thirteen years after unification, attendance fluctuated greatly. But the regular plenipotentiaries 
always outnumbered the proxies by at least one hundred appearances. After 1884, there was a 
clear trend: the attendance of the proxies rose steadily while that of the regular 
plenipotentiaries decreased. Between 1885 and 1894, they balanced each other for most of the 
time. After that, the trends diverged more sharply. In 1900, three hundred proxies sat on the 
Prussian bench, as compared to only seventy-eighty regular plenipotentiaries. Until the 
beginning of the war, the proxies constituted between eighty and sixty-five per cent of all 
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attendants, while the share of regular plenipotentiaries never exceeded twenty-eight per cent 
(see Figure 7). In 1914, the number of both regular and proxy plenipotentiaries more than 
doubled. By the time the war ended, it had dropped back to the pre-war level.  
In addition to the regular and proxy plenipotentiaries, Prussia sometimes sent officials to 
the Bundesrat who were registered neither in the annual registry nor in the protocols. These 
unregistered plenipotentiaries were usually administrative experts on a subject that was 
addressed in a few meetings only. Their attendance was therefore very rare. Between 1871 
and 1913, their number fluctuated between zero and fifty-three (see Figure 6). In the first 
three years of the war, it rose so much that they appeared in the plenary assembly more often 
than the regular plenipotentiaries. But this wartime growth was due to a purely technical 
reason. From 1915 to 1917, there were no new annual registries. Any plenipotentiary who 
made his debut in the Bundesrat after 1914 was thus unregistered, unless the state 
governments undertook an ad-hoc registration in one of the meetings. They usually did not do 
so because the war removed such formalities from the top of their agenda.   
In general, the unregistered plenipotentiaries were so few that they mattered little for the 
evolution of the Prussian Bundesrat delegation. The massive increase in the total number of 
attendants was due to one factor only: the rise of the proxies. This implies that in order to 
determine by whom the Prussian bench was controlled we have to examine who the proxies 
actually were. Did they come from the Prussian or federal administration? 
The following statistics classify all officials of the Reichsämter and other national agencies 
as federal office holders, regardless of their specific rank. In the same manner, all members of 
the Prussian administration are categorised as Prussian office holders. Those plenipotentiaries 
that held positions in both Prussian and federal institutions – such as most prominently the 
Chancellor and Prussian foreign minister – are considered hybrids. For members of the 
Prussian ministry of war, there is a separate category. As the Prussian ministry administered 
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the military affairs of all states of the union, there is no point in asking whether its officials 
represented exclusively Prussian or federal interests.  
In the registry, the professional background of the Prussian proxies evolved according to a 
clear trend (see Figure 8). The groups of Prussian and federal executives both grew between 
1871 and 1918, but at very different rates. While the number of Prussian officials rose from 
two in the early 1870s to twelve in 1914, that of federal office holders increased from zero to 
over twenty-five. Only in the first seven years after the unification did the registered proxies 
not include any federal executives. In the first year that they made the list of proxies, they 
immediately outnumbered their Prussian colleagues. After 1879, more than fifty per cent of 
all registered proxies came from the federal administration each year (see Figure 9). Their 
share gradually increased to seventy-four per cent in 1901 and then stayed at a level between 
sixty and seventy per cent until the end of the war. At the same time, the share of Prussian 
officials settled at around ten per cent. Executives that held both federal and Prussian offices 
hardly played any role among the registered proxies. For most of the time, there was not a 
single such representative. Only in the 1880s and early 1890s did the registry include one or 
two. The number of military officials, too, was always very low among the proxies. During 
Bismarck’s chancellorship, the registry comprised no more than two in any year. While this 
number doubled in the Wilhelmine era, it never exceeded this level, not even during the war. 
In the registry, then, federal executives were by far the largest group among the proxies. 
This implies that the Prussian bench became dominated by the federal administration over the 
years, because the proxies – as Figure 7 has shown – constituted an ever-growing share of all 
Prussian plenipotentiaries that attended the Bundesrat. Indeed, the federal executives became 
an overwhelmingly dominant presence on the Prussian bench (see Figure 10). After 
unification, it took them no longer than one year to outnumber their Prussian colleagues. 
While Prussian officials regained the upper hand in 1874, the trend favoured the federal 
executives for all years after 1876. Only in 1883 did Prussian and federal institutions provide 
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roughly the same number of attendants on the Prussian bench. After that, the number of 
federal executives rose steadily, while that of their Prussian counterparts dropped. The gap 
grew constantly. In 1907, merely forty-two Prussian officials faced no less than 430 
representatives of the federal administration. While absolute numbers of attendance declined 
for both groups during the next few years, federal officials constituted an ever-growing share 
of all Prussian plenipotentiaries (see Figure 11). In 1910, they represented no less than ninety-
three per cent. At the same time, the share of Prussian officials dropped to five per cent. This 
ratio meant in effect that the federal administration took over the Prussian bench completely. 
When the war broke out in 1914, the attendance of both federal and Prussian executives 
climbed to an all-time high, namely to 553 and 142, respectively (see Figure 10). After this 
peak, the numbers gradually declined to their pre-war level. While the attendance of military 
officials increased during the war, it was still very low. There was not a single year between 
1871 and 1918 where more than ten per cent of Prussian plenipotentiaries had a background 
in the army (see Figure 11). The attendance of executives that held both Prussian and federal 
offices was of similar insignificance, but less constant. Before 1890, up to forty-four hybrid 
officials appeared on the Prussian bench per year (see Figure 10). In the Wilhelmine era, there 
was never more than one. Even after the war broke out, the number of such officials rose to 
no more than four. 
These patterns of attendance show that the evolution of the Prussian bench was shaped by 
one factor only: the gradual takeover by the federal government. As we have seen, this 
appropriation happened by means of a very complex mechanism. For the sake of clarity, it is 
worth briefly recapitulating the main features of this process. The overwhelming majority of 
federal officials entered the Prussian bench as proxy plenipotentiaries. It was easy for the 
federal executive to give them this status, because the registration of plenipotentiaries was the 
right of the Chancellor in his capacity as Prussian foreign minister. In the registry, the share of 
proxies rose steadily (see Figure 5). Their actual attendance in the Bundesrat increased even 
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more (see Figure 7). Over the years, the Prussian bench thus came to be dominated by federal 
executives (see Figure 9). As the proxies outnumbered the regular plenipotentiaries by three 
to one after the 1890s (see Figure 7), the federal administration gained complete control over 
the Prussian bench (see Figure 11). 
The proxies were therefore a tool of federalisation. They gave the federal administration 
the opportunity to smuggle its executives into the Bundesrat through the backdoor, where 
they could advocate bills of the Reichsämter in the committees and push them through the 
plenary assembly. Rather than representatives of Prussian interests, they were advocates of 
the national government who appeared in Prussian disguise. The Prussian Bundesrat 
delegation thus became an assemblage of administrative experts from the federal departments.  
This federalisation of the Prussian bench shows that the federal executive gradually seized 
control of the Prussian government rather than vice versa. Indeed, this process constituted a 
mediatisation of Prussia because the federal government deprived her of the core right that the 
constitution granted to each state, namely to participate in the national decision-making 
process independently.  
One manifestation of this loss of independence was the low attendance of Prussian 
ministers in the Bundesrat (see Figure 12). During Bismarck’s Chancellorship, they appeared 
on the Prussian bench sporadically. The years 1879 and 1880 were an exception, because at 
this time the chancellor encouraged the ministers of the states to visit the Bundesrat as part of 
his attempt to reform federal government by giving more weight to the plenary assembly. 
After 1896, the Prussian ministers more or less disappeared completely. Only the outbreak of 
the war led to a significant increase in their attendance. But this trend was short-lived; it 
lasted for no longer than two years.  
With the exception of the years 1879 to 1880 and 1914 to 1916, the Prussian bench 
included more members of the Prussian State Ministry that did not preside over a ministry 
than proper ministers (see Figure 12). The non-ministerial members of the State Ministry 
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were usually high-ranking officials from the Reichsämter, most often the state secretaries.32 
In his capacity as Prussian king, the Emperor – the head of the federal administration – made 
them part of the Prussian cabinet, as the previous chapter has shown, in order to coordinate 
the policies of the Prussian and federal government.33 The fact that they sat on the Prussian 
bench more often than the actual ministers was probably the clearest sign of how deeply the 
federal administration infiltrated the State Ministry and how much control it had over the 
Prussian Bundesrat delegation.  
During the war, this mediatisation of the Prussian government led to protests in the House 
of Representatives. The criticism became most outspoken in the debate over whether the 
Prussian three-class franchise should be harmonised with the liberal electoral law of the 
Reichstag in order to make it easier for the Chancellor to coordinate Prussian and federal 
politics. In winter 1917, the conservative MP Ernst von Heydebrand und der Lasa complained 
that the Prussian cabinet comprised so many federal state secretaries ‘who have to follow the 
orders of the Chancellor in their position that a distinctive, independent Prussian government 
no longer exists’.34 Exactly the same could have been said about the high number of federal 
executives on the Prussian Bundesrat bench. 
In addition to the Prussian proxies, there was a second tool of federalisation in the 
Bundesrat: an elaborate system of substitutions among the small states. By ensuring that most 
of the small principalities usually voted with the Prussian bench, this system created the 
majorities necessary for legislative proposals of the Prussian-federal executive to be adopted. 
The foundations of this system lay in the Bundesrat by-laws. In order to enable the state 
governments to take part in the voting process at all times, the by-laws determined that in the 
event of absence each directing plenipotentiary could delegate his right to cast the vote of his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32  See for example Protokolle (PSM), vol. 9, 1900-1909, pp. 454f. 
33  On this practice, the so-called ‘Staatssekretarisierung’ of the Prussian cabinet, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und 
Dualismus, pp. 32-8. 
34  [‘die nach ihrer ganzen Stellung den Anweisungen des Herrn Reichskanzlers zu folgen haben, daß also ein 
eigenes, selbständiges Preußisches Staatsministerium gar nicht mehr existiert’] Quoted in Goldschmidt, 
Kampf, p. 124 and in Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, p. 37. 
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home government to any other plenipotentiary. It did not matter whether this substitute 
plenipotentiary came from the same state or not.35 When Bismarck revised the by-laws in 
1880 in order to encourage high-ranking officials from the states to attend the Bundesrat, this 
rule was tightened. From now on, substitute plenipotentiaries were forbidden to act on behalf 
of another state in two consecutive meetings. In other words, in at least every second meeting 
a state had to be represented by one of its home plenipotentiaries. Moreover, substitute 
plenipotentiaries were no longer allowed to take over the representation of more than one 
state unless the governments gave them express authority at the Bundesrat office in the 
Federal Department of the Interior.36 After the war broke out, the number of meetings 
increased so much that these strict rules became impractical. In July 1915, the Bundesrat 
decided to suspend them for three months.37 One year later, in August 1916, they were 
rendered inoperative for the duration of the war.38 
The small states made so much use of substitutions that they in effect gave up their 
independent participation in the Bundesrat. From the unification until the wartime revolution, 
the number of substitute plenipotentiaries that represented the small states surpassed that of 
their home plenipotentiaries every single year (see Figure 13). The share of the former was 
always over fifty per cent (see Figure 14). Until the beginning of the war, the pattern of 
attendance was very consistent. While substitute plenipotentiaries usually constituted sixty to 
seventy per cent of all small state representatives, the share of home plenipotentiaries lay 
between thirty and forty per cent. On average, a small state was thus represented by an official 
of another government in roughly two out of three meetings. Only in the second half of the 
1890s did the number of substitute and home plenipotentiaries approach each other. While the 
former dropped by twenty per cent in comparison to the mid 1880s, the latter increased by ten 
per cent. The first years of the war led to an inflation of substitutions. In 1916, three out of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35  Geschäftsordnung (1871), § 2. 
36  Geschäftsordnung (1880), § 2. 
37  Protokolle (DR), 1915, session 43, 8 July, § 745, p. 619. 
38  Ibid., 1916, session 40, 8 June, § 494, p. 454. 
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four attendants on the benches of the small states were substitute plenipotentiaries. After that 
year, the number of both substitute and home plenipotentiaries plummeted, mainly because 
the small states tended less and less to attend the Bundesrat. In the last year of the war, it 
happened more often that the benches of the small states were empty than that they were 
occupied by home plenipotentiaries.  
The consistently high level of substitutions shows that the revision of the Bundesrat by-
laws in 1880 and the tightening of the relevant rules did not have a great effect on the 
participation of the small states. They still delegated their voting rights to substitute 
plenipotentiaries overwhelmingly often (see Figures 13 and 14). The main reason why there 
was no significant drop in the number of substitutions was that the small states adjusted their 
registration policy. In order to continue the system of substitutions, they simply made the 
officials of other governments who acted on their behalf a regular part of their Bundesrat 
delegations by registering them as proxy plenipotentiaries. Until the reform in 1880, over 
eighty per cent of the substitute plenipotentiaries were not on record at the Bundesrat registry 
(see Figure 15). The state governments simply nominated them ad hoc before the relevant 
meeting. The reform changed this completely. From 1881 onwards, around ninety per cent of 
all substitute plenipotentiaries were registered as proxies.  
By changing their registration policy, the small states undermined one of the central 
objectives of Bismarck’s reform, namely to increase the attendance of high-ranking officials 
from the state governments. As the level of substitutions remained roughly as high as before 
(see Figures 13 and 14), the participation of the small states did not change at all. Bismarck 
did not mind this too much, however, as he was mainly concerned with increasing the 
attendance of the ministers from the more important middling states.39 On the contrary: the 
continuation of the system of substitutions was in his interest, because the fewer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39  See the report by the Wurttemberg envoy Carl von Spitzemberg to the Wurttemberg prime minister Hermann 
von Mittnacht, 15 March 1880, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 74, p. 275. 
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plenipotentiaries there were the easier it was for him to control what the small states were 
doing in the Bundesrat. 
The fact that already in the first year after unification the share of substitute 
plenipotentiaries reached nearly sixty per cent (see Figure 14) shows that the system of 
substitution was not a phenomenon that emerged over time, but rather an implied element of 
the constitution. At the time the constitution was framed, it was clear that many small states 
would find it difficult to participate in the decision-making of the Bundesrat. This was above 
all a question of money. It was expensive to fund an envoy of one’s own – perhaps even more 
than one – in Berlin, not least because the representatives of the state governments were 
expected to take part in the social life at the Prussian court. For many small states, the 
maintenance of a permanent Bundesrat delegation simply exceeded their means.40  
This was a problem that had already occurred in the Bundestag of the German 
Confederation and in the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire.41 At the time of 
unification, Bismarck must have known about this issue, because he had been a member of 
the Frankfurt Bundestag for many years. In light of his aim to expand Prussia’s hegemony, 
this awareness suggests that he created the institution of substitute plenipotentiaries not least 
in order to exploit the predicament of the small states in a manner that would make it easier to 
control them. If we look at it from this angle, the consistently high level of substitutions 
indicates that the voting behaviour of most small states depended on the Prussian bench, 
meaning on the preferences of the Prussian government and – after the Prussian Bundesrat 
delegation had been taken over by federal executives – of the federal administration.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40  See Julia Cholet, Der Etat des Deutschen Reiches in der Bismarckzeit (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag, 2012), p. 107. 
41  On the financial difficulties of the small states in the Holy Roman Empire more generally, see for example 
Jürgen Ackermann's case study Verschuldung, Reichsdebitverwaltung, Mediatisierung. Eine Studie zu den 
Finanzproblemen der mindermächtigen Stände im Alten Reich. Das Beispiel der Grafschaft Ysenburg-
Büdingen, 1687-1806, Schriften des Hessischen Landesamtes für Geschichtliche Landeskunde 40 (Marburg: 
Hessisches Landesamt für Geschichtliche Landeskunde, 2002). 
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This dependency becomes clear if we consider what states made use of substitutions and 
whom they chose to represent them. In general, there were three major groups among the 
small states (see Table 4). First, there was a small number of states that sent their own 
plenipotentiaries to the great majority of Bundesrat meetings: Hesse, Brunswick, Lübeck, and 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The latter formed a permanent coalition with its sister principality 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, with the Schwerin plenipotentiary usually casting the vote for the 
Strelitz government (See Table 4). This joint Bundesrat delegation of the two grand duchies 
followed the vote of the Prussian bench in more or less all cases. The main reason for this 
loyalty was – as we will see in the next chapter – that the Mecklenburg governments needed 
the support of the Prussian and federal executive against the Reichstag, which was sharply 
critical of the antiquated corporative structures of the duchies and regularly demanded the 
introduction of proper constitutions.  
While Hesse acted more independently in the plenary assembly, the Brunswick 
government too usually aligned itself with the Prussian bench, in particular from 1885 
onwards. After the duke had died the year before, the following succession crisis – which will 
be one of the subjects of the next chapter – increased Prussia’s influence in the northwest 
German principality greatly. This was reflected in the appointment of a Prussian prince as 
regent and later in the marriage of the new duke to a daughter of the Prussian king. Thanks to 
the support of the Mecklenburg duchies and Brunswick, the Prussian bench could rely on five 
additional votes in the Bundesrat for most of the time. 
The second major group among the small states was composed of those principalities that 
changed from using substitute plenipotentiaries to instructing home plenipotentiaries or vice 
versa in the 1880s and early 1890s: Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and 
Oldenburg (see Table 4). All three of these states modified their participation policy because 
they became part of different factions of small states that shared the same plenipotentiaries 
and thus usually voted together.  
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These voting blocs become clear if we look at the third group of small states, which 
comprised all those principalities that conferred their voting right on substitute 
plenipotentiaries in more than three-quarters of the Bundesrat meetings: Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, Hamburg, Bremen, Saxe-Meiningen, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Anhalt, Saxe-
Altenburg, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Reuß Senior Line, and 
Reuß Junior Line.  
The three Hanseatic city-states formed a coalition under the direction of Lübeck, whose 
plenipotentiary usually cast the votes of the Bremen and Hamburg government. Thanks to 
their economic importance, the Hanseatic states were able to participate relatively 
independently in the decision-making of the Bundesrat for most of the time. This 
independence was reflected in the fact that in most meetings of the plenary assembly where 
none of their own envoys was present they mandated a Bavarian plenipotentiary with casting 
their vote rather than an official of a state that stood under Prussian control. By the time the 
war broke out, however, the Hanseatic governments were starting to draw closer to the 
Prussian bench. In 1914, they made Karl Sieveking – a scion of a great Hamburg family who 
worked as a federal administrator of Alsace-Lorraine and had been a member of the Prussian 
delegation until that year – their standard plenipotentiary (see Table 4). 
Saxe-Meiningen relied on the Bavarian government much more than the North German 
cities. The small principality employed the services of Bavarian plenipotentiaries in the great 
majority of meetings (see Table 4). For reasons of geographic proximity, there was a natural 
overlap of interest, especially in economic and financial questions. This is why the 
Franconian state usually mandated an expert of the Bavarian fiscal administration with its 
representation.42  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42  The most important of these fiscal experts were Hermann von Stengel and Ferdinand von Raesfeld. For 
biographical information, see Lilla, Föderalismus, pp. 265, 495, 581f. On Saxe-Meiningen in the Bundesrat, 
see also Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 105. 
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Apart from the Hanseatic city-states and Saxe-Meiningen, no other small state managed to 
use the system of substitutions as a way to retain at least some scope of action in the 
Bundesrat. Rather, two factions evolved that both followed the Prussian bench more or less 
blindly. Lippe and Schaumbug-Lippe formed an alliance under the direction of Brunswick, 
Oldenburg, and occasionally Hesse. The central German principality of Anhalt also joined 
this group of northwest German states. That this coalition usually supported the Prussian 
bench became manifest in its choice of substitute plenipotentiaries (see Table 4). Between 
1871 and 1885 this function was taken over by Gottlob von Liebe. The professional 
bureaucrat from Brunswick had already been a governmental envoy to the Bundestag of the 
German Confederation and to the parliament of the Erfurt Union, two positions in which he 
had advocated a close cooperation with Prussia. He continued to do so after he had become 
the Brunswick representative at the Prussian court in 1867.43  
For much of the 1900s, the leading plenipotentiary of the northwest German states was the 
Oldenburg envoy Georg Eucken-Addenhausen. His relations with the Prussian and federal 
executive could hardly have been closer. In the 1880s, he was a mayor of several cities in the 
Prussian-controlled Thuringian states, before he became an official in the Federal Department 
of the Interior in 1902.44 The voting behaviour of the states that von Liebe and Eucken-
Addenhausen represented depended of course on the instructions by the respective 
governments. But the appointment of these two officials as substitute plenipotentiaries was a 
clear sign that the northwest German governments tried to align their Bundesrat policies with 
the course of the Prussian bench as much as possible.  
This meant that the Prussian and federal executive could usually rely on a further set of 
votes. In particular under Eucken-Addenhausen, the northwest German coalition benefitted 
from this cooperation. Before important decisions, the federal administration usually 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43  For biographical information on Liebe, see Lilla, Föderalismus, pp. 402f. 
44  For biographical information on Eucken-Addenhausen, see ibid., pp. 227f. 
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exchanged information with him in order to enquire after the opinion of the governments he 
represented. As not many plenipotentiary enjoyed such a treatment, this practice gave his 
employers privileged access to information.45  
The biggest faction among the small states was composed of all Thuringian principalities 
but Saxe-Meiningen and Anhalt: Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-
Altenburg, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Reuß Senior Line, and 
Reuß Junior Line. Together, they had no fewer than seven votes, meaning one more than the 
second biggest state of the union, Bavaria. The dependency of this broad coalition on the 
Prussian bench was reflected in the fact that it began to form one uniform voting bloc 
precisely at the time when Bismarck demanded of the state governments that they stand 
together against the advance of the Reichstag. From 1880 onwards, the grand duchy of Saxe-
Weimar-Eisenach took over the representation of six other Thuringian states (see Table 4). 
Only Saxe-Coburg-Gotha had a plenipotentiary of her own after 1890. But the small 
principality was in most respects an informal member of the coalition, because it always 
voted with its neighbours.  
Until the end of the war, this Thuringian coalition had three main plenipotentiaries: Adolf 
Heerwart, Arnold Paulsen, and Karl Nebe (see Table 4). Each of them was a fiscal expert 
from the Weimar-Eisenach administration.46 Their appointment as plenipotentiaries indicated 
that financial matters were the most important issue for the Thuringian principalities. As these 
mini states were financially and economically incapable of sustaining themselves, it was a 
matter of survival for them to be on good terms with the Prussian-federal executive. Due to 
this dependency, the Prussian and federal governments could force the Thuringian states by 
various forms of pressure to follow the Prussian bench in the Bundesrat. Particularly effective 
were threats in the field of infrastructure, because these microstates would have collapsed had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45  Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 105. 
46  See Lilla, Föderalismus, pp. 303, 450f., 470f. 
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they been cut off from the rest of the union. The right of the Reich to regulate the 
administration of railways was thus a powerful source of leverage.47 So was the right of the 
Emperor to decide about the building of fortresses.48 For many structurally weak areas, the 
relocation of a local garrison would have been an economic disaster. In general, military 
affairs offered many ways to exert pressure on the small states. Since all of them were bound 
to Prussia by military conventions and as the Prussian king regulated the military 
administration of all regiments in the union, the Prussian bench could threaten them with a 
unilateral change of army arrangements at any time.49 As the troops were essential for the 
public sector in every state, especially in the smallest among them, this threat probably 
supplied the most powerful leverage of all.50 
This wide range of possible means of pressure made it easy for the Prussian bench to bring 
the Thuringian states into line in the Bundesrat. The family relationships among the ruling 
dynasties were also helpful. The Hohenzollerns were closely related to most of the different 
branches of the House of Wettin. Particularly close were the relations to Saxe-Weimar-
Eisenach, the very state whose plenipotentiaries led the voting bloc of the Thuringian states 
from 1880 onwards. Empress Augusta, the wife of William I, was a born princess of the small 
principality.51  
Moreover, pragmatic reasons made it practically impossible for a coalition of so many 
small states to pursue independent policies in the Bundesrat. In the plenary assembly, the 
acting substitute plenipotentiary of the Thuringian coalition was the busiest man, as he had to 
cast each of the up to seven votes at the right time. The whole procedure was only possible 
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47  RV (1871), art. 4.8, 41-47. 
48  Ibid., art. 65. 
49  Ibid., art. 61, 63.5. 
50  On these different means of pressure, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, pp. 51-3. 
51  For a more general study on the political importance of the Hohenzollerns’ family relations with other 
dynasties, see Daniel Schönpflug, Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern: Verwandtschaft, Politik und Ritual in 
Europa 1640–1918 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013). 
Chapter IV 
Participation 
 
205!
because each of the governments usually gave him the same instruction, namely to follow the 
Prussian bench.52  
For these reasons, the Thuringian principalities were in fact satellite states of Prussia in the 
Bundesrat. The Prussian bench could always count on their seven votes. Together with the 
support of the northwest German coalition and the two Mecklenburg duchies, this alliance 
granted Prussia between fifteen and eighteen additional votes, depending on the behaviour of 
the Hessian government. These were at least two more votes than Prussia needed in order to 
reach a majority. The Prussian bench thus usually did not have to fear that it would be 
outvoted and that its proposals would not be adopted, even if it faced opposition from the 
middling states. Indeed, throughout the imperial era, it happened only twice that the 
Bundesrat adopted an important law against the votes of the Prussian bench, namely when the 
states decided on the future seat of the Imperial Court and on a reform of the postage law in 
1877 and 1880, respectively.53  
The high degree of control that the system of substitutions gave the Prussian bench over 
the Bundesrat is reflected in how the attendance of Waldeck-Pyrmont evolved over the years. 
The small Hessian principality was a special case among the small states. In October 1867, 
the chronically bankrupt microstate concluded an accession treaty with Prussia, which 
stipulated that the Prussian government take over the entire domestic administration of 
Waldeck-Pyrmont. The external relations of the principality – including those to the Reich 
and the other constituent states – were now exercised by officials who acted in the name of 
the prince, but were appointed and instructed by the Prussian government. In practice, Prussia 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52  Rauh, Föderalismus, p. 104. 
53  Oliver F. R. Haardt, “The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918),” German History 34, no. 4 (2016), pp. 
536, 542f. Only a few days after the decision of the Bundesrat, the reform of the postage law was revised 
according to Prussian interest, see ibid. For this reason, one can even argue that the decision to locate the 
Imperial Court in Leipzig rather than Berlin – which had largely practical reasons, because the predecessor of 
the Imperial Court, the Federal Commercial High Court, had had its seat in Leipzig since 1869 – was the only 
important law of the imperial era that was adopted against the votes of the Prussian bench. The role of the 
Imperial Court and the controversy surrounding the reform of the postage laws will be further examined in 
Chapter 5.  
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thus took over the voting rights of the small state in the Bundesrat.54 As Waldeck-Pyrmont 
had one vote, this arrangement meant that in practice Prussia had at her disposal eighteen 
rather than seventeen votes in the plenary assembly.  
For the first twelve years after unification, the Prussian government usually delegated the 
casting of the Waldeck vote to the loyal Brunswick envoy Gottlob von Liebe, whom it 
appointed as substitute plenipotentiary (see Figure 16). When he fell sick in the mid-1880s, 
Prussia changed its policy. Until 1908, the Prussian executive who presided over the 
administration of Waldeck-Pyrmont, the so-called Landesdirektor, usually represented the 
Hessian principality in the Bundesrat. But the Waldeck bench was more and more often left 
empty. From the mid-1890s, the Waldeck vote was not cast in about thirty per cent of all 
meetings. The period between 1899 and 1901 was the first time that the Waldeck 
plenipotentiary was more often absent than present in the Bundesrat (see Figure 16). After 
1907, this became the norm. Until the last year of the war, the bench of Waldeck-Pyrmont 
was usually empty in more than eighty per cent of all meetings, except for in the immediate 
pre-war years, when attendance climbed to over forty per cent. 
The pronounced absenteeism of the Waldeck plenipotentiary is evidence that the Prussian-
federal executive did not need the Waldeck vote in order to reach a majority in the Bundesrat. 
Due to the system of substitutions, the Prussian bench had such extensive control over the 
small states that it could easily make do without the one vote from the Hessian principality. In 
short: by the beginning of the 1900s, the Prussian bench had become completely dominant. 
But – and this is the crucial point – the dominance of the Prussian bench did not imply the 
dominance of Prussia, for by the turn of the century the Prussian Bundesrat delegation had 
already been taken over by federal officials. The system of substitutions now provided the 
federal rather than the Prussian government with reliable majorities.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54  Vertrag zwischen Preußen und Waldeck-Pyrmont, betreffend die Übertragung der Verwaltung der 
Fürstenthümer Waldeck und Pyrmont an Preußen, 18 July 1867, especially art. 1, 9, available online 
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/he/waldeck/verwaltungsuebertragung-preussen1868.htm (first retrieved 20 
September 2015). 
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The Context of Federal Government 
 
The proxies on the Prussian bench and the system of substitutions among the small 
states turned the Bundesrat into an instrument of the federal administration. This 
transformation enabled the Chancellor and state secretaries to push their projects through 
without great consideration for the interests of the state governments. The changing modes of 
participation in the Bundesrat were thus crucial for the overall evolution of federal 
government. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at what role the benches of Prussia and 
the small states played in the four different periods of federal government that the previous 
chapter has identified. How did the Bundesrat delegations of Prussia and the small states 
relate to the functional change of the federal constitutional organs and to the constant 
centralisation of the federal system? And what part did they play in the conflict between 
monarchical and parliamentary power? 
 
I. The Period of Administrative Centralism (1867-1879) 
 
Soon after unification, the Kanzleramt and the gradually emerging Reichsämter 
assumed ministerial functions, because they coordinated the legal, economic, and social 
integration of the new nation. This development made it necessary for federal executives to 
gain access to the Bundesrat in order to introduce and defend the legislative proposals they 
had prepared. The attendance of federal executives on the Prussian bench was therefore very 
high right from the beginning. Already in 1872, they outnumbered their Prussian colleagues 
in the plenary assembly for the first time (see Figure 10). But most of them came from the 
lower and middle ranks of the federal administration. The great majority did not exceed the 
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rank of a Geheimer Oberregierungsrat, a middle-level position.55 This was not least due to 
the fact that the federal departments were not yet fully developed and needed time to grow 
into a fully-fledged bureaucratic apparatus.  
The relatively low level of authority that the federal executives had was an important 
reason why the Prussian government still had control over the Prussian bench in this period. 
While in most meetings a federal official acted as the directing plenipotentiary who cast the 
Prussian vote, this position was taken over by high-ranking Prussian executives when really 
important questions were on the agenda. This was most obvious in regard to financial matters. 
In 1873, for example, the Prussian minister of finance, Otto von Camphausen, was directing 
plenipotentiary in the meeting about the federal budget, even though the president of the 
Kanzleramt, Rudolph von Delbrück – who assumed this function in almost every other 
meeting of that year – was present.56 Whenever the Bundesrat decided about questions that 
were absolutely crucial for the course of national politics, such as the Proxy Law or the Anti-
Socialist laws, Bismarck presided over the Prussian bench himself.57  
In general, high-ranking Prussian executives appeared on the Prussian bench very rarely, 
even if the meetings addressed important questions that concerned their area of responsibility. 
Even immediately after the unification, Prussian ministers hardly attended the plenary 
assembly at all (see Figure 12). This neglect offered the heads of the expanding federal 
administration the chance to use the Bundesrat as a platform to gain more influence in the 
Prussian State Ministry. Since Rudolph von Delbrück and Karl von Hofmann, the first two 
presidents of the Kanzleramt, acted as directing plenipotentiary of Prussia in the great 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55  In the first four years after unification, the highest-ranking federal official on the register – aside from the 
president of the Kanzleramt, Rudolph von Delbrück – was the Postmaster General Heinrich von Stephan. See 
Handbuch, 1874, pp. 4ff. and the registration lists in Protokolle (DR), 1871, session 1, 20 February, § 2, pp. 
2-4; 1872, session 7, 13 March, § 63, pp. 38-40; and 1873, session 3, 17 February, § 33, pp. 18-21.   
56  Protokolle (DR), 1873, session 18, 4 May, pp. 147-55. 
57  See ibid., 1878, session 9, 21 February, pp. 91-4, and session 39, 21 October, pp. 315-19. 
Chapter IV 
Participation 
 
209!
majority of Bundesrat meetings, they were the first federal officials who were made non-
ministerial members of the Prussian State Ministry.58  
Already in this early period of the Empire, the small states did not play an active role in the 
Bundesrat.  The share of substitutions lay roughly between sixty and seventy per cent every 
year (see Figure 14). Even if the plenary assembly voted on matters that were of crucial 
importance to the states, such as the subsidies they had to pay to the Reich, most of the small-
state governments did not send their own plenipotentiaries to Berlin.59  
It was simply not necessary for them to use the Bundesrat to make their voice heard. 
Delbrück and Bismarck included them in the preparation of important decisions even before 
legislative proposals were introduced into the Bundesrat. As the previous chapter has shown, 
the two leading figures of the regime of administrative centralism made federal good will – 
Bundesfreundlichkeit – a central principle of their approach to federal government, because 
they understood a close cooperation between the federal executive and the state governments 
as the best means to prevent a further expansion of parliamentary rights.  
Monarchical solidarity was therefore one of the principal factors shaping the internal 
operations of the Bundesrat during these years. This was reflected in the attendance policy of 
the small states. The few meetings in which almost all of them made the effort to show up 
with their own plenipotentiaries were focussed on issues crucial to Bismarck’s struggle with 
the Reichstag, such as the Anti-Socialist laws or the Proxy Law, which made the state 
secretaries functional proxies of the Chancellor and thus fostered demands for the 
introduction of responsible ministers.60 As the monarchical governments needed to stay 
together in such matters, the small states refrained from using substitute plenipotentiaries, as 
they usually did, and instead made their presence felt.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58  Protokolle (PSM), vol. 6.2, 1867-1878, p. 762. 
59  Protokolle (DR), 1876, session 4, 29 January, pp. 25-34, especially § 44, pp. 32-4. Most of the time, the 
small states did not even sent own officials to the plenary assembly when it decided on the different parts of 
the federal budget. The year 1875 is a good example. See Protokolle (DR), 1875, session 24-27, 13-24 
October, pp. 301-55, and session 30-31, 7-10 November, pp. 377-400. 
60  Protokolle (DR), 1878, session 9, 21 February, pp. 91-4, and session 35, 27 August, pp. 289-94. 
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Toward the end of the 1870s, the increasing centralisation in the Kanzleramt and the 
emerging Reichsämter made liberal calls for the introduction of responsible government 
louder than ever before. In order to keep the Reichstag in its place, the state governments 
started to assign more importance to the Bundesrat, because they wanted to strengthen its 
position as the central bulwark against parliamentary influence. After 1877, the small states 
tried to send more of their own officials to the meetings of the plenary assembly (see Figure 
13). But these efforts did not suffice to protect monarchical power against the demands of an 
increasingly self-confident parliament. This is why, at the turn of the decade, Bismarck 
embarked on his attempt to redefine the system of federal government that had emerged since 
unification.  
 
II. The Period of Confederate Restoration (1879-90) 
 
In order to keep the Reichstag at bay, Bismarck wanted to restore the constitutional 
conditions that had been established at the time of unification. But his attempt to turn the 
Bundesrat into what it was supposed to be according to the constitution – namely a decision-
making body of the ministers of the states rather than of the officials of the federal 
administration – failed miserably. Even after the reform of the by-laws in 1880, high-ranking 
officials from Prussia usually did not come to the plenary assembly, even if it decided on 
matters that were relevant for their ministries. While the attendance of Prussian ministers rose 
to an all-time high in 1880, it fell back to the old level within a year (see Figure 12). At the 
same time, the share of federal executives on the Prussian bench increased to sixty-five per 
cent (see Figure 11). After it had fallen by twenty per cent in the next two years, it climbed 
back to sixty per cent over the course of the 1880s. 
The federalisation of the Prussian bench thus continued more or less unchecked. In the 
registry, the share of federal executives among the Prussian proxies skyrocketed from zero to 
Chapter IV 
Participation 
 
211!
over fifty per cent in 1880 and then rose further over the next decade (see Figure 9). Around 
1880, most of these proxies came from the Federal Department of Railway Affairs, because 
the division of competences between the Reich and the states in this field was highly 
controversial at this time, with Bismarck trying to make the building and operation of 
railways – two privileges of the states – a national competence.61 The presence of experts 
from the relevant federal department shows that the Prussian bench now began to work as an 
instrument of the federal rather than Prussian administration.  
Indeed, Prussia’s participation in the Bundesrat showed clear signs of the ongoing 
mediatisation of the Prussian government. In 1881, the list of registered Prussian proxies 
included for the first time an official who held offices in both the Prussian and federal 
administration. Karl von Jacobi had been a low-ranking official in the Prussian ministry of 
commerce before he assumed – in addition – a post in the Federal Department of the Interior. 
From now on, he acted as an official of the federal administration who – as a reward – 
became state secretary of the Federal Treasury in 1886. 62  His appointment as proxy 
plenipotentiary indicated that around 1880 the federal administration not only tightened its 
grasp around the Prussian bench, but also that it became more and more influential in the 
Prussian ministries.63 An even clearer milestone in Prussia’s gradual mediatisation was 
passed in summer 1888. After Robert von Puttkamer’s dismissal as Prussian minister of the 
interior, Karl Heinrich von Boetticher, state secretary of the Federal Department of the 
Interior and directing plenipotentiary of the Prussian bench in most meetings of the plenary 
assembly, became his successor as Vice-President of the Prussian State Ministry.64  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61  See for example the officials Daniel Körte and Ferdinand Kraefft in Handbuch, 1879, p. 6. One year later, the 
list of registered proxies also included Friedrich Schulz, an official from the Federal Agency for the 
Administration of Railways, a sub-agency of the Federal Department for Railway Affairs. See ibid., 1880, p. 
6. 
62  For biographical information on Jacobi, see Lilla, Föderalismus, pp. 342f.  
63  For Jacobi’s registration, see Handbuch, 1881, p. 6. 
64  Protokolle (PSM), vol. 7, 1879-1890, p. 508.  
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On the participation of the small states, the reform of the by-laws did not have a great 
impact. By the aforementioned change of their registration policy, the small states managed to 
continue the system of substitutions just as they had previously done (see Figure 14). In fact, 
the share of substitute plenipotentiaries among all Bundesrat envoys from the small states 
increased even further, up to a level of seventy per cent in 1887. Only in the following year 
did it start to decline.  
Overall, however, higher-ranking officials from the small states did attend the plenary 
assembly more regularly than in the 1870s. The main reasons for this development were 
simply the rising number of meetings and – above all – the increasing power of the Reichstag, 
to which the monarchical governments reacted by pooling their forces and taking collective 
action more often. The most important of these occasions were the recurring extensions of the 
measures against the Social Democrats and the adoption of a joint declaration against the 
introduction of parliamentarily responsible federal ministries in 1884. In the relevant meetings 
of the plenary assembly, the benches of the small states were packed with high-ranking 
officials.65  
But among these, there were only very few ministers. Most of the plenipotentiaries that 
represented the small states on such occasions were leading bureaucrats who were experts in 
the issue at stake. While Bismarck had hoped that the reform of the by-laws would make the 
plenary assembly a council of the state ministers, who would combine their authority in order 
to oppose the advance of the Reichstag, exactly the opposite happened. The small-state 
ministers retreated from the Bundesrat. It did not make sense for them to participate in the 
time-consuming sessions of the plenary assembly or the meetings of the committees, whose 
work required more and more specialised administrative expertise for addressing the 
increasingly complex public order. Together with the growing number of officials from the 
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65  Protokolle (DR), 1881, session 39, 22 November, pp. 277-80, and 1884, session 16, 5 April, pp. 95-8. 
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federal departments that acted as Prussian plenipotentiaries, the bureaucrats on the benches of 
the small states gradually turned the Bundesrat into a council of administrative specialists. 
This development facilitated the formation of permanent coalitions among the small states. 
Since the mid-1880s, the patterns of attendance on their benches had become more consistent 
than ever before, because most of them made the same administrative experts substitute 
plenipotentiaries.66  Adolf Heerwart, for example, a fiscal specialist from Saxe-Weimar-
Eisenach, usually represented not only his home state, but also five other Thuringian states in 
the 1880s (see Table 4). 
This uniformity, in turn, made it easier for the Prussian bench to control the voting 
behaviour of the small states. Prussia could thus afford to refrain more frequently from 
casting the Waldeck vote (see Figure 16). But as the Prussian bench became dominated by 
federal officials, its growing control over the Bundesrat increased the power of the federal 
rather than Prussian administration. By the end of Bismarck’s chancellorship, the union was 
therefore undergoing not a restoration, but a federalisation of confederate structures. 
 
III. The Period of the Formation of a Federal Government (1890-1914) 
 
In the Wilhelmine era, the accelerating centralisation of the Empire made the 
Chancellor and the state secretaries evolve into an unofficial national government, the 
Reichsleitung, which became increasingly dependent on the majority parties in the Reichstag. 
This ascendancy of the Reichsleitung was based on the total control that it gained over the 
Prussian bench. After Bismarck resigned in 1890, the Prussian government tried at first to 
reclaim authority over its Bundesrat delegation. But it soon became clear that this was a vain 
hope. While the share of federal executives on the Prussian bench dropped marginally in 1890 
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66  This consistency was most obvious in the year 1889. See Protokolle (DR), 1889, session 1-36, 4 January-19 
December, pp. 1-326 and Handbuch, 1889, pp. 10-14. 
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and then rose at a lower rate than for most of the 1880s, it climbed rapidly from 1893 onwards 
and eventually reached ninety-three per cent in 1910/11 (see Figure 11).  
The mediatisation of Prussia could hardly have become more manifest. From the mid-
1890s, there were more and more years in which Prussian officials did not preside over the 
Bundesrat bench on a single occasion, because the federal administration tightly controlled 
the position of directing plenipotentiary.67 Out of forty-five meetings of the plenary assembly 
in 1910, there were only fourteen in which at least one representative of the Prussian 
government appeared in the Bundesrat. In all other cases, federal executives had the Prussian 
bench for themselves.68 The ministers of the State Ministry no longer played any role in the 
Bundesrat. In 1903 and 1911, they did not attend once (see Figure 12).  
But the clearest sign of Prussia’s complete mediatisation was that from the 1890s, 
executives of the federal administration who hailed from other constituent states became part 
of the Prussian Bundesrat delegation. From 1891 to 1897, for example, the state secretary of 
the Federal Foreign Office, Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, was registered as a regular 
plenipotentiary for Prussia, although he had a professional background in Baden, where he 
had been an MP before he became the envoy of the ducal government in Berlin.69 
Registrations such as his, which were motivated by federal interests only, demonstrate that the 
Prussian government was no longer independent in any real sense. 
It is striking that in this process of federalisation executives who held posts in both the 
Prussian and federal administration did not play a major role, even though they were usually 
quite high-ranking. Between 1892 and 1913, there was no year in which more than three such 
representatives appeared in the plenary assembly (see Figure 10). This lack of hybrid office 
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67  See for example Protokolle (DR), 1895, session 1-40, 10 January-19 December, pp. 1-485; 1898, session 1-
38, 7 January-20 December, pp. 1-581; 1899, session 1-40, 5 Janary-21 December, pp. 1-487; and 1900, 
session 1-31, 4 January-18 December, pp. 1-734. 
68  Ibid., 1910, session 1-45, 6 January-16 December, pp. 1-616. 
69  Handbuch, 1891-1897, p. 5 in each volume. 
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holders reflected the loss of coordination between the policies of the Prussian State Ministry 
and the Reichsleitung.  
Moreover, throughout the Wilhelmine era there was no significant increase in the 
attendance of officials from the army and navy, even though military issues such as the naval 
construction programme dominated the political agenda. After Bismarck’s dismissal, military 
officials appeared on the Prussian bench more or less as often as before (see Figure 10). In the 
last years before the war, they hardly showed up at all. Inside the Bundesrat, there were 
therefore no signs of a militarisation of Wilhelmine government.  
For the small states, Bismarck’s resignation was a great turning point. On the one hand, 
they could no longer count on being included in important decisions of the federal executive, 
because the new political leaders did not make Bundesfreundlichkeit a central principle of 
their approach to federal government. On the other hand, the end of Bismarck’s authoritarian 
style of leadership gave the small states more freedom of action. In the 1890s, they thus made 
careful attempts to reassert their authority in the plenary assembly. The level of substitutions 
dropped to around fifty-five per cent, because the small state governments now tried more 
often to use the Bundesrat as a platform for their demands (see Figure 14).  
But this strategy soon turned out to be ineffective. The officials from the small states 
simply did not have the necessary expertise and resources to participate on an equal footing in 
the most important federal decisions, which became more and more complex because of 
ongoing centralisation, industrialisation, and economic, military, and colonial expansion. The 
middling states too had this problem. Most of the time, they did not manage to make use of 
their numerical dominance in the committees, because they were unable to negotiate on equal 
terms with the experts of the federal administration, who had access to privileged information 
and could draw on the great resources of a constantly expanding apparatus of federal 
departments and agencies. 
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But while the middling states could at least try to make their interests heard, the small 
states were reduced to the role of mere bystanders. For most of them, participating in the 
committees in the person of an official from their own administrative was not an option. It 
was simply too expensive to fund such a plenipotentiary and to equip him with the 
administrative assistants necessary to take part in the work of the committees. The 
powerlessness of the small states became manifest, for example, in the context of the dispute 
about the peacetime strength of the army in 1893. The negotiations between the Reichsleitung 
and the Reichstag excluded them completely. Their role was limited to providing a uniform 
front for the monarchical governments against the most ambitious demands of the parliament. 
For this purpose, they sent officials of their own governments to the meeting of the plenary 
assembly in which the Chancellor asked the Bundesrat to dissolve the Reichstag in case the 
parliamentary parties would not accept the conditions of the Reichsleitung. With the 
exception of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen and Reuß Senior Line, all of the small states voted 
in favour of a motion to this effect. They followed the Prussian bench more or less blindly and 
thus paved the way for a deal between the Reichsleitung and the Reichstag on which they had 
hardly any influence.70 
After 1900, the increasing dependency of the Reichsleitung on the Reichstag sidelined the 
monarchical governments so much that the small states became lethargic in the Bundesrat. 
The share of substitute plenipotentiaries on their benches climbed back to over sixty per cent 
(see Figure 14). The great difference to the 1870s and 1880s was that now the small states no 
longer made the effort to select their plenipotentiaries for each meeting of the plenary 
assembly according to the issue that was up for decision. Rather, they mandated one and the 
same substitute plenipotentiary – usually an expert on financial matters – with representing 
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70  Protokolle (DR), 1893, session 19, 6 May, § 305, p. 143. See also ibid., session 31, 20 July, § 477, p. 232, 
where the Reichstag informs the Bundesrat that it has accepted the bill without further amendments. On the 
conflict about the peacetime strength of the army and its impact on the constitutional system, see  Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, § 31, especially pp. 554f. 
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them in all meetings. From the mid-1890s onwards, the patterns of substitutions among them 
were thus completely consistent.71 
This lethargy of the small states further increased the control that the Prussian bench 
wielded over them. In 1898, it happened for the first time that a small state – namely 
Brunswick – appointed a Prussian official rather than an executive from one of the other small 
states or the middling states as plenipotentiary.72 Due to an ongoing succession crisis – which 
we will examine in the next chapter – the northwest German duchy was particularly 
susceptible to direct interventions from the Prussian delegation. Since the small states now 
followed the Prussian bench in more or less every decision, it was no longer necessary for the 
Prussian-federal executive to rely on the Waldeck vote. By 1910, the Waldeck bench 
remained empty in more than eighty per cent of all meetings of the plenary assembly (see 
Figure 16).  
The last great legislative projects before the war revealed how helpless the small states had 
become. When pushing the various reforms of the fiscal system through the Bundesrat, the 
Reichsleitung overwhelmed the other states by the sheer number of financial experts from the 
federal departments whom it sent to the committees and the plenary assembly. Against this 
gathering of experts the small states, in particular, had neither the means nor the authority to 
stand up. They thus did not even attempt to make an active contribution, but simply supported 
the Prussian bench in every decision, even if the measures they adopted violated some of their 
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71  The year 1896 is a good example. In forty-four meetings of the plenary assembly, Adolf Heerwart from 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach took over the representation of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen and Reuß Junior Line 
forty-four times and of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt and Anhalt forty-three-times. Bavaria and Mecklenburg-
Schwerin provided Saxe-Meinigen and Mecklenburg-Strelitz with substitute plenipotentiaries in each 
meeting. The Hessian envoy Karl Neidhardt acted on behalf of Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe in all but four 
and three meetings, respectively. Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen were represented by a Hanseatic official in 
every single meeting, most often by the Lübeck plenipotentiary Karl Peter Klügmann. See Protokolle (DR), 
1896, session 1-44, 9 January-17 December, pp. 1-428. 
72  Handbuch, 1898, p. 13. The plenipotentiary in question was Albert Halley, an executive of the ministry for 
Alsace-Lorraine, who also acted as commissioner of the Alsatian administration in the plenary assembly. See 
ibid., pp. 8, 16. 
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most important rights, such as the monopoly of the states on direct taxation.73 This shows that 
by the eve of World War I, the Prussian bench had gained so much control over the votes of 
the small states that the Bundesrat was in practice a sanctioning machine of the federal 
administration.  
 
IV. The Period of Wartime Collapse (1914-1918) 
 
After the outbreak of World War I, the Bundesrat regained its position as the central 
organ of federal government, because it was equipped with comprehensive emergency decree 
powers. But as the Prussian proxies and the system of substitutions had long federalised the 
council, this wartime regulation empowered the Reichsleitung rather than the monarchical 
governments. Still, in 1914 the share of Prussian executives on Prussia’s bench rose to nearly 
twenty per cent for the first time in over ten years (Figure 11). But this did not reflect a 
reassertion of power by the Prussian government. Rather, the increase in attendance was due 
to the insistence of the Reichsleitung that the most fundamental decisions at the beginning of 
the war – most importantly the declaration of war – had to be adopted by the highest-ranking 
Prussian representatives in order to demonstrate solidarity.74 This is the reason why there was 
an unusually large number of ministers among the Prussian plenipotentiaries who attended the 
plenary assembly in 1914 and 1915 (see Figure 12).   
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73  See for example Protokolle (DR), 1913, session 12, 28 March, pp. 391-404, especially §§ 420, 441f., pp. 392, 
396f. In the meeting, the plenary assembly adopted the laws introducing a capital gains tax and an 
extraordinary defence contribution, two direct federal taxes. On the Prussian bench, there were no less than 
ten financial experts from the federal departments, most of them from the Federal Treasury. Except for the 
Hanseatic city states, the small states did not send own officials to the meeting, but made do with the usual 
substitute plenipotentiaries. In contrast to the Bavarian and Baden government, they accepted the Prussian 
proposal without any complaint.  
74  Protokolle (DR), 1914, session 27, 1 August, pp. 401-10, especially § 664, pp. 405-406b. In this session, 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg gave a detailed report about the political situation. After that, the states 
approved the declaration of war. The Prussian delegation included no less than seven ministers of the 
Prussian cabinet (this count excludes the Chancellor and four ministers without portfolio), more than in any 
other meeting since unification.  
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In the following three years, the share of Prussian executives fell again, while that of 
federal officials climbed to over ninety per cent (see Figure 11). This total federalisation of 
the Prussian bench and the mediatisation of the Prussian government that it reflected were 
cornerstones of the centralised wartime order. After 1916, hardly any minister of the Prussian 
government appeared in the plenary assembly (see Figure 12). Already the year before, the 
Prussian bench included no other officials but federal executives in more than a quarter of all 
meetings.75  
In a way, this dominance of federal office holders was a wartime necessity. The main 
responsibility of the Bundesrat was to regulate the wartime economy in order to prevent the 
home front from collapsing. This function required the expertise of administrative specialists 
from the federal departments. Due to the wide range of technical details that the Bundesrat 
had to address, most of these experts did not even come from one of the military agencies. 
The head of the Kriegsamt, which was founded in 1916, attended the Bundesrat no more than 
five times.76 By far the largest number of the federal executives came from the Federal 
Department of the Interior, the Federal Treasury, and specialised subagencies, such as the 
Federal Office for Canal Routes.77   
The share of military officials on the Prussian bench did not increase after the outbreak of 
the war as much as one might expect. It never exceeded seven per cent of all Prussian 
plenipotentiaries (see Figure 11). The Federal Department of the Navy was hardly present at 
all. In 1915, no representative of the navy showed up all year.78 This absence of military 
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75  Namely in twenty-four out of eighty-two meetings. See Protokolle (DR), 1915, session 1-82, 5 January-22 
December, pp. 1-1080.  
76  See ibid., 1916, session 1-85, 6 January-21 December, pp. 1-1033; 1917, session 1-74, 4 January-22 
December, pp. 1-766; 1918, session 1-66, 3 January-19 December, pp. 1-1544. The most important occasion 
where this official – at the time Wilhelm Groener – appeared was the meeting that introduced compulsory 
labour for all men between seventeen and sixty. Ibid., 1916, session 74, 21 November, pp. 921f. 
77  Since his appointment as Prussian proxy plenipotentiary on 6 May 1915, the President of the Federal Office 
for Canal Routes and Director of the Food Supply Section in the Federal Department of the Interior, Georg 
Kautz, participated in thirty-one of the fifty-one remaining meetings of that year. See Protokolle (DR), 1915, 
session 31-82, 6 May-22 December, pp. 390-1080.  
78  See Protokolle (DR), 1915, session 1-82, 5 January-22 December, pp. 1-1080. In 1914, navy officials 
appeared in the plenary assembly five times, in 1916 six times, in 1917 five times, and in 1918 two times. 
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officials was simply due to the fact that the Bundesrat played no role in executive decision-
making during the war. It was a purely administrative body. The course of government was 
determined by the Supreme Army Command, the Reichsleitung, and the Reichstag rather than 
by the council of states. 
The participation of the small states did not change much after the outbreak of the war and 
the adoption of the Enabling Act. The patterns of substitutions that had evolved in the 
previous decades stayed largely the same (see Table 4). A few states registered additional 
plenipotentiaries, because the number of meetings rose so much during the war that a single 
plenipotentiary could hardly attend them all.79 The reform of the by-laws in 1915 made the 
system of substitutions even easier, as the states no longer needed to register those substitute 
plenipotentiaries that represented them in more than one meeting of the plenary assembly. 
The share of substitutions among all small state plenipotentiaries thus increased to an all-time 
high of nearly seventy-four per cent in 1915 (see Figure 14). Only in 1918 did it drop to the 
fifty per-cent level, because the state governments decided more and more often that it was 
not worth having any representative in the plenary assembly. Their increasing absence was a 
clear sign of the growing disintegration of the constitutional structures in the last year of the 
war. 
Higher-ranking officials from the small states did not come to the Bundesrat at all during 
the war. Their attendance was simply unnecessary since the governments had declared their 
unequivocal support for the wartime efforts of the Reichsleitung in August 1914.80 The states 
adopted every important measure that the federal administration proposed unanimously. This 
solidarity among the benches of the different states made the Bundesrat an anchor of stability 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See Protokolle (DR), 1914, session 1-67, 8 January-22 December, pp. 1-787; 1916, session 1-85, 6 January-
21 December, pp. 1-1033; 1917, session 1-74, 4 January-22 December, pp. 1-766; 1918, session 1-66, 3 
January-19 December, pp. 1-1544. 
79  See for example Protokolle (DR), 1914, session 37-38, 14-18 August, §§ 738, 742, pp. 492, 496, where the 
governments of Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, and Anhalt registered the Brunswick envoy Johannes Boden as 
additional plenipotentiary. 
80  Ibid., session 27, 1 August, § 664, pp. 405-406b. 
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in a wartime order of government that was quite volatile because of the permanent struggle 
between the Supreme Army Command, the Reichsleitung, and the Reichstag. 
This stability of the Bundesrat was not least due to the fact that it had evolved into a purely 
administrative body of bureaucratic experts. This became obvious when the monarchy 
collapsed in autumn 1918. After the revolution had broken out, the ministers of all state 
governments resigned collectively from their positions as Bundesrat plenipotentiaries.81 In 
contrast, the specialists from the Reichsämter and the administrative agencies of the states 
remained plenipotentiaries even after Germany had been proclaimed a republic. This 
continuity of functional elites shows that the Bundesrat was no longer a political organ of the 
monarchical governments. Indeed, it treated the introduction of responsible government in 
October as a purely administrative act that it noted down in its protocols just like any other 
decision.82 
 
This brief overview of the history of the Empire has shown that the evolution of the 
participation of the states in the Bundesrat was directly related to the functional change of the 
constitutional organs and the centralisation of the federal system. By taking over the Prussian 
bench and exploiting the weakness of the small states, the federal administration – which 
gradually expanded due to the constant shift of competences from the states to the national 
level – gained full control over the Bundesrat. This federalisation of the council greatly 
enhanced the power of the Chancellor and the state secretaries, who evolved into a proper 
national government that could pursue its agenda without much consideration for the interests 
of the state governments, a development that, in turn, reinforced the centralisation of the 
Empire. At the same time, the transformation of the Bundesrat into a compliant sanctioning 
machine of a federal ministerial apparatus deprived it of its role as the principal antagonist of 
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81  Ibid., 1918, session 64, 5 December, § 1054, pp. 1514f. 
82  Ibid., session 60, 28 October, § 984, pp. 1074f. 
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the Reichstag. It no longer constituted a collective government of the union that could shield 
the Chancellor from parliamentary influence. The federalisation of the council of monarchical 
governments thus went hand in hand with the parliamentarisation of the constitutional order. 
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Table 4: Main Substitutions among the Small States, 1871-1918 
Note: The most important substitute plenipotentiaries and the states they came from are given 
in parenthesis. 
 
States that were 
usually represented by 
their own 
plenipotentiaries  
States that changed from using 
substitute plenipotentiaries to 
instructing their own plenipotentiaries 
or vice versa  
States that were usually substituted 
by other states 
 
Hesse Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873 Karl Neidhardt; 
Saxony: 
1874-1876 Oswald von Nostitz Wallwitz, 
1877 Karl von Planitz, 
1878-1880 Oswald von Nostitz Wallwitz)  
Mecklenburg-Strelitz 
(Mecklenburg-Schwerin:  
1871-1875 Alexander von Bülow, 
1875-1888 Max von Prollius, 
1890-1906 Wilhelm von Oertzen, 
1907-1918 Joachim von Brandenstein) 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873-1879 Karl Neidhardt; 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1880-1890 Adolf Heerwart) 
Saxe-Meiningen 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873-1879 Karl Neidhardt;  
Bavaria: 
1881-1884 Ferdinand von Raesfeldt, 
1885-1903 Hermann von Stengel, 
1904-1909 Wilhelm von Burkhard, 
1910-1918 Wilhelm von Ritter) 
Brunswick Oldenburg 
(Brunswick: 
1871-1885 Friedrich von Liebe, 
1914-1916 Johannes Boden) 
Saxe-Altenburg 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873-1879 Karl Neidhardt;  
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1880-1899 Adolf Heerwart, 
1900-1907 Arnold Paulsen, 
1908-1912 Karl Nebe, 
1913-1918 Arnold Paulsen) 
Lübeck  Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 
(Hesse: 
1871-1879 Karl Neidhardt; 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1880-1899 Adolf Heerwart, 
1900-1907 Arnold Paulsen, 
1908-1912 Karl Nebe, 
1913-1918 Arnold Paulsen) 
  Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt 
(Hesse: 
1871 Karl Neidhardt, 
1872 Karl Hofmann; 
Brunswick:  
1873-1885 Friedrich von Liebe; 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1885-1899 Adolf Heerwart, 
1900-1907 Arnold Paulsen, 
1908-1912 Karl Nebe, 
1913-1918 Arnold Paulsen) 
  Reuß Senior Line 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873-1876 Karl Neidhardt; 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin: 
1877-1888 Max von Prollius 
1889 Karl Oldenburg 
1890-1893 Wilhelm von Oertzen; 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1903-1907 Arnold Paulsen, 
1908-1912 Karl Nebe, 
1913-1918 Arnold Paulsen) 
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  Reuß Junior Line 
(Hesse: 
1871-1872 Karl Hofmann, 
1873-1874 Karl Neidhardt; 
Saxe-Altenburg: 
1875 William Schlippe; 
Hesse: 
1876-1879 Karl Neidhardt; 
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: 
1880-1899 Adolf Heerwart, 
1900-1907 Arnold Paulsen, 
1908-1912 Karl Nebe, 
1913-1918 Arnold Paulsen) 
  Anhalt 
(Brunswick: 
1871-1885 Friedrich von Liebe, 
1887-1905 Christian Cramm auf Burgdorf; 
Oldenburg: 
1906-1914 Georg von Eucken-
Addenhausen; 
Brunswick: 
1914-1918 Johannes Boden) 
  Schaumburg-Lippe 
(Brunswick: 
1871-1885 Friedrich von Liebe; 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin: 
1885-1888 Max von Prollius; 
Hesse: 
1889-1908 Karl Neidhardt; 
Oldenburg: 
1909-1914 Georg von Eucken-
Addenhausen; 
Brunswick: 
1915-1916 Johannes Boden; 
Oldenburg: 
1917-1918 Georg von Eucken-
Addenhausen) 
  Lippe 
(Brunswick: 
1871-1885 Friedrich von Liebe; 
Hesse:  
1885-1908 Karl Neidhardt; 
Oldenburg: 
1909-1914 Georg von Eucken-
Addenhausen; 
Brunswick: 
1915-1916 Johannes Boden; 
Oldenburg: 
1917-1918 Georg von Eucken-
Addenhausen) 
  Bremen 
(Lübeck: 
1871-1894 Daniel Krüger, 
1895-1913 Karl Klügmann, 
1914-1918 Karl Sieveking) 
  Hamburg 
(Lübeck: 
1871-1894 Daniel Krüger, 
1895-1913 Karl Klügmann, 
1914-1918 Karl Sieveking) 
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CHAPTER V 
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If […] a court were entitled to decide […] whether or not the constitution has been violated, then 
the competence of the legislator would be conferred upon the judge. He would be entitled to 
interpret the constitution in good faith and to supplement it in substance. Even though I cherish the 
Prussian judge as a juristic authority, the government does not believe that […] the political future 
of the country, the distribution of power between the crown and the parliament as well as between 
the two chambers of the parliament should be made dependent on the verdict of a court.1  
 
 
When he made these remarks in the Prussian House of Representatives in 1863, 
Bismarck was determined to prevent the ongoing budget crisis from being taken to court. 
Although the conflict between the parliament and the crown over the reform of the army 
threatened to bring the machinery of Prussian government to a standstill, the new prime 
minister was unwilling to become embroiled in legal proceedings that could potentially 
expand parliamentary rights at the expense of the monarchy.2  Bismarck stuck to this 
principled objection to a judicial umpireship throughout his political career. During and after 
the process of unification, he vehemently opposed the creation of a national constitutional 
court. In the struggle between parliamentary and political power, constitutional questions, 
Bismarck believed, were political rather than legal issues, in which no court should intervene 
– too great was the risk that such an institution might favour the introduction of parliamentary 
government, especially considering that most constitutional jurists held liberal political views. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  [‘Wenn [...] ein Gericht berufen würde, [...] die Frage zu entscheiden: Ist die Verfassung verletzt oder ist sie 
es nicht? So wäre damit dem Richter zugleich die Befugnis des Gesetzgebers zugewiesen; er wäre berufen, 
die Verfassung authentisch zu interpretieren oder materiell zu vervollständigen. So hoch ich auch den 
preußischen Richter als juristische Autorität stelle, so hat doch die Regierung nicht geglaubt, daß von dem 
einzelnen Urtheilsspruche eines Gerichts [...] die politische Zukunft des Landes, die Machtverteilung 
zwischen Krone und dem Landtag sowie zwischen den Häusern des Landtags abhängig gemacht werden 
dürfe.’] Bismarck in the Prussian House of Representatives, 22 April 1863, printed in Horst Kohl, ed., Die 
Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, vol. 2: 1862-1865, 14 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1892), p. 172. 
2  See Dian Schefold, ‘Verfassung als Kompromiß? Deutung und Bedeutung des preußischen Verfassungs-
konflikts’, Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 3 (1981): 137–57. On the Prussian budget crisis and its 
constitutional dimension more generally, see also Winfried Becker, ‘Die angebliche Lücke der Gesetzgebung 
im preußischen Verfassungskonflikt’, Historisches Jahrbuch 100 (1980): 257–85 and Hans-Christof Kraus, 
‘Ursprung und Genese der Lückentheorie im preußischen Verfassungskonflikt’, Der Staat 29, no. 2 (1990): 
209–34. 
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But he also rejected the establishment of a German constitutional court for more personal 
reasons. ‘As the creator of the constitution’, the Bavarian diplomat Hugo Graf von und zu 
Lerchenfeld-Koefering pointed out, Bismarck ‘considered only himself competent enough to 
interpret it’.3 
Due to Bismarck’s opposition, the Empire did not have a constitutional court. Even though 
the name suggests otherwise, the Imperial Court or Reichsgericht did not have this status. It 
was merely the supreme criminal and civil court of the Empire, which a reform of the legal 
system established in 1879.4 The fact that the federal constitution did not establish a 
constitutional court was very unusual. Most of the constitutions that were adopted across 
Europe after the 1848 revolutions created such a body.5 The constitutional draft of the 
Frankfurt Assembly had made arrangements for a particularly strong constitutional court.6 
Even the Prussian constitution included provisions about the establishment of such an 
institution, which were, however, never put into practice.7 In the two other great federal states 
of the nineteenth century, the United States and Switzerland, supreme courts played a central 
role in national policy-making. The introduction of the Swiss Bundesgericht was one of the 
key measures of the revision of the constitution in the 1870s.8  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  [‘als Schöpfer der Verfassung betrachtete sich Fürst Bismarck auch als den allein kompetenten Ausleger’] 
Quoted in  Binder, Reich, p. 135. See also Bismarck's remarks in the Prussian State Ministry, 2 March 1890, 
protocol printed in Hans Fenske, ed., Quellen zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1890-1914, Quellen zum 
politischen Denken der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Freiherr vom Stein-Gedächtnisausgabe 25 
(Darmstadt: WBG, 1991), no. 140, p. 457. 
4  Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 27 January 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 4, pp. 41-76, especially section IX 
Reichsgericht’, §§ 125-41. See also Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetze, 27 January 1877, 
RGBl. (1877), no. 4, pp. 77-80. On the Imperial Court, see for example Kai Müller, Der Hüter des Rechts: 
die Stellung des Reichsgerichts im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1879 - 1918 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997) and 
Bernd-Rüdiger Kern and Adrian Schmidt-Recla, eds., 125 Jahre Reichsgericht, Schriften zur 
Rechtsgeschichte 126 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006).  
5  See for example Constitution of the French Second Republic, 4 November 1848, art. 91-100; Austrian 
Constitution, 4 March 1849, section XIII ‘Von dem Reichsgerichte’, §§ 106f., which referred closely to the 
Austrian Kremsier Draft, July 1848-March 1849, § 140; Danish Junigrundloven, 5 June 1849, §§ 72f.; Italian 
Statuto Albertino, 4 March 1848, art. 36, which determined that the senate could act as a constitutional court.   
6  FC (1849), section V ‘Das Reichsgericht’, §§ 125-129. 
7  Prussian Constitution, 31 January 1850, art. 61, 92, 116. These provisions were taken over from the imposed 
constitution of 5 December 1848, art. 59, 91. 
8  On the American Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, see the brief essay by former Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, ‘The Supreme Court in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Supreme Court History 27 
(2002): 1–13 and the comprehensive study by Robert G. McCloskey and Sanford Levinson, The American 
Supreme Court, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), chapters 3-5. On the Swiss Supreme 
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In the absence of a constitutional court, how were conflicts between the states, different 
levels of government, and the federal constitutional organs resolved in Imperial Germany? 
What system of conflict resolution emerged over the years? And what impact did it have on 
the evolution of the federal state? These issues have received almost no attention in historical 
scholarship. The two most relevant publications are two legal historical studies that consider 
the normative evolution of a customary system of constitutional jurisdiction.9 The political 
motivations behind this development have not been examined at all.  
There seem to be two reasons for this neglect. On the one hand, we are so used to 
associating the settlement of constitutional disputes in federal states with a supreme court that 
it is easy to overlook alternative mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a specific 
methodological problem. The subject matter is by its nature dispersed across a great number 
of cases; there was no single institutional location and no single process through which 
conflicts within the federal system were resolved. And in order to make sense of the structures 
and mechanisms that evolved over the years, focussing on just one constitutional crisis – even 
if it was of special importance – is not enough. Rather, we have to analyse a wide range of 
individual, often very small cases that took place at all levels of government and comprised 
no less than six different types of conflict: conflicts between different states; conflicts within 
states; conflicts between the national level and the states; succession conflicts; conflicts 
between the federal constitutional organs; and conflicts regarding the constitutionality of 
laws.10 
Moreover, for a full understanding of the problem, an analysis of legal proceedings alone 
will scarcely suffice. Rather, we have to adopt a broader perspective that also brings into view !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Court in the nineteenth century, see Alfred Kölz, Neuere Schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte. Ihre 
Grundlinien in Bund und Kantonen seit 1848 (Bern: Stämpfli, 2004), pp. 575-80. 
9  Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte. 
10  This chapter will not consider issues relating to refusal of justice [Justizverweigerung], because throughout 
the imperial era it happened not a single time that a state denied a citizen judicial aid. Had this happened, the 
Bundesrat would have been obliged to force the state government concerned to provide judicial aid, see RV 
(1871), art. 77. It is worth noting that due to the lack of a basic rights catalogue, this provision was the only 
direct form of legal protection that the federal constitution provided to German citizens. On refusal of justice, 
see Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 134-8. 
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those disputes that – even though they caused great trouble – were never addressed by legal 
channels, such as the permanent conflict over a modernisation of the Prussian electoral law. 
Analysing such cases shows us under what conditions constitutional actors refrained from 
initiating formal proceedings, an insight that is important in fully understanding how federal 
structures were manipulated in the fight between monarchical and parliamentary power. An 
unwelcome, though unavoidable, feature of this approach is that it makes the number of 
disputes we have to consider even bigger. It is only possible to examine all relevant cases 
because we can draw on a rich body of literature focusing on individual conflicts. One of the 
main tasks of this chapter is to infer from these specialised studies the overall framework of 
conflict resolution and its impact on federal evolution.  
But before we can survey real cases, it is necessary to be clear about the structural 
framework that the federal constitution established. To this end, this chapter will first examine 
the relevant constitutional provisions and their underlying principles. Through an analysis of 
the views of the Prussian government in the constitutive Reichstag and of the commentaries 
by constitutional lawyers, this opening section will show that the constitution set up a number 
of elaborate safety measures that were intended to protect monarchical power in situations of 
conflict. After that, this chapter will turn to concrete disputes, exposing the different 
mechanisms of conflict resolution that evolved over time. This second section will 
demonstrate that for a wide range of issues the Imperial Court developed into a customary 
constitutional court. All matters that concerned important questions of power, however, 
continued to be resolved by political rather than legal channels, in particular conflicts about 
the competences of the different constitutional organs and the constitutionality of laws. 
Over the course of this chapter, it will become clear that in the imperial federal state legal 
mechanisms of conflict resolution were largely replaced by political negotiations, deals, and 
threats. In the context of the struggle between monarchical and parliamentary interests, even 
minor legal disputes could thus easily turn into issues of power. Over time, this politicisation 
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of legal issues undermined the constitution to the point where it no longer provided a stable 
framework of rules and procedures that could guarantee the federal nature of the union. The 
lack of a well-defined system of conflict resolution was thus an important factor in the 
gradual implosion of the federal order.  
 
Safety Measures 
 
The central judicial organ of the constitution was the Bundesrat. While it had to resolve 
conflicts between the national level and the states in cooperation with the Emperor, it could 
decide disputes between different states and within states on its own.11 To a certain degree, 
the council of princely governments thus resembled a constitutional court.   
This status was no coincidence, but a safety measure for the protection of monarchical 
power. When the constitutive Reichstag debated the adoption of the relevant provisions in 
April 1867, the commissioner of the Prussian government, Karl Friedrich von Savigny, 
outlined the rationale behind them. The constitution did not establish a constitutional court, he 
made clear, out of respect for the sovereignty of the princes who rejected the idea of a central 
judicial body that could intervene in their sovereign affairs. In its own right, this argument 
could hardly convince the liberal majority of MPs, because they desired a centralised state 
with a powerful parliament and strong judicial institutions. The Prussian diplomat, son of the 
famous legal scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny, therefore invoked the fear that history might 
repeat itself. During the 1848 revolutions and their aftermath, he warned, attempts to create a 
pan-German constitution had failed not least because they had disregarded the scepticism of 
the princes against a national constitutional court. The Prussian government had learned from 
this experience, he declared, and no longer supported the foundation of such an institution.12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  RV (1871), art. 7, 17, 19.  
12  Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1867, session 31, 9 April, pp. 664-6. 
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It was a result of this view that the federal constitution – instead of referring to the 
constitutional drafts of the Frankfurt Assembly and the Erfurt Union – took over the judicial 
model of the German Confederation. Just like the Vienna Final Act, the 1871 constitution 
conferred the general competence for dealing with constitutional conflicts upon the congress 
of princely envoys.13 According to the constitutional historian Ernst-Rudolf Huber, the reason 
for this arrangement was rather simple: in a monarchical union, this body was the only 
institution that had sufficient authority to settle disputes between princely governments.14  
But this was not the whole truth behind the arrangements of the constitution, because 
otherwise the Bundesrat would not have enjoyed even more judicial powers than the old 
Bundestag. While the latter had been obliged to refer conflicts that it had failed to mediate to 
special arbitration courts, the former had the option of handing down a verdict on its own.15 
As the Prussian bench dominated the Bundesrat, this expansion of power buttressed Prussia’s 
hegemony over the union. From this perspective, the real motivation behind the judicial status 
of the Bundesrat was an increase of Prussian control.  
The problem was, however, that the Prussian government benefitted from the powers of 
the council only for as long as it had control over its Bundesrat delegation. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the emerging federal administration took over the Prussian bench and came 
to dominate the Bundesrat within a decade after unification. In the end, it was therefore the 
federal rather than Prussian executive that could take advantage of the judicial powers of the 
Bundesrat, because the council became an instrument of the Reich against the states, 
including Prussia. 
Nonetheless, the judicial functions of the Bundesrat worked as a safeguard of monarchical 
power. Some observers, such as the liberal constitutional lawyer and 1848 veteran Robert von 
Mohl, complained that the nature of the council as the main executive and legislative organ of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  WSA (1820), art. 19-24. 
14  Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, p. 1066. 
15  On the arbitration system of the German Confederation, the so-called Austrägelgerichtsbarkeit, and its 
relation to the judicial provisions of the 1871 constitution, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 36-8. 
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the monarchical governments implied that it would decide constitutional disputes on the basis 
of political interests rather than legal rules.16 To such criticism, Savigny replied by pointing – 
much as Bismarck had during the Prussian budget crisis – to the political nature of 
constitutional questions: ‘[A court] would decide above all in accordance with juristic 
principles and […] aspects; […] but we believe that questions eminently political in nature are 
better dealt with as their nature requires […] it.’17 
Most MPs shared this view. The protocol of the Reichstag notes that the assembly 
acknowledged Savigny’s statement with a loud ‘Bravo!’.18 At first sight, this approval seems 
odd, because the judicial functions of the Bundesrat were above all in the interest of the 
monarchical governments. But in some areas, the conflict resolution procedures of the 
constitution granted the Reichstag a greater preponderance of influence than a court-based 
system would have done. This was true, in particular, for constitutional conflicts within states. 
If a state lacked adequate judicial institutions, such a dispute was first referred to the 
Bundesrat for mediation. But if the council failed to bring about an agreement, the matter had 
to be settled by way of federal legislation.19 As Savigny noted, this provision gave the 
Reichstag a pivotal position, because without its approval no law could enter into force.20  
This context makes it easier to understand why the constitutive Reichstag did not make 
more serious efforts to introduce a constitutional court; and also why the parliamentarians did 
not insist on creating any official procedure for the resolution of conflicts between the federal 
constitutional organs. Just like the monarchical governments, they preferred conflicts between 
the Reichstag, Chancellor, Emperor, and Bundesrat to be resolved by political compromises 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  Robert von Mohl, Das deutsche Reichsstaatsrecht. Rechtliche und politische Erörterungen (Tübingen: 
Laupp, 1873), p. 69. 
17  [‘[Ein Gericht würde] jedenfalls denn doch vorzugsweise bloß nach rein juristischen Grundsätzen und [...] 
Gesichtspunkte entscheiden. [...] wir glauben aber, daß Fragen von eminent politischer Natur weit besser so 
behandelt werden, wie es ihre Natur erheischt und [...] indicirt.’] Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1867, 
session 31, 9 April, pp. 665f. 
18  Ibid., p. 666. 
19  RV (1871), art. 76.2. 
20  Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1867, session 31, 9 April, p. 665. 
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rather than by legal proceedings – not least because they hoped that the federal parliament 
would become more powerful over time.  
Such a system, in which political rather than judicial bodies dealt with the resolution of 
conflicts, was incompatible with the rule of law. As the Leipzig professor Karl Binding 
pointed out, decisions of the Bundesrat lacked ‘all guarantees of a fair judgement’. Any 
measure that the council adopted could not be revoked. It was not possible to lodge an appeal. 
Moreover, the plenipotentiaries of the state governments were anything but impartial 
judges.21 
This lack of neutrality was particularly problematic in conflicts between the Reich and the 
states, because for such disputes the constitution provided much more powerful instruments 
of law enforcement than for any other type of conflict: the powers to monitor the 
implementation of laws and to impose a federal intervention, which were known as 
Reichsaufsicht and Reichsexekution, respectively. All laws, regardless of whether they had 
been adopted at the national or state level, had to be implemented by the states. In order to 
guarantee some degree of homogeneity, the constitution gave the Emperor the right to 
monitor the implementation of laws, a right that he delegated to special federal officials, the 
so-called Reichskontrollbeamte.22 If they noticed deficiencies, the Bundesrat could determine 
what countermeasures the Emperor had to take.23 The severest sanction that could be imposed 
on a state that failed to fulfil its obligations was a federal intervention. As a measure of last 
resort, this punishment could comprise any action necessary to ensure compliance, including 
military force.24    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  [‘alle Garantien gerechten Urteils’] Karl Binding, ‘Bundesrat und Staatsgerichtshof’, Deutsche Juristen-
Zeitung 4 (1899), pp. 71-4, quote on p. 73. 
22  RV (1871), art. 17. 
23  Ibid., art. 7. 
24  Ibid., art. 19. 
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Rather than on a court decision, this process of law enforcement depended on a decree by 
the council of monarchical governments.25 In a federal system shaped by princely solidarity, 
the powers of Reichsaufsicht and Reichsexekution were therefore a tool against over-
demanding parliaments and other liberal tendencies that threatened the status of the states as 
strongholds of monarchical power.  
In order fully to comprehend this function, we have to look at the relevant mechanisms 
more closely. There were two different types of Reichsaufsicht. The Emperor and Bundesrat 
had the right to monitor the implementation of laws not only in fields that were regulated by 
federal legislation, but – most lawyers agreed – also in areas that were not.26 The difference 
between this so-called dependent and independent Reichsaufsicht was the basis on which the 
two federal organs could take action. In the case of the former, they checked whether state 
policies conformed to concrete rules that were laid down in pieces of legislation. In the case 
of the latter, in contrast, they did not primarily consider whether a state violated the law, but 
whether it acted against national interests. As Heinrich Triepel, one of the most important 
German constitutional and international lawyers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, put it in his standard work on Reichsaufsicht: 
 
The Reich makes sure that the states do what is necessary for certain purposes and that they refrain 
from doing anything that is incompatible with these purposes. In this process, the Reich is not only 
interested in the legality, but also in the “adequacy” of state behaviour [, meaning in the] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  On this issue, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 1028f., 1032f. 
26  See for example Albert Hänel, Deutsches Staatsrecht. Die Grundlagen des deutschen Staates und die 
Reichsgewalt, vol. 1, 2 vols, Systematisches Handbuch der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 5.1 (Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1892), pp. 305ff.; Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 5th ed., vol. 1, 
4 vols (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911), p. 109; Georg Meyer, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. Gerhard 
Anschütz, 7th ed. (Leipzig & Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1919), pp. 939f.; Max von Seydel, Commentar 
zur Verfassungsurkunde für das Deutsche Reich, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr Siebeck, 1897), p. 59; Heinrich 
Triepel, Die Reichsaufsicht. Untersuchungen zum Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches. (Berlin: Springer, 
1917), pp. 435f.; Philipp Zorn, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 2., vol. 1: Das Verfassungsrecht, 2 
vols, Guttentag’sche Sammlung von Lehrbüchern des Deutschen Reichsrechtes 5 (Berlin: Guttentag, 1895), 
p. 427. The only major legal scholar who disagreed was Ludwig Dambitsch, Die Verfassung des Deutschen 
Reichs mit Erläuterungen (Berlin: Dahlen, 1910), pp. 104ff. On the two types of Reichsaufsicht, see Holste, 
Bundesstaat, pp. 231-6, where he analyses the writings of these lawyers. 
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fulfilment of the constitutional duty to respect the interests of the Reich or other common interests 
acknowledged by the constitution.27  
 
The constitution established this vague standard in the clause on federal intervention. 
According to this provision, the Reich was entitled to intervene in any state that did not 
observe its ‘constitutional duties towards the Federation’.28 For obvious reasons, it was 
extremely problematic that the most powerful mechanisms for the coordination of national 
and state policies depended on the interpretation of national interest, political adequacy, and 
federal duties. The open-ended character of these concepts implied that the Bundesrat – if it 
really wanted to take action against a state – could easily find a pretext for an intervention. 
This potential for manipulation made the powers of Reichsaufsicht and Reichsexekution 
formidable instruments in the fight against an expansion of parliamentary power in the states. 
Any signs of a parliamentary takeover of government, large-scale civil unrest, or even a 
revolution would have provided plenty of reasons for punitive measures.29   
As the Prussian lawyer Paul Schilling pointed out, the character of the Reichsexekution as 
an instrument of monarchical power was further reinforced by the fact that the Bundesrat 
could, but did not have to, impose an intervention on a disobedient state.30 According to this 
provision, then, it was perfectly legitimate for the council to only take action if an 
intervention served monarchical interests. Due to her hegemonic status in the union, this 
arrangement was particularly relevant in relation to Prussia. As the right to implement the 
decisions of the Bundesrat fell to the Emperor, meaning to the Prussian king, a federal 
intervention against the Prussian government was practically impossible. What the Bundesrat 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  [‘Das Reich wacht darüber, daß die Einzelstaaten das im Dienste gewisser Zwecke Notwendige tun, das mit 
diesen Zwecken Unverträgliche unterlassen. Sein Absehen ist also hier niemals auf bloße Legalität, sondern 
auf die „Zweckmäßigkeit“ des gliedstaatlichen Verhaltens gerichtet, [d. h. auf] die Erfüllung der 
verfassungsmäßigen Bundespflicht, die Interessen des Reichs oder andere von der Reichsverfassung 
anerkannte Gemeininteressen zu achten’] Triepel, Die Reichsaufsicht. Untersuchungen zum Staatsrecht des 
Deutschen Reiches, pp. 450f. 
28  [‘verfassungsmäßige Bundespflichten’] RV (1871), art. 19. 
29  See Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 1034ff. 
30  Paul Schilling, ‘Die Reichsexekution’, Archiv für öffentliches Recht 20 (1906), pp. 65f. 
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could do, however, was charge the Emperor with punishing the Prussian parliament.31 In the 
constitutive Reichstag of 1867, the liberal MP Arnold Kitz raised this problem, arguing that a 
manipulation of the intervention power must be prevented by changing the relevant provisions 
to the effect that the Prussian executive would be obliged to observe its federal duties as much 
as the other state governments.32 But most of his colleagues did not share Kitz’ concerns, 
most probably because they agreed with Bismarck’s view that ‘one could start ringing the 
death-knell for the German Empire […] should Prussia ever refrain from fulfilling her federal 
duties’.33   
The lack of any precise definition of the circumstances under which the Bundesrat could 
intervene in a state gave this power a preventive effect. Throughout the imperial era, it 
happened not a single time that a federal intervention was undertaken. In some respects, this 
absence of relevant incidents can be taken as evidence of the stability that the threat of 
intervention created in the states. But it is important to keep things in perspective. The 
Bundesrat certainly could not afford to impose an intervention as a sanction for any 
misbehaviour. Neither the princes nor the parliaments and the public would have tolerated 
such a decision. Schilling underlined this point from a juristic perspective. The 
constitutionally defined yardstick for an intervention – the violation of ‘duties towards the 
Federation’ – was so broad, he argued, precisely because this power was meant to be applied 
only in the most dangerous cases, meaning in conflicts that threatened to destroy the union.34  
As Schilling’s observation shows, the crux of the matter was what the abstract concept of 
federal duties actually stood for. There was no uniform definition in the contemporary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  See Triepel, Die Reichsaufsicht. Untersuchungen zum Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, p. 682 and Hänel, 
Deutsches Staatsrecht. Die Grundlagen des deutschen Staates und die Reichsgewalt, vol. 1, p. 452, fn. 6. See 
also Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 237 and Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 1032, 1042, where he calls 
Prussia's partial exemption from the provisions on federal intervention a 'genuine loophole of the 
constitution' ['echte Lücke in der Verfassung']. 
32  Arnold Kitz in the constitutive Reichstag, session 20, 27 March 1867, printed in Bezold/Holtzendorff, 
Materialien, vol. 1, pp. 773f. 
33  [‘Man müsste nun aber [...] gleich das Grabgeläute für das deutsche Reich ansagen, wenn Preußen seine 
Bundespflichten verweigern sollte.’] Bismarck in the Reichstag, as reported by Schilling, ‘Die 
Reichsexekution’, p. 85. 
34  Ibid., pp. 52f. On this issue, see also Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 1034f. 
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political and legal debate. One of the few issues on which politicians and lawyers across all 
ideological camps agreed was that the federal duties of the states comprised not only the 
written provisions of the constitution, but also more general obligations toward the union that 
the constitution did not explicitly mention. These unwritten duties were usually summarised 
in the collective term Bundestreue or federal allegiance.35 
Moreover, most opinions held that federal allegiance embraced all principles that 
guaranteed a working relationship between the Reich and the states. By implication, a federal 
intervention was only justified if a state did serious harm to the fundamental organisation of 
the union. Paul Laband, celebrated law professor from Strasburg, outlined what such 
behaviour might entail: 
 
[A state] can jeopardise the interests of the Reich […] and thus violate its duty of allegiance, for 
example by disturbing the relations of the Reich to foreign countries or the peaceful relationships 
among the members of the union or by antagonising the basic direction of federal politics.36 
 
From interpretations such as this, Ernst-Rudolf Huber has derived three basic duties that 
defined federal allegiance: the preservation of peace in the union; the coordination of state 
with federal policies; and the preservation of order in the state territories. Among these duties, 
the last-mentioned is most interesting because it obliged the states to uphold the status quo, 
including the monarchical form of government, as a matter of federal allegiance. In other 
words, if there was an attempt to introduce parliamentary government in a state, the 
Bundesrat and the Emperor were allowed to intervene.37  
This consideration shows that Bundestreue played a central role in the protection of 
monarchical power. For precisely this reason, there was a rich discussion on this rather !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35  Rudolf Smend, ‘Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht im monarchischen Bundesstaat (1916)’, in 
Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), p. 48. See 
also the analysis of Bundestreue by Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 152-6, on which the following section is based. 
36  [‘[Ein Staat] kann [...] durch sein Verhalten die Interessen des Reichs gefährden und dadurch gegen die 
Treueverpflichtung verstoßen; z.B. durch Störung der Beziehung des Reichs zu auswärtigen Staaten oder des 
friedlichen Verhältnisses unter den Bundesgliedern oder durch Entgegenwirken gegen die Tendenz der 
Reichspolitik’] Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 1, p. 109. 
37  Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 3, pp. 1036-8, 1034f. 
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abstract concept in both the political and intellectual arena. One can identify two basic views, 
which differed mainly in their understanding of who owed allegiance to whom (see Figure 
17).   
In keeping with their liberal, nation-state oriented perspective, most constitutional lawyers 
argued that the states owed allegiance to the Reich. This interpretation was based on their 
strictly hierarchical understanding of the federal state, which held that the states were 
subordinated to the national level.38 For the lawyers, federal allegiance thus defined a one-
sided relationship of submission (see Figure 17). Albert Hänel, law professor in Kiel and 
national liberal MP in the Reichstag, made clear that this kind of Bundestreue comprised two 
elements, namely: 
 
the passive obedience of the states, which obliges them to do nothing and to refrain from anything 
that […] contradicts objective federal law, [and] the commitment of the states to positive action, 
[meaning] to using their state authority in order to put the provisions of federal law into practice 
and to support the objectives that [federal law] wants to achieve.39 
 
According to this view, federal allegiance meant the ‘constitutional obedience’ of the states.40 
This interpretation was the logical expression of the liberal desires of most lawyers, because it 
strengthened the national level vis-à-vis the states and thus supported Germany’s 
centralisation that – as they rightly believed – would benefit the Reichstag and would 
eventually lead to the emergence of parliamentary government.41 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38  On the subordination of the states to the Reich, see Hänel, Deutsches Staatsrecht. Die Grundlagen des 
deutschen Staates und die Reichsgewalt, p. 805; Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 1, 
1911, p. 59; Hermann Schulze, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechtes, vol. 1: Das Deutsche 
Landesstaatsrecht, 2 vols (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1881), p. 47; and Zorn, Das Staatsrecht des 
Deutschen Reiches, vol. 1, p. 137. 
39  [‘passiven Gehorsam der Einzelstaaten, der sie verpflichtet, nichts zu thun und alles zu unterlassen, was mit 
dem objektiven Reichsrecht […] in Widerspruch steht [und die] Verpflichtung der Einzelstaaten zum 
positiven Handeln, zur Handhabung der Staatsgewalt, um die Vorschriften des Reichsrecht zur Anwendung 
zu bringen und die von demselben gewollten Erfolge zu erzielen’] Hänel, Deutsches Staatsrecht. Die 
Grundlagen des deutschen Staates und die Reichsgewalt, p. 305. 
40  Ibid., p. 446. 
41  The book that will grow out of this thesis will open with a chapter on the development of the doctrinal debate 
about the federal state (see Introduction), which will analyse the political orientation of the lawyers in detail. 
On this issue, see also the standard work by Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in 
Deutschland, vol. 2, 4 vols (Munich: Beck, 1992) and the study by Manfred Friedrich, Geschichte der 
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Since Bismarck and the monarchical governments wanted to prevent this scenario, they 
interpreted Bundestreue in just the opposite way. By referring to the unification treaties, they 
argued that federal allegiance had a contractual character. It was a special form of ‘sanctity of 
contract’ (pacta sunt servanda). As such, it defined an egalitarian relationship among the 
different members of the union rather than a one-sided submission of the states to the Reich 
(see Figure 17). Bismarck outlined this view in the constitutive Reichstag of 1867 when he 
replied to criticism of Prussia’s hegemony: 
 
The basis of this union ought not to be force, either against the princes or against the people. […] 
The basis ought to be the confidence in Prussia’s observance of the contracts, […] and this 
confidence must not be shaken as long as the other states too observe the contracts.42  
 
As the unification treaties had been concluded by the monarchs, this view saw federal 
allegiance as a duty of the princes rather than states. Bundestreue was a form of princely 
solidarity. Referring to this understanding, Bismarck declared to the envoys of the state 
governments in 1885 that ‘the German Empire features a firm basis in the federal allegiance 
of the princes, which guarantees its future.’43  In the Year of the Three Emperors, he 
underlined the importance of this interpretation in a letter to Prince William, who was about 
to ascend to the throne. The ‘security of the Reich and of its monarchical institutions’, the 
Chancellor argued, ‘lies in the “unity of the princes”’. These are ‘not subjects, but allies of the 
Emperor’, he pointed out, ‘and if we do not observe the treaties, they too will not feel obliged 
to do so’.44 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
deutschen Staatsrechtswissenschaft, Schriften zur Verfassungsgeschichte 50 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1997). 
42  [‘Die Basis dieses Verhältnisses soll nicht die Gewalt sein, weder den Fürsten noch dem Volke gegenüber. 
Die Basis soll das Vertrauen zu der Vertragstreue Preußens sein und dieses Vertrauen darf nicht erschüttert 
werden, so lange man uns die Vertragstreue halt.’] Stenographische Berichte (NDB), 1867, session 10, 11 
March, p. 136. 
43  [‘Das Deutsche Reich hat die feste Basis in der Bundestreue der Fürsten, in welcher seine Zukunft verbürgt 
ist.’] Quoted in Otto Mayer, ‘Republikanischer und monarchischer Bundesstaat’, Archiv für öffentliches 
Recht 18 (1903), p. 370. 
44  [‘Sicherheit des Reichs und seiner monarchischen Institutionen [liegt] in der „Einigkeit der Fürsten“’], 
[‘nicht Unterthan, sondern Bundesgenossen des Kaisers, und wird ihnen der Bundesvertrag nicht gehalten, so 
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This understanding of Bundestreue turned the constitutional instruments that depended on 
it – most importantly the power to impose a federal intervention – into defensive weapons 
against parliamentary ambitions. One of the occasions where this became most obvious 
occurred in April 1884 when – as we have already seen in the previous two chapters – the 
state governments issued a joint declaration in reaction to the foundation of the Deutsch-
freisinnige Partei, a left liberal party that openly demanded the introduction of 
parliamentarily responsible ministries. In no uncertain terms, the statement proclaimed that 
‘the united governments are determined without exception to abide in undying allegiance by 
the contracts on which our federal institutions are based’.45  
All this means that Bismarck and the united governments had an understanding of 
Bundestreue that was completely different from that of the liberals and of most of the 
constitutional lawyers. This discrepancy reflected the tension between monarchical and 
parliamentary power. Due to the importance of federal allegiance for such crucial powers as 
the rights to monitor the implementation of laws or to intervene in the states, both sides 
adhered to their interpretation strictly. For this reason, it was not before 1916 – two years 
before the union eventually collapsed – that an attempt was made to harmonise the different 
concepts. In his influential essay Unwritten Law in the Monarchical Federal State, the young 
Bonn professor Rudolf Smend argued that only in their entirety did the written and unwritten 
parts of German constitutional law define the relations between the states and the Reich. 
While the constitution established the formal supremacy of the national over the state level, 
he maintained, the general principle of federal allegiance obliged not only the states to be 
loyal to each other, but also the Reich to be loyal to them:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
werden sie sich auch nicht dazu verpflichtet fühlen’] Quoted in Hartmut Bauer, Die Bundestreue: zugleich 
ein Beitrag zur Dogmatik des Bundesstaatsrechts und zur Rechtsverhältnislehre (Mohr Siebeck, 1992), p. 41. 
45  [‘die Verbündeten ohne Ausnahme entschlossen sind, die Verträge, auf welchen unsere Reichsinstitutionen 
beruhen, in unverbrüchlicher Treue zu erhalten’] Protokolle (DR), 1884, session 16, 5 April, § 180, pp. 96-8. 
See also Mayer, ‘Republikanischer und monarchischer Bundesstaat’, pp. 364f. 
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The Reich and the states are related to each other not only in a relationship of supremacy and 
submission –  even if legal interpretation must see this as the main proposition of the constitution – 
but also in a relationship of allies. This means that each ally owes federal allegiance […] to the 
others and to the entirety and that he has to fulfil his duties and exercise his corresponding rights in 
this sense.46 
 
According to this view, the union was based on a network of mutual loyalty between all states 
and the national level (see Figure 18). After the war, this idea evolved into the modern 
understanding of Bundestreue, which still plays an important role in the German federal state 
of today.47 
Smend tried to harmonise the competing interpretations of federal allegiance not least 
because he realised that they were largely politically motivated. With a view to the complex 
body of German constitutional law, he complained that ‘theory and parliament usually focus 
on the written constitution and ignore its unwritten appendix, while the united governments 
tend to overestimate the latter’.48  
This difference between the constitutional approaches of monarchical and parliamentary 
actors greatly shaped the evolution of Germany’s system of conflict resolution. As long as the 
monarchical governments were at the centre of the federal decision-making process, their 
interpretation of such open-ended concepts as federal duties or federal allegiance determined 
how the relevant instruments were used. But the more the federal administration controlled 
the Bundesrat and the more the Reichstag managed to increase its influence, the more 
important became the views of the parliament rather than the monarchical governments. After 
the federal government around the Chancellor had become dependent on the parliament, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  [‘Reich und Einzelstaaten stehen nicht nur in dem Verhältnis der Über- und Unterordnung, das die 
staatsrechtliche Auslegung aus der Reichsverfassung zunächst als ihren Hauptinhalt entnehmen muß, sondern 
zugleich in dem Verhältnis des Bundes zu den Verbündeten: d.h. jeder der Verbündeten schuldet den anderen 
und dem Ganzen die Bundes-Treue [...] und hat in diesem Sinne seine reichsverfassungsmäßigen Pflichten zu 
erfüllen und seine entsprechenden Rechte wahrzunehmen.’] Smend, ‘Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht im 
monarchischen Bundesstaat (1916)’, p. 51. 
47  On the importance of Smend’s ideas for the modern concept of Bundestreue, see Bauer, Die Bundestreue, pp. 
56-65 and Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarität im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht, Jus Publicum 33 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), p. 52. 
48  [‘daß Theorie und Parlament sich an die geschriebene Reichsverfassung halten und ihre ungeschrieben 
Ergänzung verkennen, während die verbündeten Regierungen diese letztere Seite eher zu überschätzen 
geneigt sein werden’] Smend, ‘Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht im monarchischen Bundesstaat (1916)’, p. 
52. 
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monarchical interpretation of Bundestreue ceased to be relevant. As a consequence, the 
powers to monitor the implementation of laws and to impose federal interventions were no 
longer defensive weapons against the advance of parliamentarism. In short: the evolution of 
the federal state gradually dissolved many safety measures that the constitution had 
established in order to protect monarchical power. With the passing of the years, 
constitutional conflicts were thus increasingly decided by factors other than monarchical 
interests. 
 
Implosion 
 
The structures and mechanisms that the constitution established for the resolution of 
constitutional conflicts had a strongly political character. In the context of the confrontation 
between monarchical and parliamentary interests, any legal issue could thus easily turn into a 
crucial question of power. This gradually undermined the constitution to the point where it no 
longer guaranteed a stable framework of rules and procedures. In order to understand this 
impact, we have to examine concrete cases of conflict. What major problems occurred? And 
how did they affect the evolution of the federal state? 
If we look first at conflicts that involved the states, we see that the few official procedures 
that existed for resolving such disputes were easy to circumvent, prone to be manipulated, and 
so rudimentary that they left enough room for the development of an alternative system. In 
order to settle constitutional conflicts that took place within their borders, the states had 
several options. Twelve out of the twenty-five states featured constitutions that designated 
special arbitrating bodies for such cases.49 Moreover, conflicting parties could always come 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49  Saxony had an own constitutional court. Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, and the two duchies of 
Mecklenburg established special arbitration tribunals. The three Hanseatic city determined special arbitration 
courts by 1895. While Hamburg opted for the Imperial Court, Bremen and Lübeck nominated the Hanseatic 
Court of Appeal in Hamburg. The constitutions of Schaumburg-Lippe and of the two principalities of Reuß 
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to an understanding on an appropriate settlement procedure. In this manner, the two 
parliaments of the composite duchy Saxe-Coburg-Gotha agreed in 1907 on asking an 
arbitration court to decide whether they had to convene in joint rather than separate meetings 
in order to adopt laws that concerned the implementation of federal legislation.50 But this was 
the only major case of intra-state dispute in which such a procedure was applied, and with 
good reason: there was no adequate enforcement mechanism. If one of the opposing parties 
did not accept the verdict of the arbitration court, there was usually no authority in the states 
that could enforce it.  
This was the great advantage of the alternative procedure that the federal constitution 
provided. Parties to a constitutional dispute that took place in one of the thirteen states whose 
constitution did not define any settlement procedures could ask the Bundesrat for a decision. 
The council was obliged first to try to bring about an amicable agreement. If this attempt 
failed, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag had to adopt a federal law that either made a final 
decision or referred the case to an arbitration court. In either case, the final ruling could be 
enforced by a federal intervention if necessary.51  
From the perspective of the monarchical governments, the great risk of this procedure was 
the participation of the federal parliament. It was crucial for the protection of monarchical 
power to prevent the Reichstag from intervening in the states on behalf of the local 
parliaments. For this reason, the Bundesrat manipulated the scope of the relevant article of the 
constitution. The basic idea was to make it so difficult for disputes to be admitted to the 
settlement procedure that it could not be used as a means of liberalising the states. This 
strategy was borrowed from the German Confederation, where the admission standards of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
automatically referred constitutional conflicts to the responsible federal organ. See Björner, 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 83ff. 
50  On this case, see ibid., pp. 97-9. 
51  RV (1871), art. 76.2. On this procedure, see also Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 80-9 and 
Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 93-5. 
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Confederate Court of Arbitration – the Bundesschiedsgericht – had been so high that it had 
never convened and had thus been dubbed a ‘stillborn child’.52  
The most important case in which Bismarck and the monarchical governments relied on 
this strategy was the decades-long conflict over the introduction of a constitution in 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz and Mecklenburg-Schwerin.53 The two Northeast German duchies were 
the only states of the union that did not have modern constitutions, but maintained corporative 
structures. After unification, the Reichstag received a great number of petitions that called for 
the Reich to rectify this deplorable state of affairs. Between 1867 and 1874, the Bundesrat 
was asked to settle three conflicts in Mecklenburg that directly concerned the modernisation 
of the duchies.54 The council rejected all of them by arguing that they did not fall within its 
jurisdiction. In two cases, certain groups of Mecklenburg residents tried to institute 
proceedings. To their requests, the council replied by declaring that it was only responsible 
for conflicts between the governments and parliaments of the states and that ordinary citizens 
thus had no right to file a suit.55 In the third case, a magistrate from Rostock claimed that the 
execution of the federal trade regulation act required the Mecklenburg government to 
introduce a constitution. This time, the Bundesrat pointed out that it could only deal with 
matters that concerned the violation of an existing constitution, but not with the introduction 
of a new one.56  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52  [‘totgeborenes Kind’] Heinrich Albert Zachariä, Deutsches Staats- und Bundesrecht. Das Regierungsrecht 
der Bundesstaaten und das Bundesrecht, 3rd ed., vol. 2, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1867), 
pp. 780f. On this issue, see also Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 79f., where he too refers to 
Zachariä. 
53  The following analysis of the Mecklenburg conflict is based on Anke John's doctoral dissertation Die 
Entwicklung der beiden mecklenburgischen Staaten im Spannungsfeld von landesgrundgesetzlichem 
Erbvergleich und Bundes- bzw. Reichsverfassung vom Norddeutschen Bund bis zur Weimarer Republik, 
Rostocker Beiträge zur Deutschen und Europäischen Geschichte 2 (Rostock: Universitätsdruckerei Rostock, 
1997), which is the authoritative study on this topic. I am thankful to Anke John for providing me with a 
copy of the manuscript.  
54  On these three cases, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 92, 95, 99f. and Bönnemann, 
Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 95-7. 
55  See in particular the report by the Bundesrat Committee of Justice, 31 May 1869, printed in Poschinger, 
Bundesrat, vol. 1, p. 269. 
56  Protokolle (DR), 1874, session 10, 15 February, § 94, pp. 69f. 
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The political motivation behind this argument was obvious. In light of the support that the 
Reichstag lent to the steady flow of petitions from Mecklenburg, Bismarck saw the common 
opposition of the monarchical governments against the modernisation of the duchies as a 
matter of Bundestreue. In October 1871, the Bundesrat plenipotentiary Bernhard Ernst von 
Bülow reported to his home government in Schwerin that 
 
according to the Prince [Bismarck], the whole issue of the Mecklenburg constitution must not be 
taken to the Reichstag; we have to stand up to such attempts as a matter of principle, [Bismarck 
maintained], by saying that they do not fall within our jurisdiction. He would never think of 
permitting such momentous constitutional changes; if the Reichstag urges us to do so, [he made 
clear], then we will deal with the matter as a question of force and we will see who is the 
strongest.57  
 
This report shows that for Bismarck and the united governments the question of whether the 
Reich should deal with disputes from Mecklenburg was less a legal than a political issue. 
Their main focus was on preventing the creation of any precedent that would allow the federal 
parliament to require the states to reform their constitutions. From this perspective, it is no 
surprise that the Bundesrat only ever admitted two cases of intra-state conflict, both of which 
concerned merely technical questions of infrastructure and public finance in two rather 
insignificant states, namely Waldeck-Pyrmont and Lippe.58  
Matters were entirely different when two states got into conflict with each other. In such 
disputes, the main problem for the state governments was not to keep the Reichstag at bay, 
but to settle their disagreement in a way that was fair and avoided bad blood between them. 
This was not least a question of monarchical solidarity, which usually prevented the 
governments from confronting each other. Unity in the face of the parliamentary menace was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57  [‘Die ganze mecklenburgische Verfassungssache, so sagte der Fürst, gehöre nicht vor den Reichstag; man 
müsse dem im Prinzip durch Bestreitung der Kompetenz widerstehen. Er denke nicht daran, 
Verfassungsänderungen von solcher Tragweite zuzugeben; wenn der Reichstag in der Weise dränge, komme 
man bei der Frage der Gewalt und wer der Stärkste sei, an.’] Quoted in John, Die Entwicklung der beiden 
mecklenburgischen Staaten, p. 147. 
58  On these cases, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 95-7 and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, p. 
97. 
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the core of federal allegiance. Over the whole imperial era it thus happened only seven times 
that states took legal proceedings against each other.59  
But there was also another reason for the low number of cases. In one way or another, 
disputes between states often concerned the implementation of federal laws. With reference to 
the power of Reichsaufsicht, the Bundesrat could bring such cases under its control and 
decide them without the conflicting states entering official proceedings.60 This possibility 
practically put the council and – after the Prussian bench had been taken over by executives of 
the Reichsämter – the federal government around the Chancellor in charge of inter-state 
conflict, because it was easy for them to find a suitable pretext in the complex net of 
overlapping federal and state competences. In 1872, for example, the Bundesrat seized 
control of a dispute between Prussia and Hesse over the taxation of civil servants by referring 
to a federal law on the effects of double taxation.61 
Technical issues like taxation were typical subject-matters of inter-state conflicts. All of 
the seven disputes that were referred to the Bundesrat for resolution concerned very specific 
juridical problems, most often issues of territorial demarcation or property law. For a political 
organ like the Bundesrat, it was extremely difficult to deal with the legal complexity of such 
issues. The steadily increasing workload of the council made matters worse. Soon after 
unification, the Judiciary Committee – chaired by the Prussian minister of justice Heinrich 
von Friedberg – thus decided to establish a system of delegation. In 1877, the Committee used 
a conflict between Prussia and Saxony as opportunity to establish a precedent. By delegating 
the decision to the regional court of appeal in Lübeck and by accepting its judgment as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59  See the surveys in Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 52-64 and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 
85-91. 
60  On the priority of Reichsaufsicht, which flowed from the superiority of federal over constituent-state law, see 
Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 40f. and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, p. 83. 
61  Protokolle (DR), 1872, session 34, 21 June, § 390, p. 240. On this case, see Björner, 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, p. 51, fn. 259. 
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legally-binding, the Bundesrat made clear that from now on it would entrust specialised 
courts with resolving conflicts between states.62  
After the Imperial Court had been established in 1879 (see above), the council referred all 
such cases to this national judicial institution. This way, the Imperial Court became the 
customary constitutional court for inter-state conflicts. Although this development guaranteed 
states a fair trial, one cannot conclude – as some legal historians have done – that a system of  
‘modern constitutional jurisdiction’ evolved.63 There were two major problems. First, in cases 
that involved Prussia political power still trumped legal decisions. Due to Prussia’s 
hegemonic status in the union, no verdict could bind her government if it contradicted her 
fundamental interests. In a conflict with Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, for example, 
the Federal Commercial High Court ordered Prussia in 1878 to stop taxing a certain railroad 
company. Instead, the Prussian government not only continued to collect taxes, but even 
increased them. In the end, it settled the unnerving issue by simply buying all shares that the 
two Thuringian states held in the railway line.64 The message could hardly have been clearer: 
no matter what any court decided, Prussia could always get her will by relying on her 
political, economic, financial, and military superiority. It was only for reasons of Bundestreue 
that the Prussian government accepted arbitrational settlements in the great majority of cases. 
The second major problem of the customary jurisdiction of the Imperial Court was that the 
state governments did not like it. They usually preferred political compromise to the 
unpredictable verdict of the court in Leipzig. This is why they often either prevented conflicts 
from being delegated to the court by not bringing them up before the Bundesrat in the first 
place; or why they reached an agreement in the midst of official proceedings. The 
governments of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen and Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, for example, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62  Poschinger, Bundesrat, vol. 3, pp. 336-9. For the court ruling, see ‘Die Entscheidung des Lübecker Ober-
Apellations-Gerichts bezüglich der Berlin-Dresdener Eisenbahn’, Annalen, 1877, pp. 993–1010. On the case 
and the decision of the Judiciary Committee, see also Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 45, 56ff., 64ff. 
and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, p. 86. 
63  [‘moderne Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’] Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, p. 68. 
64  On this case, see ibid., pp. 52-6 and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikten, pp. 87-9. 
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made an arrangement about the allocation of the shared assets of the two princely houses just 
before the Bundesrat wanted to refer the case to the Imperial Court. The same happened in a 
conflict between Prussia and Mecklenburg about the damming of a lake.65 It therefore seems 
that if state governments entered legal proceedings, they only did so because they saw them as 
a means of expediting a political compromise. 
Nevertheless, the authority of the Imperial Court did greatly increase over the years. After 
the turn of the century, even states that settled disputes without the help of the Bundesrat 
routinely nominated it as arbitration court. In 1916, for example, Prussia and Brunswick 
followed this procedure in order to determine the distribution of revenues from a joint 
lottery.66  
Moreover, the customary jurisdiction of the Imperial Court was not limited to inter-state 
conflicts. The Leipzig court also evolved into the most important institution for the resolution 
of disputes between the national level and the states. But whether or not such cases were 
referred to the court dependent on one crucial factor: the political importance of the matter at 
stake. All cases that were brought before the court dealt with more or less trivial problems, for 
example the use of public buildings, the repair of a railway coach, the construction of a train 
tunnel, or the operation of a modern system of telegraphy by a commercial shipping line.67 
None of these issues was politically relevant. Whenever the Reich and a state fought over a 
question of greater significance, the federal executive and the monarchical governments took 
care that the court would not get involved, in particular if the special status of Prussia and/or 
the structural protection of monarchical sovereignty were concerned.  
This strategy and its consequences become clear if we consider three of the most intense 
conflicts that occurred between the Reich and Prussia. The 1877 federal judiciary act obliged 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65  On these two cases, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 59f., 60-2 and Bönnemann, 
Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 89f. 
66  On this case, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 63f. 
67  On these cases, see ibid., pp. 71-6 and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 98-101. 
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the states to create regional appeal courts.68 Bremen had difficulties meeting this obligation, 
because her population was too small to constitute a full judicial district. In order to solve this 
problem, the city-state asked Prussia to establish a joint district with parts of the neighbouring 
Prussian province of Hanover.69 Bismarck supported this plan. In the Bundesrat, Bremen had 
always been a reliable ally in the fight against parliamentary demands. Prussian help, 
Bismarck claimed, was thus a matter of Bundestreue.70 But most Prussian ministers rejected 
this idea. They maintained that this way of meeting obligations that arose from a federal law 
infringed upon Prussia’s sovereignty, because the states had the right to organise their judicial 
districts independently.71 The resulting conflict became so intense that at one point Bismarck 
threatened the Prussian cabinet with imposing a federal intervention on Prussia. With 
reference to the power of Reichsaufsicht, the Chancellor pointed out that he had to make sure 
that the states properly implemented federal laws. Due to this duty, he argued, he could 
assume no responsibility for Prussia’s refusal to cooperate with Bremen.72  
At the centre of this conflict, there were two fundamental questions about the confusing 
web of federal and state rights: could a federal law establish obligations whose fulfilment 
presupposed an intervention in state sovereignty? And did the Chancellor – the highest 
executive official of the union – generally have to give priority to federal interests, even 
though he was also prime minister of Prussia?  Only a court ruling could have clarified these 
issues. But Bismarck and the Prussian cabinet never even considered taking the conflict to 
court, because a verdict could have damaged Prussia’s structural hegemony. Driven by such 
fears, they eventually agreed on a political compromise. At the intercession of the Prussian 
government, Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck founded the Hanseatic Court of Appeal in 1879. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68  Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 27 January 1877, RGBl. (1877), no. 4, pp. 41-76. 
69  On this issue and the ensuing conflict, see Kersten Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus. Preußens 
staatsrechtliche Stellung im Deutschen Reich, Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Studien zur Deutschen 
Verfassungsgeschichte (Regensburg: Roderer, 1986), p. 94. 
70  See Bismarck’s letter to the Prussian Minister of Justice Adolph Leonhardt, 18 February 1877, printed in 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, no. 31, pp. 177-9. 
71  See the report by the Prussian State Minister without Portfolio and Federal State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Bernhard von Bülow, 19 October 1877, printed in ibid., no. 33, pp. 181-3. 
72  See Bismarck’s letter to the Prussian State Ministry, 15 November 1877, printed in ibid., no. 35, pp. 184-8. 
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The legal uncertainty about the inviolability of state sovereignty and the role of the 
Chancellor remained. This lack of clarity undermined the federal order greatly, not least 
because it provided fertile ground for more disputes of this kind.  
Conflicts about state sovereignty were most intense when it was the federal parliament that 
tried to intervene in the states. This was the case, for example, in the context of Prussia’s 
immigration policy in the 1880s.73 After the number of Polish immigrants to Prussia’s eastern 
provinces had risen sharply, the Prussian government decided in 1885 to expel 30 000 
Russian and Galician Poles. The Polish Party immediately turned to the Reichstag for help. 
On 1 December, a broad coalition of 155 MPs, ranging from the Centre Party to the Social 
Democrats, submitted an interpellation that asked the Chancellor to clarify what measures he 
intended to take against the deportation policy of the Prussian government.74  
As a reply, Bismarck read out a declaration on behalf of the Emperor that condemned the 
parliamentary initiative strongly. The interpellation was based on false assumptions, he 
argued, because it presumed that a federal government existed and that the Reichstag could 
require this government to control how the states dealt with their sovereign affairs. As the 
interpellation thus violated the constitution, he pointed out, the Emperor would take any 
measures – including military actions – necessary to protect the rights of the united 
governments against any further demands for intervention. In order to underline the 
seriousness of this warning, Bismarck and the present Bundesrat plenipotentiaries left the 
assembly room of the Reichstag immediately after his speech.75  
In the following budgetary debate, the liberal MPs – above all the constitutional lawyers 
Albert Hänel and Heinrich Marquardsen – exposed the ambiguity of the intervention practice !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73  On Prussia’s immigration policy, see William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality 
Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), especially chapter 5, 
pp. 118-58. For a good overview of the main issues, see Christopher M. Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and 
Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. 76-82. On the constitutional dimension of 
the conflict on immigration, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, pp. 458ff. and Rosenau, Hegemonie 
und Dualismus, p. 65f. 
74  Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1885, session 8, 1 December, p. 130. For the text of the interpellation, see 
Drucksachen (DR), 1885, vol. 1.2, no. 25.  
75  For the declaration, see Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1885, session 8, 1 December, pp. 130f. 
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of the federal executive. Moreover, they showed that there were several possible ways of 
inferring from the constitution a right of the Reich to stop Prussia’s deportation policy.76 
Without the decision of a court, however, their arguments came to nothing. For obvious 
reasons, the Prussian government had no interest in entering into legal proceedings with the 
Reichstag. Too great was the risk that a court could confirm that since the unification an 
independent federal government had developed and that the Reichstag had the right to ask this 
national cabinet to review the constitutionality of state policies. Such a verdict would not only 
have strengthened demands for making the Chancellor and the state secretaries 
parliamentarily responsible; but it would also have given the Reichstag the power to intervene 
in the states. Under these circumstances, Bismarck increased political pressure as much as 
possible and let the conflict peter out. The underlying legal questions were never solved. 
While the persistent ambiguity of the legal framework enabled the federal executive to 
continue to make interventions in the states dependent on whether or not they protected 
monarchical power, it was extremely harmful to the stability of the federal system. 
The electoral law of the Prussian House of Representatives too had a disruptive impact on 
federal government, as Chapter 3 has shown.77 From the end of the nineteenth century, 
criticism against the Prussian three-class franchise increased across most parties, because it 
produced much more conservative majorities than the liberal electoral law of the Reichstag, 
where by 1912 the Social Democrats had become the strongest party. These diverging 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76  Hänel derived the legitimacy of an intervention from the federal competence for the immigration police, 
while Marquardsen pointed to the federal power over all questions relevant to foreign policy. See ibid., pp. 
137-9, 141f. See also the analysis of the parliamentary debate by Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, p. 
487. 
77  For an overview of the Prussian electoral system, see Clark, Iron Kingdom, pp. 559-62, where he calls the 
three-class franchise a part of 'the residual federalism of the German system [that] ensured that Prussia 
retained its distinctive political institutions'. On the constitutional issues involved, see Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, pp. 374-9. 
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majorities made governing Germany extremely difficult, because the Chancellor – who also 
held the office of Prussian prime minister – had to cooperate with both parliaments.78  
In 1905, the Social Democrats introduced a motion into the Reichstag that proposed 
amending the constitution to the effect that each state would be obliged to have a parliament 
that was elected according to the standards of the federal electoral law.79 From a democratic 
perspective, the adoption of such a homogeneity requirement would not only have solved the 
franchise problem in Prussia, but it would also have forced the two Mecklenburg duchies to 
establish modern parliaments.  
There was no doubt that the social democratic proposal was well-founded, because the 
Reich could amend the constitution by an ordinary law any time.80 The central legal issue was 
a much more fundamental question: could a state be forced to change its electoral law in order 
to facilitate federal government? In light of Prussia’s hegemonic status and the 
interconnection of the Prussian and federal constitution, the Social Democrats and some 
liberals argued that electoral reform could be seen as a federal duty of Prussia towards the 
federation. The highest-ranking Prussian and federal executives, however, saw a conservative 
House of Representatives as an insurance against a further expansion of parliamentary power. 
For this reason, they insisted that a homogeneity requirement was incompatible with the 
sovereignty of the states. But they were under no illusion that the legal situation was very 
unclear. Hence, they took care that the debate would not be shifted from the parliament to the 
courtroom by mobilising the anti-socialist majority in the Reichstag, which defeated the 
motion.81 After this had happened to all such proposals over the following years, the Social !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78  See the remarks by the Prussian State Minister without Portfolio and federal State Secretary of the Interior 
Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner in the Reichstag. Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1906, session 37, 7 
February, pp. 1087-9.  
79  The motion ‘Gesetz, betreffend die Volksvertretung in den Bundesstaaten und in Elsaß-Lothringen’ can be 
found in Drucksachen (DR), 1905, vol. 1, no. 94. It is worth pointing out that the motion also tried to 
introduce women’s suffrage by granting the right to vote to all citizens older than twenty.  
80  RV (1871), art. 78. 
81  See Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1906, session 49, 21 February, pp. 1079ff. The final decline of the 
motion can be found on p. 1492. For a concise analysis of the different positions, see Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, p. 375. 
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Democrats eventually saw no other option but to take the protest against the three-class 
franchise to the streets. In spring 1910, they organised a series of demonstrations in Berlin 
that involved up to 250 000 participants.82  
These mass demonstrations were impressive manifestations of the fact that conflicts about 
important structural issues – such as the complex relationship between Prussia and the union 
or the extent of state sovereignty – were usually addressed by political rather than legal 
means. This problem became particularly obvious in two controversies that burdened the 
Empire for most of its lifetime: the succession conflicts in Brunswick and Lippe.83 These 
were different from other constitutional disputes because they involved dynasties rather than 
states, a feature that made conflict resolution more complicated rather than easier. In a union 
shaped by the confrontation of monarchical and parliamentary power, questions of succession 
and regency were naturally among the most sensitive issues.84  
This is why the devolution of the crowns in the two relatively unimportant Northwest 
German small states became an issue of national significance in the first place. But the precise 
circumstances of the conflicts were very different. In Brunswick, the throne became vacant in 
1884. According to the relevant house rules, the succession fell to the Duke of Cumberland 
who was the head of the Guelph family, the dynasty that had ruled Hanover until Prussia had 
annexed the kingdom in 1866. Even after the Guelphs had been disempowered and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82  See Bernd Jürgen Warneken, Als die Deutschen demonstrieren lernten: Das Kulturmuster ‘friedliche 
Strassendemonstration’ im preussischen Wahlrechtskampf 1908-1910 (Tübingen: Tübinger Vereinigung für 
Volkskunde, 1986). On the constitutional dimension, see Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, pp. 378f. 
83  The most authoritative studies on the two disputes are respectively Wilhelm Bringmann, Die 
braunschweigische Thronfolgefrage. Eine verfassungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung der Rechtmäßigkeit des 
Ausschlusses der jüngeren Linie des Welfenhauses von der Thronfolge in Braunschweig 1884-1913, 
Europäische Hochschulschriften. Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 377 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 
1988) and Anna Bartels-Ishikawa, Der Lippische Thronfolgestreit: eine Studie zu verfassungsrechtlichen 
Problemen des Deutschen Kaiserreiches im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Staatsrechtswissenschaft, 
Rechtshistorische Reihe 128 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1995). On the Lippe crisis, see also Elisabeth 
Fehrenbach, ‘Der lippische Thronfolgestreit’, in Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche Ordnung. 
Festschrift für Theodor Schieder, ed. Kurt Kluxen and Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Munich and Vienna: 
Oldenbourg, 1968), 337–55. For more concise examinations of the two conflicts, see Björner, 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 105-32; Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 104-9; and Huber, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, pp. 428-36. 
84  On the general nature of succession conflicts in the Empire, see Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 
101f. and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikten, p. 101. 
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expropriated, Bismarck continued to see them as Reichsfeinde, meaning as enemies of the 
union. He distrusted them not least because the Hanoverian members of the Reichstag – 
above all the leader of the Centre Party, Ludwig Windthorst – belonged to the most outspoken 
critics of Prussian hegemony. Due to the support that the Guelphs could have lent to this kind 
of opposition, Bismarck wanted to prevent them at all costs from regaining a German throne.  
In Lippe, the dynastic situation was more complicated. When Prince Woldemar died 
childless in 1895, the crown fell to his unmarried brother Karl Alexander who was mentally 
retarded and lived in an institution for the insane. Lippe thus needed a regent who would 
become the next prince after Karl Alexander’s death.  The three dynastic branches 
Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe-Biesterfeld, and Lippe-Weißenfeld each had legitimate claims to 
the throne. A nasty quarrel broke out, in which the Kaiser played a central role. William II’s 
sister was married to Adolf von Schaumburg-Lippe, whom Woldemar’s testament designated 
as heir. Encouraged by this provision, the Emperor was determined to exploit the crisis in 
order to provide his sister with the Lippe throne.  
The two local conflicts dragged the union into serious constitutional crises when the 
Bundesrat took action at the behest of Bismarck and William, respectively. Even though the 
constitution gave the Reich no explicit right to deal with dynastic disputes, the council – after 
some hesitation – excluded the Duke of Cumberland from the Brunswick succession and 
determined that it would choose a permanent heir apparent for Lippe, where an arbitration 
court had appointed a provisional regent, after Karl Alexander died.85 In order to justify these 
decisions, the Bundesrat referred to the ambiguous principles on which its general judicial 
competences were based. While the official declarations were rather technical in the Lippe 
case, those in the Brunswick conflict invoked federal duties and Bundestreue in very clear 
terms. The Duke of Cumberland was prohibited from ascending to the throne, the Bundesrat 
argued,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85  Protokolle (DR), 1885, session 29, 2 July, § 422, pp. 252f.; and 1899, session 1, 5 January, § 16, pp. 5-7. 
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because his relation to the federation contradicts the peace among the members of the union, 
which is guaranteed by the constitution, [and because] his claims to parts of the federal territory 
[namely Hanover] are incompatible with the basic principles of the unification treaties and the 
constitution.86 
 
It is striking that the Bundesrat could not cite any more specific reasons for its 
intervention. The lack of clarity shows that the whole procedure was politically motivated. 
The council came under enormous pressure in both cases. When it first hesitated to interfere 
in the Brunswick conflict because of the lack of a clear legal basis, Bismarck reminded it that 
it was ‘a political agency and no council of judges’. If it would not take measures against the 
Guelphs, he threatened, Prussia would simply annex Brunswick.87 The Emperor was no less 
determined. After an arbitration court had decided the Lippe dispute in favour of the Lippe-
Biesterfeld line, William encouraged his brother-in-law to challenge this verdict. The 
resulting protest note argued that Ernst zur Lippe-Biesterfeld could not succeed to the throne, 
because the mother of his wife had been a commoner and atheist.88 In order to demonstrate 
his support for this view, the Kaiser prohibited the troops that were stationed in Lippe from 
saluting Ernst.89 
William’s anger soon moved the Bundesrat to reopen the Lippe case. The priority of 
political interests over legal considerations was even more obvious in the Brunswick crisis. 
Here, the whole conflict was eventually resolved by a marital arrangement. In 1913, Ernst 
August of Cumberland married Victoria Louise of Prussia, William’s only daughter. In 
addition, he joined the Prussian army and swore an oath of allegiance to the Emperor – 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86  [‘da derselbe sich in einem dem reichsverfassungsmäßig gewährleisteten Frieden unter Bundesgliedern 
widerstreitenden Verhältnisse zu dem Bundesstaate befindet [und weil] die von ihm gelten gemachten 
Ansprüche auf Gebietsteile dieses Bundesstaates [...] mit den Grundprinzipien der Bündnisverträge und der 
Reichsverfassung nicht vereinbar [sind]’] Protokolle (DR), 1885, session 29, 2 July, § 422, pp. 252. 
87  [‘eine politische Behörde und kein Richter-Kollegium ist’] See Bismarck’s letter to the State Secretary of the 
Interior Karl Heinrich von Boetticher, 9 June 1885, printed in Bringmann, Die braunschweigische 
Thronfolgefrage, pp. 132f. 
88  Drucksachen (DR), 1898, vol. 1, no. 8. See also the remarks by Julius Lentzmann, liberal MP for 
Hagen/Westfalen, in Stenographische Berichte (DR), 1899, session 11, 17 January, p. 239.    
89  See Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 4, p. 435, fn. 58. 
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problem solved.90 A few months later, the Bundesrat decided on the initiative of the Prussian 
government that the peace of the union would no longer be at risk if Ernst August ascended to 
the Brunswick throne.91  
All this demonstrates that the settlement procedures of the two succession disputes were 
shaped by political pressure, threats, and deals rather than official proceedings, legal 
arguments, and court rulings. But the Lippe crisis, in particular, was also a turning point in the 
development of the conflict resolution system of the union. On the one hand, the case was the 
first major constitutional dispute in which external experts were directly involved in the 
resolution process. Some of the most important constitutional lawyers of the time – such as 
Paul Laband, Hermann Rehm, Max von Seydel, and Philipp Zorn – were asked to provide 
legal opinions on whether or not the Bundesrat had a right to deal with succession questions. 
Even though their reports did not have much influence on how the matter was handled, their 
involvement was a significant step towards the professionalisation of Germany’s dispute 
settlement procedures.92 
On the other hand, the legally doubtful intervention of the Bundesrat triggered massive 
protest from the Reichstag, the broader public, and even some officials from the states. Many 
used this occasion to criticise the judicial competences of the council more generally, arguing 
that the natural body to decide constitutional conflicts would be the Imperial Court.93 Under 
this public pressure, the three dynastic lines agreed in 1904 on an arbitration treaty that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90  See the protocol of the Prussian State Ministry, 16 October 1913, and Ernst August’s letter to Chancellor 
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 20 April 1913, both printed in Bringmann, Die braunschweigische 
Thronfolgefrage, pp. 211ff. 
91  For the Prussian motion, see Drucksachen (DR), 1913, vol. 2, no. 125. Also printed in Bringmann, Die 
braunschweigische Thronfolgefrage, pp. 212f. 
92  For bibliographical and archival details on the reports of the lawyers, see Bartels-Ishikawa, Der Lippische 
Thronfolgestreit, pp. XIII-XV. For a good overview of the complex juristic discussion, see Björner, 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, pp. 113-16 and Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikte, pp. 124-30.  
93  For a parliamentary reaction, see the speech by the liberal Julius Lentzmann in Stenographische Berichte 
(DR), 1899, session 11, 17 January, p. 236-42, especially p. 240. In the Bundesrat, Bavaria, Saxe-Meiningen, 
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Reuß ältere Linie, and Lippe voted against the intervention in the succession 
conflict. See Protokolle (DR), 1899, session 1, 5 January, § 16, pp. 5-7. Bartels-Ishikawa, Der Lippische 
Thronfolgestreit, pp. 174-221 shows which constitutional lawyers publicly opposed the intervention. Among 
them were Max von Seydel, Wilhelm Reutling, Wilhelm Kahl, Karl Binding, Heinrich Triepel, Walther 
Schücking, Felix Stoerck, and the entire law faculty of the University of Leipzig. 
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entrusted a group of judges from the court with a final decision on the succession.94 This 
conclusion of the longstanding conflict greatly bolstered the judicial authority of the Imperial 
Court while reducing that of the Bundesrat. Indeed, after the end of the Lippe controversy the 
council was never again asked to resolve a constitutional dispute. Instead, conflicting parties 
routinely concluded arbitration agreements from then on.95  
But it is important to keep things in perspective. The Lippe crisis did not turn the Imperial 
Court into a general constitutional court of the Empire. For this status, it lacked both the 
official constitutional basis and the scope of jurisdiction. The most important judicial 
competences still rested with the Bundesrat, even if it was no longer called upon to actually 
resolve conflicts. Moreover, the Imperial Court never evolved into an institution to which all 
matters of constitutional conflict were automatically referred. In particular, it did not gain any 
authority over those issues that were arguably most important for the development of the 
federal state: the relations between the federal constitutional organs and the constitutionality 
of laws.  
For the resolution of conflicts about these matters, the constitution did not establish any 
legal framework. As a result, such disputes were not decided by procedural rules, but solely 
by the power plays of the different actors in the political arena. In this context, the 
constitution and the federal nature of the union mattered little. The unrestrained character of 
the political process and the lack of judicial review thus contributed greatly to the gradual 
implosion of the federal order. 
This problem became manifest in the permanent struggle between the federal constitutional 
organs that we have seen in Chapter 3. Driven by the underlying confrontation of monarchical 
and parliamentary power, the Bundesrat, the Reichstag, the Emperor, the Chancellor, and – 
under the latter’s direction – the different branches of the federal administration fought !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94  Drucksachen (DR), 1904, vol. 2.2, no. 131. Protokolle (DR), 1904, session 38, 18 November, § 680, pp. 
370f. 
95  See Björner, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, p. 130. 
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constantly over competences that the constitution did not clearly allocate or that the growing 
centralisation of the union newly created. The central problem of such conflicts was that they 
could never be resolved. There was no institution with the power to decide with whom 
contested powers actually rested. Legal uncertainty about who had the right to do what was 
therefore a dominant feature of federal government.  
Bismarck tried to address this problem by strengthening the position of the Chancellor as 
much as possible. When quarrels between the different federal departments, the Reichsämter, 
greatly increased after the state secretaries had been made functional proxies of the 
Chancellor in 1878, he determined that all conflicts about matters of competence had to be 
referred to him.96 He underlined that ‘the constitution equipped only the Chancellor with the 
status of a responsible federal minister and – for this reason – with the direction of all matters 
that fall into the executive authority of the Emperor.’ From this, it followed, he argued, that 
‘the provisions of the constitution are sufficiently considered if the Chancellor makes a 
decision’ about unclear competences.97 The problem of this approach was that its success 
depended solely on the personal authority of the Chancellor. As Bismarck’s successors could 
not match him in this regard, the struggle for competences reached an entirely new level of 
intensity after his resignation. 
This was all the more problematic because the legal uncertainty that flowed from the lack 
of an adequate conflict resolution mechanism concerned not only technical competences of 
the federal bureaucracy, but also some of the most fundamental powers in the interplay of the 
monarchical executive and the parliamentary legislature. It was totally unclear, for example, 
who held the power to sanction laws. The constitution left the question open as to whether !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96  For the introduction of the proxies of the Chancellor, see Gesetz, betreffend die Vertretung des 
Reichskanzlers, 17 March 1878, RGBl. (1878), no. 4, pp. 7f. On the importance of the Proxy Law for the 
development of federal government, see Chapter 3. 
97  [‘Die Verfassung weist dem Reichskanzler allein die Stellung als des verantwortlichen Reichsministers zu 
und damit auch die Leitung der in der Regierungsgewalt des Kaisers liegenden Angelegenheiten.’], [‘Den 
Bestimmungen der Verfassung ist stets Genüge geleistet, sobald eine Entscheidung des Reichskanzlers 
ergangen ist’] Bismarck’s letter to the state secretaries of the Federal Department for Postal Affairs and the 
Federal Treasury, Heinrich von Stephan and Emil von Burchard, 10 June 1883, printed in Gesammelte 
Werke, vol. 5, no. 356, pp. 460f. 
Chapter V 
Conflict 
 
273!
pieces of federal legislation obtained legal force as soon as the Bundesrat and the Reichstag 
had enacted them; or whether they first needed to be promulgated by the Emperor. This issue 
was important because according to one reading of it the Kaiser had the power to veto laws. It 
was generally accepted that he could stop a law for formal reasons. Most constitutional 
lawyers even argued that he was obliged to check whether laws had come into being 
according to the constitutionally determined process of legislation. But it was a matter of 
great controversy whether he could prevent laws from entering into force with reference to 
their material content.98   
As there was no constitutional court that could have confirmed or rejected the existence of 
such a political veto, the federal decision-making process created precedents in its own right. 
The most important incident occurred in 1880 when the Bundesrat amended a reform of the 
postage law against the votes of the Prussian, Bavarian, and Saxon governments. In response 
to this decision, Bismarck handed in his resignation, arguing that he could not assume the 
responsibility for a bill that had been adopted without the approval of the three biggest 
German states. William I did not accept this move. Instead of appointing a new chancellor 
who would countersign the bill and would thus enable him to promulgate it, the Emperor 
ordered Bismarck to resolve the conflict. Under this pressure, the Bundesrat revised the law 
according to Bismarck’s wishes only four days later. In this manner, the Emperor had 
successfully forced material changes to the bill.99  
Such an intervention was very unusual. It happened on only one further occasion that the 
Emperor vetoed a law on political grounds. In the few months of his reign, the liberally-
minded Frederick III tried to prevent an extension of the Anti-Socialist Laws and a reform of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98  For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Oliver F. R. Haardt, ‘The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-
1918)’, German History 34, no. 4 (2016), pp. 542-5, on which the following section is based. The article can 
be found in the appendix of this thesis. 
99  Ibid., pp. 542f. 
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the legislative period of the Reichstag.100 Due to the lack of any other relevant cases, most 
contemporary lawyers concluded that the Emperor did not officially possess a political veto, 
because such a customary power could only evolve by constant practice.101  
But this theoretical view missed the point. Whether or not a customary veto power actually 
emerged over the years was irrelevant. No one could prevent the Emperor from refusing to 
promulgate a law. Moreover, there was no institution that could declare a political veto 
invalid.102  For these reasons, the postage case was ‘a precedent with grave implications for 
the development of the organic relations between the authority of the Emperor and the 
legislature’, as Albert Hänel put it.103  The fact that William had successfully stopped a law 
on political grounds gave the office of the Emperor a pre-emptive influence on legislation. 
When preparing and negotiating laws after the postage case, the Bundesrat, Reichstag, state 
secretaries, and Chancellor had to take into account the possibility of the Emperor vetoing 
their plans once again, meaning they had to consider his basic interests, whether they liked it 
or not. This made the legislative process much more complicated, in particular under William 
II.  His habit of sporadically intervening in federal government made a veto against any bill a 
real possibility, above all in those fields that captured his interest, such as colonial or naval 
affairs. By thus moving the legislative and administrative bodies of the union to pursue or 
refrain from pursuing a certain course, the Kaiser enjoyed an indirect influence over federal 
legislation that must be seen as an important factor in his attempt to personally control 
national politics.104  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100  Tim Ostermann, Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung des Deutschen Kaisers nach der Reichsverfassung von 
1871 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009), p. 148f. 
101  See for example Conrad Bornhak, ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung des deutschen Kaiserthums’, Archiv 
für öffentliches Recht 8 (1893), pp. 155f. 
102  See Richard Fischer, Das Recht des Deutschen Kaisers (Berlin: Moeser, 1895), p. 158, Mohl, Das deutsche 
Reichsstaatsrecht. Rechtliche und politische Erörterungen, pp. 292-4, and especially Walter Frormann, ‘Die 
Beteiligung des Kaisers an der Reichsgesetzgebung’, Archiv Für Öffentliches Recht 14 (1899), p. 91. 
103  [‘ein Präzedenzfall, der für die Entwicklung des organischen Verhältnisses zwischen der kaiserlichen Gewalt 
und der Gesetzgebung gewichtig ist’] Albert Hänel, Die organisatorische Entwicklung der Deutschen 
Reichsverfassung, Studien zum Deutschen Staatsrechte, 2.1 (Leipzig: Haessel, 1880), p. 53. 
104  Haardt, ‘The Kaiser in the Federal State (1871-1918)’, p. 545. 
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This influence could have been limited only if the power to sanction laws had been clearly 
allocated to one of the legislative organs, for example by the decision of a constitutional 
court. As there was no such institution, many fundamental questions about the relations 
between the main federal bodies were never clarified. This lack of legal certainty enabled the 
conflict between monarchical and parliamentary power to completely change the functions 
and powers of the constitutional organs, as Chapter 3 has shown, with the result that a 
national government emerged under the Chancellor; that the federal parliament increasingly 
held this government responsible; and that the council of states became totally marginalised 
by this development. It was therefore not least the lack of an institution with the power to 
delimit competences that made Germany’s transformation into a unitary state possible in the 
first place.  
In retrospect, then, Bismarck was wrong when he claimed that a national constitutional 
court would inevitably be a danger for the independence of the states. Rather, it seems that 
such an institution could have offered them some degree of protection against the gradual 
centralisation of Germany. This appears even more likely when we consider the consequences 
of the fact that there was no practice of reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws. 
Ironically, it was the Imperial Court that declared in the 1880s that a process of judicial 
review did not exist. No judge had the right to check whether the provisions of federal laws 
violated the constitution and – if they did – to annul them. As long as the rules of the 
legislative process had been observed, no law could be revoked. The legal validity of laws 
thus depended on nothing but the political compromise between the constitutional organs.105  
Due to this lack of judicial review, federal laws constantly broke the constitution. A good 
example can be found in the field of finance, an area that was fiercely contested between the 
federal executive, the states, and the Reichstag. When Germany turned to protectionist 
economic policies in 1878/79, it was unclear what should be done with the additional revenue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105  On the lack of judicial review and the relevant decisions by the Imperial Court, see the analysis by 
Bönnemann, Verfassungskonflikten, pp. 110-14.  
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that flowed from the newly introduced tariffs. The state governments and most of the 
parliamentary parties were unwilling to leave the entire surplus to the federal executive. 
While the state governments wanted to preserve the financial dependence of the Reich on the 
states, the Reichstag feared that granting the federal executive an independent financial basis 
could encroach upon the budgetary powers of the parliament. At the suggestion of the whip of 
the Centre Party, Georg Arbogast von und zu Franckenstein, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag 
eventually introduced a system of redistribution – as we have seen in Chapter 3 – that limited 
the amount of revenue from federal customs and duties payable to the Reich to 130 million 
marks; everything beyond that would go to the states.106  
This so-called Franckenstein Clause violated the constitution not in one, but in three ways. 
First, it divided the revenue from customs and duties between the different levels of 
government, even though the constitution determined that it had to flow to the federal 
treasury.107 Second, it supplied the states with a surplus from sources that actually had to be 
used for the federal budget.108 Third, it continued a system of financial redistribution between 
the Reich and the states that the constitution had designated as a provisional practice.109  
It is worth noting that this grossly unconstitutional law was proposed by an MP rather than 
one of the state governments, because this fact shows that not only monarchical, but also 
parliamentary actors felt free to compromise the constitution if it served political interests. 
This readiness on all sides to adopt unconstitutional laws could have momentous 
consequences. As the Franckenstein Clause capped federal revenues from customs and duties, 
it kept the Reich financially dependent on the states for many years and prevented the 
gradually emerging national government from profiting fully from the staggering growth that 
set in after the end of the economic depression in 1896. After the turn of the century, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106  Gesetz, betreffend den Zolltarif des Deutschen Zollgebiets und den Ertrag der Zölle und der Tabacksteuer, 
15 July 1879, RGBl. (1879), no. 27, § 8, p. 244. 
107  RV (1871), art. 38. 
108  Ibid., art. 70. 
109  Ibid. On these violations of the constitution, see Rosenau, Hegemonie und Dualismus, p. 101. 
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situation led to a squeeze on the federal budget that made many senior members of the 
General Staff and the War Ministry so nervous about Russia’s and France’s military 
expansion, as Niall Ferguson has demonstrated, that they hoped war would come sooner 
rather than later and that they were willing to contemplate a pre-emptive strike before the 
financial constraints of the Reich would make Germany incapable of defending herself.110 
The adoption of a law that violated the basic financial provisions of the constitution thus 
created conditions that directly contributed to the outbreak of World War I. It is hard to 
imagine the lack of judicial review giving rise to a more dramatic consequence.  
However, the Franckenstein Clause was rather unusual. Most federal laws did not 
strengthen, but weakened the position of the states. In the absence of a constitutional court, 
even the most basic constitutional provisions about Germany’s federal nature were not 
immune from political compromises. This lack of protection proved fatal for the 
independence of the states. After the Bundesrat had been brought under the control of the 
federal administration, the state governments no longer played a central role in the national 
decision-making process. Federal legislation now depended solely on what the national 
parliament and the different federal departments around the Chancellor agreed upon. These 
unitary bodies usually cared little about the genuine interests of the states. This was 
particularly true for the Reichstag. Except for the confederate Centre Party and the 
Conservatives, all major parties had a one-sided national orientation, because it was much 
easier to hold the government of a centralised state responsible. From this perspective, it 
seems that the adoption of laws that undermined the constitutionally guaranteed status of the 
states was part of the strategy that the parties pursued in order to bring about parliamentary 
government. 
However, the most obvious infringement of the federal constitution actually happened on 
the initiative of the executive rather than of the parliament: the gradual expansion of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110  Niall Ferguson, ‘Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War 
Revisited’, Past and Present 142 (1994): 141–68. 
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federal ministerial apparatus, an institution that according to the constitution should never 
have existed. The creation of new federal agencies was an exclusive right of the Bundesrat.111 
But most of the new Reichsämter – such as the Kanzleramt, the Federal Treasury, and the 
Federal Department for Postal Affairs – were founded by way of decrees (see Table 3 in 
Chapter 3) that the Emperor issued as head of the federal administration.112 As the Bundesrat 
had no say in this process, such decrees lacked any constitutional basis. Nevertheless, the 
Reichstag approved them tacitly. The reason was simple: the smooth creation of a growing 
number of individual ministries was a big step toward the introduction of parliamentary 
government.  
The expansion of the federal administration was only one field of many where the federal 
executive and the Reichstag reached political compromises at the expense of the states. In 
fact, this became the rule rather than exception after Bismarck’s resignation. The laws that 
thus came into being routinely violated the constitution not only by disregarding the federal 
character of the union, but also by dissolving power-dividing structures more directly. The 
fiscal laws of the 1900s and 1910s, which Chapter 3 has examined, are a case in point. The 
reform of the inheritance tax, the introduction of a capital gains tax, and other measures not 
only infringed upon the constitutionally guaranteed monopoly of the states on direct taxation, 
but – as a result – also diminished the importance of the old confederate system of subsidy 
payments from the states, thus greatly reducing the influence of the state governments in 
national-decision-making. 
As the example of the fiscal reforms illustrates, the adoption of unconstitutional laws led to 
a gradual erosion of the federal order. From this perspective, the lack of judicial review was a 
central structural precondition for the centralisation that Germany underwent. If there had 
been a constitutional court with the power to annul legislative measures that violated the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111  RV (1871), art. 7.2. 
112  On this issue, see Rudolf Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890, Neue 
Münstersche Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957), especially p. 313. 
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rights of the states, Germany would probably have remained a decentralised union – a 
scenario that would have changed the course of both German and international history.  
This consideration highlights the importance of the union’s peculiar system of conflict 
resolution for the development of imperial politics. What made this impact so problematic 
was that in the tense atmosphere of the struggle between monarchical and parliamentary 
forces, the replacement of legal with political mechanisms of dispute settlement, the absence 
of an institution with the power to delimit competences, and the lack of judicial review could 
turn any legal issue into a question of power. This politicisation of legal problems gradually 
undermined the constitution to the point where it no longer provided a stable framework of 
rules and procedures. The constitution lost its stability-enhancing function, with the 
consequence that it could not guarantee the federal organisation of Germany.   
The clearest symptom of this problem was that even allegedly insignificant legal problems 
regularly developed into conflicts that called the continued existence of the whole federal 
order into question. A case in point is the 1880 dispute between Prussia and Hamburg over 
the integration of St. Pauli and Altona, two districts of the Hanseatic city, into the German 
customs area.113  While the Prussian government based a motion to this effect on the right of 
the Bundesrat to define Germany’s custom’s frontier, the Hamburg Senate argued that a 
forced accession to the customs union would violate its constitutionally guaranteed right to a 
free harbour.114 In order to determine which of these arguments had priority, Hamburg 
proposed appealing to the Constitutional Committee of the Bundesrat, a body that had largely 
been inactive since unification.115 
For Bismarck, the Committee ‘had always been a bête noire’, as the Bavarian Bundesrat 
plenipotentiary Hugo von und zu Lerchenfeld-Köfering observed, because he saw any 
institution that could potentially evolve into a constitutional court as a threat to Prussian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113  On this case, see Binder, Reich, pp. 134-40; Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 73-7, 276f.; and Rosenau, Hegemonie 
und Dualismus, pp. 58-60. 
114  RV (1871), art. 7.2, 34. For the Prussian motion, see Drucksachen (DR), 1880, vol. 2, no. 86. 
115  See Drucksachen (DR), 1880, vol. 2, no. 90. 
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hegemony and monarchical power.116 He thus made every effort to prevent the creation of a 
precedent that would give the Committee the right to interpret the constitution. His basic 
strategy was to put the state governments in the Bundesrat under so much pressure that they 
would refrain from referring the case to the Committee. For this purpose, he not only 
threatened them with his resignation, but also attacked them more directly.117  After a 
Bavarian plenipotentiary had proposed adjourning the negotiations, Bismarck used an official 
dinner party as an opportunity to insult him so severely that he was forced to abandon his post 
the next day.118 When the Lippe government still continued to oppose the Chancellor, he 
instructed the Prussian envoy in Detmold, the capital of the small principality, to remind the 
local ministers that ‘one day it will be payback time’.119  
Bismarck’s sharpest weapon, however, was the threat that Prussia could leave the union. 
He reminded the Constitutional Committee of Prussia’s withdrawal from the German 
Confederation by declaring that ‘a situation could arise for Prussia similar to the one she 
faced in the Bundestag in June 1866’.120 In order to underline the seriousness of this threat, he 
ordered the Prussian envoys at the German courts to warn the state governments that if they 
rejected Prussia’s motion in the Bundesrat, this decision would violate the constitution, annul 
the unification treaties, and dissolve the union.121  
Driven by the fear that they might lose Prussia as their protecting power, the state 
governments eventually gave in and refrained from referring the case to the Committee. In the 
end, the conflict was resolved by a political compromise rather than a legal decision. While 
Altona joined the German customs area, St. Pauli remained a part of Hamburg’s free 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116  [‘rotes Tuch’] Quoted in Binder, Reich, p. 135. 
117  On Bismarck’s threat of resigning in this context, see Goldschmidt, Kampf, p. 74. 
118  For the details of this episode, see Binder, Reich, pp. 136-41. 
119  [‘Der Zeitpunkt uns dessen zu erinnern, wird gelegentlich eintreten.’] Bismarck’s letter to the Prussian envoy 
in Oldenburg Prinz zu Ysenburg, 9 May 1880, printed in Goldschmidt, Kampf, p. 276. 
120  [‘daß daraus für Preußen eine Lage entstehen könne wie diejenige, in der es sich im Juni 1866 im Bundestag 
befand’] Quoted in Poschinger, Bundesrat, vol. 4, p. 227 and in Binder, Reich, p. 136.  
121  See Bismarck’s letter to the Prussian envoy in Oldenburg Prinz zu Ysenburg, 9 May 1880, printed in 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, p. 276. 
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harbour.122 The striking feature of the whole process that brought this decision about was that 
Bismarck’s threat did not provoke any major protest. This lack of dissent shows that a 
potential dissolution of the union was not only an effective means of applying political 
pressure, but also a contingency whose plausibility was widely accepted. It was commonly 
understood that the federal organisation of Germany was a subject-matter just like any other 
and could thus be modified or even abolished in the course of any conflict. There was no 
guarantee of Germany’s federal nature, then, because the dissolution of the union was not a 
taboo. Rather, it was seen as a measure of last resort that could legitimately be applied in 
order to decide a constitutional dispute.  
For obvious reasons, this understanding was particularly important for the monarchical 
governments and their fight against growing parliamentary influence. The idea that the federal 
constitution depended on the unification treaties could easily be manipulated for the 
protection of monarchical power. Bismarck was most outspoken about this strategy when his 
authority crumbled in spring 1890. After the federal elections of that year, in which his 
Kartell coalition lost the majority and the Social Democrats became the strongest party in 
terms of the popular vote, his relationship with the majority parties in the Reichstag had 
become so difficult that he was about to lose the confidence of the new Emperor William II. 
In this situation, the Chancellor saw no other option but to propose a coup d’état that would 
eliminate the Reichstag.123 Before the Prussian cabinet, he elaborated on his old argument 
that Germany was a union of princes rather than states. As the monarchs had concluded the 
unification treaties, he maintained, they also had the right to terminate them and to thus 
dissolve the federation. In order to do so, the Prussian king could abdicate as German 
Emperor and – together with all the other princes – withdraw from the treaties. After that, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122  Protokolle (DR), 1880, session 26, 22 May, § 369, p. 266. 
123  On Bismarck’s plans for a coup d’état, see Michael Stürmer, ‘Staatsstreichgedanken im Bismarckreich’, HZ 
209, no. 3 (1969): 566–615 and Egmont Zechlin, Staatsstreichpläne Bismarcks und Wilhelms II. 1890-1894 
(Stuttgart & Berlin: Cotta, 1929). On the wider federal context, see Binder, Reich, pp. 156-63 and 
Goldschmidt, Kampf, pp. 75, 91f. 
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Bismarck pointed out, the princes could found a new pan-German state that would either not 
establish a national parliament at all or, if it did, would equip the popular assembly with much 
fewer rights than the Reichstag.124  
The growing rift between the Kaiser and the Chancellor, which led to the latter’s 
resignation two weeks later, prevented this plan from being implemented. However, already 
the fact that Bismarck and the Prussian cabinet considered this coup d’état a serious option 
shows that the lack of well-defined legal channels for the resolution of constitutional conflicts 
– in particular between the monarchical executives and the parliaments – was crucial to the 
collapse of the union. As the few structures that existed for the settlement of such disputes 
had distinctly political origins, they could not shield the federal order from the widespread 
reservations against it. Any conflict could thus put the federal nature of Germany up for 
discussion. These circumstances greatly facilitated the gradual implosion of the federal order 
and paved the way for Germany’s transformation into a centralised state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124  Protocol of the Prussian State Ministry, 2 March 1890, printed in Zechlin, Staatsstreichpläne Bismarcks und 
Wilhelms II. 1890-1894, pp. 180ff. 
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Figure 17: Liberal and Monarchical Concepts of Bundestreue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Rudolf Smend’s Concept of Bundestreue, 1916 
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Picture 4: Niederwalddenkmal in Rüdesheim 
 
 
 
Picture 5: Equestrian statue of William I in Koblenz 
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Picture 6: Crests of the German states on the plinth of the Germania statue (Niederwalddenkmal) 
 
 
 
 
Picture 8: German Corner  (Deutsches Eck) in Koblenz 
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Picture 8: Inscription above the main entrance of the Reichstag 
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Along the Rhine, the most German of all rivers, there are two great monuments to 
national unification. In the vineyards above Rüdesheim, a small town close to Mainz, a 38-
meter high figure of Germania – the female personification of the German nation – 
commemorates the successful campaign against France and the foundation of the Empire in 
1870/71 (see Picture 4). Seventy kilometres to the north, where the Mosel river joins the 
Rhine at Koblenz, the post-war reconstruction of a similarly imposing equestrian statue of 
William I has been converted into a memorial to the 1989/90 reunification and the victims of 
German partition (see Picture 5).  
Originally built between the 1870s and 1890s, the two monuments are prime examples of 
the propagation of German nationalism in the imperial era. Flanked by the angels of war and 
peace, Germania holds the recovered crown of the emperor in her right hand, while resting 
her left hand on the Imperial Sword. Beneath her, a large bronze relief shows the nation’s 
baptism of fire: the departure of the Prussian king and his allies to the battlefield. This scene 
is further emotionalised by an engraving of the anti-French patriotic anthem ‘Watch on the 
Rhine’.1 The Koblenz memorial too shows ‘William the Great’, as a large inscription says, 
riding into battle. He is accompanied by a female angel who carries the imperial crown and a 
laurel wreath. Directly beneath the Emperor, an ornamental frieze quotes the final verse of the 
poem ‘Spring Greetings to the Fatherland’, which the local poet Max von Schenkendorf 
composed during the Wars of Liberation: ‘Never shall the Reich be destroyed, so long as you 
are one and loyal!’2  
The two monuments convey an image of the Empire as a national monarchy characterised 
by military strength, cultural superiority, and political unity. But they also point to a feature 
that is overshadowed by all the imperial pomp, namely Germany’s federal nature. Germania 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Max Schneckenburger, Die Wacht am Rhein, 1840. On the anthem, see the contemporary account by Georg 
Scherer and Franz Lipperheide, eds., Die Wacht am Rhein, das deutsche Volks- und Soldatenlied des Jahres 
1870: mit Portraits, Facsimiles, Musikbeilage, Uebersetzungen etc (Berlin: Lipperheide, 1871). 
2  [‘Nimmer wird das Reich zerstöret,/ Wenn ihr einig seid und treu!’] Max von Schenkendorf, Frühlingsgruß 
an das Vaterland, 1814. 
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stands on a plinth that is decorated with the crests of the different German states (see Picture 
6). The nation rests on a union of states that was formed in the war against France – this is the 
message of the overall composition of the monument. The federal dimension of Germany is 
just as central to the reconstruction of the German Corner (Deutsches Eck) in Koblenz. After 
the statue of the Emperor was destroyed at the end of the Second World War, the first 
president of the Federal Republic, Theodor Heuss, had it replaced by a German flag that flew 
over the remains of the socle as a memorial to German unity. In order to further underline this 
change of function, the crests of the German states, including those of the former East-Elbian 
territories, were installed around the ruin. When East and West Germany reunited in 1990, the 
memorial became obsolete. Remodelling started on the very same day the reunification 
treaties were signed. The crests of the five East German states were added to the others and 
three concrete chunks of the Berlin Wall were installed next to them. Following controversial 
discussions, a replica of the equestrian statue – donated by a local publisher – was re-erected 
in 1993, on the anniversary of the Battle of Sedan. A few years later, the plaza was 
surrounded along the riverside by a big national tricolour and the flags of the sixteen German 
states (see Picture 7). After this sophisticated redevelopment, the entire area appears today as 
a complex ensemble of memorial culture that comes to terms with Germany’s long history of 
empire, division, and war by emphasising regional diversity rather than national 
homogeneity.3  
When facing the two monuments, it is easy to overlook these references to Germany’s 
federal nature. The imposing features of the memorials are the towering figure of Germania !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  On the Niederwaldenkmal in Rüdesheim, see Reinhard Alings, Monument und Nation: das Bild vom 
Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal: zum Verhältnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-
1918 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), pp. 167ff.; Hans A. Pohlsander, National Monuments and Nationalism in 
19th Century Germany (Oxford: Lang, 2008), chapter 7, especially pp. 160ff.; and Lutz Tittel, Das 
Niederwalddenkmal: 1871 - 1883 (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1979). On the German Corner in Koblenz, see 
Heinz Peter Volkert, Das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Denkmal am Deutschen Eck in Koblenz, 2nd ed. (Koblenz: Görres, 
1993); Marco Zerwas, Lernort ‘Deutsches Eck’. Zur Variabilität geschichtskultureller Deutungsmuster 
(Berlin: Logos, 2015); and Bill Niven, ‘The Legacy of Second Empire Memorials after 1945’, in 
Memorialization in Germany since 1945, ed. Bill Niven and Chloe Paver (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 399–408. On both monuments, see Klaus Bemmann, Deutsche Nationaldenkmäler und Symbole im 
Wandel der Zeiten (Göttingen: MatrixMedia, 2007), chapters 10-11. 
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and the equestrian statue of William, two symbols of national strength, imperial might, and 
the Empire’s claim to power after the heroic age of unification. This prioritisation is no 
coincidence. Throughout the lifetime of the Empire, its federal organisation was at the mercy 
of power interests.  
 
The Anatomy of Power 
 
The struggle between monarchical and parliamentary power, this thesis has argued, was 
the driving factor behind Germany’s gradual transformation from a decentralised union into a 
centralised state. It was the struggle for and against the introduction of parliamentary 
government that determined the course of federal evolution. More clearly than anywhere else, 
this relationship is reflected in the decoration of the most famous building of the imperial era: 
the Reichstag in Berlin. Above the main entrance, the façade is adorned with a frieze that 
reads ‘Dem Deutschen Volke’ – ‘For the German people’ (see Picture 8). This inscription was 
installed only in 1916, more than twenty years after the parliamentary palace had been built. 
The reason for this delay was the opposition of the Emperor. William II despised the epigram, 
because it evoked notions of popular sovereignty. He preferred the alternative ‘Der Deutschen 
Einigkeit’ – ‘For German Unity’. By referring to the states rather than people, this 
formulation expressed the sovereignty of the princes. Over two decades, politicians and public 
commentators engaged in a fierce debate. It was the world war that eventually brought about a 
decision. In order to appease the growing dissatisfaction with the imperial monarchy, several 
officials urged William to change his mind. One day after the Kaiser had given in, the 
democratic motto was added to the façade. Its installation marked not only the breakthrough 
of parliamentary government, but also the collapse of the old federal order.4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  On the history of the inscription, see Michael S. Cullen's book Der Reichstag - Parlament, Denkmal, Symbol, 
2nd ed. (Berlin: be.bra, 1999), pp. 44-6 and his essay ‘“Still zu erledigen”. Die Inschrift am 
Reichstagsgebäude’, in ‘Dem Deutschen Volke’. Die Geschichte der Berliner Bronzegießer Loevy. Katalog 
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As one of the most eye-catching features of the Reichstag building, the frieze is a powerful 
reminder of how closely the dissolution of federal structures was intertwined with the 
emergence of parliamentary government. The development of the federal state was the basic 
framework of the Empire’s political history. Not everything was about federal evolution; but 
federal evolution was about everything.  
This dissertation has shown that the Germany that fought the First World War was 
fundamentally different from the Germany that had been founded in 1871. Over the four and a 
half decades in between, the Empire changed from a rather confederate union that did not 
even feature a national government into a centralised state that was shaped by the cooperation 
and competition of the federal administration and the Reichstag. The course of this 
development was complex. The states lost more and more competences to the national level. 
Prussia ceased to determine the direction of German politics. The Prussian executive became 
completely dominated by its federal counterpart, which reduced the former hegemon to an 
instrument of national government. Unification did not mark the greatest triumph, but the 
approaching death of Prussia. The monarchical state governments, under Bismarck the prime 
movers of federal government, became marginalised by the increasing interaction between the 
federal administration and the parliament. They eventually sank into insignificance when the 
Chancellor stopped being their spokesman. He became instead the centre of a comprehensive 
government bureaucracy that practically formed an imperial cabinet, which the Reichstag !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
zur Ausstellung im Jüdischen Museum Berlin, ed. Helmuth F. Braun (Cologne: Dumont, 2003), 98–115. See 
also Neil MacGregor, Germany. Memories of a Nation (London: Penguin, 2016), p. 547. In the twenty-first 
century, the inscription has become subject to a new controversy. As it suggests that the nature of the people 
in Germany is homogenously German, various politicians have suggested removing it, including the former 
Federal President Roman Herzog. In 2000, the parliament invited the conceptual artist Hans Haacke to install 
an alternative inscription in one of the interior courts of the Reichstag. His slogan 'Der Bevölkerung' – ‘For 
the Population’ – dedicates the parliamentary building to all people living in Germany, regardless of their 
citizenship. See the official description on the website of the Bundestag, 'Hans Haake. Projekt "Der 
Bevölkerung" im Reichstagsgebäude', http://www.bundestag.de/besuche/kunst/kuenstler/haacke/ (first 
retrieved 10 April 2017) and the interview by Vera Stahl, ‘Hans Haacke: “Der Reichstag ist ein imperialer 
Palast”’, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 12 September 2000, http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/hans-haacke-der-
reichstag-ist-ein-imperialer-palast-a-92860.html (first retrieved 10 April 2017). On the meaning of the 
inscription for the notion of  ‘the people’, see the article by the President of the German Parliament Norbert 
Lammert, ‘Wer sind wir?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January 2017, available online 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/lammert-ueber-identitaet-wer-sind-wir-14604613.html (first 
retrieved 10 April 2017). 
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managed with ever-greater success to hold responsible. The position of the Kaiser improved 
greatly. Originally merely the primus inter pares among the German princes, he grew into a 
national monarch who had the power to intervene in the federal decision-making process. In 
short: the Reich evolved from a weak and underdeveloped federation that depended on the 
states and had merely coordinating functions into a mighty, centralised great power that 
possessed a fully-fledged executive apparatus, featured an increasingly self-confident national 
parliament, and had at its disposal the entire political, economic, and military resources of the 
nation. 
What was special about this development? How does the evolution of the imperial union 
compare to that of the two other great federal states of the nineteenth-century, the United 
States and Switzerland? This conclusion cannot offer a full-scale comparison; such an 
analysis would be a book in its own right. What it can do, however, is point out some of the 
main differences. Most fundamental among these was the monarchical rather than republican 
nature of Germany. The Empire was the only union that faced the challenge of combining 
monarchical and federal government – and it failed utterly. Even Bismarck, the master of 
statecraft, did not find a working formula that managed to reconcile monarchical sovereignty 
– which, by definition, was inseparable – with the power-dividing nature of a federal state. 
His attempt to make the organisational paradox of a federal union of sovereign princes work 
was unsuccessful. The federal structures he created and the monarchical form of government 
they were designed to protect started dissolving as soon as the ink under the constitution was 
dry. Already before the outbreak of the world war, the federal order had largely imploded. 
The ‘mission’ that the legal historian Georg Waitz had defined for Germany after the 1848 
revolutions, namely ‘to develop the constitutional monarchy in the form of a federal state’, 
turned out to be impossible.5  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  [‘Beruf [...] die konstitutionelle Monarchie in der Form des Bundesstaates zu entwickeln’] Georg Waitz, 
“Das Wesen des Bundesstaates. Reden und Betrachtungen von J. v. Radowitz,” Allgemeine Monatsschrift für 
Wissenschaft und Literatur, 1853, 494–530, printed in Fenske, Reichsgründung, no. 18, p. 91. 
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In fact, the monarchical nature of the federal order was the main reason for its 
disintegration. The transformation of Germany into a centralised state came about, this thesis 
has argued, because both monarchical and parliamentary actors – above all the Prussian 
government, the federal bureaucracy, and the Reichstag – saw the federal order primarily as 
an instrument that they tried to manipulate for their own purposes, namely for either the 
preservation of princely prerogatives or the expansion of parliamentary rights. Federal 
evolution was driven by power interests rather than by law and constitutionality. In order to 
achieve political goals, federal structures were modified, twisted, or even abolished without 
much ado.  
The princely governments considered Germany’s federal organisation merely a device for 
the protection of monarchical sovereignty. They agreed to unification only because it set up a 
structural framework that secured their power to the greatest extent possible in a national 
state. For the same reason, the Reichstag understood the federal structures of the constitution 
as the main obstacle to the introduction of parliamentary government. The status of the 
Bundesrat, in particular, shielded the Chancellor and the federal administration from 
parliamentary control. Under the impression of the failure of the 1848 Frankfurt Constitution, 
however, the parliament decided to approve the constitution, first in 1867 and then again in 
1871 – too great was the risk that there would never be a better chance of establishing a 
German nation state. While the state governments and the Reichstag thus looked at the federal 
system from two completely different angles, both saw it as a necessary evil.   
Attitudes toward federalism were fundamentally different in the republican federal states. 
In America, federal organisation was widely considered a precondition for the protection of 
individual liberty. With a view to the founding period of the United States, the Chicago 
historian Alison LaCroix has characterised this ‘federal ideology’ as ‘a belief that multiple 
independent levels of government could legitimately exist within a single polity, and that such 
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an arrangement was not a defect to be lamented but a virtue to be celebrated’.6 Even those 
Founding Fathers who preferred a more centralised order were convinced, as Alexander 
Hamilton put it in 1788, that ‘the State governments possess inherent advantages, which […] 
will forever preclude the possibility of federal encroachments’.7 In Switzerland, on the other 
hand, the power-dividing structures of the federal state were commonly respected because 
they guaranteed the peaceful coexistence of the different national, religious, and linguistic 
groups while preserving the country’s political independence. The law professor and left 
liberal politician Wilhelm Snell, who had emigrated to Switzerland from Germany in the 
1820s, described this capacity in 1859, eleven years after his adopted country had been 
transformed from a confederation into a federation: ‘For a great people, the federal state […] 
is the best form of a republic [because] it combines the individual development and active 
competition between small republics with the advantages of larger states, namely overall 
strength in the international arena and the possibility of joint national institutions at home’.8 
Such genuine respect for federalism as an organisational principle that was beneficial per se 
never existed in Imperial Germany to any noticeable extent. Even the Centre Party, the most 
important advocate of federalism in the national parliament, had ulterior motives, namely the 
protection of the Catholic south against the Protestant north, in particular against the federal 
hegemon Prussia.  
If we turn to more specific questions, we see that there were many structural and 
contextual differences that set Germany’s federal evolution apart. Chapter 1 has shown that 
the Empire’s unification was a rather problematic process. The foundation of a federal rather 
than confederate or unitary state lacked historical and intellectual legitimacy. Rather than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), p. 6. 
7  Quoted in Warren L. McFerran, Birth of the Republic. The Origin of the United States (Gretna/LA: Pelican, 
2005), p. 399. 
8  [‘Der Bundesstaat […] ist die eigenthümlichste Form des repräsentativen Freistaates für ein großes Volk 
[weil] sie  […] die freieste individuelle Entwicklung und den regsamsten Wetteifer kleiner Republiken mit 
den Vortheilen größerer Staaten, namentlich mit einer tüchtigen Gesammtkraft nach Außen, und der 
Möglichkeit großer, gemeinsamer Nationalanstalten im Innern [verbindet]’] Anonymous, ed., Naturrecht 
nach den Vorlesungen von Dr. Wilhelm Snell, 2nd ed. (Bern: Huber & Comp, 1859), p. 235-6. 
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being the manifestation of a historical tradition or an underlying systemic principle, the 
imperial union was simply the lowest common denominator of the many diverging political 
forces involved in the unification process. The Swiss and American federations could draw on 
a much more powerful source of legitimacy: popular sovereignty. They were created as 
unions of peoples rather than states. Despite this difference, the unification process of all three 
countries shared one central feature: war. If we adopt a long-term perspective on American 
unification, we can even say that each federal order was founded or consolidated by means of 
a civil war, namely the Austro-Prussian War of 1866/67, the Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847, 
and the American Civil War of 1861-1866, respectively.  
Chapter 1 has also shown that German unification left several structural birthmarks on the 
federal state. Among these, the hegemonic status of Prussia was probably most important. The 
American and Swiss unions were created as joint efforts of the popular representatives of 
multiple states rather than under the leadership of one dominant state government. As a result, 
the unification process of the two republican federal states made provisions that were meant 
to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic state and to guarantee general equality between the 
member states.9  
It is important to note, however, that it was much easier to create a well-balanced union in 
the American and Swiss context than in Germany. As Chapter 2 has pointed out, the complex, 
often ambiguous constitution of 1867/71 was the product of Germany’s constitutional 
development since the Vienna Congress. The failures of the federal constitutions that had 
been adopted during the 1848 revolutions and their aftermath – the drafts of the Frankfurt 
Assembly and the Erfurt Union – greatly overshadowed the constitutional negotiations two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  Good examples are, on the one hand, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787s, which prevented the emergence of a 
hegemonic state in the American union by determining that the newly created Northwest Territory would be 
divided into several smaller states; and, on the other hand, the maintenance of some egalitarian measures of 
the Helvetic Era (1789-1803), in which the French revolutionary government had turned Switzerland into a 
unitary state. Among these measures, the abolition of the different political statuses of the states (Kanton, 
Untertanengebiet, zugewandter Ort) was particularly important. On these issues, see Hans Kristoferitsch, 
Vom Staatenbund zum Bundesstaat?: Die Europäische Union im Vergleich mit den USA, Deutschland und 
der Schweiz, Schriftenreihe Europainstitut Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien 27 (Vienna: Springer, 2007), pp. 58, 
99ff. 
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decades later. In contrast, the constitutions of 1787 and 1848 created the first federal orders 
on American and Swiss soil, respectively. They were defined as counter projects to the 
Articles of Confederation and the old order of the Helvetic confederation, respectively. 
Hence, the two republican federal constitutions had the advantage of being less burdened by 
history than their German counterpart.  
But there was another reason for the complexity of the imperial constitution: it was 
specifically designed, Chapter 2 has argued, to protect monarchical power. For this purpose, 
the constitution equipped the council of state governments, the Bundesrat, with executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions, thus making it the central organ of federal decision-making. 
The American and Swiss constitutions took exactly the opposite approach. Putting the 
republican ideal of the separation of powers into practice, they established a complex system 
of checks and balances between the different federal constitutional organs. Moreover, they 
made the republican form of government obligatory for all constituent states.10 The German 
constitution lacked such a homogeneity requirement. Rather than by legal rules, the 
monarchical federal state coordinated the different member states and the national level by 
safeguarding the homogeneity of the ruling elites. This arrangement implied that the federal 
order would implode, should the Reichstag manage to establish control over the national 
government.  
Precisely this is what happened. Chapter 3 has demonstrated that based on the continuous 
growth of national competences the Reichstag gradually increased its influence to the point 
where the Chancellor and the newly emerged federal departments became dependent on it. 
Federalisation went hand in hand with parliamentarisation. In the course of this development, 
the functions of the federal organs completely changed. The United States and Switzerland, 
where parliamentary government was the central principle of the constitution, also saw waves 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  USC (1789), art. 4, sect. 4. SC (1848), art. 6. 
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of centralisation that reduced the role of the states and the cantons, respectively.11 But their 
federal constitutional organs never experienced a reshuffle of functions similar in scale to that 
in Germany.12  
One of the main reasons why this functional transformation came about, Chapter 3 has 
argued, was that there were no proper forums of communication. In the plenary assembly of 
the Bundesrat, the representatives of the states could not engage in an open exchange, because 
they were bound by the instructions of their home government. Until the last years of the 
world war, regular cabinet meetings of the Chancellor and the state secretaries did not take 
place. Nor was there an official framework for negotiations between the Reichstag and the 
federal administration. Due to this lack of institutionalised consultations between the different 
seats of power, they competed for influence in a totally uncoordinated way. The result was a 
permanent struggle over competences that made constitutional functions extremely volatile 
and greatly destabilised federal government. The United States and Switzerland did not have 
this problem, as they possessed adequate channels of communication. In the American Senate 
and the Swiss Ständerat, the representatives of the states could exchange views without 
restrictions. Regular cabinet meetings defined a coherent course of the different ministries. 
Parliamentary interrogations and policy briefs ensured that the federal government reached 
political compromises with respectively the House of Representatives and the Nationalrat 
according to systematic procedures.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  On the rapid growth of the administrative capacity of the national government after the Civil War, see Mark 
Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of America: A Contextual Analysis, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart, 
2015), pp. 23-7 and Ballard C. Campbell, The Growth of American Government: Governance from the 
Cleveland Era to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), chapters 1-2. In Switzerland, it 
was above all the total revision of the constitution in 1874 that brought about centralisation, in particular 
regarding the military and the unification of laws. See Alfred Kölz, Neuere Schweizerische 
Verfassungsgeschichte. Ihre Grundlinien in Bund und Kantonen seit 1848 (Bern: Stämpfli, 2004), 599-626, 
especially pp. 610-22. For a good overview, see also Johann Jacob Schollenberger and Otto Zoller, Das 
Bundesstaatsrecht der Schweiz: Geschichte und System, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Springer, 1920), pp. 56ff. 
12  Among the American and Swiss constitutional organs, the most pronounced change of status pertained to the 
US president, who started as ‘chief clerk’ and then gradually took centre stage over the course of the 
nineteenth century. See Michael A. Genovese, A Presidential Nation: Causes, Consequences, and Cures 
(Boulder: Westview, 2012), chapters 3-4. A comparison of the rise of the president to that of the German 
Emperor would be an interesting book in is own right. 
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These official institutions made it unnecessary for the American and Swiss federal systems 
to rely on any of the auxiliary practices that the German union maintained in order to 
guarantee at least some degree of coordination, such as the exchange of diplomats among the 
constituent states. The diplomatic missions in Berlin were most important, because the envoys 
to the Prussian court usually also served as Bundesrat plenipotentiaries of their home 
governments. The Bundesrat granted the states a central role in the federal decision-making 
process. But their participation in the council could easily be manipulated. Chapter 4 has 
revealed that soon after unification a complex system of registration, substitution, and 
attendance became established that gave the federal administration full control over the 
Prussian bench and the voting behaviour of the small states. On this basis, the federal 
administration around the Chancellor turned the Bundesrat into a compliant instrument, with 
the result that the states lost their independent voice in national policy-making.  
Such a disempowerment of the states was impossible in the United States and Switzerland. 
Here, the constitutions and different legislative acts fixed the composition and procedures of 
the bodies that represented state interest, the Senate and the Ständerat.13 But the two 
republican unions were not free of systemic manipulations either. In the American Senate, the 
excessive practice of extending the debate over proposed pieces of legislation – the so-called 
filibuster – delayed or entirely prevented the vote on many important proposals of the federal 
administration.14 The Swiss liberal party, the Freisinn, secured its political hegemony over the 
cantons and the union not least by gerrymandering.15 Yet, these manipulations were different 
in quality from the takeover of the Bundesrat by the federal government. The reduction of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  USC (1789), art. 1, sect. 3. SC (1848), art. 69-72. 
14  On the history of filibustering, which until 1842 was also allowed in the House of Representatives, see 
Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). Chapter 3 of Koger's study deals with the nineteenth century and is aptly 
titled 'The Escalation of Filibustering, 1789-1901'. 
15  See for example  Albert Tanner, ‘Ein Staat nur für die Hablichen? Demokratie und politische Elite im frühen 
Bundesstaat’, in Etappen des Bundesstaates. Staats- und Nationsbildung der Schweiz, 1848-1998, ed. 
Brigitte Studer (Zürich: Chronos, 1998), pp. 65ff. 
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council of state governments to a mere sanctioning machine violated the most basic principle 
of federal organisation, the participation of the states in national decision-making.  
An institution capable of taking action against such an infringement of the law did not 
exist. The Empire did not possess a federal constitutional court. Chapter 5 has shown that the 
consequences of this defect were momentous, in particular in the context of the fight between 
monarchical and parliamentary power. Constitutional disputes between the states, the 
different levels of government, and the federal organs were decided by political negotiations, 
threats, and deals rather than by the legal mechanism of conflict resolution; the Bundesrat, the 
federal administration, the Chancellor, the Reichstag, and the Emperor constantly fought over 
unclear competences; and federal laws routinely violated the constitution. All this greatly 
contributed to the collapse of the union, most importantly because it bereaved the constitution 
of its central function, namely providing a stable framework of rules and procedures.  
Problems of this kind did not befall the United States and Switzerland, because their 
constitutions were protected by powerful constitutional courts. Soon after the end of the 
eighteenth century, the American Supreme Court established itself as a co-equal branch of 
federal government, alongside Congress and the executive. The most important measure in 
this direction was the creation of the doctrine of judicial review under Chief Justice John 
Marshall. On the basis of this authority, the court gradually expanded the scope of federal 
government in order to adapt the union to the needs of the emerging national economy, while 
also protecting the rights of the states against excessive tendencies of centralisation.16 By thus 
balancing states’ and national rights, the court played a central role in the further development 
of the union. It acted, as President Woodrow Wilson later put it, as a ‘constitutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  On these issues, see the concise analysis by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ‘The Supreme Court in 
the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Supreme Court History 27 (2002): 1–13. The literature on the evolution 
of the American Supreme Court and the relevant cases is too vast to cite even the most important works here. 
It must suffice to point the reader to one particularly good standard work, where additional literature can be 
found: Robert G. McCloskey and Sanford Levinson, The American Supreme Court, Sixth Edition, 6th ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).  
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convention in continuous session’.17 The Swiss Bundesgericht was less prominent, but also 
expanded its power over the years. Under the 1848 constitution, it was restricted to matters of 
civil and criminal law, similar to the Imperial Court in Germany. As one of the key reforms of 
the revisions of the constitution in the 1870s, the Bundesgericht was made responsible for 
resolving constitutional conflicts about cantonal rights, federal competences, and the violation 
of civil rights. However, it never gained the right to review the constitutionality of federal 
statutes.18 The direct democratic system made it unnecessary to equip the court with this 
power. Now as then, any statue has to be made subject to a popular referendum if a certain 
number of citizens demand it.19 It is the people themselves that exercise review. This division 
of constitutional jurisdiction between the Swiss people and the Supreme Court proved very 
effective. Despite its sharp confessional, linguistic, and national divide, nineteenth-century 
Switzerland did not experience any major constitutional crisis after the end of the culture wars 
in the 1870s.20 
In light of these comparative considerations, we see that the evolution of the imperial 
federal state featured many structural and contextual peculiarities. Still, it is pointless to 
conclude that it constituted a special path. There was nothing like a German federal 
Sonderweg.21 The central argument with which David Blackbourn, Geoff Eley, and many 
other historians have disproved the concept of a Sonderweg applies equally to Germany’s 
federal evolution, not least because the federal evolution itself formed an essential part of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  Quoted in John R. Vile, Constitutional Change in the United States. A Comparative Study of Constitutional 
Amendments, Judicial Interpretations, and Legislative and Executive Actions (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p. 6. 
18  On the evolution of the competences of the Bundesgericht, see Kölz, Neuere Schweizerische 
Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 804f. SC (1999), art. 190, as amended by the Bundesbeschluss from 8 October 
1999, makes it explicit that federal statutes – as well as international law – are binding on the Supreme Court. 
19  SC (1874), art. 89. SC (1999), art. 141. 
20  On the history of the Swiss Supreme Court, see: Arthur Haefliger, ‘Hundert Jahre Schweizerisches 
Bundesgericht’, Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 71 (1975): 1–8; Eduard His, Geschichte des neueren 
Schweizerischen Staatsrechtes, vols. 2-3 (Basel: Helbing&Lichtenhahn, 1929-1938); Kölz, Neuere 
Schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 575-80; and Goran Seferovic, Das Schweizerische Bundesgericht 
1848-1874: die Bundesgerichtsbarkeit im frühen Bundesstaat (Zurich: Schulthess, 2010). 
21  On this issue from a cultural perspective that considers discourses on German federalism since the Holy 
Roman Empire, see the brief essay by Maiken Umbach, ‘History and Federalism in the Age of Nation-State 
Formation’, in German Federalism. Past, Present, Future, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 172–88, especially pp. 63f. 
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Germany’s twisted road to democracy: a developmental norm that would justify the 
characterisation as a Sonderweg never existed, neither in the Anglophone world nor anywhere 
else.22 Even the evolutions of the two great republican federal states of the nineteenth-century 
widely diverged from each other. The historical legacy federal unions had to come to terms 
with, the political challenges they had to address, and the economic, social, and cultural 
circumstances they had to deal with were so different that we cannot speak of any 
evolutionary norm or exception.23 
Rather than calling Germany’s federal evolution a Sonderweg, it makes more sense to 
point out where most of its peculiarities came from. Unlike the developments of the Swiss and 
American systems, the evolution of the imperial federal state was primarily driven by the 
underlying struggle between monarchical and parliamentary actors. It was the character of the 
German union as an instrument of power – or, to be more precise, as a device for the 
protection of monarchical sovereignty against the introduction of parliamentary government – 
that made its foundation possible, propelled its transformation, and brought about its collapse. 
The history of the imperial federal state is thus an image of the Empire’s anatomy of power. 
This conclusion urges us to consider the broader impact of this history. What legacy did 
the federal evolution of Imperial Germany bequeath to the Weimar Republic and beyond? In 
other words, what influence did it have on the course of German history in the twentieth 
century?24 In many ways, the federal state founded in 1919 was a deliberate departure from its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  On this issue, see Hans Fenske, Der moderne Verfassungsstaat. Eine vergleichende Geschichte von der 
Entstehung bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), p. 528. On the Sonderweg debate and the 
relevant literature, see the overview I have provided in the Introduction. 
23  On the exceptional character of Switzerland’s historical development, for example, see the detailed study by 
Jonathan Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On 
federalism, see especially pp. 48ff., 77ff., 254ff. 
24  On lines of continuity, see Gerhard Lehmbruch, ‘Der Entwicklungspfad des deutschen Bundesstaats - 
Weichenstellung und Krisen’, in Föderalismus in historisch vergleichender Perspektive, ed. Gerold 
Ambrosius, Christian Henrich-Franke, and Cornelius Neutsch, vol. 2 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 327–70. 
Already Hans Boldt, ‘Der Föderalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich als Verfassungsproblem’, in Innere 
Staatsbildung und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Österreich und Deutschland 1867/71-1914, ed. 
Helmut Rumpler (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), p. 40 has argued that the 'legacy of Imperial German 
federalism is one of the most interesting topics of modern German constitutional history' ['Erbschaft des 
Kaiserreichsföderalismus zu den interessantesten Themen der neueren deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte 
gehört']. 
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imperial predecessor. For obvious reasons, the historical role model for the constitution of the 
new republic was not the monarchical order of 1871, but the revolutionary draft of the 
1848/49 Frankfurt Assembly.25 Already in 1917, the left-liberal lawyer Hugo Preuß, who 
drafted the original proposal of the Weimar constitution, had argued that in order to establish 
republican government ‘individual reforms’ would no longer suffice. Rather, he pointed out, a 
‘fundamental change of the [federal] system’ would be necessary.26  According to this 
rationale, the constitution of the Weimar Republic established a federation that was very 
different from the imperial union: a unitary federal state. In the words of the famous jurist and 
political theorist Carl Schmitt, Germany became a ‘federal state without a confederate 
basis’.27 
The concrete structural lessons that the fathers of the Weimar constitution drew from the 
federal evolution of the Empire were manifold. Chief among them was the necessity of 
clearly defining Germany’s form of government in order to avoid that the struggle between 
monarchical and parliamentary forces would continue. At a time when a counterrevolution 
was still a real possibility, this measure was crucial. The constitution thus opened by declaring 
Germany a republic.28 Putting this democratisation into practice, other significant provisions 
made the Reichstag the central organ of federal decision-making, replaced the Emperor as 
head of state by a powerful President who was directly elected by the people, and created the 
possibility of holding popular referenda.29 Moreover, the constitution established a collegial 
national government that comprised the Chancellor and the ministers, all of whom were made 
responsible to the Reichstag.30 In addition, the states were obliged to maintain republican !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  On this issue, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 281-90 and Werner Frotscher and Bodo Pieroth, 
Verfassungsgeschichte, 11th ed. (Munich: Beck, 2012), pp. 257f. 
26  [‘Einzelreformen’], [‘fundamentalen Systemwechsel’] Hugo Preuß, ‘Vorschläge zur Abänderung der 
Reichsverfassung und der preußischen Verfassung’, 1 September 1917, printed in Hans Fenske, Wilhelm II., 
no. 150, p. 496. 
27  [‘Bundesstaat ohne bündische Grundlage’] Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 
1928), p. 389. 
28  WRV (1919), art. 1. 
29  Ibid., art. 20-40, 41-51, 73-76. 
30  Ibid., art. 52-59. 
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constitutions and parliamentary governments. 31  This homogeneity requirement made a 
reintroduction of monarchical regimes impossible and guaranteed a minimum degree of 
coordination between the state and national level, an element of stability that the Empire had 
gradually lost due to the lack of such a provision. 
In order to prevent particularistic interests from paralysing national politics again, the 
council of states – which was renamed ‘Reichsrat’ – was greatly reduced in rank.32 While it 
lost all of its judicial functions, its legislative and administrative powers were severely 
curtailed.33 In the legislature, it became inferior to the Reichstag. Not only did it lose the right 
to directly initiate legislation.34 But its approval was no longer necessary for bills to enter into 
force. The Reichstag could overrule any veto by a two-thirds majority.35 Even constitutional 
amendments no longer required a positive vote of the states. 36  The right to decree 
administrative ordinances, one of the key powers of the old Bundesrat, was now conferred 
upon the federal government.37 Besides, the council was deprived of most of its influence 
over foreign affairs. It no longer decided matters of war and peace – which were now subject 
to federal legislation – and had to relinquish its right to sanction treaties to the Reichstag.38 
The internal structures and procedures of the council were changed too. Its meetings now 
had to be held in public and the states could only be represented by members of their 
governments.39 These measures were intended to prevent a renewed manipulation of the 
council by the Prussian and federal government. For the same purpose, the dominance of the 
Prussian bench was greatly reduced. While the number of votes still depended on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  Ibid., art. 17. 
32  On this demotion and the new internal structures and procedures of the council, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 
286f., 430-42. 
33  For the restriction of the council to participating in the legislature and administration of the Reich, see WRV 
(1919), art. 60. 
34  Ibid., art. 68.1, 69. 
35  Ibid., art. 74. 
36  Ibid., art. 76.2. 
37  Ibid., art. 77. 
38  Ibid., art. 45.2, 45.3.  
39  Ibid., art. 66.3, 63.1, first sentence. 
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population size of the states, no state could possess more than two-fifths of all votes.40 
Furthermore, half of the Prussian votes had to be cast by representatives of the different 
Prussian provinces, who were not bound to the instructions of the Prussian government.41  
These restrictions effectively abolished Prussia’s constitutional hegemony. In order to 
further diminish her influence and to thus prevent a resumption of the Prussian-federal 
dualism, the Prussian administration was separated from the federal bureaucracy. The latter 
became an independent institution. Taken together, all these new regulations replaced the old 
hegemonic constitutional order with a system in which all states enjoyed the same status and 
equal rights.42 
Vis-à-vis the national level, however, the states had a much weaker position than under the 
1871 constitution.43 In view of the great centralisation that the Empire had undergone, the 
Weimar constitution granted the Reich many more competences right from the beginning.44 
This change was most pronounced in the field of finance. While before 1919 the Reich had 
largely relied on subsidy payments from the states, it was now financially independent, most 
importantly because it gained the right to collect direct taxes.45  
The delimitation of competences that did not clearly belong to either the national or state 
level fell into the jurisdiction of the new national constitutional court, the Staatsgerichtshof. 
This body was created in order to ensure that constitutional conflicts would now be resolved 
by legal rather than political means and that the constitution would be better protected against 
power plays and pragmatic compromises. 46  Above all, the court was responsible for 
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40  WRV (1919), art. 61.1. 
41  Ibid., art. 63.1, second sentence. 
42  See Helmut Klaus, Der Dualismus Preussen versus Reich in der Weimarer Republik in Politik und 
Verwaltung, Studien zur Kultur- und Rechtsgeschichte 3 (Mönchengladbach: Forum, 2006), chapters 2-3. 
For concise overviews, see Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 282 and Frotscher and Pieroth, Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 
260. 
43  For a concise analysis of the distribution of competences between the states and the Reich, see Holste, 
Bundesstaat, pp. 283-7, 335-405. 
44  For the federal competence catalogue, see WRV (1919), art. 6-13, 78-101. 
45  Ibid., art. 8, 11.  
46  The creation of the court was based on ibid., art. 108 and the Gesetz über den Staatsgerichtshof, 9 July 1921, 
RGBl. (1921), no. 74, pp. 905-10.  
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constitutional disputes of a genuinely federal nature, namely for conflicts between the Reich 
and a state, quarrels between different states, and disagreements between the constitutional 
organs of those states that lacked an own constitutional court.47 But it also dealt with charges 
that the Reichstag brought against the Chancellor, the ministers, or the President.48 
Structural innovations like the Staatsgerichtshof show that the fathers of the Weimar 
constitution considered the federal evolution of the Empire closely and that they tried to 
create a union that would not suffer from the same systemic problems. Nevertheless, the 
federal structures of the Weimar Republic were immature, open-ended, and easy to 
manipulate. 49  Just before the final vote on the constitution, the right-liberal Adelbert 
Düringer, a former judge at the Imperial Court in Leipzig, warned his colleagues in the 
National Assembly that  
 
the major problems that have to be decided – federal state or unitary state, particularism or 
unitarism – are solved by the constitution in an insufficient and unsatisfactory manner; indeed they 
are not solved at all, rather the solution is postponed.50  
 
Commentators on both ends of the political spectrum came to the same conclusion. Carl 
Schmitt, who later supported the Nazis, spoke of ‘dilatory compromises of a formalistic 
nature’.51 In 1930, the young socialist lawyer Otto Kirchheimer, who later emigrated to the 
United States and became one of the most important constitutional theorists of the twentieth 
century, published the controversial essay Weimar – and then what?, in which he argued that 
the republic was unlikely to experience a healthy development because it was based on a 
constitution that made no decisions.52  
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47  WRV (1919), art. 19.1. 
48  Ibid., art. 59. 
49  Similar assessment by Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 290-2. 
50  [‘Die großen zur Entscheidung stehenden Probleme: Bundesstaat oder Einheitsstaat, Partikularismus oder 
Unitarismus, sind in der Verfassung in ungenügender und unbefriedigender Art und Weise gelöst; sie sind 
überhaupt nicht gelöst, sondern die Lösung ist verschoben.’] Quoted in ibid., p. 292. 
51  [‘dilatorischen Formelkompromissen’] Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, pp. 31ff. 
52  Otto Kirchheimer, ‘Weimar - und was dann? Analyse einer Verfassung (1930)’, in Politik und Verfassung, 
Edition Suhrkamp 95 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1964). On p. 52 he speaks of a 'constitution without 
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Such negative characterisations remind us that the Weimar constitution did not put the 
lessons from the federal evolution of the Empire consistently into practice. On the most 
fundamental level, this issue became manifest in the territorial organisation of Germany. Even 
though the constitution gave the Reich the right to restructure the federal territory, the 
constituent states of the imperial era, which had primarily been dynastic entities, were taken 
over without major changes.53 The internal structure of Germany thus stayed largely the same 
– as did the problems that this territorial framework created.54 
This dilemma was most important in regard to Prussia. Even though Hugo Preuß and 
others made a strong case for breaking Prussia up into several middling states, her territory 
was left intact.55 Despite the loss of her constitutional prerogatives, Prussia thus retained a 
hegemonic position, simply because she was by far the biggest political, economic, and 
cultural power among the states. Governing the Reich without the support of the Prussian 
government was still impossible.56 Precisely this was the reason why in 1932 Chancellor 
Franz von Papen persuaded President Paul von Hindenburg to issue an emergency decree that 
dismissed the Prussian cabinet and put Prussia under the control of the national government.57 
The Preußenschlag was necessary in order to remove the last major force standing in the way 
of von Papen’s plan for nationalist rule, namely the centre-left ‘Weimar coalition’ that 
governed Prussia under the social democratic prime minister Otto Braun. By depriving the 
hegemonic state of its independence, this coup d’état disempowered Germany’s power-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
decision' [‘Verfassung ohne Entscheidung’]. The comments by Schmitt and Kirchheimer can also be found in 
Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 292. 
53  WRV (1919), art. 19. Only a few territorial changes occurred at all. The two principalities of Reuss were 
merged during the revolution. Together with six other Thuringian small states they formed the new state of 
Thuringia in 1920, see Gesetz, betreffend das Land Thüringen, 30 April 1920, RGBl. (1920), no. 7483, pp. 
841f. Coburg, formerly part of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, joined Bavaria, see Gesetz, betreffend die Vereinigung 
Coburgs mit Bayern, 30 April 1920, RGBl. (1920), no. 7484, p. 842. In 1929, Waldeck was incorporated into 
Prussia, see Gesetz über die Vereinigung von Waldeck mit Preußen, 7 December 1928, RGBl. (1928), no. 42, 
p. 401.  
54  On the maintenance of Germany’s territorial structure and its consequences, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 
293f. 
55  On the contemporary discusssion, see Ibid., pp. 276-8. 
56  Klaus, Der Dualismus Preussen versus Reich in der Weimarer Republik in Politik und Verwaltung, chapters 
4ff. 
57  Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten, betreffend die Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und 
Ordnung im Gebiet des Landes Preußen, 20 July 1932, RGBl. (1932), no. 48, pp. 377f.  
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dividing structure at a stroke and thus paved the way for the centralisation under Hitler. In a 
union that would have featured a concert of roughly equipollent states, no measure against a 
single state could have had the same impact.58 
With respect to the powers and relations of the federal constitutional organs, too, the 
Weimar constitution failed to leave some of the most severe problems of the imperial union 
behind. In fact, it often made matters worse. The President was much more powerful than the 
Emperor ever had been. When combined, his rights to dissolve the parliament and to issue 
emergency decrees gave the President quasi-dictatorial powers, which Hindenburg used in the 
1930s to turn the republic into an autocracy.59 In the overall structure of the constitution, these 
far-reaching powers created a dualism between the President and the Reichstag that was even 
more pronounced than the antagonism that had existed between the latter and the imperial 
government around the Chancellor. The resulting juxtaposition of the state with the people – 
represented by the President and the parliament, respectively – was incompatible with the 
democratic principle, because it implied that the state was a separate entity that did not 
necessarily need to serve the people. This dualism undermined the legitimacy of republican 
institutions in general and impeded the development of a democratic culture.60 
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58  On the Preußenschlag and its impact, see Jürgen Bay, Der Preussenkonflikt 1932/33: ein Kapitel aus der 
Verfassungsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik (Erlangen: Hogl, 1967); Ludwig Biewer, ‘Der Preußenschlag 
vom 20. Juli 1932. Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen und Wertung’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte 119 
(1983): 159–72; Rudolf Morsey, ‘Zur Geschichte des “Preußenschlags” am 20. Juli 1932’, Vierteljahreshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte 4 (1961): 430–39; Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine 
Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie, 5th ed. (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971), pp. 556-63; 
Dirk Blasius, Weimars Ende: Bürgerkrieg und Politik 1930-1933, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2005), pp. 68-78; Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin, 2004), pp. 285-7; 
and Gerhard Weiduschat, ed., Ein Staatsstreich? Die Reichsexekution gegen Preußen. (Preußenschlag vom 
20. Juli 1932 und die Folgen). Darstellungen und Dokumente. (Berlin: Bundesrat, 2007). 
59  WRV (1919), art. 25.1, 48.1-2. On this issue, see Ludwig Richter, ‘Reichspräsident und Ausnahmegewalt’, 
Der Staat 37 (1998): 221–47; Achim Kurz, Demokratische Diktatur?: Auslegung und Handhabung des 
Artikels 48 der Weimarer Verfassung 1919-25 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1992); and Wolfram Pyta, 
Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler (Munich: Siedler, 2007). For a good overview, 
see Dietmar Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 6th ed. (Munich: Beck, 2009), pp. 298, 303-06. 
60  Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, pp. 43-7 and Frotscher and Pieroth, Verfassungsgeschichte, 
pp. 265, 290ff. For a detailed study of this dualism and its practical problems, see Peter Haungs, 
Reichspräsident und parlamentarische Kabinettsregierung: Eine Studie zum Regierungssystem der Weimarer 
Republik in den Jahren 1924 bis 1929 (Wiesbaden: Springer, 1968). 
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Another factor that nurtured the scepticism against the republic was the frequent change of 
federal governments. In the fourteen years between the end of the war and the National 
Socialist takeover, Germany witnessed no fewer than twenty different governments. The key 
problem was that the parliament could withdraw its confidence from the Chancellor and thus 
force him to resign without electing a successor.61 This destructive vote of no confidence gave 
the parties of the extreme right and left the chance to destabilise the republic from the 
opposition benches. 62  The creation of this provision, which established parliamentary 
government in its purest form, can be seen as an act of overcompensation that originated in a 
lack of experience. For more than forty years, the federal structures of the Empire had 
prevented the emergence of an official framework of parliamentary responsibility. When the 
Weimar constitution was drafted, it was therefore largely unclear what arrangements were 
needed in order to guarantee the stability of a German parliamentary system. 
In regard to other fundamental questions, the federal evolution of the Empire provided 
very clear advice. But the Weimar constitution ignored it. This problem was particularly 
obvious in the judiciary. One of the basic reasons for the systemic instability of the imperial 
union was the lack of an institution that could review the constitutionality of laws and resolve 
conflicts between the federal constitutional organs. Nevertheless, the Weimar constitution 
refrained from equipping the Staatsgerichtshof with these rights – a failure for which the 
republic paid a high price. When the Nazis gradually transformed the union into a unitary 
Führer state, there was no institution that could have declared the legislative measures that 
they adopted to this end – such as the annulment of the basic rights, the abolishment of the 
Reichsrat, or the Enabling Act – unconstitutional. As a result, the Nazis could present their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61  WRV (1919), art. 54, especially sentence 2. 
62  On the destructive vote of no confidence, see the comparative reflections by Edmund Brandt, Die Bedeutung 
parlamentarischer Vertrauensregelungen - Dargestellt am Beispiel von Art. 54 WRV und Art. 67, 68 GG 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981) and Karl-Ulrich Meyn, ‘Destruktives und konstruktives 
Mißtrauensvotum - von der schwachen Reichsregierung zum starken Bundeskanzler?’, in 80 Jahre Weimarer 
Reichsverfassung - was ist geblieben?, ed. Eberhard Eichenhofer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 71–94. 
See also the remarks by Heinrich August Winkler, Weimar 1918 - 1933: die Geschichte der ersten deutschen 
Demokratie (Munich: Beck, 1998), pp. 576f. 
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seizure of power as a lawful process. This strategic move was crucial in order to gain the 
support of the bureaucrats that run the state.63  
It was just as important for the Nazi takeover that the Weimar constitution – like its 
imperial predecessor – did not explicitly stipulate that Germany had to be organised federally. 
While the lack of such a definition had enabled Bismarck to defend monarchical sovereignty 
by representing the Empire as a confederation of princes, it greatly facilitated the 
monopolisation of power under the Nazi, because it permitted them to abolish the 
independence of the states by a series of legal acts, the so-called Gleichschaltung laws (see 
below).  
The list of parallels of this kind could be continued much further. But this is unnecessary. 
The point here is that despite all the innovations and its unitary orientation, the Weimar 
constitution was, as its leading commentator Gerhard Anschütz put it, ‘not […] the antithesis 
of the old [union], but […] the next stage of development’.64 His colleague Walter Jellinek 
underlined this view in 1920 when he pointed out that ‘the difference between today and the 
past is often overstated’.65 The international lawyer and liberal politician Walther Schücking 
even argued that there was no more than one essential difference between the Weimar order 
and the Empire after the latter had introduced parliamentary government in October 1918, 
namely the ‘abolition of a purely decorative imperial head’.66 In other words: Weimar did not 
represent a radical break with, but an evolutionary transformation of the imperial union.67 
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63  On the legality of the Nazi takeover and the importance of this question, see Irene Strenge, Machtübernahme 
1933: alles auf legalem Weg?, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungen 15 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002) and 
the concise overview by Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 311f. 
64  [‘nicht […] Antithese der alten [bundesstaatlichen Ordnung], sondern […] geradlinige Fortbildung’] Gerhard 
Anschütz, ‘Der deutsche Föderalismus’, VVDStRL 1 (1924), p. 16.  
65  [‘Überhaupt wird der Unterschied zwischen heute und früher leicht übertrieben’] Walter Jellinek, 
‘Revolution und Reichsverfassung’, Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 9 (1920), p. 81. 
66  [‘Abschaffung einer rein dekorativen kaiserlichen Spitze’] Walter Schücking, ‘Staatsrechtliche 
Reformbestrebungen und Reformen während der Kriegszeit’, in Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. 
Gerhard Anschütz and Richard Thoma, vol. 1, 2 vols (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930), p. 95.  
67  See Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 288-90, where he quotes the same comments by Anschütz, Jellinek, and 
Schücking. 
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Only the adoption of an entirely different form of organisation, such as for instance the 
decentralised unitary state that Hugo Preuß originally proposed, would have constituted a 
fresh start.68 But the political spectrum of the revolutionary era was ideologically too divided 
for any consensus to emerge on a complete reorganisation of Germany. As a result, the 
Weimar federal state was a compromise between tradition and progress that faced opposition 
from two sides, while receiving little, if any support.69 For the proponents of a unitary state – 
above all the Socialists, the left liberals, and later the Nazis – it was too federal. In contrast, 
the advocates of the states – regional politicians, separatists, monarchical revisionists, and 
other conservatives – considered it too unitary. This lack of support made the Weimar 
Republic a ‘restless federal state’ whose structural framework was too fragile to withstand the 
economic and political crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s.70 
These considerations suggest that in addition to its complex systemic legacy the federal 
evolution of the Empire had a distinct cultural impact. The purely pragmatic origin, the 
constant manipulations, and the gradual implosion of the imperial federal order produced a 
political culture that was characterised by a shortage of genuine respect for federal 
organisation. This negative attitude towards federalism was perhaps the most important 
legacy of the Empire’s federal evolution, because it shaped Germany’s structural development 
for most of the twentieth century.  
In the Weimar National Assembly, there were very few voices that genuinely believed 
federalism to be a good form of organisation. Unitary views greatly dominated the discussion. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68  See Hugo Preuß' essays ‘Vorschläge zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung und der preussischen Verfassung, 
nebst Begründungen (1917)’, ‘Begründung für den Entwurf einer Verfassung für das Deutsche Reich 
(1919)’, and above all ‘Denkschrift zum allgemeinen Teil der Reichsverfassung vom 3. Januar 1919 (1919)’, 
all printed in Staat, Recht und Freiheit aus 40 Jahren deutscher Politik und Geschichte (Hildesheim: Olms, 
1964), 290-335, 394-421, 368–94. See also Günther Gillessen, Hugo Preuss. Studien zur Ideen- und 
Verfassungsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1955). 
69  On the nature of the Weimar constitution as a compromise, see the essays by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde 
and Hans Boldt ‘Der Zusammenbruch der Monarchie und die Entstehung der Weimarer Republik’ and ‘Die 
Weimarer Reichsverfassung’, in Die Weimarer Republik 1918-1933, ed. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred 
Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 3rd ed. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1998), pp. 37ff., 59 
and Christoph Gusy, Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), p. 78f. See also 
Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 291, where he refers to the same studies by Böckenförde, Boldt, and Gusy. 
70  [‘ruhelosen Bundesstaat’] Holste, Bundesstaat, p. 546, see also pp. 292f. 
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Most MPs considered a federal state less powerful and less democratic than a unitary system. 
That the assembly decided nevertheless to maintain Germany’s federal structure had merely 
practical reasons.71 It was not only the simplest option, but also the only compromise the 
different ideological camps could agree on. It was just as important that in order to maintain 
law and order after the war, the new republican regime depended on the cooperation of the 
bureaucratic elites of the states. For obvious reasons, these were unwilling to surrender their 
power in favour of a unitary reorganisation of Germany.72 Moreover, it is doubtful that the 
victorious powers of the First World War would have accepted the creation of a centralised 
state. Such a concentration of power would have been incompatible with their objective of 
weakening Germany by the territorial losses, military restrictions, and reparations payments 
that the Versailles Treaty determined. 
Since the National Assembly left Germany’s federal structure intact only out of pragmatic 
motivations such as these, the adoption of the Weimar constitution did not equip the federal 
organisation of the country with any new or positive legitimation. Federalism was still widely 
seen as a necessary evil, albeit for different reasons than in imperial times. Even many 
adherents of a state-based system understood the federal union merely as an interim solution 
on the way to a ‘German unitary state with autonomous provinces’, as the Centre MP Ludwig 
Kaas put it.73 No one expressed the common contempt for the federal division of the nation in 
more elegant terms than the celebrated author Erich Kästner, who was born in Saxony but 
lived in Berlin. In his 1932 poem ‘Inscription on a Saxon-Prussian border stone’, federalism 
got nothing but scorn and derision:  
 
Passer-by, observe this border stone and sigh! 
And ponder on a nation 
Criss-crossed by walls invisible and high 
Whose deeper sense is: mutilation. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71  See ibid., pp. 290f. 
72  Ibid., pp. 270-3. 
73  [‘deutscher Einheitsstaat mit autonomen Stammesländern’] Quoted in ibid., p. 291. 
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This stone that you now look upon 
Serves as a grave, and down below  
Lie the dogs to which, it’s said, the nation’s gone. 
Just in case you didn’t know!74 
 
Based on such antipathies, the relations between the states and the Reich came under fire as 
soon as the constitution had entered into force. When the republic slithered into a presidential 
system at the end of the 1920s, the federal order was gradually eroded. The emergency 
decrees of the president made the Reichsrat practically superfluous and routinely infringed 
upon the rights of the states. This centralisation and the persistent propaganda for the creation 
of a strong unitary state tilled the soil for the Preußenschlag in 1932.75 The ensuing judgment 
of the Staatsgerichtshof was perhaps the most distressing manifestation of the contempt in 
which the public elite held federal structures.76 Citing formalistic reasons, the judges avoided 
a clear condemnation of the measure. This decision, which indirectly legitimised Papen’s 
attack on Prussia, was the act of a politically naive judiciary that silently approved the erosion 
of Germany’s federal structures, because these were not associated with freedom and the rule 
of law – too strong were the prejudices that had been inherited from the imperial era. 
The low esteem in which federalism was held made it easy for the Nazis to abolish the 
power-dividing structures of the union and to replace them with a centralised system. 
According to National Socialist propaganda, the unitary Führer state was the governmental 
expression of the Volksgemeinschaft and the final triumph over the age-old fragmentation of 
the German nation, which the republic had artificially preserved.77 The Nazis therefore lost no 
time in abolishing the remaining independence of the states. Only one week after the adoption !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74  [‘Wer hier vorübergeht, verweile!/Hier läuft ein unsichtbarer Wall./Deutschland zerfällt in viele Teile./Das 
Substantivum heißt: Zerfall.’], [‘Was wir hier stehngelassen haben,/das ist ein Grabstein, dass ihr´s 
wisst!/Hier liegt ein Teil des Hunds begraben,/auf den das Volk gekommen ist.’] Erich Kästner, Inschrift auf 
einem sächsisch-preußischen Grenzstein, 1932, printed in Gesang zwischen den Stühlen (Zurich: Atrium, 
2011), p. 36, translation by Christopher M. Clark. 
75  On these effects of the presidential dictatorship on the federal order, see Holste, Bundesstaat, pp. 355-8, 455-
7, 547f. 
76  On the court decision, see Henning Grund, ‘Preußenschlag’ und Staatsgerichtshof im Jahre 1932, Studien 
und Materialien zur Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit 5 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1976). 
77  Albert Funk, Kleine Geschichte des Föderalismus: vom Fürstenbund zur Bundesrepublik (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2010), p. 286 and Klaus Hildebrand, Geschichte des Dritten Reiches (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2012), pp. 15f. 
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of the Enabling Law had brought them to power in January 1933, they reconstituted the state 
parliaments on the basis of the votes in the last Reichstag election, in which they had won a 
sizeable majority.78 Another week later, they put the state governments under the permanent 
control of the Reich minister of the interior by installing local proconsuls, the so-called 
Reichsstatthalter.79 In January 1934, the ‘law concerning the reconstitution of the Reich’ 
finished the job. By abolishing the state parliaments and reducing the local governments to 
merely administrative agencies, it turned the states into mere provinces and converted 
Germany into a centralised state.80  
In broad parts of the population, this centralisation was welcomed. Even circles that were 
otherwise critical of the National Socialists often saw the abolition of federal structures as 
something positive. An anonymous noblewoman later recalled in an interview: 
 
Until Hitler came along, there were still different citizenships in Germany. My husband had Baden 
citizenship, not Prussian. There were Bavarians, Saxons, etc. […] Hitler changed that. This was 
considered good. My husband always said: if there is one thing Hitler has managed to achieve, 
then it is the unity of the Germans.81 
 
Such approving views provided the unitary Nazi state with popular legitimacy. The 
consequences were dreadful. It was Germany’s centralisation and the ensuing monopolisation 
of power that made the organisation of the Holocaust possible in the first place. A mass-
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78  Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich, 31 March 1933, RGBl. I (1933), no. 29, pp. 153f. 
79  Zweites Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich, commonly called ‘Reichsstatthaltergesetz’, 7 
April 1933, RGBl. I (1933), no. 33, p. 173. 
80  Gesetz über den Neuaufbau des Reichs, 30 January 1934, RGBl. I (1934), no. 11, p. 75. On this centralisation 
process, the so-called ‘Gleichschaltung der Länder’, see Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und 
Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, 2nd ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), chapter 4 
and the relevant passages in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and Gerhard Schulz, Die 
nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in 
Deutschland 1933/34 (Wiesbaden: Springer, 1960), especially pp. 136ff. For a concise overview, see 
Frotscher and Pieroth, Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 308-10 and Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 
pp. 310f. 
81  [‘Bis Hitler kam, gab es noch verschiedene Staatsangehörigkeiten in Deutschland. Mein Mann hatte die 
badische Staatsangehörigkeit, nicht die preußische. Es gab die Bayern, die Sachsen etc. [...] Das wurde dann 
durch Hitler aufgehoben. Das ist positiv empfunden worden. Mein Mann sagte immer, wenn Hitler eins 
geschafft hat, dann ist es die Einheit der Deutschen.’] Klaus Humann, Ingke Brodersen, and Susanne von 
Paczensky, eds., 1933. Wie die Deutschen Hitler zur Macht verhalfen. Ein Lesebuch für Demokraten 
(Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1983), p. 27. 
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killing programme of that scale could not have been implemented in the power-dividing 
framework of a federal order. 
In light of the atrocities that the Nazi state had committed, a unitary organisation of 
Germany became a widespread taboo after the end of the war. Power – that was one key 
conclusion from the Nazi era – should never again be concentrated in the hands of one 
government. The Americans, British, and French began to create new constituent states in 
their occupation zones as early as 1946. In February 1947, the Allied Control Council 
formally abolished the state of Prussia, the former hegemon.82 One and a half years later, the 
western allies made federalism a precondition for the foundation of a new German nation 
state. In their instructions for the drafting of a common constitution for the western states, 
they determined that 
 
the constitutional assembly will prepare a democratic constitution that will create […] a federal 
form of government, which is best suited to restore the presently shattered German unity, to 
protect the rights of the states involved, to create an appropriate central authority, and to preserve 
the guarantee of individual rights and liberties.83 
 
The authors of the 1949 constitution, the Grundgesetz, took these directives seriously. As they 
had witnessed in the Weimar years how a democratic federal order could be demolished piece 
by piece, they created not only refined federal institutions and procedures, but also made 
federalism an irrevocable feature of the German state. The so-called ‘eternity clause’ of the 
constitution prohibits – in addition to a change of the principles relating to basic rights – any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82  Gesetz Nr. 46 Auflösung des Staates Preußen, 25 February 1947, in Amtsblatt des Kontrollrats in 
Deutschland, 31 March 1947, no. 14, p. 262. On the abolition of Prussia, see Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte 
Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948: Alliierte Einheit - deutsche Teilung? (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 
pp. 415-36. 
83  [‘Die verfassunggebende Versammlung wird eine demokratische Verfassung ausarbeiten, die für die 
beteiligten Länder eine Regierungsform des föderalistischen Typs schafft, die am besten geeignet ist, die 
gegenwärtig zerrissene deutsche Einheit schließlich wieder herzustellen, und die Rechte der beteiligten 
Länder schützt, eine angemessene Zentralinstanz schafft, und Garantien der individuellen Rechte und 
Freiheiten enthält.’] Richtlinien der Militärgouverneure der USA, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs an die 
Ministerpräsidenten der westlichen Besatzungszonen, so-called ‘Frankfurter Dokumente’, printed in Ernst 
Rudolf Huber, Quellen zum Staatsrecht der Neuzeit, vol. 2, 2 vols (Tübingen: Matthiesen, 1951), p. 197. On 
the Frankfurt Documents, see Bettina Blank, Die westdeutschen Länder und die Entstehung der 
Bundesrepublik: Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Frankfurter Dokumente vom Juli 1948 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1995). 
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‘amendment […] that would affect the division of the Federation into Länder’ or ‘their 
participation on principle in the legislative process’.84 
In the East, the situation was completely different. Already in summer 1945, the Soviet 
military administration created five new states in order to organise the administration of the 
occupation zone. Even though these states adopted own constitutions over the next two years, 
they lost most of their rights when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded in 
1949. According to the socialist ideal of a centralised republic, the new constitution vested all 
legislative and executive power in the central parliament and government, respectively. In 
addition, the ruling socialist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), 
seized control over the state parliaments in the 1950 elections by preselecting all candidates 
who ran for office. Two years after that, the remaining functions of the states were transferred 
to the newly created administrative districts of the republic, the Bezirke.85 Another year later, 
the chamber of states, the Länderkammer, which had never gained any political importance, 
was formally abolished.86 The states officially continued to exist until 1974, when a reform of 
the 1968 constitution eliminated all federal elements of the GDR.87  
In the context of the Cold War, this gradual creation of a unitary state was an important 
part of the ideological battle with the west. ‘Democratic centralism’ along the lines of the 
Russian example was the socialist counter model to the federal orders of West Germany and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84  [‘Änderung […], durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder’], [‘die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der 
Länder bei der Gesetzgebung’] GG (1949), art. 79.3. On the guarantee of the federal organisation of the 
German state, see Matthias Jestaedt, ‘Bundesstaat als Verfassungsprinzip’, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 
2004), § 29, 785–842. 
85  Gesetz über die weitere Demokratisierung des Aufbaus und der Arbeitsweise der staatlichen Organe in den 
Ländern der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 23 July 1952, GBl. DDR I (1952), no. 99, p. 613. 
86  Gesetz über die Auflösung der Länderkammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 8 December 1958, 
GBl. DDR I (1958), no. 71, p. 867. 
87  On the gradual transformation of the GDR into a unitary state, see Henning Mielke, Die Auflösung der 
Länder in der SBZ/DDR. Von der staatlichen Selbstverwaltung zum sozialistisch-zentralistischen 
Einheitsstaat nach sowjetischem Modell 1945-1952, Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 66 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995) and Siegfried Wietstruk, ‘Von den Ländern zu den Bezirken. Die DDR 1949 bis 
1952’, Staat und Recht 9 (1989). 
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its main protecting power, the United States.88 At least in the first decades of the post-war era, 
the belief of the SED regime that centralism would eventually triumph over federalism was 
not totally unfounded. In contrast to the unitary state of the GDR, the federal organisation of 
West Germany was not underpinned by any distinct ideology. When the Grundgesetz was 
adopted, the federal system it established was primarily legitimised by it being a lesson from 
the terror of the Nazi era. In other words: the creation of a federal rather than unitary republic 
was no affirmation of an optimistic vision of the future, but a reaction to the catastrophic 
development of the past. Just like the imperial and Weimar federal states, which had never 
enjoyed any deeper legitimacy, their post-war successor lacked a positive raison d’être. The 
federal organisation of Germany was considered necessary for historical reasons, but not 
beneficial of its own accord. Rather than ‘Now more than ever!’, the underlying motto of the 
newly founded federal state was ‘Never again!’.89  
After 1949, this shortage of positive legitimacy became manifest in a long-lasting debate 
on the most basic features of the federation. The discussion focussed in particular on 
territorial questions. According to the Grundgesetz, the federal territory can be restructured by 
a federal law that has been approved by a popular referendum. 90  Already in 1952, 
Wurttemberg-Baden, Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern, and Baden became merged in the new state 
Baden-Wurttemberg. Other referenda wanted to reconstitute historic states, such as 
Schaumburg-Lippe, but failed. The Saarland became the tenth constituent state of the Federal 
Republic in 1957, after the local population had rejected the proposal of making the small 
state a European territory within the framework of the Western European Union. In 1973, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88  On Democratic Centralism in the GDR, see Mary Fulbrook, ‘Democratic Centralism and Regionalism in the 
GDR’, in German Federalism. Past, Present, Future, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 172–88. On Democratic Centralism more generally, see Michael Waller, Democratic Centralism: An 
Historical Commentary (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981). 
89  On the character of the Grundgesetz as a lesson from the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship, see 
Christoph Gusy, ed., Weimars lange Schatten: ‘Weimar’ als Argument nach 1945 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2003) and Michael Kloepfer, ‘Verfassungsgebung als Zukunftsbewältigung aus Vergangenheitserfahrung’, in 
Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte. Von der Reichsgründung zur 
Wiedervereinigung, ed. Michael Kloepfer et al. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), 35–84. For a concise 
overview, see Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 342. 
90  GG (1949), art. 29. 
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federal government under Chancellor Willy Brandt appointed a commission that made several 
proposals for reducing the number of states. The plan eventually foundered on the resistance 
of the state governments. Moreover, the people showed little to no interest in the proposals.91 
This indifference reflected a long-term change in the debate on federalism. While in the 
first one and a half decades after the war the discussion had focussed on the most fundamental 
questions of the federal system, it shifted to more specific regulatory issues at the end of the 
1960s, in particular regarding the distribution of legislative competences and fiscal revenue. 
In 1969, the so-called ‘Große Finanzreform’ greatly reorganised the federal financial 
system.92 For the next four decades, the distribution of competences and the financial 
relations between the national and state level remained the most fiercely contested matters of 
federal organisation. In some form or another, these problems appeared on the political 
agenda on a regular basis.93 It was not until the new millennium, however, that they were 
addressed by two great reform packages, the Federal Reform Acts I and II.94 In June 2017, the 
federal parliament – the Bundestag – and the Bundesrat adopted another major reform of the 
Grundgesetz, which strengthened the competences of the national level in exchange for more 
financial support for the states.95 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91  On the development of the debate on restructuring the federal territory, see the detailed study by Reinhard 
Schiffers, Weniger Länder - mehr Föderalismus? Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes im Widerstreit der 
Meinungen 1948/49-1990. Eine Dokumentation (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996). 
92  On the reform, see for example Ernst-Adolf Baumann, Die Finanzreform 1969: ihre Auswirkungen auf den 
Föderalismus und die Lebensverhältnisse in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: 
Florentz, 1980). 
93  See for example the overview provided by Wolfgang Renzsch, ‘Der Streit um den Finanzausgleich. Die 
Finanzverfassung als Problem des Bundesstaates’, in Die deutschen Länder. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, 
ed. Hans-Georg Wehling, 3rd ed. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 373–96. See also 
Charlie Jeffery's essay ‘German Federalism from Cooperation to Competition’, in German Federalism. Past, 
Present, Future, ed. Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 172–88. 
94   Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 22, 23, 33, 52, 72, 73, 74, 74a, 75, 84, 85, 87c, 91a, 91b, 93, 
98, 104a, 104b, 105, 107, 109, 125a, 125c, 143c), commonly called ‘Föderalismusreform I’, 28 August 2006, 
BGBl. FRG I (2006), no. 41, p. 2034-8.  Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 91c, 91d, 104b, 
109, 109a, 115, 143d), commonly called ‘Föderalismusreform II’, 29 July 2009, BGBl. FRG I (2009), no. 48, 
p. 2248-50. On the reforms and the alleged modernisation they brought  about, see for example Peter Selmer,
‘Die Föderalismusreform - Eine Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung?’, Juristische Schulung,
2006, 1052–60 and Roland Sturm, ‘Föderalismusreform II: “Schuldenbremse”, neokeynesianischer Glaube
an die Steuerbarkeit der Wirtschaft und das altbekannte Instrument der Politikverflechtung’, Gesellschaft -
Wirtschaft - Politik 4 (2009): 487–99.
95  Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 90, 91c, 104b, 107, 108, 109, 114, 125c, 143e, 143f, 143g). 
The law has not yet been published in the federal law gazette. But a report can be found on the website of the 
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Today, fundamental criticism against federal structures still exists, of course. But it is 
largely limited to specific areas. The federal segmentation of the education sector, in 
particular, is at the centre of the public and political debate. Gregor Gysi, the whip of the 
socialist party Die Linke, complained in the Bundestag in 2013, for example, that 
we have sixteen constituent states, sixteen different school systems and sixteen different curricula. 
[…] That is nineteenth century. That is the time of stagecoaches. It has absolutely nothing to do 
with the twenty-first century.96  
Such views point out that the modernisation of the federal order remains a burning issue. It is 
commonly agreed across all political parties and levels of government that federal structures 
must be adapted to the needs of the global and digital age, for example by standardising and 
improving the education system. However, none of the major political forces calls, on 
principle, Germany’s organisation as a federal state into question anymore. Federalism is now 
widely considered an essential feature of German statehood that greatly contributes to the 
country’s political stability and economic strength.  
The most important reason for this change of opinion has been the great success of the 
federal system. Under the impression of West Germany’s post-war recovery, Golo Mann, one 
of the nation’s most celebrated twentieth-century historians, pointed out in 1951 that  
one could almost call it a rule that whenever the German Reich is powerful and makes mischief the 
German states seem to disappear; but that whenever the fall comes after pride the states are the 
ones that pay the bill and that have to re-establish order.97 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Bundesrat http://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/TO/958/tagesordnung-958.html?cms_topNr=51a#top-51a 
(first retrieved 5 June 2017), Top 51a. 
96  [‘Wir haben 16 Bundesländer, 16 verschiedene Schulsysteme und 16 verschiedene Lehrpläne. [...] Das ist 19. 
Jahrhundert. Das ist die Zeit der Postkutschen. Es hat mit dem 21. Jahrhundert rein gar nichts zu tun.’] 
Gregor Gysi in the German Bundestag, session 240, 16 May 2013, printed in Plenarprotokoll 17/240, 
available in the online archive of the parliament: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17240.pdf (first 
retrieved 12 April 2017). 
97  [‘Man könnte es geradezu als Regel aufstellen, daß immer, wenn das deutsche Reich mächtig ist und Unfug 
stiftet, die deutschen Staaten zu verschwinden scheinen; daß aber, wenn der Fall dem Hochmut folgt, es 
immer die einzelnen Länder sind, die die Rechnung übernehmen und zunächst einmal wieder leidliche 
Ordnung schaffen.’] Golo Mann, ‘Geschichtsschreibung als Realpolitik (1951)’, in Geschichte und 
Geschichten (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1962), p. 274. 
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If we consider the role of the states after the war, we see that Mann’s characterisation could 
not have been more correct. Based on their competences for infrastructure and urban 
planning, the states were the chief organisers of the reconstruction of German cities, transport 
routes, and communication systems. By setting the legal and structural framework for 
regional industry, agriculture, and services, they laid the foundation of the economic miracle. 
As they were responsible for all matters concerning refugees and foreigners, they managed 
the integration process first of the wartime expellees from Germany’s former eastern 
territories and later of the immigrant workers from southern Europe. Moreover, their authority 
over judicial and police affairs made them cornerstones of the maintenance of law and order 
in Germany’s militant democracy. On the basis of their control over the school and university 
system, they greatly expanded the education sector in the 1970s and 1980s, thus granting 
more and more people access to higher education. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
reunification was organised by recreating the five constituent states that the GDR had 
abolished. The economic reconstruction of the east was carried out as a matter of federal 
solidarity, with a complex system of subsidy payments being established not only between the 
national and state level, but also among the different states. Last but not least: the 
responsibility of the states for education and cultural affairs made them the engine of 
Germany’s transformation into a liberal society that gradually came to terms with its dark past 
and developed a democratic, pacifist, and European mentality.98 
On the basis of this success story – which had no equivalent in the imperial and Weimar 
era – Germany’s federal organisation has gained a positive legitimacy at last. For the first 
time in the history of the German national state, federalism is – despite the widespread 
criticism against individual arrangements of the federal system – no longer primarily 
considered an instrument of power, a structural weakness, or a necessary evil, but an anchor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98  On the important role of the Länder and the federal system since 1949, see for example Roland Sturm, 
‘Bundesstaatlichkeit’, in Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren, ed. Hans-Peter 
Schwarz (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 279–99 and Funk, Kleine Geschichte des Föderalismus: vom Fürstenbund 
zur Bundesrepublik, chapters 16 and 18.  
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of stability and a guarantee of freedom. In short: federalism has become an integral part of 
German constitutional democracy. When in 2015 the Bundesrat celebrated the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the first joint meeting of the West and East German state governments, 
Joachim Gauck became the first Federal President to ever address the council of states. On 
this occasion, he stressed the change that had taken place since 1949, arguing that federalism 
has become part of a new political culture: 
 
Federalism is more than a technical form of organisation […]. In our country, [federalism] stands 
for a political culture that it has shaped and by which, in turn, it has been shaped. This culture 
revolves around balancing pros and cons, searching for compromises, and reconciling different 
interests. This makes decisions sometimes more difficult and limits the ambitions of the political 
process. Some call this “inertia”. But one can also call it differently, namely “moderation and 
balance”. And these are the values that are good for our country, in particular in times as turbulent 
as those we live in today.99 
 
Gauck’s remarks put the positive attitude toward federalism that has spread in Germany in a 
nutshell. It seems that at the beginning of the twenty-first century the Germans have at last 
overcome the cultural impact of the federal evolution of the Empire. It has taken them almost 
a century, in which they abolished their monarchy at the end of a world war, replaced a 
federal democracy with a unitary Führer state that, after bringing about a second world war, 
implemented the largest killing programme ever organised by a state, and divided the country 
into a federal republic and a unitary dictatorship – so great was the burden imposed by the 
legacy that emanated from the development of the imperial union. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99  [‘Der Föderalismus ist mehr als eine technische Organisationsform [...]. Er steht in unserem Land auch für 
eine politische Kultur, die er geprägt hat und von der er wiederum geprägt ist. Diese Kultur zielt auf 
Abwägung, Kompromissfindung und Ausgleich. Das macht Entscheidungen manchmal etwas mühsamer und 
dämpft die Ausschläge des politischen Pendels. Manche nennen das dann "Schwerfälligkeit". Man kann aber 
auch anderes dazu sagen, nämlich "Maß und Mitte". Und das sind Werte, die unserem Land guttun, gerade 
auch in bewegten Zeiten, in denen wir heute leben.’] Joachim Gauck in the Bundesrat, 27 November 2015, 
available in the online archive of the Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat 
http://www.vermittlungsausschuss.de/SharedDocs/texte/15/20151127-rede-gauck-25jahre-16laender.html 
(first retrieved 12 April 2017). 
!
Conclusion ! 320!
Patterns of Union 
 
Some structural features of present-day Germany still stand in the tradition of the 
federal order of 1871.100 Apart from a few parallels in the division of competences between 
the state and national level, three fundamental principles of organisation stand out. Just as in 
the Empire, the states participate in the national decision-making process by forming a 
council that consists of representatives of their governments: the Bundesrat. This arrangement 
strengthens the state governments vis-à-vis the parliaments and originates in the Bundestag of 
the German Confederation.101 It is part of a larger system in which the executives of the 
different state governments dominate the internal relations of the union. Such a system is 
often called ‘executive federalism’. In other federal unions, the members of the chamber of 
states are usually either chosen by the state parliaments, such as in Austria, or directly elected 
by the local electorate, as is the case for the American and Australian Senates.102  
Since these alternative procedures are more democratic, executive federalism is often 
criticised. One of the main complaints is that it undermines the division of powers. Indeed, by 
making the state governments part of the national legislative process, the German federal 
order intertwines the executive and the legislature with each other. This connection rather 
than separation of powers is the second major organisational principle that the Federal 
Republic inherited from the Empire. Unlike the American union, for example, the German 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100  On this issue more generally, see Nevil Johnson, ‘Territory and Power. Some Historical Determinants of the 
Constitutional Structure of the Federal Republic of Germany’, in Recasting German Federalism. The 
Legacies of Unification, ed. Charlie Jeffery (London: Pinter, 1999), 23–39. 
101  On this issue, see Heinz Laufer and Ursula Münch, Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Opladen: Leske, 1998), especially p. 260. 
102  On executive federalism more generally, see Ronald L. Watts, Executive Federalism: A Comparative 
Analysis (Ontario: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1989) and Philipp Dann, 
Parlamente im Exekutivföderalismus: Eine Studie zum Verhältnis von föderaler Ordnung und 
parlamentarischer Demokratie in der Europäischen Union (Berlin: Springer, 2004). 
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federal state does not divide the three powers by a system of checks and balances, but merges 
them in a concert across the different levels of government.103 
Lastly, like the imperial constitution, the Grundgesetz generally confers the right to 
implement national laws on the states.104 In the Empire, this provision originated in the lack 
of a constitutionally defined national administration. Today, there is a wide range of federal 
ministries, agencies, and other national authorities. Nevertheless, the separation of law-
making and law enforcement persists as matter of principle. It has become a core feature of 
executive federalism in Germany. While nowadays the great majority of laws are adopted on 
the national and European level, most of them are implemented by the states.105 
These systemic similarities between Imperial and present-day Germany show us that there 
is a structural tradition of federal organisation that continues to this very day. All systems of 
multi-level government face similar systemic problems to which there is only a limited 
number of possible solutions. Hence, the structural observations that we can infer from the 
federal evolution of the Empire are relevant for federal orders more generally.  
The importance of historically grounded insights into federal organisation can hardly be 
overestimated. Since the nineteenth-century federalism has spread around the globe. Today, 
forty per cent of the world’s surface are covered by federal states. These include many global 
and regional powers, such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, India, Nigeria, and 
Australia. More than fifty per cent of the world’s population live in some form of federal 
order, and this share is constantly increasing. 106  Many international and supranational 
organisations have a federal character. Among these, the European Union (EU) stands out, 
because it features a particularly high degree of political integration.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103  On this feature of German federalism and the controversies surrounding it, see Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt, 
Politikverflechtung im vereinigten Deutschland, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2005). 
104  GG (1949), art. 83-85. 
105  On this topic, see Christian Heitsch, Die Ausführung der Bundesgesetze durch die Länder (Tübingen: Mohr, 
2001) and Joachim Suerbaum, Die Kompetenzverteilung beim Verwaltungsvollzug des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts in Deutschland, Schriften zu Europäischen Recht 50 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1998). 
106  Numbers are taken from European Center for Research on Federalism, ed., Europäischer Föderalismus im 
21. Jahrhundert (Nomos, 2003), p. 32. 
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While it is fiercely contested whether the EU has already evolved into a federation, is still 
a confederation, or constitutes a new type of multi-level order, there can be no doubt that it 
shares many structural features with Imperial Germany.107 It must suffice here to name only 
the most important ones. Like the Empire, the EU does not have a proper constitution. Its 
legal basis is a set of treaties that is often regarded as a constitution. The imperial constitution 
too had a composite character, for it was merely a federal law that harmonised the contractual 
foundations of the union, the unification treaties of 1867 and 1870. Moreover, the EU 
resembles the Empire in lacking an official government. In both federal orders, governmental 
functions are or were conferred on a bureaucratic apparatus, namely the Commission and the 
Reichsämter, respectively. Together, the Council and the Commission form a collegiate 
executive that faces the parliament in the legislative process. The same was true for the state 
secretaries and the Chancellor, the so-called Reichsleitung. Furthermore, the EU too features a 
system of executive federalism. The member states participate in the decision-making process 
of the Union primarily via the Council of Ministers, which consists of representatives of the 
state governments. Besides, just like the Empire the EU leaves the enforcement of laws to the 
states.108  
In the light of these parallels, it is reasonable to suppose that the federal evolution of the 
Empire may have resonances for the EU and the ongoing discussion about a fundamental 
reform. Pointing to these resonances seems important today, because the EU is at a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 On the controversy about the organisational nature of the European Union, see the interesting historical 
perspectives by Ralph Bollmann, ‘Staatenbund oder Bundesstaat: Heiliges Römisches Europa’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 November 2012, available online http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/staatenbund-
oder-bundesstaat-heiliges-roemisches-europa-11957028.html (first retrieved 12 April 2017) and 
Kristoferitsch, Vom Staatenbund zum Bundesstaat?: Die Europäische Union im Vergleich mit den USA, 
Deutschland und der Schweiz. See also the critical article by Albert Funk, ‘Europa ist schon längst ein 
Bundesstaat’, Der Tagesspiegel, 15 July 2015, available online http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/essay-
europa-ist-schon-laengst-ein-bundesstaat/6879848.html (first retrieved 12 April 2017).  
108  For comparative reflections on the federal systems of the European Union and Imperial Germany, see for 
example Stefan Oeter's essay ‘Die föderale Gestalt der Europäischen Union - Vergleichende Überlegungen 
im Blick auf das Kaiserreich und die Donaumonarchie’, in Föderalismus in historisch vergleichender 
Perspektive, ed. Gerold Ambrosius, Christian Henrich-Franke, and Cornelius Neutsch, vol. 2 (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2015), 299–325. For a comparison of a concrete structural issue, see the essay by Gerold Ambrosius 
and Christian Henrich-Franke, ‘Regulierung und Steuerung von Infrastrukturen in föderalen Systemen - 
Eisenbahnen im Deutschen Reich von 1871 und in der Europäischen Union heute’, in ibid., 249–77. 
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crossroads. For the first time in its history, it will lose one of its member states. But Brexit is a 
symptom rather than a disease. Britain is not the only country that is dissatisfied with the EU. 
The other twenty-seven states are drifting apart, too. The Euro Crisis has produced a rift 
between southern and northern states about the right course of fiscal, economic, and social 
policies. Solidarity is further strained by the great wave of immigrants from war-torn Syria 
and North Africa. The member states have failed to agree on a common refugee policy, with 
some states shutting and others opening their borders. In addition, the aggressive foreign 
policy of Russia following the annexation of Crimea and the election of US President Donald 
Trump, who calls the traditional transatlantic security architecture into question, are forcing 
Europe to redefine its role in the world.  
All this confronts the EU with the decision of whether to either redefine the treaties and to 
devolve power back to the nation states or to create a more coherent European constitution 
that will further deepen integration. In March 2017, the President of the Commission Jean-
Claude Juncker presented five different scenarios for Europe’s future, ranging from confining 
the Union to the maintenance of a common market to increasing its powers across all fields 
and levels of government.109 On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Treaty of 
Rome, which had founded the European Economic Community in 1957, the leaders of the 
member states adopted a joint declaration that opted for a middle course often called ‘multi-
speed Europe’.110 This idea wants integration to take place at different levels and paces, 
depending on the political situation in each individual country. Apart from expressing a 
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109  European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU 27 by 
2025, 1 March 2017, available on the website of the Commission https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf (first retrieved 12 April 2017). See also the 
accompanying press release by the Commission, 1 March 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
385_en.htm (first retrieved 12 April 2017).  
110  Rome Declaration of the Leaders of 27 Member States and of the European Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, 25 March 2017, available on the website of the Commission 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-767_en.htm (first retrieved 12 April 2017). 
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principled commitment to a common future, however, this concept seems to create at least as 
many problems as it solves.111 
In view of this situation, what concrete implications does the federal evolution of Imperial 
Germany have for current and future European structural arrangements? Six observations 
spring to mind. First, the development of the Empire is a textbook example of how the 
existence of a hegemonic power among the member states can create an almost never-ending 
chain of structural problems that have the potential to paralyse the whole union. The 
dependency of the Reich on Prussia prevented the emergence of an independent national 
government, obstructed the work of the Chancellor as chief executive of the union, and 
reduced the other states to mere bystanders in the federal decision-making process. As a 
result, Prussia’s hegemony made federal government completely dysfunctional. For the EU, 
the lesson is obvious. Any great structural reform must create institutional conditions that 
prevent Germany’s economic dominance from translating into outright political hegemony 
while guaranteeing every state – including Germany – a fair share in the Union’s decision 
making process. Defining such a system will be extremely difficult. But some possible steps 
in the right direction emerge from a comparison of the EU’s current predicaments with the 
history of the Prussian-German dualism. The administrative institutions of the EU must be 
strictly separated from those of the states. To this end, the Union must be equipped with a 
completely independent ministerial apparatus, which is competent and big enough to prepare 
bills and enforce laws, and the role of the state governments must be confined to participating 
in the Council or a newly created second chamber of a bicameral legislature. Moreover, if the 
principle of unanimity among the state governments is ever dropped in favour of a majority 
voting system – a measure that would greatly improve the Union’s scope of action – it will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111  See for example the assessments by Ruth Berschens, ‘E.U. Leaders to Back Multi-Speed Europe at Summit’, 
Handelsblatt Global Edition, 22 March 2017, available online https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/e-u-
leaders-to-back-multi-speed-europe-at-summit-733270 (first retrieved 12 April 2017) and Valentina Pop, 
‘Once Scorned, “Multispeed Europe” Is Back’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 March 2017, available online 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/once-scorned-multispeed-europe-is-back-1488388260 (first retrieved 12 April 
2017). 
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necessary to balance very carefully the distribution of votes; to establish special voting 
requirements for certain decisions, such as constitutional amendments; and to define the 
voting procedure so closely that it cannot be manipulated as easily as was possible in the 
imperial Bundesrat.  
Second, the federal evolution of the Empire shows that without a well-defined constitution 
a federal union can gradually implode. The lack of a clear legal framework permitted rival 
power centres to emerge, whose struggles destabilised federal government. It also facilitated 
the transformation of Germany into a unitary state. The EU is already displaying symptoms of 
a similar evolution: intense competition between different institutions, above all the Council, 
the Commission, and the Parliament, as well as a creeping centralisation in Brussels. In order 
to prevent a further perversion of federal structures, the EU will sooner or later have to adopt 
a coherent constitution. Such a charter must explicitly define the Union as a federation, 
simplify institutional structures, stipulate clear powers and functions of the different organs, 
and strictly delimit European from national competences.  
Third, the history of Imperial Germany suggests that it is unwise for a federal union to 
create a powerful fulcrum on which the coordination of the whole system depends. Under 
Bismarck, the Chancellor acquired precisely this position. The consequences of this 
concentration of power were terrible. It exacerbated the antagonism between the federal 
executive and the Reichstag, marginalised the state governments, and fostered the 
centralisation of the union. After Bismarck’s dismissal, matters got worse. As none of his 
successors matched his personal authority, they failed to exercise the coordinating functions 
that their office had gained. The resulting power struggle between the different institutions 
made federal government sink into chaos. In light of this development, the popular proposal 
that the President of the Commission should be directly elected by the people and, in turn, 
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receive more powers does not appear as a good idea.112 Such a measure promises to create 
major difficulties, in fact, unless it is accompanied by a comprehensive reform of the overall 
institutional framework.113 Rather than concentrating power in one office, it seems healthier 
to create a better equilibrium between the institutions that represent the different forces in the 
EU, namely the state governments, the parliament, and the European executive. In short: a 
new and simpler system of checks and balances is needed that makes European decision-
making more transparent and saves the Union from experiencing the same volatility of 
constitutional functions as the imperial federation.  
Fourth, the evolution of the Empire demonstrates what can happen if a federal union lacks 
a coherent system of constitutional jurisdiction: legal problems easily turn into issues of 
power, federal integration follows no orderly course, and – as a result – the union loses its 
systemic stability, with every conflict having the potential of putting it on the brink of 
dissolution. While over time the Imperial Court became responsible for many questions, it 
never gained the right to address conflicts about the competences of the federal constitutional 
organs and to review the constitutionality of laws. Although the European Court of Justice is 
much more powerful, it is not an official, fully-fledged constitutional court. It is true that if 
we view the treaties as a comprehensive set of constitutional norms, the European Court does !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112  For this proposal, see for example the article by former British Prime minister Tony Blair, ‘It’s Time for the 
Direct Election of a European President’, Huffington Post, 26 November 2012, available online 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tony-blair/its-time-for-the-direct-e_b_2191918.html (retrieved 12 April 
2017) or the speech by Germany's Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble on the occassion of him receiving 
the Charlemagne Prize 2012, 17 May 2012, available on the website of the Charlemagne Prize 
http://www.karlspreis.de/de/preistraeger/wolfgang-schaeuble-2012/rede-von-dr-wolfgang-schaeuble (first 
retrieved 12 April 2017). According to a poll by Eurobarometer from May 2014, seventy per cent of all 
European citizens are in favour of a direct election of the President of the Commission, see the website of the 
European media platform EURACTIV http://www.euractiv.de/section/europawahlen-2014/news/europaer-
wollen-direktwahl-des-kommissionsprasidenten/ (first retrieved 12 April 2017). 
113  See for example the critical remarks by the legal scholars Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, ‘Direktwahl 
des EU-Kommissionspräsidenten: Mehr Schaden als Nutzen’, Verfassungsblog, 26 June 2012, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/direktwahl-des-eukommissionsprsidenten-mehr-schaden-als-nutzen/ (first retrieved 
12 April 2017) and the view of the former President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy ‘Van 
Rompuy: Direktwahl eines EU-Präsidenten wäre „absurd“’, Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten, 1 December 
2012, http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2012/12/01/van-rompuy-direktwahl-eines-eu-praesidenten-
waere-absurd/(first retrieved 12 April 2017). For a more detailed analysis of the chances, problems, and 
consequences of a direct election of the Commission President, see Jared Sonnicksen, Ein Präsident für 
Europa: Zur Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014), especially chapter 4, 
pp. 242ff. 
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carry out the main functions of a constitutional court. For example, it regularly decides 
questions about the allocation of powers among the various European institutions and defends 
fundamental rights.114 However, there is no hierarchy between the European Court and the 
constitutional courts of the member states. The implementation of European law depends on 
the cooperation of the national judiciaries – it is for them to review whether European laws 
are correctly implemented by the member states. Until the European Court gains clear 
supremacy over national constitutional courts and the right to review both federal and national 
laws on its own initiative, national judiciaries can stop European integration in its track and 
national governments can easily subvert the legal framework of the Union by making political 
deals among them.115 From this point of view, the EU must develop a more coherent system 
of constitutional adjudication.  
Fifth, the example of Imperial Germany shows that federalism without democracy does not 
work. The power-dividing structures of federal organisation can only be held together if they 
are based on a common framework of popular sovereignty. It was one of the main structural 
reasons for the disintegration of the imperial federal order that governmental functions were 
not carried out by a proper national government, but by a range of supreme administrative 
bodies – the Reichsämter – that the constitution did not make responsible to the parliament. 
This arrangement caused a permanent struggle between the federal bureaucracy and the 
Reichstag, induced the federal administrative apparatus to claim more and more competences 
and to grow continuously, and thus encouraged an ever-increasing centralisation that pushed 
the states to the margin. In the EU, the situation is strikingly similar: the relationship between 
the Commission and the parliament is characterised by confrontation rather than cooperation; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114  On the character of the European Court of Justice as a constitutional court, see for example Bo Vesterdorf, 
‘A Constitutional Court for the EU?’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 4 (2006): 607–17, 
which includes a good overview of the relevant literature. 
115  On the lack of hierarchy in the European judicial system, see the article by Birkbeck law professor Michelle 
Everson, ‘Is the European Court of Justice a Legal or Political Institution Now?’, The Guardian, 10 August 
2010, available online https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/10/european-court-justice-legal-political 
(first retrieved 12 April 2017). 
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the bureaucratisation of the Union is widely considered one of its biggest problems; and many 
states feel threatened by the constant shift of competences to Brussels, a development that 
was one of the key arguments of the Brexit supporters. The implication from the imperial 
German case is clear: if the EU wants to avoid disintegration, it needs to tackle its democratic 
deficit. Most importantly, the Commission must be transformed into an official European 
government that is elected by and responsible to the parliament. In other words: popular 
government must take the place of bureaucratic government.116  
Sixth and lastly, the federal evolution of the Empire and the long shadow that it cast over 
Germany’s history in the twentieth century are a warning that a federal order cannot thrive 
unless politics and society show basic respect for federalism as an organisational principle. 
The imperial union imploded and sent Germany down the road toward the abyss because its 
power-dividing structures were merely seen as either an obstacle to or an instrument of power 
that could be manipulated at discretion. Disrespect for Europe’s federal organisation takes a 
different form, but is just as harmful. The structures and procedures of the Union are often 
criticised as cumbersome, overly bureaucratic, and undemocratic. The political discord 
between the member states in the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and in the ongoing European 
Debt Crisis has further reinforced the view that the Union is unable to solve important 
problems. Indeed, it has almost become a commonplace to condemn Brussels as a den of 
corruption for a political elite that wastes money, dictates the shape of bananas, and is out of 
touch with the people.117 As a result, the EU is gradually losing legitimacy, while nationalist 
parties, such as the UK Independence Party, the French Front National, and the German 
Alternative für Deutschland, gain ground. But after Brexit, there has also been a rise of 
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116  On the democratic deficit of the European Union, see for example Koen Lenaerts and Nathan Cambien, ‘The 
Democratic Legitimacy of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon’, in European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon, 
ed. Jan Wouters, Luc Verhey, and Philipp Kiiver (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009), 185–207. 
117  On popular prejudices against the EU and its allegedly nonsensical legislation, in particular in the context of 
the Brexit campaign, see for example Jon Henley, ‘Is the EU Really Dictating the Shape of Your Bananas?’, 
The Guardian, 11 May 2016, available online https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/boris-
johnson-launches-the-vote-leave-battlebus-in-cornwall (first retrieved 12 April 2017). 
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support for the Union, in particular among the young. Pro-European movements like Pulse of 
Europe or Young European Federalists show that the commitment to Europe is not dead 
yet.118 Their political activism reminds us that in order to save the Union it is necessary to 
develop a new political culture that understands federalism as the best possible form of 
organisation for Europe. Social movements can do much, but not enough. It is for the Union 
to take action and to create conditions under which such a positive attitude toward European 
federalism can flourish. The most important step in this direction is probably a reform that 
makes the EU more democratic. But the history of the Weimar Republic shows that, on its 
own, democratisation does not suffice. Rather, the EU must strive to do the same as the 
Federal Republic after the war, namely legitimising its federal organisation by making it a 
success. The only way to do this is to tackle head-on the socio-economic problems that move 
the European people – for example the high unemployment of the young, the growing 
national debts, and the consequences of Brexit. Unless it wants to become superfluous, the 
EU must prove that it has the capacity to solve these problems.  
Institutionalising a structural balance between the states, adopting a proper constitution, 
establishing a more refined system of checks and balances, creating a hierarchical 
organisation of constitutional adjudication, introducing a parliamentarily responsible 
government, and developing a pan-European culture of federalism – taken together, these 
implications of the imperial German case mean that the EU must fundamentally change. In 
fact, they suggest nothing less than that if the Union wants to overcome its structural 
problems and prepare for a long life, it must develop into a fully-fledged republican federal 
state: the United States of Europe. At the time of writing, this seems completely unrealistic. 
Centrifugal forces are strong in Europe and have culminated to date in the Brexit vote. In 
March 2017, the very month when the UK government officially declared its withdrawal from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118  See the websites of these movements at http://pulseofeurope.eu and https://www.jef.eu/home/ (first retrieved 
12 April 2017). 
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the Union, the President of the Commission picked up on the widespread scepticism vis-à-vis 
a further deepening of European integration, arguing in an interview that ‘we will never see 
the European Union become a state’.119 
But such reservations seem to be based on a misunderstanding of what a European federal 
state can – or, indeed, must – look like. Federalism does not mean assimilation, but preserving 
diversity in a coherent public framework. Present-day Germany as well as the United States 
and Switzerland are prime examples of this potential, which a European federal state must 
fully exploit. In order to do so, it must allow the member states at once to keep their cultural 
identity and most of their political sovereignty, while also coordinating their mutual relations 
in a new, more efficient, and more democratic way. In concrete terms, this means that a 
European federal state does not need to have more competences vis-à-vis the member states 
than the existing Union. To the contrary: European government should concentrate on those 
fields that individual states of the relatively small size of the European powers can no longer 
sensibly handle on their own in a globalised world. Most importantly, these areas include 
foreign and security policy, monetary policy, the common market, and some parts of 
employment and social policy. All other powers could either remain with or be devolved back 
to the member states. In short: a European federal state does not have to be a homogenous 
superstate. Rather, it must be a federation that is institutionally more integrated, but 
functionally more decentralised than the current Union.  
Whatever form a grand-scale reform of the European Union will take, it must be based on 
a belief in the benefits and chances of federalism. The example of Imperial Germany is a 
warning that Europe must not allow its structural evolution to be dependent on power 
interests. Showing respect for federal organisation is the key to a healthy development. This 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119  [‘Wir werden nie erleben, dass die Europäische Union ein Staat wird.’] Jean-Claude Juncker in an interview 
with the news programme heute of the German public channel ZDF, 25 March 2017. 
http://www.heute.de/60-jahre-roemische-vertraege-eu-staats-und-regierungschefs-verabschieden-erklaerung-
und-betonen-unterschiede-46833556.html (first retrieved 12 April 2017).  
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may be asking too much. But one should remain optimistic. Europe has learned much from 
the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So why not in this case, too? 
! ! i!
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